Can Latent Groups Influence Policy Decisions? The Case of Telecommunications Policy

Can Latent Groups Influence Policy Decisions? The Case of Telecommunications Policy

Source :

• Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization [ 8756-6222 ] ; 2003-04-01.

English descriptors

• Teeft :
  • 3sls 3sls instrument, Actual support, American journal, Bell system, Business subscribers, Business users, Cambridge university press, Cast ballots, Collective action, Collective action theory, Constituency, Cost allocation, Cost allocations, Dependent variables, Electoral constituencies, Electoral institutions, Electoral participation, Empirical evidence, Exchange carriers, Favorable policy outcomes, Favorable policy treatment, Federal communications, Federal legislators, Formal institutions, Formal treatment, Fundamental components, Group members, Harvard university press, Heavy users, Home page, Independent variables, Informal constraints, Informal institutions, Informal norm, Instrument perot, Interest groups, Interested groups, Interested players, Joint board, Latent group, Latent groups, Latent groups policy decisions, Lecs, Local cost allocation, Local exchange, Local exchange cost allocations, Local exchange costs, Local exchange estimation method, Local exchange policy, Local exchange prices, Local exchange service, Local exchange service cost, Local exchange services, Local services, Long distance, Long distance sector, Long distance services, Loop cost, Menu auction game, Negative relationship, Nonpecuniary, Nonpecuniary considerations, Observable implication, Other hand, Other words, Parameter estimates, Perot, Perot supporters, Perot turnout, Perot voters, Policy decisions, Policy outcomes, Political agent, Political agents, Political allocations, Political capabilities, Political economy, Political forces, Political participation, Political support, Positive relationship, Present section, Presidential campaign, Presidential election, Productive suppliers, Pucs, Rational choice models, Registration rules, Regressor, Relevant costs, Residential subscribers, Residential users, Resource cost, Separate estimation method, Separations decisions, Several channels, Standard deviation, Standard deviation increase, Standard errors, Subscriber, Telecommunication, Telecommunications industry, Telecommunications network, Telecommunications policy, Telecommunications services, Turnout, Unorganized groups, Unreported regressions, User, Users face, Utility commissioners, Utility commissions, Voter, Voter registration, Voter turnout, Voting calculus, Voting costs, Yale university press.

Abstract

• https://api.istex.fr/document/9568B9E87E5328874D996663DFEC3AEC0B924258/fulltext/pdf

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