EdenteV2, Istex, Corpus, bibRecord, 000E11

Conflicting Loyalties and the American Military Ethic

Identifieur interne : 000E11 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000E10; suivant : 000E12

Conflicting Loyalties and the American Military Ethic

Auteurs : Philip M. Flammer

Source :

American behavioral scientist (Beverly Hills) [ 0002-7642 ] ; 1976-05.

RBID : ISTEX:1C77076E3C82AC828CBA1266BEC5D26833F11BE7

English descriptors

KwdEn :
- American ethic, Behavioral scientist, Body count, Ethic, False confidence, Fellow officers, Fest, Flammer, German ethic, Harold martin, Idealistic ethic, John vann, Liddell hart, Many instances, Military ethic, Military leaders, Military system, Montgomery advertiser, Moral courage, Officer corps, Other words, Parent society, Personal integrity, Personality conflict, Policy letter, Third reich, True critic.
Teeft :
- American ethic, Behavioral scientist, Body count, Ethic, False confidence, Fellow officers, Fest, Flammer, German ethic, Harold martin, Idealistic ethic, John vann, Liddell hart, Many instances, Military ethic, Military leaders, Military system, Montgomery advertiser, Moral courage, Officer corps, Other words, Parent society, Personal integrity, Personality conflict, Policy letter, Third reich, True critic.

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https://api.istex.fr/document/1C77076E3C82AC828CBA1266BEC5D26833F11BE7/fulltext/pdf

DOI: 10.1177/000276427601900507

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ISTEX:1C77076E3C82AC828CBA1266BEC5D26833F11BE7

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<meta-value>589 Conflicting Loyalties and the American Military Ethic SAGE Publications, Inc.1976DOI: 10.1177/000276427601900507  Philip M. Flammer Brigham Young University After visiting the United States in 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville (1899: Vol. 2: 227, 229) noted that while democracies need armies, they inherently find these "troublesome." The nation and the army, he wrote, have "opposite tendencies" which "expose democratic communities to great dangers." The "oppo- site tendencies" between a political democracy and its armed forces are obvious. The former is oriented towards the individual with emphasis on personal freedoms. It is characterized by debate, attempted reconciliation between conflicting freedoms, and inefficiency. The military, on the other hand, is necessarily group-oriented with strong emphasis on rigid discipline and obedience. It is also unavoidably authoritarian if not totalitarian in approach, which means that it is a closed organization with its own jargon, expertise, customs, and justice system. As such, it is vulnerable to dangerous tendencies such as abuse of power, careerism, and over-concern for image. The American military ethic, which, for the purposes of this paper, I take to be all that is implied in the West Point motto of duty, honor, country, is designed, in part at least, to bridge this chasm between the U.S. armed forces and their parent society. It does so by pledging honorable and dutiful service to the state, which includes the American way of life. In short, the American 98590 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST military pledges strict allegiance to a loyalty higher than itself, and its internal, nondemocratic codes and practices are, in theory at least, designed to enhance the means of meeting the resultant obligations in the most efficient manner. That the American military has had trouble maintaining its ethic at the best possible level is not surprising. Soldiers are, after all, not supermen, and the system has certain inherent weaknesses and tendencies which work against its own ethic. To speak about these weaknesses and deficiencies is sometimes considered trespassing on "sacred ground" (Williams, 1972: 11). Many in the military, in fact, seem to operate under the dubious assumption that criticism, even internal criticism of the highest order, is a form of disloyalty (Weigley, 1972: 103). Nevertheless, most genuine conflict of loyalties involving the military ethic often initially stem from the system itself. William Mitchell, for example, gave the Army considerable provocation before eliciting anything but a slap on the wrist; Hyman Rickover eventually won over his opposition on the matter of the nuclear submarine; Admiral Zumwalt, while encountering some unhealthy opposition, still used his top position to reconcile the often conflicting goals of permitting initiative and preventing costly mistakes. Power does tend to corrupt, and throughout history military men have had no special immunity to what Will Durant (1944: 266) aptly calls the "poison of power." Power is essential to the military ethic, but its possession does not necessarily enhance allegiance to that ethic. Indeed, the military commander rarely tolerates adverse comments from any subordinate source. It is no accident, therefore, that the military has its own public relations and justice systems, and that it clings tenaciously to a system whereby a sterling career may be ruined by the single adverse rating by a superior.l Moreover, the system instinctively protects itself by strongly discouraging