Serveur d'exploration Hippolyte Bernheim

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Adaptive behavior and coordination failure

Identifieur interne : 000855 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000854; suivant : 000856

Adaptive behavior and coordination failure

Auteurs : John B. Van Huyck [États-Unis] ; Joseph P. Cook [États-Unis] ; Raymond C. Battalio [États-Unis]

Source :

RBID : ISTEX:7ACB4C4C5AECAE02F36F49B1B1A9658C2CC334ED

English descriptors

Abstract

Abstract: We use the experimental method to study people's adaptive behavior in a generic game with multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. The experiment was designed to discover if behavior diverged at the separatrix predicted by the fictitious play dynamic. The equilibrium selected was sensitive to small differences in initial conditions as predicted. The experiment provides some striking examples of coordination failure growing from small historical accidents.

Url:
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00007-3


Affiliations:


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