ALTRUISM AND BENEFIT‐COST ANALYSIS
Identifieur interne : 000871 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000870; suivant : 000872ALTRUISM AND BENEFIT‐COST ANALYSIS
Auteurs : John QuigginSource :
- Australian Economic Papers [ 0004-900X ] ; 1997-06.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Aggregate, Altruism, Altruistic, Altruistic concern, Altruistic concerns, Altruistic members, Altruistic preferences, Arbitrary project, Benefit cost analysis, Canadian journal, Costly transfers, Current generation, Deadweight loss, Decision process, Endogenous welfare weights, Existence value, Existence values, Family members, First agent, First term, Future generations, Individual consumption bundles, Isolation paradox, Moral beliefs, More weight, Papers june, Policy analysis, Policy conclusions, Policy implications, Policy proposal, Possible responses, Precise line, Public economics, Quarterly journal, Redistribution, Redistributive projects, Second agent, Sectarian preferences, Sens analysis, Single individuals, Social rate, Standard benefit cost analysis, Total valuation, Total valuation framework, Traditional benefit cost analysis, Universalist benevolence, Utility function, Water resources research, Welfare analysis, Welfare economics, Welfare weight, Welfare weights.
Abstract
The central theoretical achievement of classical and neoclassical economics is the demonstration, summed up by Adam Smiths metaphor of the invisible hand, that the interaction of selfish economic agents may produce a mutually beneficial, and Pareto‐optimal outcome. The assumption that economic agents are selfish has been criticised both as empirically inaccurate (Margolis, 1982; Quiggin, 1987) and as likely to generate anti‐social attitudes in those who hold it (Marwell and Ames, 1981). There has, therefore, been considerable interest in economic behaviour and policy analysis when agents are altruistic.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8454.1997.tb00827.x
Affiliations:
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Le document en format XML
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