The Social Ethics of Agnes Heller
Identifieur interne : 000818 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000817; suivant : 000819The Social Ethics of Agnes Heller
Auteurs : Clifford G. ChristiansSource :
- Qualitative inquiry [ 1077-8004 ] ; 2002-08.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Abstract ethics, Agnes, Agnes heller, Arendt, Basil blackwell, Burnheim, California press, Chicago press, Communication ethics, Decisive question, Dynamic justice, Emotional intensity, Ethics, Everyday life, Feminist, Feminist ethics, General ethics, Good life, Good persons, Habermas, Heller, Human beings, Human bond, Human condition, Human race, Moral consciousness, Moral philosophy, Nussbaum, Personal attachments, Philosophical anthropology, Philosophical ethics, Principled politics, Public sphere, Qualitative inquiry, Rodopi, Social ethics, Social philosophy.
Abstract
Heller’s trilogy developing a theory of social ethics is grounded in the decisive question of how good persons are possible. She disavows an abstract ethics of rules, so she does not build an ethical system but observes the lives of good persons. She focuses on healthy everyday lives rather than constructing an essentialist human nature. The key issue in social ethics is dynamic justice with three dimensions: (a) optimal possibility for developing natural capacities to the maximum, (b) active involvement as a citizen, and (c) emotional intensity in close personal attachments. She refuses to discount the rational and radical and contributes a fresh understanding of emancipatory praxis to social justice.
Url:
DOI: 10.1177/10778004008004002
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:CF0A1D456C137E99DBE911A00B8A70490A31CC11Le document en format XML
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1996a, p. 3</json:string><json:string>Benhabib & Dallmayr, 1990</json:string><json:string>Vajda, 1994, p. 17</json:string><json:string>August 2002</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987a, p. 320</json:string><json:string>Wolin, 1994, p. 138</json:string><json:string>Márkus, 1994, p. 260</json:string><json:string>Heller (1957)</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1990b, p. 69</json:string><json:string>Jay, 1994, p. 41</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987a, p. 167</json:string><json:string>Camps, 1994, p. 246</json:string><json:string>1974, 1990, 1998</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987a, p. 319</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1990b, p. 41</json:string><json:string>Taylor et al., 1994, p. 26</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1994, p. 308</json:string><json:string>1992, 1997</json:string><json:string>Jay (1994)</json:string><json:string>Bauman, 1994, p. 116</json:string><json:string>Camps, 1994, p. 240</json:string><json:string>Burnheim, 1994, p. 14</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987a, p. 313</json:string><json:string>Habermas, 1990</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987a, p. 183</json:string><json:string>Nussbaum, 2000, p. 6</json:string><json:string>1982, 1983</json:string><json:string>Camps, 1994, p. 239</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1994, p. 307</json:string><json:string>Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988</json:string><json:string>Denzin, 1997, p. 284</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987a, p. 281</json:string><json:string>Heller (1994)</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987b</json:string><json:string>Nussbaum, 2000, p. 5</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987a, p. 323</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987a, p. 5</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1987a, p. 317</json:string><json:string>Heller, 1984b, p. 15</json:string><json:string>Taylor et al., 1994, p. 52</json:string><json:string>Murphy, 1994, p. 171</json:string><json:string>1993, 1999, 2000</json:string><json:string>Márkus, 1994, p. 268</json:string><json:string>Kadarkay, 1991, p. 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She disavows an abstract ethics of rules, so she does not build an ethical system but observes the lives of good persons. She focuses on healthy everyday lives rather than constructing an essentialist human nature. The key issue in social ethics is dynamic justice with three dimensions: (a) optimal possibility for developing natural capacities to the maximum, (b) active involvement as a citizen, and (c) emotional intensity in close personal attachments. 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<contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Christians</surname><given-names>Clifford G.</given-names></name><aff>University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign</aff></contrib></contrib-group>
