Serveur d'exploration Hippolyte Bernheim

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Viewpoint: On the generalizability of lab behaviour to the field

Identifieur interne : 000383 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000382; suivant : 000384

Viewpoint: On the generalizability of lab behaviour to the field

Auteurs : Steven D. Levitt [États-Unis] ; John A. List [États-Unis]

Source :

RBID : ISTEX:3777A3B0E1B81E5D313F8E99A2FEECE9672D4A21

English descriptors

Abstract

Abstract.  We can think of no question more fundamental to experimental economics than understanding whether, and under what circumstances, laboratory results generalize to naturally occurring environments. In this paper, we extend Levitt and List (2006) to the class of games in which financial payoffs and ‘doing the right thing’ are not necessarily in conflict. We argue that behaviour is crucially linked to not only the preferences of people, but also the properties of the situation. By doing so, we are able to provide a road map of the psychological and economic properties of people and situations that might interfere with generalizability of laboratory result from a broad class of games.
Il n'y a pas de question plus fondamentale en économie expérimentale que de savoir si et en quelles circonstances les résultats de laboratoire peuvent être généralisés à ce qui se passe sur le terrain. Dans ce texte, on développe les résultats de Levitt et List (2006) pour les appliquer à une classe de jeux dans lesquels les résultats financiers et ≪faire la bonne chose≫ ne sont pas nécessairement des choix conflictuels. Le comportement n'est pas une simple question de préférences des gens mais aussi un écho des propriétés de l'environnement. Il devient alors possible de proposer une image des propriétés psychologiques et économiques des gens et des situations qui pourraient empêcher qu'on généralise les résultats de laboratoire à une classe plus vaste de jeux.

Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00412.x


Affiliations:


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<div type="abstract">Abstract.  We can think of no question more fundamental to experimental economics than understanding whether, and under what circumstances, laboratory results generalize to naturally occurring environments. In this paper, we extend Levitt and List (2006) to the class of games in which financial payoffs and ‘doing the right thing’ are not necessarily in conflict. We argue that behaviour is crucially linked to not only the preferences of people, but also the properties of the situation. By doing so, we are able to provide a road map of the psychological and economic properties of people and situations that might interfere with generalizability of laboratory result from a broad class of games.</div>
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