Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada
Identifieur interne : 002157 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 002156; suivant : 002158Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada
Auteurs : Tamar Liebes ; Shoshana Blum-KulkaSource :
- Armed forces and society [ 0095-327X ] ; 1994-10.
Abstract
The Palestinian uprising (intifada) in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 has created a moral dilemma for at least some Israeli soldiers who are assigned to participate, however reluctantly, in the military effort to suppress it. The dilemma consists in strong commitment to the army, on the one hand, and objections to its tactics of repression on the other. In an attempt to observe the processes of coping with the resulting dissonancewidely assumed to result in the surrender to some sort of routinization-conversations were initiated with soldiers from an upper-middle class background. Their discourse reveals that coping takes the form of searching for (1) cognitive reorganization through frames that reduce inconsistency and justify obedience; and (2) improvising behavior and negotiating with external reality so as to make the dilemma more livable. But while the findings, on the whole, are in line with the axiom that dissonance is reduced even when inconsistency is maintained, it is proposed here that in certain cases where two ego-involving commitments conflict, an individual may willfully attempt to preserve the pain of dissonance rather than to alleviate it.
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The dilemma consists in strong commitment to the army, on the one hand, and objections to its tactics of repression on the other. In an attempt to observe the processes of coping with the resulting dissonancewidely assumed to result in the surrender to some sort of routinization-conversations were initiated with soldiers from an upper-middle class background. Their discourse reveals that coping takes the form of searching for (1) cognitive reorganization through frames that reduce inconsistency and justify obedience; and (2) improvising behavior and negotiating with external reality so as to make the dilemma more livable. But while the findings, on the whole, are in line with the axiom that dissonance is reduced even when inconsistency is maintained, it is proposed here that in certain cases where two ego-involving commitments conflict, an individual may willfully attempt to preserve the pain of dissonance rather than to alleviate it.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>sage</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Tamar Liebes</name><affiliations><json:string>Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Shoshana Blum-Kulka</name><affiliations><json:string>Departments of Communication and Education at the Hebrew University</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><articleId><json:string>10.1177_0095327X9402100104</json:string></articleId><arkIstex>ark:/67375/M70-2XRKQWQC-B</arkIstex><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>research-article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>The Palestinian uprising (intifada) in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 has created a moral dilemma for at least some Israeli soldiers who are assigned to participate, however reluctantly, in the military effort to suppress it. The dilemma consists in strong commitment to the army, on the one hand, and objections to its tactics of repression on the other. In an attempt to observe the processes of coping with the resulting dissonancewidely assumed to result in the surrender to some sort of routinization-conversations were initiated with soldiers from an upper-middle class background. Their discourse reveals that coping takes the form of searching for (1) cognitive reorganization through frames that reduce inconsistency and justify obedience; and (2) improvising behavior and negotiating with external reality so as to make the dilemma more livable. 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The dilemma consists in strong commitment to the army, on the one hand, and objections to its tactics of repression on the other. In an attempt to observe the processes of coping with the resulting dissonancewidely assumed to result in the surrender to some sort of routinization-conversations were initiated with soldiers from an upper-middle class background. Their discourse reveals that coping takes the form of searching for (1) cognitive reorganization through frames that reduce inconsistency and justify obedience; and (2) improvising behavior and negotiating with external reality so as to make the dilemma more livable. But while the findings, on the whole, are in line with the axiom that dissonance is reduced even when inconsistency is maintained, it is proposed here that in certain cases where two ego-involving commitments conflict, an individual may willfully attempt to preserve the pain of dissonance rather than to alleviate it.</p></abstract></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="1994-10">Published</change><change xml:id="refBibs-istex" who="#ISTEX-API" when="2017-10-17">References added</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/446118ED719E561F857CF364F4E8C209CC5D3D4D/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus sage not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.3 20070202//EN" URI="journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="2.3" xml:lang="EN"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="hwp">spafs</journal-id><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">AFS</journal-id><journal-title>Armed Forces & Society</journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">0095-327X</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Sage Publications</publisher-name><publisher-loc>Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA</publisher-loc></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1177/0095327X9402100104</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">10.1177_0095327X9402100104</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada</article-title></title-group>
<contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Liebes</surname><given-names>Tamar</given-names></name><aff>Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem</aff></contrib></contrib-group>
<contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Blum-Kulka</surname><given-names>Shoshana</given-names></name><aff>Departments of Communication and Education at the Hebrew University</aff></contrib></contrib-group>
<pub-date pub-type="ppub"><month>10</month><year>1994</year></pub-date><volume>21</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>45</fpage><lpage>68</lpage><abstract>
<p>The Palestinian uprising <italic>(intifada)</italic> in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 has created a moral dilemma for at least some Israeli soldiers who are assigned to participate, however reluctantly, in the military effort to suppress it. The dilemma consists in strong commitment to the army, on the one hand, and objections to its tactics of repression on the other. In an attempt to observe the processes of coping with the resulting dissonancewidely assumed to result in the surrender to some sort of routinization-conversations were initiated with soldiers from an upper-middle class background. Their discourse reveals that coping takes the form of searching for (1) cognitive reorganization through frames that reduce inconsistency and justify obedience; and (2) improvising behavior and negotiating with external reality so as to make the dilemma more livable. But while the findings, on the whole, are in line with the axiom that dissonance is reduced even when inconsistency is maintained, it is proposed here that in certain cases where two ego-involving commitments conflict, an individual may willfully attempt to preserve the pain of dissonance rather than to alleviate it.</p>
</abstract><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>sagemeta-type</meta-name><meta-value>Journal Article</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>cover-date</meta-name><meta-value>Fall 1994</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>search-text</meta-name><meta-value> Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada TAMAR LIEBES AND SHOSHANA BLUM-KULKA Background and Theory rT he Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories brought to an end what, from the Israeli perspective, were 21 years of relatively calm military occupation. Since the outbreak of the intifada, however, the Is- raeli-Arab conflict can no longer be regarded as simply external but is experienced as a growing rift within the society. In Turnerian terms, Israel is going through a social drama in which "fundamental aspects of society, normally overlaid by customs and habits of daily intercourse," are brought into "frightening prominence." The study presented here is an analysis of the discourse of a group of soldiers in the Israeli army. Research on the intifada includes analysis of its political history,2 its influence on public opinion, its effect on the in- crease of violence within Israeli society, and its portrayal in press and television.3 Questions about its implications for the Israeli army have been raised by Gal,4 who focuses on the possible moral, psychological, and functional effects. The first published attempt to focus on the experiences of the soldiers is an anthropological study,5 in which the researcher analyzes his own and his unit's behavior on reserve duty, focusing on the transformation from civilian norms to intifada norms. The present project is an analysis TAMAR LIEBES is senior lecturer in the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She is co-author, with Elihu Katz, of The Export of Meaning (Polity Press, 1994), and of numerous articles on the social construction and the decoding of popular culture and on the role of journalism in democratic society. SHOSHANA BLUM-KULKA is associate professor in the Departments of Communication and Education at the Hebrew University. Her research interests include sociolinguistics and pragmatics, especially cross-cultural pragmatics, and language socialization. She recently co- edited Interlanguage Pragmatics (G. Kasper & S. Blum-Kulka, Oxford University Press) and is currently working on a book on Israeli and Jewish-American family discourse. ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, Vol. 21, No. 1, Fall 1994, pp. 45-68. Armed Forces & Society/Fall 1994 of the modes of managing moral conflict, based on discussions of soldiers who are asked to reflect on their situations. The situation is one in which Israeli soldiers are being called upon to employ means for the repression of civil violence that defy both the behavioral and the moral principles according to which the Israeli army is trained to defend itself against the armed forces of an enemy.6 The sol- diers involved have to cope cognitively, emotionally, and behaviorally with a situation in which the army itself is constantly improvising its rules. The study asks what happens to soldiers under such circumstances. How do they deal with the ambiguity and the inconsistency that charac- terize the situation? Does a process of habituation to brutality take place when soldiers are called upon to serve not only as an occupying force but as riot police to repress a civil uprising? Dissonance theory "requires" three conditions,7 and it can be argued that Israeli soldiers in the intifada fulfill all three. The first-real or illu- sory free choice-applies to Israeli boys who are brought up to feel a commitment, even to look forward to serve in the Israeli Defense Forces. At least subjectively, there is a voluntary element in the way these sol- diers experience their compulsory army service. While accepting the coer- cive dictum of the army, the group we interviewed experiences army service as allowing for free choice within a limited cognitive and even behavioral range. Ironically, the intifada situation adds a further element of free choice due to the existence of a "gray area" where orders may be interpreted and carried out in different ways. The second condition for the existence of dissonance is public com- mitment to a value or a belief. While we have no direct evidence of this, there is no doubt that Israeli youth are socialized to a humanistic ideology of respect for the other. The third condition-awareness of the possibility of a negative out- come to one's behavior-emerges from the discourse of moral unease expressed throughout the interviews we have conducted. Since we know from public opinion research that class, education, and ethnicity in Israel are strong predictors of political affiliation,8 we de- cided to focus our research on interviewees from middle to upper-middle class families who will enter the university after completing army service. As expected, a majority of this group proved to be politically left of the average Israeli-with "dovish" positions toward the Arab-Israel conflict. Since ideological positions and attitudes towards military service in the occupied territories are correlated,9 we expected to find that soldiers with a "dovish" ideology would experience a moral dilemma more keenly. Thus, Israelis who believe in searching for a compromise with the Pales- 46 IUebes and Blum-Kulka tinians find it more difficult to justify the repression of the intifada. Radi- cal dovish movements have even called for refusing to serve in the intifada. Another aspect of our decision to interview soldiers of relatively high socioeconomic background relates to Kohn's and Kelman and Hamilton's'0 findings that social class reflects situational differences in opportunities, leading to differences in the sense of efficacy and in types of compliance with authority. Thus, the option of critical attitude toward obedience can be expected from people who are self-propelled. In lower-status families, one is more likely to grow up with the realization of being at the mercy of the hegemony, which leads to keeping a low profile. In terms of the theory of cognitive dissonance, therefore, the choice of an elite sample is based on the assumption that these soldiers would have a self-image inconsistent with the behavior expected of them in the intifada.1 l No claim is made for the group's representativeness, and we intentionally did not include those (very few) who have declined to serve. The Interview Situation Two-thirds of the interviews were in groups of two and three friends who have spent at least some army time together; one-third were inter- viewed individually. Interviewees were asked to recall their thoughts and emotions upon being inducted into the army as teenagers, the experience of their first encounter with the occupied territories, and the problems encountered during the periods of their service, as soldiers and junior officers, in the intifada. Altogether, 22 in-depth interviews, loosely struc- tured, were conducted with 36 soldiers, 23 in regular service and 13 civilians who were in the territories during their most recent stint of reserve duty. All interviewees had served for periods of several weeks in the occupied territories during the first 2 years after its outbreak.12 The interview situation is an unusual one, and it is important to keep in mind that its functions for the interviewees may bear on what they told us. It was an opportunity to portray a difficult situation in elaborate detail, inasmuch as the interviewers were perceived not only as outsiders but also as motivated by a concern over the moral and political issues that the soldiers confront. The researchers were perceived as civilian representatives of pre- intifada norms, by whom the soldiers feel they may be severely judged. In this sense the researchers may have been seen as both empathetic and judgmental, perhaps as symbolic substitutes for parents, with whom-it is widely held-the soldiers experienced a communication block. 47 Armed Forces & Society/FaUl 1994 The silence at home about the service in the territories may be caused by the son's feeling that his parents cannot possibly understand the way he experiences the intifada. Dovish parents, therefore, may not compre- hend their son's behavior. They may be disappointed in him, and perhaps even judge him harshly for taking part in morally objectionable patterns of behavior. This type of painful, reflexive awareness seems to lie behind the reluctance to "talk about it" at home, reported by many of those participating in the interviews.13 Indeed, the data indicate that the inter- view situation was used as a "griping" or even a "purging" ritual,'4 in which painful and problematic aspects of the intifada could be exorcised. In the group interviews, the cathartic function of the interview was increased by the presence of intimate, long-time friends. The Typology The audiotapes of these interviews were transcribed and content-ana- lyzed according to various aspects of the soldiers' army experience. The present article is based on all statements in which interviewees reported having experienced some moral dilemma in coping with an aspect of army service during the intifada. A statement might take the form of an episode or an abstract generalization, and the unit of analysis is the whole of the statement, which might range from a few sentences to a long, detailed story. The coding system is based on identifying statements that describe a moral dilemma and categorize the forms of coping. The coding scheme was developed from an in-depth analysis of a small subsample of the interviews. 