Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals with Asymmetric Information

Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals with Asymmetric Information

Source :

• Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy [ 1538-0645 ] ; 2003-12-31.

English descriptors

• Teeft :
  • Adverse selection, Adverse selection problem, Agency problem, Asymmetric, Asymmetric information, Asymmetric information works, Cambridge university press, Chapel hill, Claudio mezzetti, Common agency, Common agency model, Common agency models, Common agency problem, Comparative advantage, Competitive industry, Cooperative equilibrium, Cooperative governments, Cooperative outcome, Cost function, Development economics, Different technologies, Direct mechanism, Direct mechanisms, Dirty industry, Disutility, Domestic production, Economic analysis, Economic analysis policy, Economic growth, Economic studies, Economic theory, Empirical implications, Empirical studies, Environmental economics, Environmental regulation, Environmental regulations, Equilibrium, Equilibrium output levels, Externality, Extraction, Foreign country, Foreign government, Foreign governments, Foreign maximization problem, Foreign objective function, Foreign output, Foreign output scheme, Foreign production, Foreign residents, Foreign schemes, Free trade, Freer trade, Full information, General case, Global implementability, Gresik, Grossman, Henk folmer, Higher information rent, Home attempt, Home country, Home government, Home maximization problem, Home output, Home output level, Home production, Home rent extraction attempt, Home residents, Imperfect information, Implementability, Implementable, Incomplete information, Individual welfare, Information cost, Information rent, Information rent extraction behavior, Information rents, International economics, International trade, Jean tirole, Joint welfare, Last term, Lower output, Marginal cost, Marginal disutility, Martimort, Mezzetti, Monotonicity, Monotonicity condition, Moral hazard, Moral hazard problem, More pollution, Multinational, Multinational firms, Multinationals, Multiple equilibria, Nash, Nash equilibrium, Objective function, Objective functions, Optimal choice, Optimal output, Order condition, Order conditions, Other hand, Output levels, Output scheme, Overall effect, Perfect information, Pollution, Pollution emissions, Pollution haven, Pollution haven hypothesis, Pollution havens, Pollution intensity, Pollution reduction, Private information, Production technology, Public economics, Rand journal, Regulatory agencies, Regulatory regime, Rent extraction, Rent extraction behavior, Rent extraction effect, Rent extraction incentive, Resource economics, Resource users, Revelation principle, Right hand side, Same output, Same technology, Scale effect, Second order derivatives, Second term, Single problem, Social welfare, Special case, Standard result, Strategic interaction, Superior information, Technique effect, Third term, Total output, Transboundary, Transboundary pollution, Transfer scheme, Transfer schemes, Transportation costs, True technology, Uninformed, Uninformed government, Uninformed principals, World bank, World price, World welfare.

Abstract

• https://api.istex.fr/document/CB598FDFC2CAFB52ED0E094A1D97BFC85B5B07AB/fulltext/pdf

Affiliations:

• États-Unis

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