Serveur d'exploration Hippolyte Bernheim

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Credible public policy

Identifieur interne : 000A41 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000A40; suivant : 000A42

Credible public policy

Auteurs : Nancy L. Stokey [États-Unis]

Source :

RBID : ISTEX:576BD78418C12406CD39D98C18432FBBC7F8D630

English descriptors

Abstract

Abstract: Credible public policy is defined in a way that incorporates competitive equilibrium behavior for households and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium behavior for the government. It is shown that the set of all equilibrium outcome paths for credible policies can be constructed by using arguments analogous to those of Abreu (1988) for repeated games. The results are then extended to systems with state variables. Simple models of monetary policy and capital taxation are studied by way of example.

Url:
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1889(91)90036-Z


Affiliations:


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<term>Capital holdings</term>
<term>Capital income</term>
<term>Capital stock</term>
<term>Capital taxation</term>
<term>Certain predecessors</term>
<term>Chari</term>
<term>Competitive equilibrium</term>
<term>Competitive equilibrium behavior</term>
<term>Constraint</term>
<term>Credible</term>
<term>Credible outcome path</term>
<term>Credible outcome paths</term>
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<term>Credible policies</term>
<term>Credible policy</term>
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<term>Cyclical paths</term>
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<term>Discount factor</term>
<term>Economic behavior</term>
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<term>Entire revenue</term>
<term>Equilibrium</term>
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<term>Feasible sequences</term>
<term>Finite sequence</term>
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<term>Future periods</term>
<term>Government moves</term>
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<term>Growth rate</term>
<term>Harvard university press</term>
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<term>High money growth</term>
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<term>Households move</term>
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<term>Policy models</term>
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<term>Ramsey outcome path</term>
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<term>Ramsey policy</term>
<term>Rapid money growth</term>
<term>Representative household</term>
<term>Reputational equilibria</term>
<term>Revenue requirement</term>
<term>Reversion</term>
<term>Right side</term>
<term>Same action</term>
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<term>Simple policy</term>
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<term>Stokey</term>
<term>Subsequent period</term>
<term>Such paths</term>
<term>Sustainable plans</term>
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