Mutual Optimism and War
Identifieur interne : 000393 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000392; suivant : 000394Mutual Optimism and War
Auteurs : Mark Fey ; Kristopher W. Ramsay [États-Unis]Source :
- American Journal of Political Science [ 0092-5853 ] ; 2007-10.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Action space, American journal, Arbitrary event, Asymmetric information, Bargaining game, Bargaining power, Bargaining process, Bayesian, Bruce bueno, Bueno, Cambridge university press, Cognitive biases, Commitment problems, Common knowledge, Common priors, Common priors assumption, Common state space, Companion paper, Complete information, Conditional expectation, Conditional probability, Correlated equilibria, Country possibility correspondence, Crisis situation, Decision maker, Decision makers, Decision rules, Democratic peace, Disjoint sets, Econometrica, Equilibrium, Equilibrium outcome, Extensive form, Extensive form games, Face value, Fearon, Formation structure, Geanakoplos, Generalized information structure, Generalized information structures, Generalized partitions, High demand, High number, High probability, High roll, Incentive compatibility, Incomplete information, Inconsistent beliefs, Inefficient wars, Information partitions, Information processing, Information sets, Information structure, Information structures, International relations, John geanakoplos, Kristopher, Likely outcome, Main result, Mesquita, Military strategy, Mutual, Mutual optimism, Mutual optimism argument, Mutual optimism explanation, Mutual optimism game, Mutual optimism hypothesis, Mutual optimism result, Negotiation stage, Nestedness, Next section, Nite game, Noncommon, Noncommon priors, Noncommon priors framework, Nondeluded, Nonpartitional information structure, Optimism, Optimism result, Other causes, Other hand, Partition, Partitional, Partitional information structure, Payoff, Peaceful settlement, Players share, Political science, Possibility correspondence, Possibility correspondences, Posterior belief, Princeton university press, Private information, Process information, Propositions show, Public event, Public events, Ramsay, Rational actors, Rational bayesian, Rational decision makers, Rational player, Rational players, Rationalist explanations, Rationalist framework, Rationality, Resolution wittman, Risky asset, Same conclusion, Same element, Same result, Same time, Second assumption, Settlement outcome, Settlement procedure, Simple example, Single country, Single state, Stam, State space, Strategic equivalence, Strategic form game, Strategic situations, Strategy profile, Sufficient conditions, Theoretical results, Tough type, Troop quality, True state, Unpleasant information, Utility function, Utility functions, Weak type, Wittman.
Abstract
Working with the definition of mutual optimism as war due to inconsistent beliefs, we formalize the mutual optimism argument to test the theory's logical validity. We find that in the class of strategic situations where mutual optimism is a necessary condition for war—i.e., where war is known to be inefficient, war only occurs if both sides prefer it to a negotiated settlement, and on the eve of conflict war is self‐evident—then there is no Bayesian‐Nash equilibrium where wars are fought because of mutual optimism. The fundamental reason that mutual optimism cannot lead to war is that if both sides are willing to fight, each side should infer that they have either underestimated the strength of the opponent or overestimated their own strength. In either case, these inferences lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. We also show that this result extends to situations in which there is bounded rationality and/or noncommon priors.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00278.x
Affiliations:
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Le document en format XML
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<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Working with the definition of mutual optimism as war due to inconsistent beliefs, we formalize the mutual optimism argument to test the theory's logical validity. We find that in the class of strategic situations where mutual optimism is a necessary condition for war—i.e., where war is known to be inefficient, war only occurs if both sides prefer it to a negotiated settlement, and on the eve of conflict war is self‐evident—then there is no Bayesian‐Nash equilibrium where wars are fought because of mutual optimism. The fundamental reason that mutual optimism cannot lead to war is that if both sides are willing to fight, each side should infer that they have either underestimated the strength of the opponent or overestimated their own strength. In either case, these inferences lead to a peaceful settlement of the dispute. We also show that this result extends to situations in which there is bounded rationality and/or noncommon priors.</div>
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