15 Crudely, from the point of view of our interviewees, the moral di- lemma can be described in terms of the following propositions: (1) I am committed to the army; (2) The army represses the intifada harshly; (3) I am against repression. Graphically, the dilemma can be illustrated in the following disso- nance-type triangle: Figure 1 The Dissonance Diagram Army + + / \ Self - Repressive Measures 48/1 liebes and Blum-KuLk Table 1 Patterns of Coping with Moral Dilemmas I II III Solving the dilemma by radical action 1. [Quitting] Minimizing the dilemma by redefinition 1. Redefining self in terms of role as officer/soldier Minimizing the dilemma by negotiation 1. Pre-army choice of military unit 2. Contemplating quitting 1. [Refusal to serve in the occupied territories] 2. Behaving by reference group norms (army sub-group) 1. Redefining the intifada as "war" 1. Arguing vs. specific orders 2. Justifying army a. by comparison to others b. by discarding alternative military action 2. Exemplifying proper behavior of army. For example, differen- tiating "enemy" from civilian 1. Changing to acceptance: unquestioning compliance 1. Redefining self as victim, threatened, Jewish 1. Avoidance strategies 2. Individual modification of orders; limiting or modifying involvement or compliance within acceptable limits 3. Role complementation [ I = brackets indicate responses that are not represented in our sample As in all such cases, reducing the dissonance requires reversing the sign of one of the three sides of the triangle. The range of options for accomplishing this is shown in Table 1, which also, in effect, constitutes A. Self-Army (+) B. Army- Repressive Measures (+) 2. Arguing principles C. Self- Repression () 49 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 1994 the coding scheme. It is based on the postulate that a change in the sign of any one of the three propositions of the triangle will reduce the disso- nance. Coping mechanisms are coded, therefore, with reference to one or another of the three propositions, and are subdivided in terms of (1) solutions based on radical change; (2) reducing dissonance through cog- nitive reorganization; and (3) reducing the dissonance through improvising behavior and negotiating with external reality so as to make the dilemma more livable, "at least for me." Some of these distinctions coincide with Kelman and Baron's,16 but we have preferred a scheme that highlights the difference between internal cognitive adjustment and acting on the envi- ronment that are combined in several of Kelman and Baron's categories. A solution to the dilemma can be achieved, as Column I of the table shows, by a radical change of attitude or action. This may be achieved by (a) quitting the army or leaving the country, thereby changing the rela- tionship between self and army into a negative one; (b) refusing to serve in that part of the army that polices the occupied territories (a punishable offense), or challenging the legality of the repressive measures, thereby demanding a change in the relationship between the army and repression; or (c) changing one's initial beliefs, convincing oneself that the intifada should, indeed, be harshly repressed, thereby accepting a positive rela- tionship between self and repression. Almost by definition, none of these three radical resolutions of the dissonance problem is represented in our sample. However we do have a number of examples of people who come very close, subjectively imagining themselves leaving the country, leaving the army, or refusing service in the territories. An indication that there is such a trend can be found in a recent interview of the head of the I.D.F.'s manpower division, who confirmed that reservists' service in the intifada is becoming a cause for leaving Israel.17 The two remaining columns in the table deal with more frequent and less radical attempts to lessen the dissonance and make the situation livable. Column II points to ways of redefining self, army, or intifada in order to reduce dissonance. It consists of trying out various cognitive frames that serve to justify obedience and thus to avoid the dilemma. Column III expresses a different orientation, because it is concerned with ways of controlling the dilemma by negotiated actions. This column is concerned with attempts to reduce dissonance by working on external reality rather than on internal adjustment. It consists of various attempts to construct solutions so that one's commitment to the army and to the value of decency may both be maintained. These solutions are unstable, however, because they are doomed, almost by definition, to remain partial and temporary. so liebes and Blum-Kulka The Responses On the whole, we find that attempts to minimize the dilemma by negotiation (Column III) are the preferred choice. Among the utterances which refer to patterns of coping with moral dilemmas, most statements fell in Column III (51.9%) followed by Column 11 (35.8%). As expected from the fact that these soldiers are actively serving in the army, Column I, which consists of radical (or near-radical) solutions, constitutes only 12.2% of the discourse of moral dilemmas. Types of Framing and Political Ideologies Classifying the coping statements also allows us to determine whether the different groups in our sample tended to prefer one type of coping over the others. Of several categorizations that could be applied to this small group of individuals, it is the ideological parameter that appears to influence the variance most of all-more than age, or type of army ser- vice, or rank. This relationship is shown in Table 2. Because Column I consists of radical solutions either in the direction of total compliance or, at the other end of the spectrum, to considering refusal, these extremes were placed at both ends of the table. Interviewees affiliated with parties that are left of labor, all of whom favor territorial concessions, predictably lean toward "ad hoc negotia- tion," whereas interviewees who are centrist-oriented (Labor, Likud) and rightist-oriented (right of Likud) tend to cope by "redefining the situa- tion." The ratio of negotiation to redefinition for the doves is 2:1, and for the hawks is 1:1.5. The tendencies of interviewees with dovish or hawkish inclinations for preferred modes of coping, however strong, do not override the fact that within the discourse of any one individual, the two major modes, and sometimes the third as well, co-exist. While a few doves cope almost exclusively by negotiation, and vice versa for a few hawks, most interviewees commute between their dominant mode and the alternate mode quite frequently. In order to gain insight into these three modes of coping we will provide and discuss some examples. RadicalAction (Column I) Quitting army or country (I.A.) hardly enters these conversations, 51 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 1994 Table 2 Distribution of Modes of Coping with the Dilemmas of Intifada Service Political Ideology Doves Hawks Modes Change to Compliance (Column I) 1.6 3.9 Redefine Situation (II) 27.2 50.6 Negotiate Specific Incidents (III) 58 38 Argue Principle 9.2 4.8 Consider Refusal 1.6 1.3 Consider Leaving 2.2 1.3 Number of Persons (25) (11) Number of Statements 489 231 except as a natural way out for the future. This postponed resolution of the dissonance makes it possible to live in the present with its relatively short, strictly defined, period of regular army service. On the radical "leave or stay" level, getting rid of the dissonance without compromising one's commitments translates as principled refusal to serve in the territories. The closest to this approach (I.B.2.) are reports of going to the brink, i.e., arguing with commanders about the legality of army orders aimed at civilian repression and contemplating petitions against the army's presence in the territories. The discussion with Gil, Omer and Yoel is a good illustration:'8 Example 1: Contemplating and Organized Protest Gil: "Once, we even considered rebelling. We planned to or- ganize a kind of petition, to collect signatures. We almost did it ... but there was an officer,, Richard, who had his feet on the ground. He managed to explain to us that we would just get into trouble and that nothing would come of it. First of all, it would be considered inciting a rebellion . . . " Interviewer: "What did you want to write in this petition?" Omer: "That we are actually acting against the values we were brought up on ... and the army here ... is giving us orders, and that without some kind of political process we can't do such things ... I don't know ... all sorts of extreme things. We wrote a letter. . . " 52 liebes and Blum-Kulka Interviewer: "What exactly were you afraid of?" Yoel: "To get into trouble, to be sent to prison." Omer: "We knew that we had only six months left in the army and we were afraid ... it was a pity . . . " Gil: "But there was something like that in our unit." Yoel: "I know that my soldiers prepared a petition stating that they object to what is happening in the territories. They were invited to meet with the senior commander. He told them: "Either you stop it or you go to prison, and that's that." And that's how it ended." Interviewer: "And you did not think that if others joined you, it would be less likely?" Omer: "We did not believe there would be enough." Redefinition (Column HI) 11. A. Redefining Self in Terms ofArmy Role Defining oneself as soldier, or better still as officer, committed by rules and by loyalties to one's unit, is a way of making salient those values that support compliance, and playing down other aspects of self that might be in the way. Thus, an officer concerned about the smooth operation of "his" company is threatened by the danger that "radicals" (like himself) might create a stir and obstruct his efforts to get the unit to function harmoniously. The following example shows how David, the company commander, refuses to allow the circulation of a petition against serving in the territories, despite his belief in the cause. He justifies his decision by reference to his duty to his soldiers. Example 2: I Could NotAllow Disruptions I had all sorts of thoughts. There were two girls from my unit who were in the final phase of their army service. They 53 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 1994 were company sergeants. And before this they had not been acquainted with the intifada. They were in shock ... They got used to it after a while . . . very quickly . . . but .. . they wanted to organize, I remember . . . a petition, a strike, a petition against serving in the Territories, or something. I told them . .. I could not, I simply had my platoon. I had so many problems, . . . all sorts of problems: social, disciplinary . . . And just as we got to Nablus, it [the platoon] started to shape up, and I was be- ginning to feel pleased. So I told (the two girls), "Anywhere else you can do what you like, but if you cause trouble in the company . . . I don't know what I'll do to you..." so they didn't have the guts to go on with it. Another quote identifies self with the job of soldiering: Example 3: I Have a Job to Do The way I see myself in all this, as well as afterwards . .. is I have a job to do and I have to carry it out. That is ... as a person it's disturbing to me, too. It upsets me to beat up a child, it's upsetting to see children throwing (stones) . . . and to see myself chasing after them. It disturbs me to shoot rub- ber bullets at boys. It disturbs me also to see soldiers .. . shoot with other things . . . But on the other hand, this is what we have got to do ... I have no choice . . . I would be glad not to have to go there. We read this quote as an example of minimizing the dilemma by emphasis on one's role as soldier. But here, as elsewhere, the texts are open to somewhat different interpretations. Stanley Cohen (personal com- munication) suggests that the phrase, "This is what we have got to do . . . I have no choice," should be classified as unquestioning obedience (I.C. 1), rather than cognitive redefinition of self in terms of role. The "role" and "rule" orientations proposed by Kelman and Hamilton19 coexist in the same discourse. Still, the officers among the group are more likely to redefine the situation by taking responsibility for their units and their jobs,21 whereas ordinary soldiers more often opt for retreating to a position of what soldiers refer to as "small head" [rosh katan], i.e., relin- quishing thought and responsibility, claiming that to avoid punishment soldiers have no choice but to comply with the orders: 54 Liebes and Blum-Kulka Example 4: No Time to Think A private who is used to the absolute authority of com- manders, is petrified to refuse an order. You understand, it's a real problem for him to refuse. Add to that how unclear it is what is illegal and what is legal ... So there is the fear of re- fusal. On the other hand, you know that if you do not refuse an order which is illegal, you will be punished ... But if you do refuse an order which is not illegal, you are also punished. Un- derstand? . . . You have to react in a flash, there's no time to think. It's a real problem. Framing the uprising as "war" is another aspect of redefinition (II.B. 1). This makes it possible to admit that one is getting used to brutality: repression turns into combat, so the nature of the conflict is differently perceived. In terms of dissonance theory, such a formulation makes it possible to attribute army policy to the redefined threat. Example 5: In War You Do What Has to be Done Soldiers talk, soldiers express different opinions. There are soldiers who have expressed opposition ... Look, in the Six Days War there were those who said we had to go to war, and those who said that we shouldn't . . . But when they said "Go," everybody went to war, everybody did what had to be done. That's why we have an army, that's why soldiers are soldiers. And we are soldiers. Similarly, it is possible to redefine the army's repressive measures as necessary not so much for their own sake but as measures to protect the lives of soldiers (II.B.2). Example 6: It Happens to Everyone They understood it gradually ... After we were there for a month already . . . they realized it wasn't just brutality, with- out reason. . . After being there for some time, bombarded with curses and stones ... In the beginning, they thought that ... the soldiers really became ... corrupt. Then they say, it happens to everyone. 55 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 1994 Brutality is the price the army pays for ensuring the safety of its soldiers. Moral principles get in the way. Again, it is the junior officers who shoulder the brunt of responsibility. The more concrete the threat to their soldiers, the fewer scruples they have: Example 7: It's the Intifada, Not the Orders It's not that I didn't feel uncomfortable with the orders. I felt uneasy with the situation. When 8,000 people confront you and throw stones at you, your soldiers are hit in the head and you are helpless. There is nothing you can do. You can't shoot them. You can't do anything. . . The order not to shoot is right. However, you feel uneasy with the situation. A further aspect of redefinition is when the soldier reverses roles and perceives himself as a victim confronting the aggression of violent pro- testers, threatened by faceless, demonic Palestinians (II.C.). He is still against the idea of unwarranted repression, but this is not arbitrary brutal- ity; it is self-defense in the tradition of Israelis and Jews faced with generations-long Arab hostility. These perceptions reflect the "siege men- tality" which has a stronghold on Israeli society (and about which much has been written, for instance, by Bar-Tal.)22 Amnon, interviewed towards the end of his military service, was under such pressure during the period he spent in the territories that he was sent afterwards to a course for sports instructors as "compensation" ("Tchupar"). This is how Amnon expresses what it means to be scared when one arrives in Gaza for the first time: Example 8: Suddenly You Feel Scared You see all sorts of things . . . strange things . . . a toothless old woman screams ... she curses at me . . . You see their hatred . . . the fact that they are throwing stones at you . . . suddenly, you feel scared. Beyond the immediate fear comes the understanding that for "them," the Palestinians, an Israeli is someone to be hated absolutely, violently, and unforgivingly. Israeli soldiers are hated collectively: 56 liebes and Blum-Kulka Example 9: She Hates Me Personally I didn't understand why they hate me. I spoke to one [Pal- estinian] girl. I told her I don't hate her personally, she said she hates us ... personally. She doesn't make any distinctions. She sees us all as Nazis. Following upon the realization of being a victim of absolute hatred is the understanding that one's life is being threatened: Example 10: Someone Tried to Kill Me Someone tried to kill me. He stood above me with a rock and if this rock had hit me . . . He was on the roof and I pointed my gun at him and told him in Arabic that I would. . . shoot him. He said: "Shoot me, I don't care." He aimed and threw the rock at me ... I jumped to one side ... escaping the stone. Negotiation (Column III) The third form of coping is an attempt to modify or reorganize one's external situation so that it is more compatible with one's internal com- mitments. These are not radical one-time actions as in I.A. and I.B., but repeated and ad hoc efforts to negotiate a more consonant existence. Once again, we divide these forms of negotiated actions, according to three legs of the triangle. In the following example Boaz, the youngest of three brothers, is about to join an elite army unit. A major consideration in his choice is the avoidance of intifada service. Boaz points out the- role of the family-in this case, his mother-in arousing his awareness of the dissonance that would follow. This reference also demonstrates Benyamini's finding,23 according to which adolescents in Israel prefer turning to their mothers rather than consulting a friend or a professional in times of hardship. Example 11: My Mother Made Me Aware of This And about the current situation... My mother told me. . . once when we talked about it, that the only reason she 57 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 1994 supports my going into an elite unit (i.e., a unit defined by a specialized job)-she knows I'm interested in going into a fighting unit-is that. . . I will serve in a smaller unit. Like my brother, for instance. She thinks that if I went into the paratroopers or to Golani or to Givati [infantry units] now, I would spend my military service in the Territories. Neither she nor I have any doubt about the intifada continuing. It will not end, not tomorrow and not the next day. So she told me that she definitely wouldn't be happy if ... that it is worth- while thinking of something else.... She has added this con- sideration. My brother is in the army and he was in the Terri- tories, about every four weeks, on and off. I don't like the idea of being there for four months, or whatever.... It doesn't seem like a lot of fun. So my mother made me aware of this, I didn't think about it that much. But after she drew my attention to it, I understood that it is very rational, and correct. Because assignment to an army unit that is not sent to the territories becomes increasingly difficult, another way of living with moral discon- tent while keeping an unproblematic commitment to the I.D.F. is by asso- ciating more closely with one's reference group-"my company," "my battalion," friends, who share the moral unease, with whom it is possible to "do the job" in "the most humane" way. The following is Uri's story about the way "his" battalion interpreted orders: Example 12: Like Beating Up Boys in the Neighborhood In principle, it seems to me that my battalion's behavior was proper, as much as possible. That is, I didn't see .. . I know there weren't ... at least when I was there . . . any ex- treme immoral acts. One can argue that on the whole our being there is immoral. But ... I can say that no people were beat up ... women