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<p>
<italic>Heller’s trilogy developing a theory of social ethics is grounded in the decisive question of how good persons are possible. She disavows an abstract ethics of rules, so she does not build an ethical system but observes the lives of good persons. She focuses on healthy everyday lives rather than constructing an essentialist human nature. The key issue in social ethics is dynamic justice with three dimensions: (a) optimal possibility for developing natural capacities to the maximum, (b) active involvement as a citizen, and (c) emotional intensity in close personal attachments. She refuses to discount the rational and radical and contributes a fresh understanding of emancipatory praxis to social justice.</italic>
</p>
</abstract><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>sagemeta-type</meta-name><meta-value>Journal Article</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>search-text</meta-name><meta-value> QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 Christians / SOCIAL ETHICS OF AGNES HELLER The Social Ethics of Agnes Heller Clifford G. Christians University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Heller's trilogy developing a theory of social ethics is grounded in the decisive question of how good persons are possible. She disavows an abstract ethics of rules, so she does not build an ethical system but observes the lives of good persons. She focuses on healthy everyday lives rather than constructing an essentialist human nature. The key issue in social ethics is dynamic justice with three dimensions: (a) optimal possibility for develop- ing natural capacities to the maximum, (b) active involvement as a citizen, and (c) emo- tional intensity in close personal attachments. She refuses to discount the rational and radical and contributes a fresh understanding of emancipatory praxis to social justice. Agnes Heller is the Hannah Arendt Professor of Philosophy at the New School for Social Research in New York. Star student of Hungarian Georg Lukcs and professor at the University of Budapest and at the Institute of Sociology until her dismissal in 1973, Heller's work has developed into one of philosophy's "boldest and most far reaching efforts to formulate a radical ethic consistent with the modern condition" (Murphy, 1994, p. 169). Agnes Heller was born in Budapest in 1929 into an intellectual world dom- inated by Georg Lukcs (1885-1971). Considered "the greatest Marxist intel- lectual of the twentieth century" (Kadarkay, 1991, p. 3), Lukcs opposed offi- cial Stalinism as a crude ideology and worked for the revival of Marxist humanism. He sought to retrieve the "basic theoretical ideas and intentions of Marx" and develop an "emancipatory social theory" by applying those basic ideas to the contemporary problems Marx himself could not or did not address (Mrkus, 1994, pp. 267-268).1 What later came to be called the Buda- pest School in the 1960s and 1970s was an informal "but closely knit group of like-minded philosophers, literary theoreticians, and sociologists" commit- ted to his renaissance of Marxism. Agnes Heller was a "central figure in the School" (Mrkus, 1994, p. 267). Heller (1957) wrote her dissertation under the supervision of Lukcs in the early 1950s on the ethical views of Chernyshevskii, a Russian follower of Feuerbach. She published it in 1957 as her first book and in that year began teaching a course on general ethics at the University of Budapest as Lukcs's assistant. During this period--"as so often in his life"--Lukcs was "in dis- grace with the authorities." He had been removed as a professor of philoso- phy and interned to Romania as Heller began teaching for him. "To become 411 Qualitative Inquiry, Volume 8 Number 4, 2002 411-428 2002 Sage Publications his student and follower was not only an intellectual, but also a political choice that only a few wished to risk" (Mrkus, 1994, p. 260). In 1958, all academic associates of Lukcs who refused to denounce him publicly were fired. Heller was condemned for not representing class inter- ests as the supreme criterion in her lectures on ethics and was banned from publication. During the Kdrian politics of "controlled and selective recon- ciliation," Heller was hired in 1963 by the Institute of Sociology where she taught and wrote until 1973, when the leading representatives of the Buda- pest School were removed by Hungarian authorities from all academic posi- tions on "the venerable charge of spiritual corruption of the unexperienced youth" (Mrkus, 1994, pp. 265, 280).2 After 5 years of unemployment, she emi- gratedtoAustraliain1977forapositionatLaTrobeUniversityinMelbourne. In 1985, Heller accepted an appointment as a professor of philosophy at the New School