admission of error, particularly serious error. The powerful, in other words, not only make mistakes but they can dictate cover-up mistakes. A recent and serious example of such cover-up occurred in Vietnam when General Bill Dupuy, a bright young general, recently named commander of the crack First Infantry Division, "made a fetish of firing his battalion and company com- 99591 Flammer / CONFLICTING LOYALTIES manders" and replacing them with men of his own choosing. Public relief of command is a serious detriment to an officer's career, but Dupuy's abuse of power was not counteracted even though Army Chief of Staff Harold Johnson thought the behavior "criminal" (Halberstam, 1972: 657). Later, when some of the usually wise and seasoned veterans of the Indo-China conflict tried to warn him of potential error, he rejected their advice outright. "Dupuy," wrote David Halber- stam (1972: 657), "was not interested; no one who had been associated with the past, flawed as it was, could teach him anything. He told the old-timers, in effect, 'Just stay out of my way and I will show you how it is done!' " The Dupuy story is not foreign to my own experience. While serving with the Air Force in Vietnam, I questioned a Seventh Air Force intelligence officer about a stunning discrepancy between very optimistic Air Force estimates of air interdiction along the Ho Chi Minh trail and the pessimistic reports of "road watch teams" which physically counted troop and truck movements along the network. "The general knows what he wants before he sees the data," the captain told me with some bitterness. "He writes the words. We are to provide the music. "2 The abuse of power so prevalent in the armed forces is not always the responsibility of the commander. In the military, as in all hierarchies, there are subtle tendencies at work which enlarge the power and in so doing, encourage its abuse. One of these is the inherent relationship that exists between an individual commander with real or potential power and those who are part of or are trying to become part of the "inner ring" that surrounds him. It is a maxim that "authority comes to the leader from those who consent to do what he asks." Unfortunately, there has never been a shortage of followers, even if what is asked is obviously wrong. This stems partly from fear, partly from ambition and partly because of man's well-recognized affinity for a person-to-person type loyalty. For the timid, it may range from applause for what the person in power says and does, to strict adherence to social protocol. A recent example from a state Air National Guard aptly 100592 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST demonstrates this moral myopia. In March 1970, the Commanding General of the Air Guard told a group of his officers, "Gents, I know that what I am about to do is illegal as hell, but I've got to have political contributions; I've got to have one hundred dollars from each of you." Major John Calhoun refused; his loyalty to the ethic would not permit this moral wrong. As a consequence, he suffered severe personal abuse, including deliberate mistreatment by fellow officers who accepted favors from the general in return for whipping Calhoun into line.3 Calhoun took the case to civil court, and won legal vindication. But his action was neither understood nor forgiven by many responsible leaders. Sometime after the scandal broke, for example, my position as editor of an Air Force journal allowed me to attend a national meeting of Air Guard commanders. Three generals sitting in front of me were talking about the case and I did my best to listen in. "It is a damn shame," one of them said. "He is ruining the guard." The others vigorously agreed. But, sad to say, it was Calhoun and not the general they were talking about. The abuse and courting of power combine to set up conflicts of loyalty. These conflicts exist not only between the commander and the ethic he claims to support, but between the subordinate who finds his loyalty to this commander in conflict with the higher loyalty theoretically common to both. Basil Liddell Hart offers two rather profound observations about the use and abuse of high level military power. The first, given to him, he said, by "his beloved old chief" was that "You'll find that generals are as sensitive as prima donnas." To this Liddell Hart (1944: 66) added, "Royalty is also a state of mind." Another area of conflict involving the military ethic is ambition. Like loyalty, ambition does not take its value from the objective it seeks. Thus, an officer who wants to win a battle to preserve his nation has a worthy and lofty ambition, while one who seeks the same victory to get another star or build a foundation for political or material gain violates the ethic. Similarly, one maintains the integrity of his ambition by not doing that which is unethical, despite the fact that his action may be unpopular with those who write his efficiency ratings. 