What puts the “meta” in metacognition?
Identifieur interne : 000723 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000722; suivant : 000724What puts the “meta” in metacognition?
Auteurs : Michael L. Anderson ; Don PerlisSource :
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences [ 0140-525X ] ; 2009.
Abstract
This commentary suggests an alternate definition for metacognition, as well as an alternate basis for the “aboutness” relation in representation. These together open the way for an understanding of mindreading that is significantly different from the one advocated by Carruthers.
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DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X09000557
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These together open the way for an understanding of mindreading that is significantly different from the one advocated by Carruthers.</p></abstract></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2009">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus cambridge not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.2 20060430//EN" URI="journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article dtd-version="2.2" article-type="research-article"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">BBS</journal-id><journal-title>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</journal-title><abbrev-journal-title>Behav Brain Sci</abbrev-journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">0140-525X</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1469-1825</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Cambridge University Press</publisher-name><publisher-loc>New York, USA</publisher-loc></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1017/S0140525X09000557</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="pii">S0140525X09000557</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">00055</article-id><title-group><article-title>What puts the “meta” in metacognition?</article-title><alt-title alt-title-type="left-running"><italic>Commentary</italic>/Carruthers: How we know our own minds</alt-title><alt-title alt-title-type="right-running"><italic>Commentary</italic>/Carruthers: How we know our own minds</alt-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib><name><surname>Anderson</surname><given-names>Michael L.</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">a</xref><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">b</xref></contrib><contrib><name><surname>Perlis</surname><given-names>Don</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">b</xref><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff3">c</xref></contrib></contrib-group><aff id="aff1"><label><sup>a</sup></label><addr-line>Department of Psychology</addr-line>, <institution>Franklin & Marshall College</institution>, <addr-line>Lancaster, PA 17604</addr-line> <email xlink:href="michael.anderson@fandm.edu">michael.anderson@fandm.edu</email> <uri xlink:href="http://www.agcognition.org">http://www.agcognition.org</uri></aff><aff id="aff2"><label><sup>b</sup></label><institution>Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland</institution>, <addr-line>College Park, MD 20742</addr-line></aff><aff id="aff3"><label><sup>c</sup></label><addr-line>Department of Computer Science</addr-line>, <institution>University of Maryland</institution>, <addr-line>College Park, MD 20742</addr-line> <email xlink:href="perlis@cs.umd.edu">perlis@cs.umd.edu</email> <uri xlink:href="http://www.activelogic.org">http://www.activelogic.org</uri></aff><pub-date><month>04</month><year>2009</year></pub-date><volume>32</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage seq="4">138</fpage><lpage>139</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2009</copyright-year><copyright-holder>Cambridge University Press</copyright-holder></permissions><related-article related-article-type="commentary-article" journal-id="BBS" journal-id-type="publisher-id" vol="32" issue="2" id="S0140525X09000545" page="121"><article-title>How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition</article-title> <name><surname>Carruthers</surname><given-names>Peter</given-names></name> Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 <email xlink:href="pcarruth@umd.edu">pcarruth@umd.edu</email> <uri xlink:href="http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/">http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/</uri></related-article><abstract abstract-type="normal"><title>Abstract</title><p>This commentary suggests an alternate definition for metacognition, as well as an alternate basis for the “aboutness” relation in representation. These together open the way for an understanding of mindreading that is significantly different from the one advocated by Carruthers.</p></abstract><counts><page-count count="2"></page-count></counts><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta><meta-name>pdf</meta-name><meta-value>S0140525X09000557a.pdf</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta><meta-name>dispart</meta-name><meta-value>Open Peer Commentary</meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><body><sec id="sec1"><title></title><p>Carruthers suggests that cognitive scientists are confused about the meaning of “metacognition,” citing our work as an illustrative example. In fact, we follow a standard definition of the term, adopted from Nelson and Narens (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref13">1990</xref>). (This particular formulation appears in Anderson & Oates [<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref1">2007</xref>], but the definition is in widespread use. See, e.g., Dunlosky <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">2004</xref>; Dunlosky & Bjork <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">2008</xref>; Dunlosky & Metcalfe <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">2009</xref>; Metcalfe <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">1993</xref>; Metcalfe & Shimamura <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">1994</xref>.) The definition runs as follows:
<disp-quote><p>Imagine two components <italic>X</italic> and <italic>Y</italic> (where <italic>X</italic> and <italic>Y</italic> could be the same), related in such a way that state information flows from <italic>Y</italic> to <italic>X</italic>, and control information flows from <italic>X</italic> to <italic>Y</italic>. Component <italic>X</italic> is in a monitoring and control relationship with <italic>Y</italic>, and when <italic>Y</italic> is a cognitive component, we call this relationship metacognitive monitoring and control.</p></disp-quote></p><p>This offers an information-theoretic characterization of metacognition that is neutral regarding the form that information takes, or the processing it undergoes. Thus, it is quite incorrect to say that cognitive scientists use the term “in two quite distinct ways, often without noticing the difference” (target article, sect. 5.1, para. 2). We use the term consistently in a way that leaves open the various ways in which such a relationship could be implemented. We are not confused about the difference between systems that involve “metarepresentations of [its] own first-order cognitive processes as such” (sect. 5.1, para. 2) and those that don't; rather, this distinction is not relevant to the definition of metacognition.</p><p>In fact, <italic>some</italic> of the processes in the systems we implement are indeed metacognitive in Carruthers' more restricted sense. To take just one example, mentioned by Carruthers: If an active logic system notices the presence of both <italic>P</italic> and ¬<italic>P</italic> in its knowledge base (KB), it will assert <italic>Contra(P</italic>, ¬<italic>P, t)</italic>. That is a statement <italic>about</italic> – a metarepresentation of – the state of the KB at time <italic>t</italic> (i.e., that it contained that contradiction). Our systems can reason about this fact with that metarepresentation, and consequently take various control steps, the simplest of which is to refrain from using these premises in further deduction (Anderson & Perlis <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref3">2005a</xref>). But other processes in active logic systems, and other of our metacognitive systems, effect such monitoring and control without explicit metarepresentations of this sort (see, e.g., Anderson et al. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2006</xref>).</p><p>Of course, Carruthers is free to define his terms and circumscribe his interests as best serves his argument, and if this were merely a terminological dispute, we would not be submitting a commentary. But there is a more substantive point in the background, which potentially affects Carruthers' overall proposal. Carruthers writes: “Generally the term is used, as it has been throughout this article, to mean cognition <italic>about</italic> one's own cognition. Metacognition, in this sense, is inherently higher-order, involving metarepresentations of one's own first-order cognitive processes as such” (sect. 5.1, para. 2, emphasis in original). The implication seems to be that for something to be <italic>about</italic> another requires a higher-order metarepresentation. But we would like to suggest that this associates <italic>higher-order</italic>-ness with <italic>meta</italic>-ness and <italic>about</italic>ness (if we can be forgiven the neologisms) in a way that is not necessary.</p><p>First, it is not clear that aboutness requires higher-order-ness. Surely a representation or a process can be about another without being at a different level, or in a different representational language. Indeed, can't a process (or representation) be about itself? (See, e.g., Perlis <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref14">1985</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref15">1988</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref16">1997</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref17">2000</xref>; Perlis & Subrahmanian <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref18">1994</xref>.) It is a common bias, perhaps stemming from Tarski, that there must be a hierarchy of meta-languages, each standing back from the one it refers to. But Tarski adopted that approach to avoid technical difficulties in formal logic; it is not necessary a priori.</p><p>Second, it is not clear that meta-ness requires higher-order-ness. In related writings, we have suggested that representation requires only the following: tokens, whatever their form/content, that can be used to guide actions with respect to certain targets (Anderson & Perlis <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">2005b</xref>; Anderson & Rosenberg <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">2008</xref>). On these accounts, the information being used and manipulated during cognition is representational just in case it is used to guide behavior with respect to targets in various circumstances. Likewise, a metacognitive monitoring and control process represents a cognitive process, just in case it allows the metacognitive component to guide actions with respect to the cognitive process. Such monitoring and control is indeed (we maintain) cognition <italic>about</italic> cognition – is thus <italic>meta</italic>cognition – without having to be/utilize higher-order representations of cognition as such.</p><p>As should be clear from the preceding, we have a somewhat different understanding of what the representational aboutness relation requires. This most definitely applies to self-representation as well (Anderson & Perlis <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">2005b</xref>), although it is perhaps worth noting that the account of self-awareness we develop in the cited paper is – despite differences in the fundamental criteria for aboutness – nevertheless compatible with the “mindreading is prior” framework that Carruthers advocates.</p><p>So why might all of this matter to Carruthers? Because of Carruthers' understanding of what aboutness requires, he is driven to adopt a higher-order, meta-representational account of what having certain thoughts about another's thoughts (“mindreading”) requires. In contrast, the less restrictive option offered by us opens the door for a broader range of theories of what our responsiveness to the mental states of others requires. This would include, for instance, Shaun Gallagher's interesting, and interestingly different, interaction-based account of understanding self and others (Gallagher <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">2004</xref>; <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">2005</xref>). It would have been useful and instructive to see how this rather broader portrayal of the competing possibilities might have affected Carruthers' argument, discussion, and conclusions.</p></sec></body><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref><citation citation-type="journal" id="ref1"><name><surname>Anderson</surname><given-names>M. L.</given-names></name> & <name><surname>Oates</surname><given-names>T</given-names></name>. 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A.</given-names></name>. <publisher-name>Oxford University Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref></ref-list></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>What puts the “meta” in metacognition?</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative"><title>Commentary/Carruthers: How we know our own minds</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>What puts the “meta” in metacognition?</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Michael L.</namePart><namePart type="family">Anderson</namePart><affiliation>Department of Psychology, Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster, PA 17604 michael.anderson@fandm.edu http://www.agcognition.org</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: michael.anderson@fandm.edu</affiliation><affiliation>Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Don</namePart><namePart type="family">Perlis</namePart><affiliation>Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742</affiliation><affiliation>Department of Computer Science, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 perlis@cs.umd.edu http://www.activelogic.org</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: perlis@cs.umd.edu</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">New York, USA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2009</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2009</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract type="normal">This commentary suggests an alternate definition for metacognition, as well as an alternate basis for the “aboutness” relation in representation. These together open the way for an understanding of mindreading that is significantly different from the one advocated by Carruthers.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>Behav Brain Sci</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0140-525X</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1469-1825</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">BBS</identifier><part><date>2009</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>32</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>2</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>138</start><end>139</end><total>2</total></extent></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="reviewOf"><identifier type="commentary-article"></identifier><part><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>32</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>121</start></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">0EC382C1F9482BB5A85D0FA5AD113B884941687F</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/6GQ-NL3NKFHQ-T</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1017/S0140525X09000557</identifier><identifier type="PII">S0140525X09000557</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">00055</identifier><identifier type="related-article-ID">S0140525X09000545</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-G3RCRD03-V">cambridge</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/0EC382C1F9482BB5A85D0FA5AD113B884941687F/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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