for Social Research, and in 1986, she was inaugurated in the Hannah Arendt Chair. As Martin Jay (1994) observed, there have been few more strikingly appropriate academic honors than the selection of Agnes Heller as the New School's Hannah Arendt Professor of Phi- losophy. For the holder of the chair and the thinker after whom it is named are inextricably linked in a myriad of important ways. . . . Born a generation apart (Arendt in 1906), both were products of that remarkably creative, if often rest- lessly tormented . . . Central European Jewry. Although the two never actually met, . . . Arendt has been Heller's sub rosa intellectual companion for at least the past two decades. . . . Heller's work can be construed as a subtle response to Arendt's, often in the form of a meditation on the same themes in the changing context of a later day. (Jay, 1994, p. 41)3 Although not accepting Arendt's dismissal of Marx, Heller has found many of Arendt's arguments compatible "in her own gradual move away from the strong version of the Marxist Humanism she absorbed from Lukcs" (Jay, 1994, p. 53; cf. Heller, 1982, 1999, chap. 2). Given her personal struggles with Hungarian Communism, her ongoing critical examination of Lukcs as in The Theory of Needs in Marx, and the political upheavals she witnessed in Central and Eastern Europe, Heller's repudiation of a Marxist philosophy of history is more complicated and nuanced than Arendt's (cf. Heller, 1983). As Heller (1994) wrote, having Lukcs for a mentor was one of the main good fortunes (and luxuries) of my life. . . . The density of his personality and his passion for speculative think- ing [were] overwhelming. I looked up to him with respect and awe, and yet, at the same time, I talked to him as to my equal. He encouraged me to do just this, by accepting it as a "natural" thing. Perhaps this is why I never developed "com- plexes" when I realized that I could not believe anymore in many things he did. And there was another reason too. I did not only have Lukcs as a mentor, I also happened to be a member of a group of young philosophers who were my friends. It was in this peer group that we all began to learn how to fly. Later on we flew in different directions. . . . We became "idiosyncratic" thinkers, just like the rest of our contemporaries. But that this school once existed I still see as a bless- 412 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 ing, as the major source of that light which illuminated life's path in those dark times. (p. 311) GOOD PERSONS Heller's (1988b, 1990b, 1996a) trilogy, developing a contemporary theory of social ethics, revolves around what she calls the decisive question of how good persons are possible. As she puts it in the first volume, General Ethics (1988b), there is indeed one decisive question I raise and try to answer throughout the whole inquiry. . . . The fundamental question addressed is: "Good persons exist--how are they possible?" This question will be answered in the first part [1988b] from the position of theoretical reason (that of the participant observer), in the second part [1990b] from the position of practical reason (that of the partic- ipant member of the contemporary world), and in the third part [1996a] from the position of the human person as a whole (that of the individual who seeks the good life). (pp. 6-7) Mainstream ethics asks, instead, How is moral knowledge possible? Anglophone philosophy tends first of all to construct theories and to use real- life application only secondarily to test them. Heller's project is the more diffi- cult one of "elucidat[ing] experience in its broadest dimensions." She shows "that being a good person is a realisable option, one that some people actually embrace successfully. The task is to get a clear view of all that is involved in doing so" and includes "conceptual, empirical, evaluative and theoretical considerations . . . all focused on actual moral experience" (Burnheim, 1994, pp. 9-10). This is a substantial alternative to constructing an ethical system from a priori rules or reducing the moral agent to a calculator of least-risky options. "Her search is for 'orientative' rather than strictly 'prohibitive' norms" (Burnheim, 1994, p. 14).4 In fact, she disavows an abstract ethics of rules and ideals external to human beings. Ethics never "starts from scratch. Moral philosophy cannot be 'invented,' it is rather 'found' in the 'real life morality' of (good) persons and then enlarged" (Heller, 1994, p. 307). The moral philosopher speaks as a member of a community, as a member of the human race or, as I have been doing, as a contingent person like others. Moral philosophy is a speech act in a practical discourse. . . . I bring to the surface, as well as subject to theoretical scrutiny, moral norms which have been unearthed, invented,followedandobservedby goodpersons.