101593 Flammer / CONFLICTING LOYALTIES The striking personal excellence of men like George C. Marshall and Omar Bradley certifies what ambition has achieved for the armed forces. Our concern, however, is with cases that clearly conflict with the military ethic. But the conflict is largely generated by the military system itself. Rank is, after all, the basic hallmark of success for the professional military man. It determines not only pay and status, but has much to do with an individual's self-esteem. Also, the hierarchical system wherein men with power can hinder or hurry rank according to their desires carries within it opportunities for the overly ambitious that the well-anchored ethical do not have. It is not difficult, in other words, to make the subtle but terribly critical transition from professional to "careerist." "Careerism" inherently involves conflicting loyalties in relation to any idealistic ethic, and particularly the military ethic. There is no way of knowing how much "careerism" has infected each of the American armed forces. Despite many examples of dedicated professionalism, including whole units of men, I have seen too many instances of "careerism." General Max von Hoffman, one of the ablest and most sensible generals in World War I, confided in his reminiscenses that among his fellow officers, "The race for power and personal positions seems to destroy all men's character" (Hart, 1971: 62). Liddell Hart also lamented what he saw as "the growing obsession with personal career ambition": As a young officer I had cherished a deep respect for the Higher Command, but I was sadly disillusioned about many of them when I came to see them more closely from the angle of a military correspondent. It was saddening to discover how many apparently honorable men would stoop to almost anything to help advance their careers. [Hart, 1971: 25-29] If one can debate the quantity of "careerism" in the armed forces, one can hardly debate its negative effects. The change from "professionalism" to "careerism" has the same effect that the change from the "public servant" to the "public official" has for some politicians. It automatically signals a change in emphasis from service to others to self-interest, from the responsibilities of trust to self-defined "rights" of position. It is 102594 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST a subtle and oft unnoticed transition, but the true professional and the genuine careerist are poles apart when it comes to the viability of the military ethic. One important factor which links the powerful who want to strengthen their positions and the ambitious who want to achieve positions of power is concern for image. Concern for image can have significant positive effects on any group. The U.S. marines, special forces, and rangers have demonstrated the strong relationship between morale and the self-image that stems from rigorous training, personal accomplishment, and belonging to an "elite" group. But concern for image can also have the unintended consequence of suppressing anything that might tarnish it. Official military histories offer numerous illustrations. During World War I, one of the top French generals officially ordered troops in a particular area to stand firm during the night and begin a counterattack the next morning. When a perplexed corps commander reminded the general that the line in question is "behind the German front. You lost it yesterday," the commander smiled and said, "C'est pour l'histoire" (Hart, 1971: 21). Jean de Pierrefeu (1924: 12-13), who helped edit the official French dispatches of World War I, was so stunned by the discrepancies he found that he later wrote his disturbing book, Plutarch Lied, in which he charged that "history itself is made the auxilliary of legend," and that "our historians [have] ] dressed the Staff in a cloth embroidered with gold palms, woven in its own factories." My own experience with official military history confirmed these experiences. While in Vietnam, where I worked on the official, top secret, MACV history, I often found shocking discrepancies about such important items as body count, number of sorties flown, effectiveness of interdiction, and so on. But it was the "official" and often demonstrably false figures that found their way into the MACV account, which we jokingly referred to as the "official progress report." In several instances I ran across official high level forecasts of operations for periods several days hence which were written in the past tense and gave detailed statistics on engagements, body count, 103595 Flammer / CONFLICTING LOYALTIES and weapons captured. Also, the history always went through command channels for review, where unfavorable events and even "discouraging" words were altered or deleted. Indeed, my experience paralleled that of Sir Colin Coote who attempted to write a history of the British Eighth Army in World War II. "Productions of that kind," he wrote, "had to pass through so many 'vets' that by the time they had finished, an original Cruft's prize winner had become a toothless mongrel." Sir Colin attempted to salvage his honor as a historian by short circuiting some of the censors "without full regard for protocol." This, he records, "was very nearly lethal" (Masterman, 1972: 9). But the concern for image goes far beyond the official histories. Liddell Hart (1944: 131) writes that not only does the military have many things "too