or children ... apart from . . . a few ... cases .. . when things got out of control, but this wasn't planned brutality, it was more like beating up boys in the neighbor- hood. It should be noted that in the intifada, small units assigned to do po- licing jobs, are spread out over a large area, often with no higher ranking 58 Liebes and Blum-Kulka officers on the spot, and this creates a broad "grey range" for interpreting orders. Specific standards of behavior can develop within these units- which Martin Van Krefeld24 calls "gangs" -who often feel left on their own, without "backing from above." In this context, the phenomenon of "my army" takes on particular relevances.25 Naturally, these norms of behavior that develop within the small group can be easily shaken and put into question with the introduction of new commanders. This delicate balance emerges from David's story: Example 13: We Also Gave In I remember a time when we were careful, we didn't shoot at anything, for a month and a half ... until ... one day ... we were walking with my deputy commander..., I remem- ber ... it was a really difficult day . . . They surrounded us from all sides, he shot in the air and ... hit somebody in the leg ... and we realized what idiots we were. For a month and a half, we had been bombarded by stones and curses ... running the whole day. Putting out every burning tire by ourselves ... he (the commander) comes to the Kasba [Arab marketplace] for only two hours and immediately starts shooting. And then ... we ourselves also gave in ... a little.26 As already noted, there are only occasional examples of soldiers ar- guing with superiors about questions of principle-such as the legality of orders and the role of the army in the intifada-as these issues are classi- fied as "radical." Arguments about carrying out specific orders, however, are much more common (III.B.1). The phenomenon of arguments with commanders can be understood against the background of the loosening of the military hierarchy in the army's actions in the territories.27 In this situation, the "argumentativeness" of the Jewish-Israeli style of discourse observed in other contexts emerges.28 There is much evidence of attempts to negotiate the army's repressive measures against the intifada during daily activity in the field (column III). Example 14: Personal Influence Gil: There were some officers who were okay, like Yoel's platoon commander, who would simply talk to him. And Yoel would convince him . . . So whatever Yoel said, he would agree. 59 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 1994 Example 15: Arguing over Orders We argued over the orders . . . What to do, for instance with burning tires in the middle of the road. What should we do? The order was to put them into people's courtyards. That was the company commander's order. He claimed that if we saw a burning tire next to a house we should throw it into the house, burning. We didn't agree. There are even cases of soldiers appealing to a higher officer to protest against the behavior of the immediate commander: Example 16: Exposing an Officer's BrutalActions Yoel: We had a commander who would grab [Arabs] in the street, grab them by the shoulder. He said that Arabs don't feel the pain ... and they were afraid to react, but the shoulder is a terribly painful spot ... I talked to the company commander about this officer ... But others who did not think like us learned from this officer; they did the same thing, without thinking twice. Arguing about a specific order can also occur in the actual process of carrying it out, as Alon's story demonstrates: Example 17: They Didn't Bring Down the (P.L.O.) Flag There was a curfew and they caught a child. The deputy platoon commander arrived, he grabbed a child and told him: "Climb up on the electrical pole"-it was a high-tension wire- "and take down the (P.L.O.) flag." It was a huge pole, impos- sible to climb. Impossible. He started and after a few meters he could not go on. He [the commander] started to hit the child in the legs, and told him: "Go on climbing." He sort of didn't let him get down. We were in shock! The soldiers were enjoying it and Yigal from my Garin [group designated to join a kibbutz] and I, . . . Then his father came out of the house- which was prohibited-and he started to cry: "Leave my child alone, I'll take it down." He started climbing. He was quite 60A Uiebes and Blum-Kulka old, and he couldn't do it. Then he said: "Wait a minute, I'll bring ladders." He tied them together but he still couldn't get to the flag. An he [the deputy platoon commander] started hitting him. Yigal and I started crying. It was really an impos- sible situation. I started to fight with the commander. We al- most started fighting with clubs. The commander said: "They put it there, they can take it down. They can do it. You don't realize how capable they are." I asked: "How will he get it down. It's impossible" . . . We were actually fighting in front of the soldiers, and finally he gave in. They did not bring down the flag. The moral dilemma is obviously most clear in cases of collective punishment, and thus may lead to this type of negotiation. Not only did Alon's commander rescind his order to force Arabs to pull down their P.L.O. symbol, but later this general order was revoked by the Chief of Staff. It was probably decided that this activity was too problematic, both practically and ideologically. Modification of the army's repressive measures in the intifada is also attempted by exemplifying what is considered as proper behavior of the army when carrying out orders (III.8.2). Thus, when in a command posi- tion, certain of our interviewees reported carrying out searches with mini- mal harassment of Palestinian families to demonstrate the decent way of carrying out this kind of task. Sometimes it is possible to avoid contact with the confrontational aspects of the intifada altogether through maneuvering within the system (III.C.1). Thus, when it is Oren's turn to serve in the territories, he "ar- ranges" with his immediate commander to be sent elsewhere. In this instance Oren prefers to stay in the camp and give the tanks an overhaul, a job everybody dislikes. Example 18: Staying Out The first time I was supposed to be sent down to the territo- ries I had a choice between going down to Gebelia for a week or so, and staying at the base for a week maintaining the tanks. People were amazed that anybody would volunteer to stay for a week of maintenance because it means working from morn- ing to night ... They couldn't wait to get away from the tanks and they felt they were missing out . . . They were waiting to 61 Armed Forces & SocietylFall 1994 get to the territories. Not everyone would be sent so they fought over it. It was no problem for me to stay out. When in charge of a particular activity in the field-i.e., when carry- ing out the army's repressive measures-the commander, junior though he may be, is the one who interprets the regulations and represents the army's measures against the intifada. In such a case it is possible to modify individual orders and to comply within what are considered acceptable limits (III.C.2). Trying to preserve his anti-repression principles means a constant tension in carrying out orders. Thus, there are reports about carrying out orders to smash houses by "smashing only a little," about letting people carry vegetable carts despite the orders of curfew, and about attempts to humanize the routine of searching cars on roadblocks. As shown above, this brinkmanship is easier when one is surrounded by a sympathetic reference group. This kind of negotiation of actions means attempting to act as de- cently as possible, by modifying orders. The active struggle to preserve the commitment to self and to army is demonstrated in incidents such as the following: Example 19:. .. AndAfterwards We Would Clear the Roads Ourselves My platoon commander was pretty violent. .. I was less vio- lent . . . Often I would tell him over the walkie-talkie: "Listen, the whole road is blocked, it's full of road blocks. .. " ""Okay, get people (out of their homes) to clear it up. . ." "Okay, order received." And afterwards we would clear it out ourselves ... I found it very hard. This way of coping is defined by one interviewee as following the orders by "one degree less," interpreting the "highest degree" not as the maximum demand, but as the maximum allowed: Example 20: How We Followed Orders If the order said: "When a person throws stones at you, catch.him and beat him up," we would catch him and not beat him. 62 Liebes and Blum-Kulka Or, as in the following example, where Shai prefers not to embarrass the inhabitants while carrying out a house search: Example 21: I Don't Turn the House Upside Down All in all, I am decent. If I ask "Who's in this room?" and they tell me "My daughter," I let it go. If it's a room full of mattresses, I don't check and I don't turn the house upside down . . . It's as if . . . I'm embarrassed about coming into your house and turning it upside down like I should be doing. Another way of controlling the dissonance created by taking part in actions which are considered immoral, is through regarding one's partici- pation as limited to one's army role and "counteracting" it when function- ing as a civilian who opposes the army's role in the territories, or the occupation altogether (III.C.3).29 Thus, Gil carries out orders in the field and hurries to a "Peace Now" demonstration