(Heller, 1990b, pp. 170, 230) In Heller's terms, morals belong to the human condition; there are immoral but no amoral persons. The existential choice of humans for good- ness is the basis for claiming that good persons are possible. Thus, as Heller described her work in A Philosophy of Morals, she did not build a system but Christians / SOCIAL ETHICS OF AGNES HELLER 413 observed "good persons in their lives. I gave a report of their predicaments and noted how they dealt with them. . . . I wanted to be a thorough reporter, eager to accompany decent persons wherever they went, whatever they did" (Heller, 1994, p. 308). Exceptional acts of responsibility under duress and pre- dicaments, each in its own way, are especially "worthy of theoretical interest" (Heller, 1996a, p. 3). Accumulated wisdom from human struggles and moral meaning from choices of decency together reintroduce love, happiness, sym- pathy, and beauty into a comprehensive and nonabsolutist, but principled, theory of morals. In formal terms, "a person is good if he or she prefers to suffer wrong rather than to wrong others" (Heller, 1988b, p. 174). Heller chooses Plato's version, which she summarized this way: "The righteous person is the person who prefers suffering injustice (being wronged) to committing injustice (doing wrong), where committing injustice means infringing moral norms in direct relation to other people" (Heller, 1987a, p. 279). She recognizes that it is impossible to prove that suffering injustice is better than committing it. In fact, it often seems irrational "to opt for honesty and goodness even though these qualities may not bring obvious benefits" (Camps, 1994, p. 239). But this affirmation is the cornerstone of her ethics nonetheless. Trying to answer the question of why some people prefer justice is unproductive. "The first ingre- dient of the good life is righteousness, that is, preferring good rather than evil. . . . Certainly there are persons who demonstrate their moral autonomy in this way," whether we know why or not (Camps, 1994, p. 240). Aphysician trained in the Royal College of Surgeons chooses a leper colony near Cairo rather than practicing medicine among the wealthy in London. Aperson suf- fers slander in order not to betray the confidence of a friend (Heller, 1987a, p. 319). The Holocaust is a defining evil of the 20th century. However, it cannot be understood only in terms of Hitler. One must account for Oscar Schindler and the benefactors of Anne Frank. "No matter where we look, we shall always find righteous people. Whether such people are few or many is irrele- vant. They exist" (Heller, 1987a, p. 281). The issue is not only the nature of good persons but how the good life is possible. That is, how can we enjoy our own lives and look after our own hap- piness without contradicting the freedom of others? For Heller, our private interests and the public interest assume and imply each other. "The recogni- tion of the other . . . is the precondition for the possibility of one's own happi- ness" (Camps, 1994, p. 241; cf. p. 247). The two fundamental values for her are freedom and life. Given that emphasis on autonomy, Heller insists on dissent. The "moral authority of a person lies" in dissent, "not in subjection to estab- lished norms" (Camps, 1994, p. 246). Heller fears moral totalitarianism, but individual freedom is not absolute. Freedom and life are inseparable. Free- dom is always carried out in the context of intersubjectivity and has its basis in the human bond. 414 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 Communities not only are linguistic entities but require at least a minimal moral commitment to the common good. Since social entities are moral orders and not merely functional arrangements, moral commitment consti- tutes the self in relation. Our identity is defined by what we consider good or worth opposing. According to Taylor (1989, pp. 27-29), only through the moral dimension can we make sense of human agency. A self exists within "webs of interlocution," and all self-interpretation implicitly or explicitly "acknowledges the necessarily social origin of any and all their conceptions of the good and so of themselves." Moral frameworks are as fundamental for orienting us in social space as the need to "establish our bearings in physical space" (Mulhall & Swift, 1996, pp. 112-113; cf. Taylor, 1989, pp. 27-29.) Heller's social ethics challenges media professionals to participate in a community's ongoing process of moral articulation. In fact, culture's contin- ued existence depends on identifying and defending its normative base. Therefore, ethnographic texts must enable us "to discover moral truths about ourselves"; narratives ought to "bring a moral compass into readers' lives" by