sacred to write about," but that armies tend to be "temples of ancestor worship." As a result, the services tend to regard as inherently "dishonorable" or "disloyal" any suggestion that important errors were made or that leadership, at least at the top levels, was ever less than sterling. This is true even of in-house documents. As editor of a military journal, I once attempted to authorize the publication of a remarkable article about a potential disaster apparently set up by unusually stringent "rules of engagement." It seemed an ideal chance to confirm a basic military lesson, i.e., if the mission is important enough, both politically and militarily, then the rules of engagement ought to foster its accomplishment. If not, then the mission itself should be questioned. I dutifully took the manuscript up the chain of command, only to be told by the Commandant of the War College that the subject was "not important." At my request the general passed the manuscript on to his superior who, it turned out, had been in charge of the official investigation. He too felt the subject was "unimportant." Several months later, however, an aviator who flew the mission in question, informed me that the discrepancy in the rules of engagement, which prevented adequate protection of the bomber force, had been recognized by air crews for months. The fliers had repeatedly reported it to superiors; the latter just as often discounted the warnings. The implications are obvious and it is incidents such as this that 104596 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST leave one wondering why the Air Force has been so silent about its role in the Mayaquez incident. The fact that the military has been overconcerned with image is not surprising. As indicated earlier, it represents a basic weakness characteristic of "closed societies." Still, concern for image to the point where truth is covered-up or distorted is fundamental to the viability of our military ethic and the credibility of the military establishment. A false image, like camouflaged history, "not only conceals faults and deficiencies that could otherwise be remedied," it fosters "false confidence-and false confidence underlies most of the failures that military history records. It is the dry rot of armies. But its effects go wider and are felt earlier. For the false confidence of military leaders has been a spur to war" (Hart, 1971: 27). Moreover, maintaining an image of expertise and infallibility helps explain why, in the words of one critic, "Soldiers are so supersensitive to criticism that they feel it even when it does not exist. This tendency corresponds to the well-known medical condition of a nervous rash" (Hart, 1944: 138). Concern for image, however, inherently carries with it a subsidiary failing that runs directly counter to the military ethic and hence calls the viability of that ethic into question. This is the unwillingness of men in authority to admit error. Because the military service involves the "management of violence," human lives are in the balance and unwillingness to admit error, which in the long run may be more serious than the original error, potentially carries with it the unnecessary loss of life. A graphic example of this failing was the doctrine of elan with which the French entered World War I. This doctrine, which stemmed from Clausewitz's conclusion that an army is not beaten until it thinks it is, together with the triumphal vigor of the Prussian armies in 1870, suggested that will and determination were the keys to success. But this doctrine soon hardened into dogma which automatically transformed reasoned doubt into a form of heresy and hence effectively neutralized the few who dared to question it. The initial test of this doctrine was catastrophic. The number of casualties suffered by the French in 1914, when this doctrine ran headlong into quickfiring artillery, machine guns, and intrenched positions, is still 105597 Flammer / CONFLICTING LOYALTIES [ classified. But the French clung to the doctrine long after the virtue of perseverence had become the vice of stubbornness. General Foch, one of those responsible for this doctrine, later called it an "infantile notion." But not until France had paid a fearful price. "The French came into World War I the slaves of an abstract military concept which was totally invalid," Sir John Hackett told his audience at Cambridge in 1962, "but from which they only painfully struggled free" (Hackett, 1962: 50).4 A recent and striking example of the twin failings of unwillingness to admit error and the hardening of doctrine into dogma involved the U.S. Air Force's adoption of the so-called Zero Defect System. Taken from industry, this program sought professional and personal excellence to the point of minimum error. But interpreted literally, as some image conscious and ambitious commanders were inclined to do, it automatically moved from the realm of the plausible and desirable to the impossible and impractical. In many instances, the program evolved into a "Zero Error Mentality," that is, the commander felt that his command had to be error free. Since these men did not generally distinguish between mistake and misfortune, the