Does the government crowd-out private donations? New evidence from a sample of non-profit firms
Identifieur interne : 000780 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000779; suivant : 000781Does the government crowd-out private donations? New evidence from a sample of non-profit firms
Auteurs : A. Abigail Payne [Canada]Source :
- Journal of Public Economics [ 0047-2727 ] ; 1998.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- 2sls, Additional dollar, Adequate housing, Altruistic behavior, Capita income, Capita income3type, Capita unemployment, Caput, Charitable, Charitable activity, Charitable contributions, Charitable donations, Charitable goods, Charitable organizations, Charity donations, Constant dollars, Constant elasticity, Cooperative economics, Democratic governor3type, Democratic party, Democratic senators, Democratic senators ratio, Dollar increase, Domestic violence, Donation, Donor, Economic conditions, Economic journal, Economic measures, Economic variables, Effects effects, Empirical model, Endogeneity, Exogenous, Exogenous measures, Federal education, Food stamps, Funding, Good change, Government contract, Government contributions, Government expenditures, Government funding, Government grant, Government grants, Government grants term, Government policy, Government spending, Government transfer payments, Government transfers, Governmental transfers, Hausman tests, Heterogeneity, Human services, Human services organizations, Impure altruism, Individual transfers, Instruments firm, Legislators ratio, Local level, Organizations crime, Other individuals, Other measures, Other organizations, Other types, Panel data, Passive players, Payne journal, Political economy, Political measures, Political variables, Positive government grants, Possible endogeneity, Potential endogeneity, Poverty rate, Private donations, Private donors, Private goods, Private provision, Private spending, Program service revenue, Public contributions, Public donations, Public economics, Public goods, Public radio stations, Public safety, Representatives ratio, Same state, Second stage regression, Shelter category, Shelter organizations, Social services, Stage process, Stage regression, Standard error, Standard errors, State level, State population, State population3type, Such things, Total house, Total state, Transfer payments, Unemployment rate, Unemployment rate3type, Utility function, Year effects effects, Year effects effects firm, Youth food, Youth population rate.
Abstract
Abstract: During the 1980s, government grants to non-profit organizations declined dramatically and the price of private donations increased. Given there are different costs associated with government grants and private donations to non-profits, it is important to study the relationship between these two sources and determine whether government grants `crowd-out' private donations. I take a fresh look at the issue of crowd-out and improve upon the literature by exploiting a panel data set that links private donations to non-profit firms with the government grants they received. I study 430 non-profit shelter, human services, and other similar types of organizations that were in operation between 1982 and 1992. I find private donations to these non-profits effectively do not change with changes in government grants after controlling for firm heterogeneity and political and economic factors under an OLS specification. In a 2SLS specification, after controlling for possible endogeneity of the government grants the estimated crowd-out is significantly different from zero and one dollar; on average, the estimated crowd-out is ∼50 cents.
Url:
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00005-X
Affiliations:
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Le document en format XML
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<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Abstract: During the 1980s, government grants to non-profit organizations declined dramatically and the price of private donations increased. Given there are different costs associated with government grants and private donations to non-profits, it is important to study the relationship between these two sources and determine whether government grants `crowd-out' private donations. I take a fresh look at the issue of crowd-out and improve upon the literature by exploiting a panel data set that links private donations to non-profit firms with the government grants they received. I study 430 non-profit shelter, human services, and other similar types of organizations that were in operation between 1982 and 1992. I find private donations to these non-profits effectively do not change with changes in government grants after controlling for firm heterogeneity and political and economic factors under an OLS specification. In a 2SLS specification, after controlling for possible endogeneity of the government grants the estimated crowd-out is significantly different from zero and one dollar; on average, the estimated crowd-out is ∼50 cents.</div>
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