accounting for things that matter to them (Denzin, 1997, p. 284). Heller's work seeks to engender moral reasoning, and an effective way to maintain that focus in social discourse is concentrating on her question, How are good people possible? Communities are woven together by narratives that invigo- rate their common understanding of good and evil, happiness and reward, the meaning of life and death. Recovering and refashioning moral discourse help to amplify our deepest humanness. EVERYDAY LIFE Heller's formulation of philosophy's crucial question and her under- standing of the human condition are the framework in which she develops her "highly original work on everyday life" (Burnheim, 1994, p. 12). Although she openly acknowledges the influence of 20th-century phenom- enology in opposition to a stale neo-Kantianism, one of her most laudable achievements in Everyday Life is to have supple- mented the phenomenological regard for the "things themselves" with an evaluative standpoint drawn from the tradition of Hegelian-Marxism. As a result, Heller has succeeded in transforming a philosophical doctrine-- phenomenological ontology--that at times can be stultifyingly conservative into a mode of analysis fraught with emancipatory significance and potential. (Wolin, 1994, p. 138) Heller (1984a) argued for a Lebensphilosophie that suggests useful life-forms and optimal possibilities for action while working out a social theory and in terms of philosophical anthropology.5 In resolving the central question of Christians / SOCIAL ETHICS OF AGNES HELLER 415 how good persons are possible, Heller appeals to the human context rather than to essentialist human nature. The explicit connection between a philosophical anthropology and a theory of modernity is one of the most distinctive features of Agnes Heller's work. . . . [Her] version of philosophical anthropology centers on the paradigm of the human condition, which she opposes to theories about human nature and pre- fers to the conceptions of human essence that were more characteristic of Neo- Marxistanthropology(includingsomeofherearlierworks).(Arnason,1994,p.58) The aspect of the human condition on which Heller focuses is that of con- tingency. She sees us as "the first generation who knows of the absence of its existential foundations." This is not a temporary absence or a nuisance to be overcome but an "absence one needs to accept as a fate" (Bauman, 1994, p. 116). We live with Dostoyevsky's warning, "if there is no God, everything is permissible," and with Durkheim's premonition that "if the normative grip of society slackens, the moral order will collapse." Heller calls us to "make the fate of contingency into a consciously embraced destiny." We are "the first generation capable in principle to make contingency a conscious choice and a life-building principle" (Bauman, 1994, p. 116). In pre-modern times, people were born to become this and not that. . . . The mod- ern person is born as a cluster of possibilities without telos. . . . Like a terrified man running for his life who suddenly turns around to face his assailant, mod- ern men and women now turn round to face their true historical condition after attempting to rid themselves of their contingency awareness. (Heller, 1990b, pp. 5, 125; cf. pp. 5-24) A healthy everyday life for Heller consists of balancing what she calls objectivations in themselves, for themselves, and in-and-for themselves. These three spheres correspond to everyday cultural practice; to the rules and norms of religion, art, and philosophy; and to society's institutional practices (cf. Heller, 1985, pp. 71-250). If the taken for granted rules and ways of lan- guage in themselves "are not firmly given, the basic framework of life is weakened." We need custom and norms for dealing "with everyday objects and with others" or the prospects of social integration are threatened. "If the 'higher' sphere of objectification for itself is weakened, people no longer have the means of making sense of life as a whole and becoming whole persons." When rules and norms in the institutional sphere in-and-for itself become tenuous, "a certain chaos ensues because effective social action on a rational basis is no longer possible, leading to the rule of violence" (Burnheim, 1994, p. 12).6 In her emphasis on the what and how of the moral life, Heller is neo-Aris- totelian. Instead of Kantian appeals to formal transcendental imperatives, she follows the Aristotelian tradition, which "accepts our moral 'structure' as valid and real and dedicates philosophical discourse to making it explicit" (Camps, 1994, p. 239). Heller sees Aristotle as her significant precursor 416 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 in the sphere of practical philosophical inquiry. As a rule, the history of philoso- phy has