Markov-perfect equilibria in intergenerational games with consistent preferences
Identifieur interne : 000980 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000979; suivant : 000981Markov-perfect equilibria in intergenerational games with consistent preferences
Auteurs : Peter A. Streufert [États-Unis]Source :
- Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control [ 0165-1889 ] ; 1993.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Action space, Action stream, Action streams, Additional generality, Admissible equilibria, Admissible equilibrium, Admissible solution, Aggregator, Aggregator stream, Altruism, Biconvergence, Commodity space, Compact subset, Consistent preferences, Constant consumption stream, Consumption stream, Continuous monotonic transformations, Convergence, Convergent, Convex hull, Direct consequence, Dynamic programming, Economic dynamics, Economic studies, Economic theory, Endogenous altruism, Equilibrium, Equilibrium equivalences, Game theory, Good stream, Government debt, Impure, Impure altruism, Infinite sequence, Intergenerational, Intergenerational altruism, Intergenerational games, Koopmans, Labor endowment, Last example, Lemma, Lipschitz condition, Lower convergence, Lower convergent, Markov, Markov strategies, Multiplicity accords, Nice characterization, Optimization, Optimization barrier, Other hand, Past generations, Pathological example, Pathological examples, Perfect information, Political economy, Poor stream, Present paper, Previous example, Production correspondences, Proof mimics, Recursive, Recursive optimality equations, Ricardian equivalence, Section lemma, Section model, Smallest interval, Special case, Spurious valuations, Streufert, Strict consistency, Such equilibria, Such preferences, Sufficient condition, Sufficient statistic, Time additivity, Time period, Topological, Upper convergence, Upper convergent, Useful models, Utility barrier, Utility function, Utility function stream, Utility functions, Utility sequence, Value functions, Values streams, Weak consistency.
Abstract
Abstract: This paper considers the subgame-perfect equilibria, in Markov strategies, of an abstract intergenerational game in which the generations' preferences are consistent in the sense that they admit recursive aggregators. Given biconvergence, I show that such equilibria exist and are equivalent both to the solutions of Bellman's recursive optimality equations and to the optima of the first generation's utility function. These results are then applied to a simple model casting new light on the neutrality of government debt, and to another accommodating impure altruism. Finally, two new examples crisply illustrate how the paper's equivalences fail when biconvergence fails.
Url:
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1889(93)90023-L
Affiliations:
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Streufert</name><affiliation wicri:level="2"><country xml:lang="fr">États-Unis</country><wicri:regionArea>University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706</wicri:regionArea><placeName><region type="state">Wisconsin</region></placeName></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">DYNCON</title><idno type="ISSN">0165-1889</idno><imprint><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><date type="published" when="1993">1993</date><biblScope unit="volume">17</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">5–6</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="929">929</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="951">951</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0165-1889</idno></series></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0165-1889</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="Teeft" xml:lang="en"><term>Action space</term><term>Action stream</term><term>Action streams</term><term>Additional generality</term><term>Admissible equilibria</term><term>Admissible equilibrium</term><term>Admissible solution</term><term>Aggregator</term><term>Aggregator stream</term><term>Altruism</term><term>Biconvergence</term><term>Commodity space</term><term>Compact subset</term><term>Consistent preferences</term><term>Constant consumption stream</term><term>Consumption stream</term><term>Continuous monotonic transformations</term><term>Convergence</term><term>Convergent</term><term>Convex hull</term><term>Direct consequence</term><term>Dynamic programming</term><term>Economic dynamics</term><term>Economic studies</term><term>Economic theory</term><term>Endogenous altruism</term><term>Equilibrium</term><term>Equilibrium equivalences</term><term>Game theory</term><term>Good stream</term><term>Government debt</term><term>Impure</term><term>Impure altruism</term><term>Infinite sequence</term><term>Intergenerational</term><term>Intergenerational altruism</term><term>Intergenerational games</term><term>Koopmans</term><term>Labor endowment</term><term>Last example</term><term>Lemma</term><term>Lipschitz condition</term><term>Lower convergence</term><term>Lower convergent</term><term>Markov</term><term>Markov strategies</term><term>Multiplicity accords</term><term>Nice characterization</term><term>Optimization</term><term>Optimization barrier</term><term>Other hand</term><term>Past generations</term><term>Pathological example</term><term>Pathological examples</term><term>Perfect information</term><term>Political economy</term><term>Poor stream</term><term>Present paper</term><term>Previous example</term><term>Production correspondences</term><term>Proof mimics</term><term>Recursive</term><term>Recursive optimality equations</term><term>Ricardian equivalence</term><term>Section lemma</term><term>Section model</term><term>Smallest interval</term><term>Special case</term><term>Spurious valuations</term><term>Streufert</term><term>Strict consistency</term><term>Such equilibria</term><term>Such preferences</term><term>Sufficient condition</term><term>Sufficient statistic</term><term>Time additivity</term><term>Time period</term><term>Topological</term><term>Upper convergence</term><term>Upper convergent</term><term>Useful models</term><term>Utility barrier</term><term>Utility function</term><term>Utility function stream</term><term>Utility functions</term><term>Utility sequence</term><term>Value functions</term><term>Values streams</term><term>Weak consistency</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Abstract: This paper considers the subgame-perfect equilibria, in Markov strategies, of an abstract intergenerational game in which the generations' preferences are consistent in the sense that they admit recursive aggregators. Given biconvergence, I show that such equilibria exist and are equivalent both to the solutions of Bellman's recursive optimality equations and to the optima of the first generation's utility function. These results are then applied to a simple model casting new light on the neutrality of government debt, and to another accommodating impure altruism. Finally, two new examples crisply illustrate how the paper's equivalences fail when biconvergence fails.</div></front></TEI><affiliations><list><country><li>États-Unis</li></country><region><li>Wisconsin</li></region></list><tree><country name="États-Unis"><region name="Wisconsin"><name sortKey="Streufert, Peter A" sort="Streufert, Peter A" uniqKey="Streufert P" first="Peter A." last="Streufert">Peter A. Streufert</name></region></country></tree></affiliations></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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