on his weekend leave: Example 22: Home for the Weekend-It Kept Us Going Gil: "When we would get leave and go home ... we were lucky that we got to go home a lot..., if, for instance, we would not have gotten home so often we would have ended up doing something. . . " Yoel: "We would have been carried away." Gil: "But the fact that we got to go on home leave ... we always waited for it. That's what kept us going. We would go home and go straight to all the protest demonstrations. There was a time when ... every week there were some demonstra- tions . . . " Summary and Discussion On the whole, the discourse of these soldiers shows that at least some of the interviewees made use of the research occasion to try out various definitions of the situation and agonize over the options of reducing or preserving the moral dissonance. Many of our interviewees were eager to 63 Armed Forces & Society/FaUl 1994 participate and related their experiences in great detail. Contrary to our expectations, the interviewees used many different modes of coping with the dilemmas described. Such commuting takes the form of passing from the claim of being just a soldier who has to follow orders, to acknowledgment of the obligation towards one's peers or to one's subordinates, to protesting the ambiguities of the I.D.F.'s orders, to expressing a sense of the futility of the army's presence in the territories. This easy fluctuating from one notion of compliance to another seems to characterize the soldiers' discourse. Therefore we take the various posi- tions, not as describing personality make-ups or as individual orientations toward obedience,30 but as choices from a repertoire of various "presenta- tions of self."'3' It is worth noting that the kinds of commuting that figure in the rhetoric of our soldiers are essentially unstable, and may even appear in adjoining sentences of their discourse. It is therefore unlike some of the ostensibly similar forms of dissonance reduction-such as Kelman and Baron's32 compartmentalization-which are based on institutionalized patterns of commuting between options. The trying-out of different options can be interpreted in two ways. The first sees, in the internal struggle over modes of obedience, the recur- rent temptation to escape to the lower levels of obedience, in Kelman's term, and to compliance. In our terms this would mean moving from Column III to II. This interpretation emphasizes the transitions from one mode of coping to another, the transformation from attempts at external to internal change. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the data do not support this single process of routinization. A more generous interpretation would regard the transitions from one mode of coping to another as an expression of recur- ring dissonance which is not satisfactorily reduced either by changes of values to fit the world or by attempts to change the world to fit values. In terms of dissonance theory, which has been regaining popularity in recent years,33 our findings show that at least in certain cases of loyalty to conflicting values, there is an active effort to maintain inconsistency. More than that, we think we also see.evidence of a desire to maintain dissonance almost as if the pain of the resulting dissonance may over- come the drive to rid oneself of it. The proposition that inconsistencies may be willfully preserved is acknowledged in dissonance theory, with the caveat, however, that the inconsistency-even when explicitly confronted-needs to be "managed."134 Role-conflict theories deal with some of these forms of management, such -as segregation.35 Our point, however, is not that inconsistency may 64 Liebes and Blum-Kulka sometimes be considered valuable enough to endure, but that, on some occasions, the pain of the inconsistency may itself be considered valuable. A related point is made by Back,36 who locates examples of dissonance- seeking in creative processes-as in science, art, and play-where "an obstruction of balance" may lead not to frustration, but to positive affect. Back, for example, finds positive affect in those trying to keep contradic- tory cognitions salient, by "prevent(ing) premature closure of balance."37 Of course, there may be reflexive satisfaction in the experience of this kind of unease-as indeed there may be in the experience of guilt, for example.38 But we do not wish to go so far beyond the explicit content of these conversations, except to note, methodologically, that the occasion of the interview may have assisted in the formulation of the crucial importance attached to constantly reminding the self that the dissonance exists. Beyond the various ways of reducing dissonance the discourse re- veals tendencies to ascribe a value to the unease of dissonance. This is demonstrated in Yoel's words: Example 30: You Only Remember It's NotAll Right I only remembered that it wasn't right. I don't really be- lieve in it anymore (when serving in the intifada). I remember that . . . I remembered that it isn't right to arrest people, . . . and when a soldier arrests somebody and he (the Palestinian) says: "Leave me alone, I haven't done anything" and the soldier hits him in the face ... The first week it shocked me and I fought all the time with everyone. But after a while ... you have to remind yourself that it's not right. Otherwise you don't feel it. Notes An early version of this article appeared in Hebrew in R. Gal, ed, The Seventh War (Tel- Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1990); it was based on impressionistic analysis and ap- peared prior to the coding of the data. The study reported was funded by the Smart Communications Institute at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. We would like to express our thanks to Elihu Katz who greatly contributed to the conceptual framework of this article. We are also grateful to Itamar Luria, an Israeli psychologist who joined our team, for insights into the psychological pro- cesses revealed through the interviews analyzed here, and to Tali Silberstein, who assisted in the fieldwork and editing of this article. 1. Victor Turner, Dramas, Fields and Metaphors (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1974). 65 Armed Forces & Society/Fall 1994 2. Ze'ev Shiff and Ehud Yaari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990). 3. Akiba Cohen and Gadi Wolsfeld, Framing the Intifada: People and Media (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex corporation, 1993). 4. Reuven Gal, "Psychological and Moral Aspects of Coping with the Intifada by IDF Soldiers," in The Seventh War, ed. Reuven Gal (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Hebrew, 1990), 135-149. 5. Eyal Ben-Arin "Masks and Soldiering: The Israeli Army and the Palestinian Upris- ing," CulturalAnthropology 4 (1989), 372-389. 6. Reuven Gal, "Commitment and Obedience in the Military: An Israeli Case Study," Armed Forces & Society II (1985), 553-564. 7. Leon Festinger, Conflict, Decision andDissonance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), elaborated on (among others) by Joel Cooper and Russel H. Fazio, "A New Look at Dissonance Theory," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 17 (1984), 229-259; and Stephen Worchel and Joel Cooper, Understanding Social Psychology (Chicago: The Worsey Press). 8. Elihu Katz and Hanna Levinsohn, "Too Good to be True: Notes on the Israel Elec- tions of 1988," InternationalJournal of Public Opinion Research 1 (1988), 116. 9. Tamar Liebes, Elihu Katz and Rivka Ribak, "Ideological Reproduction," Political Be- havior 13 (1991), 237-247. 10. Melvin L. Kohn, Class and Conformity: A Study of Values with Appeasement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and Herbert C. Kelman and Lee V. Hamilton, Crimes of Obedience (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989). 11. Elliot Aronson, "Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems," in Theories of Cogni- tive Consistency, ed. Robert P. Abelson, Elliot Aronson, William Mcguie, Theodor Newcomb, Milton Rosenberg and Percy Tannenbaum (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968). 5-28. 12. That these soldiers were highly motivated to be interviewed can be explained by their regarding it as an occasion to express their anguish. To neutralize the emotional loading of the situation, we notified interviewees in advance that this was a research interview for which they were offered payment. 13. A graver interpretation for such silence, suggested by psychoanalyst Amira Fletcher (personal communication), is that the soldier may perceive, possibly subconsciously, that his parents feel guilty or helpless about not being able to change the situation for him. Transferring the role of parents to empathic outsiders makes the judgment and the guilt less personal. Rather than talking familiarly about themselves from within a primary and ongoing relationship, they can present the "case" of themselves to a professional, through modes of confession, self-justification, and generalization. 14. Tamar Katriel and Perla Nesher, "Gibush: The Rhetoric of Cohesion in Israel School Culture," Comparative Education Review 30 (1986), 216-232. 15. Coding was carried out in pairs of coders until 80% reliability was achieved between 66 Liebes and Blum-Kulka coders. Afterwards, coding was carried out by individual coders; cases of doubt were resolved through team discussion. 16. Kelman and Baron, op. cit. 17. In an interview to Bamachane, March 26, 1990. 