Metacognition is prior
Identifieur interne : 000291 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000290; suivant : 000292Metacognition is prior
Auteurs : Justin J. Couchman ; Mariana V. C. Coutinho ; Michael J. Beran ; J. David SmithSource :
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences [ 0140-525X ] ; 2009.
Abstract
We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.
Url:
DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X09000594
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<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title>Metacognition is prior</title><author><name sortKey="Couchman, Justin J" sort="Couchman, Justin J" uniqKey="Couchman J" first="Justin J." last="Couchman">Justin J. Couchman</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Coutinho, Mariana V C" sort="Coutinho, Mariana V C" uniqKey="Coutinho M" first="Mariana V. C." last="Coutinho">Mariana V. C. Coutinho</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Beran, Michael J" sort="Beran, Michael J" uniqKey="Beran M" first="Michael J." last="Beran">Michael J. Beran</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303 mjberan@yahoo.com</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: mjberan@yahoo.com</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Smith, J David" sort="Smith, J David" uniqKey="Smith J" first="J. David" last="Smith">J. David Smith</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:05E741DFD0FA50FE263E5525874AFAE1DC1572BB</idno><date when="2009" year="2009">2009</date><idno type="doi">10.1017/S0140525X09000594</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/05E741DFD0FA50FE263E5525874AFAE1DC1572BB/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">000291</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">000291</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a">Metacognition is prior</title><author><name sortKey="Couchman, Justin J" sort="Couchman, Justin J" uniqKey="Couchman J" first="Justin J." last="Couchman">Justin J. Couchman</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Coutinho, Mariana V C" sort="Coutinho, Mariana V C" uniqKey="Coutinho M" first="Mariana V. C." last="Coutinho">Mariana V. C. Coutinho</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Beran, Michael J" sort="Beran, Michael J" uniqKey="Beran M" first="Michael J." last="Beran">Michael J. Beran</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303 mjberan@yahoo.com</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: mjberan@yahoo.com</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Smith, J David" sort="Smith, J David" uniqKey="Smith J" first="J. David" last="Smith">J. David Smith</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Behavioral and Brain Sciences</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">Behav Brain Sci</title><idno type="ISSN">0140-525X</idno><idno type="eISSN">1469-1825</idno><imprint><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><pubPlace>New York, USA</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2009">2009</date><biblScope unit="volume">32</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="142">142</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="142">142</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0140-525X</idno></series></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0140-525X</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract">We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>cambridge</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Justin J. Couchman</name><affiliations><json:string>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</json:string><json:string>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Mariana V. C. Coutinho</name><affiliations><json:string>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</json:string><json:string>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Michael J. Beran</name><affiliations><json:string>Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303 mjberan@yahoo.com</json:string><json:string>E-mail: mjberan@yahoo.com</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>J. David Smith</name><affiliations><json:string>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</json:string><json:string>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><articleId><json:string>00059</json:string></articleId><arkIstex>ark:/67375/6GQ-83QHHDBB-Z</arkIstex><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>research-article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. 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C.</forename><surname>Coutinho</surname></persName><email>jjc38@buffalo.edu</email><affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-0002"><persName><forename type="first">Michael J.</forename><surname>Beran</surname></persName><email>mjberan@yahoo.com</email><affiliation>Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303 mjberan@yahoo.com</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-0003"><persName><forename type="first">J. David</forename><surname>Smith</surname></persName><email>jjc38@buffalo.edu</email><affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</affiliation></author><idno type="istex">05E741DFD0FA50FE263E5525874AFAE1DC1572BB</idno><idno type="ark">ark:/67375/6GQ-83QHHDBB-Z</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1017/S0140525X09000594</idno><idno type="PII">S0140525X09000594</idno><idno type="article-id">00059</idno><idno type="related-article-ID">S0140525X09000545</idno></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Behavioral and Brain Sciences</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">Behav Brain Sci</title><idno type="pISSN">0140-525X</idno><idno type="eISSN">1469-1825</idno><idno type="publisher-id">BBS</idno><imprint><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><pubPlace>New York, USA</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2009"></date><biblScope unit="volume">32</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="142">142</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="142">142</biblScope></imprint></monogr></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2009</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract style="normal"><p>We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.</p></abstract></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2009">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus cambridge not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="US-ASCII"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.2 20060430//EN" URI="journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article dtd-version="2.2" article-type="research-article"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">BBS</journal-id><journal-title>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</journal-title><abbrev-journal-title>Behav Brain Sci</abbrev-journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">0140-525X</issn><issn pub-type="epub">1469-1825</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Cambridge University Press</publisher-name><publisher-loc>New York, USA</publisher-loc></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1017/S0140525X09000594</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="pii">S0140525X09000594</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">00059</article-id><title-group><article-title>Metacognition is prior</article-title><alt-title alt-title-type="left-running"><italic>Commentary</italic>/Carruthers: How we know our own minds</alt-title><alt-title alt-title-type="right-running"><italic>Commentary</italic>/Carruthers: How we know our own minds</alt-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib><name><surname>Couchman</surname><given-names>Justin J.