inevitable result was not so much a positive objective of excellence but a passive, even negative, approach to the mission, one that precluded risk. Yet outlawing risk precludes initiative, which is a basic requisite for modern combat effectiveness. In the end, many errors were made and consequently covered up, for the "zero error mentality" is automatically wedded to the grotesque philosophy that it is worse to report a mistake than it is to make one. Such a philosophy has had severe reverberations throughout the entire military system and, unavoidably, runs into headlong conflict into the military ethic itself. The nature of the military system, particularly as reinforced by the assumption of infallibility, concern for image, and unwillingness to admit error, demands that no military force be immune to the real possibility of dogmatic adherence to what ought to be flexible if not questionable doctrine. In World War II, the Germans suffered grave effects for their belief in Aryan supremacy and the personal infallibility of Hitler. The French lost the war, in large part, because of the "Maginot Line 106598 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST mentality." The British suffered from the doctrine of "limited liability" and the "indirect approach," while the Americans initially clung to the belief that their eagerness could not fail-a view that was severely undermined at Kasserine Pass-and that the bomber would always get through. In Vietnam, the "heroic infallibility" of certain political-military leaders caused serious errors, forced extensive cover-up, and effectively created a disastrous credibility gap between the politicians and military, and with the American public. Surely it was not surprising that a 1972 survey showed that, among 20 occupations, U.S. Army generals ranked fourteenth in credibility (well below the mean), while politicians ranked only above used car salesmen.s Unwillingness to admit error is so common that one is tempted to call it a simple failing rather than a malignancy. But it is inherently no less critical than the error it is trying to hide, and because of a cumulative effect, it has often proven enormously costly. The Dreyfus case and now Watergate should serve as constant reminders of what desperate men will and will not do when their images are threatened. Primarily because of the tendencies and weakness noted above, the American Armed Forces are much more distant from the military ethic than they claim to be. Most of this inadequacy is inherent to the system and could not be rooted out without radically changing the system itself. But these changes must certainly come. Errors, corruption, and wrong attitudes are generally more critical than in some other professions, since in battle these errors are paid for in lives loaned to the commanders in sacred trust that unnecessary sacrifices will be kept to a minimum. The implications of this assertion are, of course, quite uncomfortable to military leaders. Granted that in war time there is little time to consider the kinds of problems we are discussing in this paper-there is little excuse for not doing so in time of peace. In short, the military ethic calls for ultimate loyalty to cause and principles higher than self or branch of service. For that ethic to be truly viable, therefore, loyalty inherently demands emphasis on such fundamentals as integrity, a firm will to justice, and to truth, per se. But since "loyalty" is so often regarded as a virtue in and of itself, Liddell Hart's (1971 : 30-31 ) 107599 Flammer / CONFLICTING LOYALTIES I warning is salutary-that loyalty is a "noble quality, so long as it does not blind and does not exclude the high loyalty to truth and decency." Much like their civilian counterparts, the vast majority of American servicemen simply close their minds to the dichotomy posed by serious conflict in loyalty. By reducing almost any crisis to its simplest form, they pass off the dilemma as "something no one can do anything about." If a true critic has spoken out, one can easily avoid a moral decision by automatically reducing the issue to personality conflict between the critic and those suppressing him. For some, the natural reaction is to follow Nicodemus of Messina's response to charges of inconsistency. He saw "no contradiction in this," he said, "since it was always wise to be on the side of conquerers" (Plutarch, n.d.: 375). For the "simplifiers," the dilemma generates a form of moral blindness. As Joachim Fest (1970: 208) writes in his monumental Face of the Third Reich, "Heroes are rare and in bad times weakness and blindness are for many a technique of survival. " More enlightened or courageous soldiers may recognize the dangers and ardently wish for someone to do something about it. They themselves would stand firm, but not in the first line. Their problem is a basic lack of moral courage, a virtue so rare that, in Theodor Fontane's words, it "is always bound up with insults and contempt" (Fest, 1970: 235). At the far extreme stand the true critics-men like Mitchel, Mahan, Lonnie Franks, or John Vann, who spoke out when the occasion demanded, and paid the price. The initial charges inevitably brought against these