18. Names of all interviewees are changed. 19. Kelman and Hamilton, op. cit. 20. For Kelman and Hamilton, the type of relationship with authority, i.e., the possibility of asserting rather than denying responsibility, depends on the manner in which one perceives one's place in the system. Defining one's task as "compliance" with the "rules" is derived from a sense of helplessness that assumes that by refraining from mistakes one will avoid punishment and gain security. Defining one's task in terms of enacting a "role" leads to obedience through "identification" with the job and a motivation to fulfill system-specific expectations of the army. Only that form of coping based on self-direction, that is, the type that values "internalization," allows for critical evaluation of one's behavior and self-questioning based on the assumption that policy should reflect basic values. 21. An army study argues that many young officers-unlike our interviewees-see an opportunity in the intifada to test themselves. Quoting former army psychologist Micha Popper, journalist Ben-Menachem (Ha'aretz, 1991) says, "You can take a platoon commander, give him responsibility for a street or neighborhood in a refugee camp, and he has to make big decisions. A real foreign minister. All of a sudden he has to cope with situations that demand judgment, such as whether to enter a house, political conflict in the platoon, etc. The men said it strengthened them as officers." 22. Daniel Bar-Tal, Understanding the Psychological Basis of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Tel Aviv: The International Center for Peace in the Middle East, 1990). 23. Kalman Benyamini, "Society and Youth in Israel and Expressions of Social Narcis- sism," in From Crisis to Chance (Tel Aviv: National Conference of Israeli Social Workers, 1982). 24. Martin van Krefeld, "The Future Battlefield is the Intifada," Ha'aretz Magazine, 1989. 25. van Krefeld's "gangs" are a pejorative interpretation of the army psychologist's refer- ence (see note 21, above) to officers who feel that they gain independence due to decentralization. 26. Rhetorically, the descriptions of both David and Uri can be seen as two opposed patterns of mitigation in the sense of Bruce Fraser's "Conversational Mitigation," Journal of Pragmatics 4 (1980) 341-350. Whereas David chooses distancing terms such as doing the job "carefully" to describe the activities of his unit, Uri plays it down by bringing it close to home. Beating up Arab boys is made to sound unserious and childish by the image of fights among boys as if to smooth over the inequality between the soldiers and the Palestinians. In terms of motivational accounts theory, this example corresponds to the category of "denial of injury" as discussed in Stanley Cohen, "Criminology and the Uprising," Tikkun 3 (1988), 60-62. 27. van Krefeld, op. cit. 67 Armed Forces & Society/Fal 1994 28. Devorah Schifrin. "Jewish Argument as Sociability," Language in Society 13 (1984). 3 11-335. 29. Herbert C. Kelman and Reuben M. Baron, "Determinants of Modes of Resolving Inconsistency Dilemmas: A Functional Analysis," in Theories of Cognitive Consis- tency, op. cit. 30. Kelman and Hamilton, op. cit. 31. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Pres, 1974). 32. Kelman and Barn, op. cit. 33. Martin P. Zanna and Joel Cooper, "Dissonance and the Pill: An Attribution Approach to Studying the Arousal Properties of Dissonance," The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 29 (1986), 703-709. 34. As Kelman and Baron (op. cit., 679) propose, "inconsistency-maintenance is motivated to the extent that the two goals to which the two inconsistent elements are linked are independently important to the individual, particularly if they are more or less equal in importance . . . Inconsistency reduction would require a sacrifice in at least one of the elements, a resolution which he would prefer to avoid. He is thus highly motivated to find some way of handling the discomfort generated by the inconsistency that would, at the same time, permit him to keep the two inconsistent elements intact." 35. Vernon Allen, "Role Theory and Consistency Theory," in Theories of Cognitive Con- sistency, op. cit. 36. Kurt W. Back, "Equilibrium as Motivation: Between Pleasure and Enjoyment." Ibid., 311-319. 37. Ibid., 315. 38. Ultimately it can be argued that the function of this imbalance at a reflexive level is nonetheless gratifying. Dolf Zillman and Bryant Jennings, Perspectives on Media Ef- fects (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), provide an analogous example in their discussion of the moral approval (pleasure) we give ourselves in enduring the pain of viewing tragedy. Their analysis of the pleasure of viewing tragedy makes the point that one may morally approve of oneself for one's ability to endure the painful narrative. ,co UO </meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><back><notes>
<p>
<list list-type="order">
<list-item>
<p>1. Victor Turner, <italic>Dramas, Fields and Metaphors</italic> (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1974).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>2. Ze'ev Shiff and Ehud Yaari, <italic>Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front</italic> (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>3. Akiba Cohen and Gadi Wolsfeld, <italic>Framing the Intifada: People and Media</italic> (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex corporation, 1993).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>4. Reuven Gal, "Psychological and Moral Aspects of Coping with the <italic>Intifada</italic> by IDF Soldiers," in <italic>The Seventh War</italic>, ed. Reuven Gal (Tel-Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, Hebrew, 1990), 135-149.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>5. Eyal Ben-Arin "Masks and Soldiering: The Israeli Army and the Palestinian Uprising," <italic>Cultural Anthropology</italic> 4 (1989), 372-389.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>6. Reuven Gal, "Commitment and Obedience in the Military: An Israeli Case Study," <italic>Armed Forces & Society</italic> II (1985), 553-564.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>7. Leon Festinger, <italic>Conflict, Decision and Dissonance</italic> (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), elaborated on (among others) by Joel Cooper and Russel H. Fazio, "A New Look at Dissonance Theory," <italic>Advances in Experimental Social Psychology</italic> 17 (1984), 229-259; and Stephen Worchel and Joel Cooper, <italic>Understanding Social Psychology</italic> (Chicago: The Worsey Press).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>8. Elihu Katz and Hanna Levinsohn, "Too Good to be True: Notes on the Israel Elections of 1988," <italic>International Journal of Public Opinion Research</italic> 1 (1988), 116.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>9. Tamar Liebes, Elihu Katz and Rivka Ribak, "Ideological Reproduction," <italic>Political Behavior</italic> 13 (1991), 237-247.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>10. Melvin L. Kohn, <italic>Class and Conformity: A Study of Values with Appeasement</italic> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977); and Herbert C. Kelman and Lee V. Hamilton, <italic>Crimes of Obedience</italic> (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1989).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>11. Elliot Aronson, "Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems," in <italic>Theories of Cognitive Consistency</italic>, ed. Robert P. Abelson, Elliot Aronson, William Mcguie, Theodor Newcomb, Milton Rosenberg and Percy Tannenbaum (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968). 5-28.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>12. That these soldiers were highly motivated to be interviewed can be explained by their regarding it as an occasion to express their anguish. To neutralize the emotional loading of the situation, we notified interviewees in advance that this was a research interview for which they were offered payment.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>13. A graver interpretation for such silence, suggested by psychoanalyst Amira Fletcher (personal communication), is that the soldier may perceive, possibly subconsciously, that his parents feel guilty or helpless about not being able to change the situation for him. Transferring the role of parents to empathic outsiders makes the judgment and the guilt less personal. Rather than talking familiarly about themselves from within a primary and ongoing relationship, they can present the "case" of themselves to a professional, through modes of confession, self-justification, and generalization.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>14. Tamar Katriel and Perla Nesher, "Gibush: The Rhetoric of Cohesion in Israel School Culture," <italic>Comparative Education Review</italic> 30 (1986), 216-232.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>15. Coding was carried out in pairs of coders until 80% reliability was achieved between coders. Afterwards, coding was carried out by individual coders; cases of doubt were resolved through team discussion.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>16. Kelman and Baron, <italic>op. cit.</italic></p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>17. In an interview to <italic>Bamachane</italic>, March 26, 1990.