The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations
Identifieur interne : 001A66 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001A65; suivant : 001A67The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations
Auteurs : Alexandru GrigorescuSource :
- International Studies Quarterly [ 0020-8833 ] ; 2010-09.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Alexandru, Alexandru grigorescu, American states, Andreas schedler, Annual reports, Bureaucratic oversight, Cambridge university press, Control mechanisms, Democratic norms, Diffusion mechanisms, Diffusion processes, Domestic institutions, European union, Exogenous factors, Formal interactions, Government accountability project, Grigorescu, Horizontal accountability, Horizontal diffusion, Igos, Important state, Institutional diffusion, Institutional integrity, Intergovernmental, Intergovernmental organizations, International institutions, International organization, International organizations, Investigative function, Joint inspection unit, Large budgets, Large proportion, Many igos, Many members, Mechanism, Nancing, Nancing share, Nancing shares, Nielson, Other hand, Other igos, Other organizations, Other variables, Oversight, Oversight mechanism, Oversight mechanisms, Same city, Spatial diffusion, Special relationships, State representatives, Such igos, Such mechanisms, Such organizations, Tierney, Voting systems, Weighted voting, Weighted voting systems, World bank.
- Teeft :
- Alexandru, Alexandru grigorescu, American states, Andreas schedler, Annual reports, Bureaucratic oversight, Cambridge university press, Control mechanisms, Democratic norms, Diffusion mechanisms, Diffusion processes, Domestic institutions, European union, Exogenous factors, Formal interactions, Government accountability project, Grigorescu, Horizontal accountability, Horizontal diffusion, Igos, Important state, Institutional diffusion, Institutional integrity, Intergovernmental, Intergovernmental organizations, International institutions, International organization, International organizations, Investigative function, Joint inspection unit, Large budgets, Large proportion, Many igos, Many members, Mechanism, Nancing, Nancing share, Nancing shares, Nielson, Other hand, Other igos, Other organizations, Other variables, Oversight, Oversight mechanism, Oversight mechanisms, Same city, Spatial diffusion, Special relationships, State representatives, Such igos, Such mechanisms, Such organizations, Tierney, Voting systems, Weighted voting, Weighted voting systems, World bank.
Abstract
The study asks why so many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have established recently offices and policies intended to facilitate the oversight of their bureaucracies. It begins from a set of hypotheses derived from the principal‐agent (PA) literature, a natural starting point for answering this question. It then considers explanations based on norms and institutional diffusion to offer a more complete explanation of developments. The study argues that the empowerment of democratic norms and institutional diffusion processes across IGOs have altered member‐states’ preferences and allowed them to overcome collective action problems involved in the adoption of oversight mechanisms. The hypotheses are tested across more than 70 organizations. The results suggest that arguments extracted from the PA literature and the one on norms allow us to understand which IGOs are more likely to have bureaucratic oversight mechanisms. On the other hand, models that also take into account diffusion processes allow us to understand better when such mechanisms are adopted.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00613.x
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:3695152284C6D4650E2C9DC30238B6369A741B5CLe document en format XML
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It begins from a set of hypotheses derived from the principal‐agent (PA) literature, a natural starting point for answering this question. It then considers explanations based on norms and institutional diffusion to offer a more complete explanation of developments. The study argues that the empowerment of democratic norms and institutional diffusion processes across IGOs have altered member‐states’ preferences and allowed them to overcome collective action problems involved in the adoption of oversight mechanisms. The hypotheses are tested across more than 70 organizations. The results suggest that arguments extracted from the PA literature and the one on norms allow us to understand which IGOs are more likely to have bureaucratic oversight mechanisms. 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2004</json:string><json:string>Gehring and Oberthur 2006</json:string><json:string>Vaubel 2006:132</json:string><json:string>Hawkins et al. 2006:26</json:string><json:string>Majone 1998</json:string><json:string>UN Joint Inspection Unit 2006:38</json:string><json:string>Vaubel et al. 2007:277</json:string><json:string>Starr and Lindborg 2003</json:string><json:string>Bearce and Bondanella 2007:724</json:string><json:string>Dahl 1999</json:string><json:string>Loughlin et al. 1998</json:string><json:string>Vaubel 2006</json:string><json:string>Hawkins et al. 2006:31</json:string><json:string>Mulgan 2000</json:string><json:string>Wejnert 2005:73</json:string><json:string>Cortell and Peterson 2006</json:string><json:string>Hawkins et al. 2006:7</json:string><json:string>World 2007 (Banks, Overstreet, and