</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">a</xref></contrib><contrib><name><surname>Coutinho</surname><given-names>Mariana V. C.</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">a</xref></contrib><contrib><name><surname>Beran</surname><given-names>Michael J.</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff2">b</xref></contrib><contrib><name><surname>Smith</surname><given-names>J. David</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1">a</xref></contrib></contrib-group><aff id="aff1"><label><sup>a</sup></label><addr-line>Department of Psychology</addr-line>, <institution>University at Buffalo, The State University of New York</institution>, <addr-line>Buffalo, NY 14260</addr-line> <email xlink:href="jjc38@buffalo.edu">jjc38@buffalo.edu</email> <email xlink:href="mvc5@buffalo.edu">mvc5@buffalo.edu</email> <email xlink:href="psysmith@buffalo.edu">psysmith@buffalo.edu</email></aff><aff id="aff2"><label><sup>b</sup></label><addr-line>Language Research Center</addr-line>, <institution>Georgia State University</institution>, <addr-line>Atlanta, GA 30303</addr-line> <email xlink:href="mjberan@yahoo.com">mjberan@yahoo.com</email></aff><pub-date><month>04</month><year>2009</year></pub-date><volume>32</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage seq="8">142</fpage><lpage>142</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2009</copyright-year><copyright-holder>Cambridge University Press</copyright-holder></permissions><related-article related-article-type="commentary-article" journal-id="BBS" journal-id-type="publisher-id" vol="32" issue="2" id="S0140525X09000545" page="121"><article-title>How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition</article-title> <name><surname>Carruthers</surname><given-names>Peter</given-names></name> Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 <email xlink:href="pcarruth@umd.edu">pcarruth@umd.edu</email> <uri xlink:href="http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/">http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/</uri></related-article><abstract abstract-type="normal"><title>Abstract</title><p>We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the <italic>metacognition-is-prior</italic> account and against the <italic>mindreading-is-prior</italic> account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.</p></abstract><counts><page-count count="1"></page-count></counts><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta><meta-name>pdf</meta-name><meta-value>S0140525X09000594a.pdf</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta><meta-name>dispart</meta-name><meta-value>Open Peer Commentary</meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><body><sec id="sec1"><title></title><p>Carruthers acknowledges that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading would provide dramatic evidence for the <italic>metacognition-is-prior</italic> view and against the <italic>mindreading-is-prior</italic> view, and he asserts that the existing evidence can be explained using a first-order system of belief and desire <italic>strengths</italic> (target article, sect. 5.2; see also Carruthers <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2008b</xref>). We evaluated similar response strategies using formal modeling (Smith et al. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref9">2008</xref>) and found indeed that some animal metacognition findings could be explained using first-order strategies. Yet Carruthers' use here of the field's earliest paradigms and oldest data to make his argument is unfortunately selective. More recent paradigms often do not support his first-order argument and description.</p><p>Smith et al. (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref10">2006</xref>) dissociated monkeys' uncertainty responding from any reinforcement and stimulus cues that could have organized Carruthers' gradients of first-order beliefs and response tendencies. It was clear in that study that monkeys' uncertainty-response strategies were adjudicated cognitively and decisionally, not using first-order cues. They followed the animal's subjective decisional construal of the task. Couchman et al. (submitted) extended this dissociation to situations of broader task transfer in which animals had to establish functional regions of judged difficulty and uncertainty even when forced to self-organize their task performance.</p><p>Recent cross-species research on uncertainty monitoring also speaks against first-order interpretations of uncertainty-monitoring performances. Beran et al. (in press) gave capuchin monkeys a Sparse-Uncertainty-Dense task that was matched to a Sparse-Middle-Dense task. Capuchins used the middle (first-order) response easily and naturally. They almost never used the uncertainty response, despite having the reinforcement history needed to do so. Likewise, elegant research by Shettleworth and her colleagues (Inman & Shettleworth <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref6">1999</xref>) has shown that pigeons also do not express an uncertainty-responding capability, even when there are strong first-order reasons for them to do so. It is an important implication from these cross-species results that the organizing psychology underlying uncertainty responding is not first-order, because adept first-order animals such as capuchins and pigeons cannot find and use that psychology.</p><p>In other writings, Carruthers (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref2">2008b</xref>) also acknowledges that first-order beliefs and desires will not explain the wide-ranging empirical findings of uncertainty monitoring and information seeking by animals. He devises a secondary mental construct to explain why an animal uses the uncertainty response in too-close-to-call situations. He suggests that some species have a gate-keeping “mechanism . . . which when confronted with conflicting plans that are too close to one another in strength will refrain from acting on the one that happens to be strongest at that moment, and will initiate alternative information-gathering behavior instead” (p. 66 ).</p><p>The gatekeeper mechanism operates on first-order cognition's outputs to assess their ability to produce a correct response. It meets the definition of a second-order controlled cognitive process. It produces a qualitative change in behavior and cognitive strategy (information seeking, uncertainty responses, etc.). It typifies the metacognitive utility that all theorists have envisioned. Even in Carruthers' own description of animals' cognitive self-regulation, it seems, metacognition is prior.