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>18. Names of all interviewees are changed.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>19. Kelman and Hamilton, <italic>op. cit.</italic></p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>20. For Kelman and Hamilton, the type of relationship with authority, i.e., the possibility of asserting rather than denying responsibility, depends on the manner in which one perceives one's place in the system. Defining one's task as "compliance" with the "rules" is derived from a sense of helplessness that assumes that by refraining from mistakes one will avoid punishment and gain security. Defining one's task in terms of enacting a "role" leads to obedience through "identification" with the job and a motivation to fulfill system-specific expectations of the army. Only that form of coping based on self-direction, that is, the type that values "internalization," allows for critical evaluation of one's behavior and self-questioning based on the assumption that policy should reflect basic values.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>21. An army study argues that many young officers-unlike our interviewees-see an opportunity in the <italic>intifada to</italic> test themselves. Quoting former army psychologist Micha Popper, journalist Ben-Menachem <italic>(Ha'aretz</italic>, 1991) says, "You can take a platoon commander, give him responsibility for a street or neighborhood in a refugee camp, and he has to make big decisions. A real foreign minister. All of a sudden he has to cope with situations that demand judgment, such as whether to enter a house, political conflict in the platoon, etc. The men said it strengthened them as officers."</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>22. Daniel Bar-Tal, <italic>Understanding the Psychological Basis of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict</italic> (Tel Aviv: The International Center for Peace in the Middle East, 1990).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>23. Kalman Benyamini, "Society and Youth in Israel and Expressions of Social Narcissism," in <italic>From Crisis to Chance</italic> (Tel Aviv: National Conference of Israeli Social Workers, 1982).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>24. Martin van Krefeld, "The Future Battlefield is the <italic>Intifada," Ha'aretz Magazine</italic>, 1989.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>25. van Krefeld's "gangs" are a pejorative interpretation of the army psychologist's reference (see note 21, above) to officers who feel that they gain independence due to decentralization.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>26. Rhetorically, the descriptions of both David and Uri can be seen as two opposed patterns of mitigation in the sense of Bruce Fraser's "Conversational Mitigation," <italic>Journal of Pragmatics</italic> 4 (1980) 341-350. Whereas David chooses distancing terms such as doing the job "carefully" to describe the activities of his unit, Uri plays it down by bringing it close to home. Beating up Arab boys is made to sound unserious and childish by the image of fights among boys as if to smooth over the inequality between the soldiers and the Palestinians. In terms of motivational accounts theory, this example corresponds to the category of "denial of injury" as discussed in Stanley Cohen, "Criminology and the Uprising," <italic>Tikkun</italic> 3 (1988), 60-62.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>27. van Krefeld, <italic>op. cit.</italic></p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>28. Devorah Schifrin. "Jewish Argument as Sociability," <italic>Language in Society</italic> 13 (1984). 3 11-335.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>29. Herbert C. Kelman and Reuben M. Baron, "Determinants of Modes of Resolving Inconsistency Dilemmas: A Functional Analysis," in <italic>Theories of Cognitive Consistency, op. cit.</italic></p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>30. Kelman and Hamilton, <italic>op. cit.</italic></p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>31. Erving Goffman, <italic>Frame Analysis</italic> (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Pres, 1974).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>32. Kelman and Barn, <italic>op. cit.</italic></p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>33. Martin P. Zanna and Joel Cooper, "Dissonance and the Pill: An Attribution Approach to Studying the Arousal Properties of Dissonance," <italic>The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology</italic> 29 (1986), 703-709.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>34. As Kelman and Baron <italic>(op. cit.</italic>, 679) propose, "inconsistency-maintenance is motivated to the extent that the two goals to which the two inconsistent elements are linked are independently important to the individual, particularly if they are more or less equal in importance... Inconsistency reduction would require a sacrifice in at least one of the elements, a resolution which he would prefer to avoid. He is thus highly motivated to find some way of handling the discomfort generated by the inconsistency that would, at the same time, permit him to keep the two inconsistent elements intact."</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>35. Vernon Allen, "Role Theory and Consistency Theory," in <italic>Theories of Cognitive Consistency, op. cit.</italic></p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>36. Kurt W. Back, "Equilibrium as Motivation: Between Pleasure and Enjoyment." Ibid., 311-319.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>37. Ibid., 315.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>38. Ultimately it can be argued that the function of this imbalance at a reflexive level is nonetheless gratifying. Dolf Zillman and Bryant Jennings, <italic>Perspectives on Media Effects</italic> (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1986), provide an analogous example in their discussion of the moral approval (pleasure) we give ourselves in enduring the pain of viewing tragedy. Their analysis of the pleasure of viewing tragedy makes the point that one may morally approve of oneself for one's ability to endure the painful narrative.</p>
</list-item>
</list>
</p>
</notes></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" lang="en" contentType="CDATA"><title>Managing a Moral Dilemma: Israeli Soldiers in the Intifada</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Tamar</namePart><namePart type="family">Liebes</namePart><affiliation>Department of Communication and Journalism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem</affiliation></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Shoshana</namePart><namePart type="family">Blum-Kulka</namePart><affiliation>Departments of Communication and Education at the Hebrew University</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Sage Publications</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1994-10</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1994</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract lang="en">The Palestinian uprising (intifada) in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 has created a moral dilemma for at least some Israeli soldiers who are assigned to participate, however reluctantly, in the military effort to suppress it. The dilemma consists in strong commitment to the army, on the one hand, and objections to its tactics of repression on the other. In an attempt to observe the processes of coping with the resulting dissonancewidely assumed to result in the surrender to some sort of routinization-conversations were initiated with soldiers from an upper-middle class background. Their discourse reveals that coping takes the form of searching for (1) cognitive reorganization through frames that reduce inconsistency and justify obedience; and (2) improvising behavior and negotiating with external reality so as to make the dilemma more livable. But while the findings, on the whole, are in line with the axiom that dissonance is reduced even when inconsistency is maintained, it is proposed here that in certain cases where two ego-involving commitments conflict, an individual may willfully attempt to preserve the pain of dissonance rather than to alleviate it.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Armed forces and society</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0095-327X</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1556-0848</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">AFS</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID-hwp">spafs</identifier><part><date>1994</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>21</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>1</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>45</start><end>68</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">446118ED719E561F857CF364F4E8C209CC5D3D4D</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/M70-2XRKQWQC-B</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1177/0095327X9402100104</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">10.1177_0095327X9402100104</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-0J1N7DQT-B">sage</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/446118ED719E561F857CF364F4E8C209CC5D3D4D/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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