Global Social Interactions with Sequential Binary Decisions: The Case of Marriage, Divorce, and Stigma
Identifieur interne : 000215 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000214; suivant : 000216Global Social Interactions with Sequential Binary Decisions: The Case of Marriage, Divorce, and Stigma
Auteurs : Finn Christensen [États-Unis] ; Juergen Jung [États-Unis]Source :
- The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics [ 1935-1704 ] ; 2010-10-24.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Action increases, Average level, Choice sets, Christensen, Cient, Complementarity, Concrete model, Conformity, Conformity increases, Conformity obtains, Continuous actions, Cuto, Decision node, Decision nodes, Decisions table, Divorce decision, Divorce decisions, Divorce multiplier, Divorce rate, Divorce stigma, Divorce threshold, Durlauf, Dynamic analogue, Dynamic system, Economic studies, Empirical distribution, Empirical implications, Empirical tests, Entire population, Equilibrium, Equilibrium response, Equilibrium system, Facebook, Full expressions, General conditions, Glaeser, Global, Global attractor, Greater homogeneity, Guarantee uniqueness, Hand side, Harvard university press, Health economics, Helpful comments, Horst, Implicit function theorem, Increase heterogeneity, Individual preferences, Individual response, Juergen jung, Jung, Labor markets, Liapunov function, Life stage, Lower divorce threshold, Lower marriage selectivity, Maid stigma, Marginal couple, Marginal increase, Marginal pair, Marital status, Marriage decision, Marriage increases, Marriage selectivity, Matrix, Matrix norm, Maximum value, More time, Multidimensional choice, Multiple decisions, Multiple equilibria, Multiplier, Nancial assets, Numerical example, Numerical examples, Obtains, Optimal strategy, Other agents, Other contexts, Other words, Payo, Peer, Peer group, Peer groups, Period timing, Point theorem, Positive measure, Possible life paths, Private payo, Qualitative nature, Quality marriages, Quarterly journal, Random vector, Real line, Reference group, Right hand side, Same direction, Scheinkman, Second period, Selection device, Selectivity, Sequential, Sequential actions, Single pool, Singlehood, Singlehood multiplier, Singles, Social environment, Social incentive, Social interactions, Social multiplier, Social multipliers, Social payo, Social value, Stability theory, Stable equilibrium, State variables, Stigma, Stochastic dominance, Strategic complementarities, Theoretical economics, Towson university, Traditional models, Uence, Unique equilibrium, Unit decrease, Upper limit, Value example, Vector norm, Young marriage, Young people.
Abstract
This paper studies global social interactions in a stylized model of marriage and divorce with complementarities across agents. The key point of departure from traditional models of social interactions is that actions are interrelated and sequential. We establish existence and uniqueness results akin to those in traditional models. In contrast to these models, however, we show that the presence of strategic complementarities is no longer sufficient to generate a social multiplier that exceeds one in this environment. Self-fulfilling conformity, whereby a greater desire to conform at the individual level leads to greater homogeneity of choices in the aggregate, is not retained either. Some empirical implications are also discussed.
Url:
DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1652
Affiliations:
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Le document en format XML
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<term>Complementarity</term>
<term>Concrete model</term>
<term>Conformity</term>
<term>Conformity increases</term>
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<term>Decisions table</term>
<term>Divorce decision</term>
<term>Divorce decisions</term>
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<term>Liapunov function</term>
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<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">This paper studies global social interactions in a stylized model of marriage and divorce with complementarities across agents. The key point of departure from traditional models of social interactions is that actions are interrelated and sequential. We establish existence and uniqueness results akin to those in traditional models. In contrast to these models, however, we show that the presence of strategic complementarities is no longer sufficient to generate a social multiplier that exceeds one in this environment. Self-fulfilling conformity, whereby a greater desire to conform at the individual level leads to greater homogeneity of choices in the aggregate, is not retained either. Some empirical implications are also discussed.</div>
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