failed to live up to this Aristotelion precedent, whereby everyday life is sanctioned as a valid field of philosophical investigation. . . . For the most part, philosophical ethics has, in a neo-Platonic vein, scorned the world of everydayness as unworthy of serious philosophical scrutiny. (Wolin, 1994, pp. 138-139) "The Aristotelian world order has fallen apart," Heller (1990b) said, "but it has not taken virtues and vices with itself into the grave of history" (p. 69). Thus, she insists on virtuous character as the backbone of our different courses of conduct, that is, "the supporting center around which all experi- ences, values, value commitments, and personal commitments are crystal- lized" (Heller, 1990b, p. 69).7 In contrast to moral relativism, and rather than allowing everyday life to languish in indeterminancy, Heller emphasizes its "intrinsic potential for self-transcendence." Following the early Marx, Heller speaks of the "species- essential character" of everyday life, that is, those occasions "when its content becomes universal from the standpoint of the interests of 'humanity in gen- eral'. . . . Heller insists on the indispensable necessity of bringing questions of truth to bear on ethical matters." The process of "transforming objectivations that are merely in itself into ones that are for us" Heller identifies as the "species-essential project of the modern age" (Wolin, 1994, pp. 143-144). Heller's lifework forms a rounded whole, and the cement of this unity is her con- viction that philosophy as an objectivation for itself has the task to criticize Being in the name of Ought to. This Ought to is the unity of the True and the Good. (Vajda, 1994, p. 17) "What is the True, and what is the Good, this is what philosophy wants to know, because it loves the True and the Good" (Heller, 1984b, p. 15). DYNAMIC JUSTICE In Heller's (1988a) terms, we must go beyond the static justice of applying rules to a dynamic justice where people realize the completion of their free- dom. In the traditional understanding, "justice means the consistent and con- tinuous application of the same norms and rules to each and every member of the social cluster to which the norms and rules apply" (Heller, 1987a, p. 5). But this formal concept presumes a largely discredited scientific or quasi- scientific view of society, and it does not ensure that the rules being applied correctly are themselves just. Moreover, static justice has been emaciated by the crises of modern life. Only remnants of distributive justice remain. It is haunted by its inability to determine criteria for inequality, its struggles over which kind of inequalities beyond income matter, and how far inequalities should go (Heller, 1987a, p. 183). Retributive justice correctly insists that punishment must be propor- Christians / SOCIAL ETHICS OF AGNES HELLER 417 tional to the crime and that legal sanctions ought to be applied without revenge. However, in complicated matters, the formal justice of retribution is irresolute--whether vigorous punishment should be used to deter crimes, for example; whether the reform of criminals can occur only by "the deep inter- nalization of norms" (Heller, 1987a, p. 167); and to what extent social causes make the equal application of rules inequitable. In John Rawls's theory of jus- tice, "what is approved of is 'fairness,' the shabby remnant of the 'sum total of virtues' that was once called 'justice.' . . . In the place of socio-political justice, only minima moralis remain" (Heller, 1987a, p. 93). Three Dimensions Within the paradigm of dynamic justice, social change is not limited to "economic reforms or a wholesale change in political structures, but, instead, concerns the entirety of a way of life--human interpersonal relationships included" (Wolin, 1994, pp. 139-140). Dynamic justice is concerned not only with poverty "but with the eradication of human degradation, dependency and lack of dignity" (Murphy, 1994, p. 171). Rather than a formal righteous- ness of complying with the established rules, in dynamic justice, value dis- course is promoted in terms of the virtues of the good life: turning one's endowments into talents, vigorous involvement in public affairs, and the for- mation of close personal attachments (Heller, 1987a, pp. 313-320) that enhance the well-being of others (cf. Jacobson, 1994, p. 164; Murphy, 1994, p. 170). First, a sociopolitical world characterized by dynamic justice "offers the optimal possibility" of developing natural capacities to the maximum. In the best possible political system, no way of life involves domination; . . . there cannot exist any endowment the development of which into a talent would not be permitted. . . . Different ways of life enhance different talents, and a person is free to relinquish one way of life and take up