</p><p>Another analytic problem in the target article concerns the different standard of evidence that is applied to studies of animal metacognition and studies of animal mindreading. It seems highly unlikely, and it goes completely undefended in the target article (sect. 5, para. 2) that all the metacognition paradigms fall prey to behaviorist explanations, but that all the mindreading paradigms are veridical. They clearly are not (Heyes <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref5">1998</xref>).</p><p>Carruthers makes a valid suggestion that, if metacognition is prior, one should be able to explore the evolutionary pressures that produced a free-standing metacognitive utility. Fortunately, James (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref7">1890</xref>/1952), Dewey (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref4">1934</xref>/1980), Tolman (<xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref12">1938</xref>), and many others have provided this evolutionary narrative (see also Smith et al. <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref11">2003</xref>). Animals often encounter doubtful and uncertain situations in which their habitual stimulus-response associations do not clearly indicate a safe and adaptive response. They would benefit enormously in those situations from having an online cognitive utility that will let them assemble the relevant facts and recollections and choose an adaptive course of action. Metacognition provides exactly this utility.</p><p>It is also a remarkable phylogenetic fact that there appear to be no species that show mindreading ability but fail to show metacognitive ability. This could be used to support more than one of the possibilities discussed in the target article. However, it clearly supports least of all the <italic>mindreading-is-prior</italic> account.</p><p>Finally, we believe that an evolutionary perspective on this issue raises a serious problem for the <italic>mindreading-is-prior</italic> account. The author's account may, in principle, explain the development of metacognition ontogenetically, especially if one assumes a parent is constantly informing you of the intentions of others. Your mother may tell you, “Johnny wants a cookie” while you see Johnny reaching for the cookie jar, and the next time you find yourself reaching for the cookie jar, you may well apply “wants a cookie” to yourself. This works only because humans communicate their knowledge of concepts and intentions from one generation to the next.</p><p>The first mindreading animal would have no basis for which to make an attribution of a mental state. How would it be possible or beneficial to attribute “wants a cookie” to Johnny, if the attributer has no known experience with “wanting,” no understanding of “what it is like to want” and no idea that it has ever “wanted”? The <italic>mindreading-is-prior</italic> account must explain how, from nothing but observed physical behavior, and with no reason to ever attribute anything but cause-and-effect mechanical processes, animals came to attribute subjective belief and desire states to others. This would be equivalent to knowing there is something “that it is like” to be a bat (Nagel <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="ref8">1974</xref>) prior to knowing that there is anything “that it is like” to be you!</p><p>Indeed, exactly the opposite seems to be true. We have great access to and a rich understanding of our own mental states and only a very limited understanding of the mental states of others. We first knew what it was like to know, and then assumed that others might be having an analogous experience. This process of extending mental concepts outward is surely a more plausible and tractable evolutionary narrative. Within that narrative, metacognition is prior.</p></sec></body><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref><citation citation-type="journal" id="ref1"><name><surname>Beran</surname><given-names>M. J.</given-names></name>, <name><surname>Smith</surname><given-names>J. D.</given-names></name>, <name><surname>Coutinho</surname><given-names>M. V. C.</given-names></name>, <name><surname>Couchman</surname><given-names>J. J.</given-names></name> & <name><surname>Boomer</surname><given-names>J. 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C.</namePart><namePart type="family">Coutinho</namePart><affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Michael J.</namePart><namePart type="family">Beran</namePart><affiliation>Language Research Center, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303 mjberan@yahoo.com</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: mjberan@yahoo.com</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">J. David</namePart><namePart type="family">Smith</namePart><affiliation>Department of Psychology, University at Buffalo, The State University of New York, Buffalo, NY 14260 jjc38@buffalo.edu mvc5@buffalo.edu psysmith@buffalo.edu</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: jjc38@buffalo.edu</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Cambridge University Press</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">New York, USA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2009</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2009</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract type="normal">We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Behavioral and Brain Sciences</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>Behav Brain Sci</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0140-525X</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1469-1825</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">BBS</identifier><part><date>2009</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>32</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>2</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>142</start><end>142</end><total>1</total></extent></part></relatedItem><relatedItem type="reviewOf"><identifier type="commentary-article"></identifier><part><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>32</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>121</start></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">05E741DFD0FA50FE263E5525874AFAE1DC1572BB</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/6GQ-83QHHDBB-Z</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1017/S0140525X09000594</identifier><identifier type="PII">S0140525X09000594</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">00059</identifier><identifier type="related-article-ID">S0140525X09000545</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-G3RCRD03-V">cambridge</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/05E741DFD0FA50FE263E5525874AFAE1DC1572BB/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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