disturbers of complacency were disloyalty, ambition, and/or bitterness. Perhaps the overall process of resolving the disharmonies between a military ethic and concrete problems inherent in the military system can best be illustrated by what happened to the German officer corps under Hitler. The German ethic put duty and honor at levels equal to the American and, in theory at least, the state remained supreme even after Hitler extracted the famous oath of obedience. But when he began overtly and covertly to undermine the officer corps with its remarkable reputation for solidarity and professionalism, the ethic dis- 108600 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST integrated. When Hitler fired his Minister of War, Von Blomberg, for marrying his secretary, who had a questionable reputation, and framed the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Fritsch, a bachelor, on the charge of homosexuality using a perjured and pressured witness, conflict in loyalty became inevitable. The frameup of Fritsch became widely known, especially throughout the army: but in this crisis, blindness quickly set in for those who chose to see it as a personality conflict and opted for the obvious conquerer. The most enlightened saw that the removal of Fritsch and Blomberg were only stepping stones to Hitler's real target, the officer corps. But they did nothing. In thus eliminating the two officers without the resistance which was demanded by the ethic, Hitler, Fest ( 1970: 242) writes: had eliminated the last power center of any significance and, along with the whole civilian power, now held the military in his hand. Contemptuously he commented that he now knew all generals were cowards. His contempt was reinforced by the unhesitating readiness of numerous generals to move into the positions which had become free, even before Fritsch's rehabilitation. This process also demonstrated that the inner unity of the officer corps was finally broken and that the solidarity of the caste, which had already failed to vindicate itself in the case of the murder of Schleicher and Bredow, no longer existed. It is significant that one man, Chief of General Staff General Ludwig Beck, had the vision to see what the ultimate loss of the military ethic would mean. "What are at stake here, are decisions which in the last analysis affect the existence of the nation. " If the German ethic, like the American, "repudiated disobedience, it nonetheless left room for the refusal of obedi- ence" (Fest, 1970: 245). Those, like Beck, who eventually were involved in the plot on Hitler's life, did so because they saw an unavoidable conflict between personal loyalty to a constituted authority who was leading a nation to ruin and their higher duty to the nation itself. "We are purifying ourselves," General Stieff replied when asked the reason for the attempt. But others, who lacked both perspective and moral courage, showed themselves unwilling or unable to understand the necessity of 109601 Flammer / CONFLICTING LOYALTIES recapturing the lost ethic. When asked at Nuremberg whether he ever thought of getting rid of Hitler, former Field Marshall von Rundstedt replied without hesitation that he was a soldier not a traitor (Fest, 1970: 244). For his part, Field Marshall Keitel, Hitler's military aide, and a toad of man, had so far lost his grip on the military ethic that he could see nothing in the attempt on Hitler's life other than "injured pride, frustrated ambition and office-seeking." Keitel, like the crack SS, sought refuge from moral decisions in clinging to an abstract loyalty that was "isolated from all reasons and hence from all meaning" (Fest, 1970: 186). In thus maintaining a personal ethic which separates loyalty from the object one is supposed to be loyal to, the latter helped write the most sordid and bloody chapter in German history. Not all German officers, of course, were Nazis, and one is left with Fest's (1970: 248) melancholy conclusion that: it was not solely the Nationalist Socialist party officer who damaged the reputation and prestige of the Army. It was no less the obsequiousness of so many, the total lack of moral courage in so many, that dulled the lustre of undoubtedly real soldierly and professional virtues and did more to dishonor the image of the officer corps than all the reproaches of its bitterest opponents. The American military ethic is designed to put principle above self-interest. Personal integrity and moral courage are the keys to viability of that ethic. Yet Liddell Hart (1971: 29-30) found moral courage "was quite as rare in the top levels of the services as among politicians." And the "inherent isolation" which he says awaits the true critic is possible only because of the weakness on the part of the many. Indeed, I know of no single instance where moral courage on the part of more than a few of the military professionals played a significant part in correcting a major defect in the system or corrected a major injustice, despite the fact that moral courage is, in theory, encouraged in the military. An Army ROTC manual, for example, currently used throughout the country contains the following statement: There probably comes a time in every