another. (Heller, 1987a, p. 313) In the modern functionalist society, constraints on developing talents for making money have decreased, and it is easier "to maneuver well within rationalized institutions" (Heller, 1987a, p. 309). However, in dynamic justice, the process of developing our endowments is understood as the holistic con- struction of the self--moral, intellectual, artistic, and personal. And in pro- viding the best possible conditions for the good life, the key ingredient for dynamicjusticeissocialandpoliticalrulesfreeofdominationandoppression. Second, dynamic justice means control over one's affairs through active involvement in political affairs. As Aristotle did, Heller distinguishes the good person from the good citizen. "The good man shines in all virtues, while the good citizen participates in the business of the state." Good citizens inter- pret their rights as responsibilities. They are "concerned with matters of jus- 418 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 tice and injustice in the state and participate in acts which aim to remedy injustice" (Heller, 1990b, pp. 124, 147). Good citizens share the conviction that justice is the supreme public good and show a commitment to social institu- tions and the flourishing of the human race. Heller works out a politics consistent with a culturally plural universe yet promotes a political ethos that might outlive the process of fragmentation. . . . She calls this a principled politics. Aprincipled politics assumes that there are certain univer- sal principles binding on all persons, whatever their value system, which make possible the functioning of a culturally plural universe. (Murphy, 1994, pp. 194- 195) Heller's principled politics seeks to identify the preconditions that allow vari- ous value systems to coexist without destroying each other. Heller assumes not there is only one moral good but that there are several different "best pos- sible moral worlds" (Heller, 1987a, chap. 5). She does not "attempt to legislate a single way of life." Her principled politics respects heterogeneity and multi- culturalism and "defends the multiplicity of customs, individual options, and cultural traditions within any country" (Murphy, 1994, p. 197). Rather than accepting a self-contradictory relativism, Heller advocates pluralism.8 Not every practice is acceptable, but principled pluralism means that several forms of life are legitimate. Where citizens are radically tolerant, ready to participate in value discourse, refuse to treat others as mere means,9 resist domination and heirarchy, "rationally argue for their legal and policy preferences" instead of using violence or oppression--such forms of life seek- ing equal freedom for everyone and tied together by "symmetrical reciproc- ity" are all "the best possible moral worlds." In dynamic justice, different ways of life can be equally good. The values of freedom and life "provide us with the ultimate yardsticks to judge" authentic plurality. Political and social structures reflecting freedom and life meet the test (Murphy, 1994, pp. 197, 200). Third, in a world of dynamic justice, close personal attachments are enhanced. "Emotional intensity in personal attachments is a necessary con- stituent of the good life" (Heller, 1987a, p. 317). Heller understands emotional bondedness as "public happiness," that is, as choices not merely for myself but for others. The human bond we nurture interpersonally is "that which ties all human persons to each other." Making my happiness depend on the exis- tence, the well-being, of another person "makes me a full member of the human race. By being bound to one person, I am fully bound to the human race. The bond of personal attachment is the microcosm of the human bond" (Heller, 1987a, p. 319). The social world is constituted intersubjectively. Although our relations are personal, we choose them within the options and values that in fact are socially given. In choosing others, we choose the human bond and human togetherness. Christians / SOCIAL ETHICS OF AGNES HELLER 419 Personal bonds free of social domination are mutual in appearance. But hidden in emotional attachments is a paradox that my self-determination is not entirely under my own control. "If I abandon myself to another human being, I choose relative unfreedom" (Heller, 1987a, p. 317). Power is every- where, and "by definition, all forms of power restrict the self. But to rid our- selves of every form of power is equivalent to ridding ourselves of our own self" (Heller, 1987a, p. 320). The Enlightenment was wrong. There is no abso- lute autonomy, no pure freedom within the human condition. Our humanness is relational. Relations governed by rules and conventions homogenize us. However, our relations are not crippling but humane when we are bound by