Muller 2006)</json:string><json:string>Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney 2006</json:string><json:string>Loughlin et al. 1998:557</json:string><json:string>Grigorescu 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Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations<ref type="note" target="#fn1"><hi rend="superscript">1</hi></ref></title><title level="a" type="short">The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight</title><author xml:id="author-0000"><persName><forename type="first">Alexandru</forename><surname>Grigorescu</surname></persName><affiliation>Loyola University Chicago</affiliation></author><idno type="istex">3695152284C6D4650E2C9DC30238B6369A741B5C</idno><idno type="ark">ark:/67375/WNG-SLFXB736-0</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00613.x</idno><idno type="unit">ISQU613</idno><idno type="toTypesetVersion">file:ISQU.ISQU613.pdf</idno></analytic><monogr><title level="j" type="main">International Studies Quarterly</title><title level="j" type="alt">INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY</title><idno type="pISSN">0020-8833</idno><idno type="eISSN">1468-2478</idno><idno type="book-DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2478</idno><idno type="book-part-DOI">10.1111/isqu.2010.54.issue-3</idno><idno type="product">ISQU</idno><idno type="publisherDivision">ST</idno><imprint><biblScope unit="vol">54</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="871">871</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="886">886</biblScope><biblScope unit="page-count">16</biblScope><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2010-09"></date></imprint></monogr></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><abstract xml:lang="en" style="main"><p>The study asks why so many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have established recently offices and policies intended to facilitate the oversight of their bureaucracies. It begins from a set of hypotheses derived from the principal‐agent (PA) literature, a natural starting point for answering this question. It then considers explanations based on norms and institutional diffusion to offer a more complete explanation of developments. The study argues that the empowerment of democratic norms and institutional diffusion processes across IGOs have altered member‐states’ preferences and allowed them to overcome collective action problems involved in the adoption of oversight mechanisms. The hypotheses are tested across more than 70 organizations. The results suggest that arguments extracted from the PA literature and the one on norms allow us to understand <hi rend="italic">which</hi> IGOs are more likely to have bureaucratic oversight mechanisms. On the other hand, models that also take into account diffusion processes allow us to understand better <hi rend="italic">when</hi> such mechanisms are adopted.</p></abstract><textClass><keywords rend="tocHeading1"><term>Original Articles</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en"></language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/3695152284C6D4650E2C9DC30238B6369A741B5C/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisherName><publisherLoc>Oxford, UK</publisherLoc></publisherInfo><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2478</doi><issn type="print">0020-8833</issn><issn type="electronic">1468-2478</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="ISQU"></id><id type="publisherDivision" value="ST"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" sort="INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY">International Studies Quarterly</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="09103"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/isqu.2010.54.issue-3</doi><numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="54">54</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue" number="3">3</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2010-09">September 2010</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="13" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00613.x</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="ISQU613"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="16"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1">Original Articles</title></titleGroup><copyright>© 2010 International Studies Association</copyright><eventGroup><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:BPG_TO_WML3G version:2.3.17 mode:FullText" date="2010-09-06"></event><event type="firstOnline" date="2010-09-06"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2010-09-06"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-01-29"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.1.7 mode:FullText,remove_FC" date="2014-10-24"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst" number="871">871</numbering><numbering type="pageLast" number="886">886</numbering></numberingGroup><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:ISQU.ISQU613.