BernheimV1, PascalFrancis, Curation, bibRecord, 000015

Allocation decisions in network industries

Identifieur interne : 000015 ( PascalFrancis/Curation ); précédent : 000014; suivant : 000016

Allocation decisions in network industries

Auteurs : Friedel Bolle [Allemagne]

Source :

Energy economics [ 0140-9883 ] ; 2008.

RBID : Pascal:07-0535144

Descripteurs français

Pascal (Inist)
- Economie énergie, Enchère, Menu, Affectation, Prise décision, Méthodologie, Implémentation, Etude cas, Privatisation, Industrie électricité, Achat, Electricité, Pologne, Fonction valeur, Fonction concave, Industrie électrique.
Wicri :
- geographic : Pologne.
- topic : Privatisation, Achat, Industrie électrique.

English descriptors

KwdEn :
- Allocation, Bidding, Case study, Concave function, Decision making, Electric power industry, Electricity, Energy economy, Implementation, Menu, Methodology, Poland, Privatisation, Purchases, Value function.

Abstract

In this paper, I want to propagate a new analytical tool: The usage of Menu Auctions for modelling complicated auctions, negotiations, rent seeking, etc. is advocated, because, contrary to "normal" auctions and bargaining models, an arbitrary number of additional aspects can be taken into account. After concentrating on "Truthful Equilibria" [Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M.D., 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1-31.] a certain broad class of Menu Auctions show unique and efficient allocations. Under an additional concavity condition even the equilibrium bids are unique. Two examples are discussed: the privatisation of a state-owned industry and the buying of wholesale electricity (concluding contracts with a number of producers) by a utility. These examples also serve to trace the sources of "non-concavities" which can prevent the uniqueness of bids and can provide the auctioneer with incentives to exclude bidders from the competition.

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A08	`01`	`1`	`ENG`	`@1 Allocation decisions in network industries`
A11	`01`	`1`		`@1 BOLLE (Friedel)`
A14	`01`			`@1 Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Lehrstuhl Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie (Mikroökonomie) @2 Postfach 1786 15207 Frankfurt (Oder) @3 DEU @Z 1 aut.`
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C01	`01`		`ENG`	@0 In this paper, I want to propagate a new analytical tool: The usage of Menu Auctions for modelling complicated auctions, negotiations, rent seeking, etc. is advocated, because, contrary to "normal" auctions and bargaining models, an arbitrary number of additional aspects can be taken into account. After concentrating on "Truthful Equilibria" [Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M.D., 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1-31.] a certain broad class of Menu Auctions show unique and efficient allocations. Under an additional concavity condition even the equilibrium bids are unique. Two examples are discussed: the privatisation of a state-owned industry and the buying of wholesale electricity (concluding contracts with a number of producers) by a utility. These examples also serve to trace the sources of "non-concavities" which can prevent the uniqueness of bids and can provide the auctioneer with incentives to exclude bidders from the competition.
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C03	`02`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Enchère @5 02`
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C03	`02`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Subasta @5 02`
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C03	`09`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Privatisation @5 09`
C03	`09`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Privatisation @5 09`
C03	`09`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Privatización @5 09`
C03	`10`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Industrie électricité @5 10`
C03	`10`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Electric power industry @5 10`
C03	`10`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Industria electricidad @5 10`
C03	`11`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Achat @5 11`
C03	`11`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Purchases @5 11`
C03	`11`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Compra @5 11`
C03	`12`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Electricité @5 12`
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C03	`14`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Función valor @5 14`
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C03	`16`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Industrie électrique @4 INC @5 72`
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C07	`01`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Europe @2 NG`
C07	`01`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Europa @2 NG`
N21				`@1 344`

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Le document en format XML

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<author><name sortKey="Bolle, Friedel" sort="Bolle, Friedel" uniqKey="Bolle F" first="Friedel" last="Bolle">Friedel Bolle</name>
<affiliation wicri:level="1"><inist:fA14 i1="01"><s1>Europa-Universität Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Lehrstuhl Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftstheorie (Mikroökonomie)</s1>
<s2>Postfach 1786 15207 Frankfurt (Oder)</s2>
<s3>DEU</s3>
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<country>Allemagne</country>
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<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">In this paper, I want to propagate a new analytical tool: The usage of Menu Auctions for modelling complicated auctions, negotiations, rent seeking, etc. is advocated, because, contrary to "normal" auctions and bargaining models, an arbitrary number of additional aspects can be taken into account. After concentrating on "Truthful Equilibria" [Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M.D., 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1-31.] a certain broad class of Menu Auctions show unique and efficient allocations. Under an additional concavity condition even the equilibrium bids are unique. Two examples are discussed: the privatisation of a state-owned industry and the buying of wholesale electricity (concluding contracts with a number of producers) by a utility. These examples also serve to trace the sources of "non-concavities" which can prevent the uniqueness of bids and can provide the auctioneer with incentives to exclude bidders from the competition.</div>
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<fC01 i1="01" l="ENG"><s0>In this paper, I want to propagate a new analytical tool: The usage of Menu Auctions for modelling complicated auctions, negotiations, rent seeking, etc. is advocated, because, contrary to "normal" auctions and bargaining models, an arbitrary number of additional aspects can be taken into account. After concentrating on "Truthful Equilibria" [Bernheim, B.D., Whinston, M.D., 1986. Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1-31.] a certain broad class of Menu Auctions show unique and efficient allocations. Under an additional concavity condition even the equilibrium bids are unique. Two examples are discussed: the privatisation of a state-owned industry and the buying of wholesale electricity (concluding contracts with a number of producers) by a utility. These examples also serve to trace the sources of "non-concavities" which can prevent the uniqueness of bids and can provide the auctioneer with incentives to exclude bidders from the competition.</s0>
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Serveur d'exploration Hippolyte Bernheim

Allocation decisions in network industries

Allocation decisions in network industries

Source :

Descripteurs français

English descriptors

Abstract

Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)

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