military leader's career when a fundamental disagreement with a superior exists. Here the institu- 110602 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST tion expects the subordinate to have the moral courage (an example of a trait in action) to make his objection known to his superior. Adjusting to personality differences is a normal human reaction and does not imply compromise of principles. [Hays and Thomas, 1967: 34] Yet, to my personal knowledge, a very bright young ROTC cadet who applied this principle at a major academic institution by questioning what happened to John Vann was denied a regular commission. That the reason was largely due to the moral courage of this student in honestly questioning some things his superiors said, is evident from the fact that the major who broke the news to him did so without rancor, telling him, in effect, that "your kind are not appreciated in the military"; "we are doing you a favor by keeping you from making the service a career." As for the American military, I know many honest, upright servicemen who cling to the most scrupulous integrity that does not discount moral courage. But, in the aggregate, they are much more rare than we have a right to expect. In the final analysis, integrity is the only thing that can certify any idealistic ethic. "Integrity is the glue that ties us all together," Air Force Chief of Staff General John Ryan told a class at the Air War College in May, 1973. "Fierce adherence to one's personal integrity is the greatest strength that any soldier or statesman could have" (AF Policy Letter, 1973). T. K. Finletter's remark that character is the "first requirement" of leadership goes well in hand with the sensible observation that occasional virtue simply does not imply any long-range values. Or we have Charles W. Ackley's (1972: 16) conviction "that the problem of military power especially in America cannot be comprehended in less than moral terms." I do not consider myself an "alarmist" although that charge is inevitably brought against anyone who complains aloud about the conditions of society. But the unfortunate conditions revealed in the Watergate mess, in books such as Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest and David Wise's The Politics of Lying, and in examples of selfishness, indifference, unethical or dishonorable conduct on a massive scale is worrisome. And it 111603 Flammer / CONFLICTING LOYALTIES deepens my concern for the American armed forces for which I retain a strong affinity. As understandable as errors are in such a massive bureaucracy, as easy as it is to comprehend that the military can hardly avoid reflecting its parent society, recognizing, as Arnold Toynbee put it, that military virtues are not a class apart but "are virtues in every walk of life ... nonetheless, virtues for being jewels set in blood and iron" (Hackett, 1962: 52), one basic conclusion remains. Unlike politics or business, where individual failings are rarely lethal, military errors inherently involve the potential loss of life. The stakes are too high for anyone in or out of the armed forces to excuse military failings on the basis that everyone else is doing them. Put another way, loyalty to the American ethic requires a dedicated effort on the part of commanders and officers to develop the art of leadership rather than fall back on raw "drivership" which is merely the offshoot of power. Perhaps the basic problem of conflicting loyalties and the American military ethic, including its relationship to the American ethic, can be summed up in a question posed by Walter Karp (1969: 35), one which he said "has never been precisely formulated, and we are in danger of answering it without even knowing what it has been asked." The question is this: do men, as a matter of ascertainable fact, want serious demands made upon their courage, loyalty, generosity and understanding? Do men, in other words, care to be moral beings, and do we prefer a life that might penalize us somehow for being craven, faithless and ungenerous? If we do not, then there is nothing radically wrong with the world. It is being fashioned in every way to suit us. If we do, then there is a great deal wrong with the world, and it is getting worse. NOTES  1. In the January 1962 issue of Military Review, a journal associated with the Army Command and Staff College, an article appeared containing the following statement: "It is common knowledge, moreover, that for every bad efficiency report that is justified on the grounds of incompetence, another is the product of a vindictive rater meting vengeance on a junior who has crossed him. The way to get promoted is to keep a clean nose-a little brown will not hurt, though, and not step on any toes." Quoted in Anthony J. Daniel (1972). 2. Personal interview with Captain P. W., Tan Son Nhut AB, Republic of South Vietnam, 16 Feb. 1969. 3. Montgomery Advertiser, 28 November 1971. By this time, of course, the suit had been filed and the Montgomery Advertiser ran a lengthy series on the scandal. In December 1971, Harold Martin, the editor, confessed to this writer that he was under considerable pressure to cease his "crusade." I also had a chance to talk with Major Calhoun about the matter and to read a portion of the trial transcript. Harold Martin did not overstate the case. 4. This small booklet is based on a series of lectures given at Cambridge University. 