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="0"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="2"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations<link href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></link></title><title type="tocForm">The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations</title><title type="shortAuthors"><sc>Alexandru Grigorescu</sc></title><title type="short"><i>The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight</i></title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" affiliationRef="#a1"><personName><givenNames>Alexandru</givenNames><familyName>Grigorescu</familyName></personName></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="a1"><unparsedAffiliation>Loyola University Chicago</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><p>The study asks why so many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have established recently offices and policies intended to facilitate the oversight of their bureaucracies. It begins from a set of hypotheses derived from the principal‐agent (PA) literature, a natural starting point for answering this question. It then considers explanations based on norms and institutional diffusion to offer a more complete explanation of developments. The study argues that the empowerment of democratic norms and institutional diffusion processes across IGOs have altered member‐states’ preferences and allowed them to overcome collective action problems involved in the adoption of oversight mechanisms. The hypotheses are tested across more than 70 organizations. The results suggest that arguments extracted from the PA literature and the one on norms allow us to understand <i>which</i> IGOs are more likely to have bureaucratic oversight mechanisms. On the other hand, models that also take into account diffusion processes allow us to understand better <i>when</i> such mechanisms are adopted.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta><noteGroup><note xml:id="fn1"><label>1</label><p>
I would like to thank Colton Carothers, Nathaniel Gest, Natalie Moran, Nelson Wainwright, and Andrea Walker for their research assistance. I am also grateful to Claudio Katz, Vincent Mahler, Karen Mingst, Emma Rodriguez, Duncan Snidal, the <i>ISQ</i> editors, and anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions. All remaining errors remain my own. The data used in this study may be found at <url href="http://www.luc.edu/faculty/agrigor/">http://www.luc.edu/faculty/agrigor/</url>.</p></note></noteGroup></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>The Spread of Bureaucratic Oversight Mechanisms across Intergovernmental Organizations1</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Alexandru</namePart><namePart type="family">Grigorescu</namePart><affiliation>Loyola University Chicago</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-6N5SZHKN-D">article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2010-09</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2010</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><extent unit="figures">0</extent><extent unit="tables">2</extent></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">The study asks why so many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have established recently offices and policies intended to facilitate the oversight of their bureaucracies. It begins from a set of hypotheses derived from the principal‐agent (PA) literature, a natural starting point for answering this question. It then considers explanations based on norms and institutional diffusion to offer a more complete explanation of developments. The study argues that the empowerment of democratic norms and institutional diffusion processes across IGOs have altered member‐states’ preferences and allowed them to overcome collective action problems involved in the adoption of oversight mechanisms. The hypotheses are tested across more than 70 organizations. The results suggest that arguments extracted from the PA literature and the one on norms allow us to understand which IGOs are more likely to have bureaucratic oversight mechanisms. On the other hand, models that also take into account diffusion processes allow us to understand better when such mechanisms are adopted.</abstract><note type="content">*I would like to thank Colton Carothers, Nathaniel Gest, Natalie Moran, Nelson Wainwright, and Andrea Walker for their research assistance. I am also grateful to Claudio Katz, Vincent Mahler, Karen Mingst, Emma Rodriguez, Duncan Snidal, the ISQ editors, and anonymous reviewers for their useful suggestions. All remaining errors remain my own. The data used in this study may be found at http://www.luc.edu/faculty/agrigor/.</note><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>International Studies Quarterly</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0020-8833</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1468-2478</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-2478</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">ISQU</identifier><part><date>2010</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>54</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>871</start><end>886</end><total>16</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">3695152284C6D4650E2C9DC30238B6369A741B5C</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/WNG-SLFXB736-0</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1468-2478.2010.00613.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">ISQU613</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© 2010 International Studies Association</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-L0C46X92-X">wiley</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/3695152284C6D4650E2C9DC30238B6369A741B5C/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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