5. The survey enjoyed wide distribution. Most newspapers which carried the survey published the results in the first week of July 1972. 112604 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST REFERENCES Ackley, C. W. (1972) The Modern Military in American Society Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminister. Air Force, Sec. of (1973) Parts of the speech were quoted in "AF Policy Letter for Commanders." Daniel, A. J. (1972) "Evaluations and systems and superior-subordinate relationships." Military Rev. (January): 5-6. De Pierrefeu, J. (1924) Plutarch Lied London: Grant Richards. De Tocqueville, A. (1899) Democracy in America 2 vols. New York : Colonial Press. Durant, W. (1944) Caesar and Christ New York: Simon & Schuster . Fest, J. C. (1970) The Face of the Third Reich New York: Pantheon . HACKETT, Sir J. [Lieutenant General] (1962 ) The Profession of Arms London: Times Publishing. Halberstam, D. (1972) The Best and the Brightest Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett. Hart, L.B.H. (1971) Why Don't We Learn From History New York: Hawthorne. ——— (1944) Thoughts on War London: Faber & Faber. HAYS, S. A. [Colonel] and W. N. THOMAS [Lieutenant Colonel] (1967) Taking Command Harrisburg, Pa.: Stackpole . Karp, W. (1969) "What's wrong with the world?" Interplay. Masterman, Sir J. (1972) "The YY Papers." Yale Alumni Magazine. Montgomery Advertiser (1971) November 28. Plutarch (n.d.) Plutarch's Lives 5 vols. [Dryden translation, revised by A. H. Clough] New York: A. L. Burt. Weigley, R. F. (1972) "Review of The Patton Papers." Military Rev. WILLIAMS, R. W. [Brigadier General] (1972) "Commanders and intelligence." Army Magazine. Wise, D. (1973) The Politics of Lying: Government Deception, Secrecy, and Power New York: Random House.</meta-value>
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</front>
<back><notes> 
         <p>1. In the January 1962 issue of <italic>Military Review,</italic>
 a journal associated with the Army Command and Staff College, an article appeared containing the following statement: "It is common knowledge, moreover, that for every bad efficiency report that is justified on the grounds of incompetence, another is the product of a vindictive rater meting vengeance on a junior who has crossed him. The way to get promoted is to keep a clean nose-a little brown will not hurt, though, and not step on any toes." Quoted in Anthony J. Daniel (1972).</p>  
         <p>2. Personal interview with Captain P. W., Tan Son Nhut AB, Republic of South Vietnam, 16 Feb. 1969.</p>  
         <p>3. <italic>Montgomery Advertiser,</italic>
 28 November 1971. By this time, of course, the suit had been filed and the <italic>Montgomery Advertiser</italic>
 ran a lengthy series on the scandal. In December 1971, Harold Martin, the editor, confessed to this writer that he was under considerable pressure to cease his "crusade." I also had a chance to talk with Major Calhoun about the matter and to read a portion of the trial transcript. Harold Martin did not overstate the case.</p>  
         <p>4. This small booklet is based on a series of lectures given at Cambridge University.</p>  
         <p>5. The survey enjoyed wide distribution. Most newspapers which carried the survey published the results in the first week of July 1972.</p> 
      </notes>
<ref-list> 
         <ref> 
            <citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Ackley, C. W.</surname>
</name>
 (<year>1972</year>
) <source>The Modern Military in American Society</source> 
               <publisher-loc>Philadelphia, Pa</publisher-loc>
.: <publisher-name>Westminister</publisher-name>
.</citation> 
         </ref> 
         <ref> 
            <citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Air Force, Sec.</surname>
</name>
 of (<year>1973</year>
) <source>Parts of the speech were quoted in "AF Policy Letter for Commanders."</source>
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         <ref> 
            <citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Daniel, A. J.</surname>
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               <source>Military Rev</source>
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            <citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>De Pierrefeu, J.</surname>
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               <publisher-loc>London</publisher-loc>
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            <citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>De Tocqueville, A.</surname>
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            <citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Durant, W.</surname>
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            <citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Fest, J. C.</surname>
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Conflicting Loyalties and the American Military Ethic

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