duty to others and by the power of love. In everyday life, the "heteronomy created by the investment of emotions is experienced as something intrinsi- cally good rather than as a curse." Even with moments of unhappiness or when a particular person becomes a curse, "in the main everyone knows that a life without any emotional intensity in personal attachments cannot be good and is not worth living." In dynamic justice, we are not constrained within the "norms and rules of superordination and subordination" but live out the good life of emotionally intense relationships (Heller, 1987a, pp. 318, 321). Cross-Cultural Setting Dynamic justice is affirmed and sustained cross-culturally. The moral bonds that are nurtured in dynamic justice flow horizontally, and obligation is reciprocal in character. In the best possible sociopolitical world of dynamic justice, we live in a "pluralistic cultural universe in which each culture is tied to every other culture by the bonds of symmetric reciprocity" (Heller, 1987a, p. 323). But the contemporary challenge of cultural diversity has raised the stakes and made easy solutions impossible. One of the most urgent and vex- ing issues on the democratic agenda at present is recognizing explicit cultural groups politically. "Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being" (Taylor et al., 1994, p. 26). However, liberal proceduralism cannot meet this vital human need. Emphasizing equal rights, with no partic- ular substantive view of the good life, "gives only a very restricted acknowl- edgement of distinct cultural identities" (Taylor et al., 1994, p. 52).10 Insisting on neutrality and living without collective aspirations produce at best only personal freedom, safety, and economic security. Unlike liberalism, the pri- mary concern of Heller's dynamic justice is not simply expanding the sphere of private choice but "eradicating those kinds of asymmetrical human rela- tionships where one person can impose upon and direct the will of another person" (Murphy, 1994, p. 171). In communal formation, the flourishing of particular cultures, religions, and citizen groups is the substantive goal to which we are morally committed as human beings. 420 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 Social ethics in Heller's model leads to resistance and empowers the inter- active self and others to action. For her, a basic norm for social narrative is enabling the humane transformation of the multiple spheres of community life--religion, politics, ethnicity, gender, and so forth. From a dialogic per- spective of his own that echoes this emphasis, Paulo Freire spoke of the need to reinvent the meaning of power. Certainly, oppressive power blocs and monopolies need the media's scrutiny--economic, technological, and politi- cal. But in concert with Heller, Freire refused to deal with power in cognitive terms only. With their political-institutional bearing, the issue is how we can empower people instead. Therefore, news narrative cannot be seen as the transmission of specialized data but is in style and content a catalyst for the "critical comprehension of reality" (Freire, 1970, p. 47). Otherwise, there is only acquiescence in the status quo. Given her political struggles, her intellectual controversies with Lukcs and Marx, and her steadfast refusal to decouple the rational and radical, Heller contributes an extraordinary understanding of emancipatory praxis to social ethics. SOCIAL AND FEMINIST ETHICS Ethical rationalism has served as the prevailing paradigm in Western com- munication ethics. Consistent with mainstream philosophical ethics gener- ally since 1890, media ethics has presumed that rationality marks all legiti- mate claims about moral obligations, so that the truth of those claims can be settled by formal examination of their logical structure. The general trend in serious-minded communication ethics entails an ethical rationalism that requires autonomous moral agents to apply rules consistently, formally, and self-consciously to every choice. Ethics centers on the rational faculties of the human species and places extraordinary emphasis on the human actor's capacity for rational thought. Making rational processes explicit has com- bined with the ancient Eurocentric emphasis on the universality of reason to create basic rules of morality that everyone is obliged to follow and against which all counterclaims about moral obligations can be measured. To begin moral reasoning with the decision-making individual has obvi- ous strengths. In this view, autonomous moral actors can be legitimately praised or blamed for choices made. Moreover, with confidence in reason, we dare to disobey divine commands and social traditions, following the test of reason instead. But rationalistic ethics is harassed on every hand these days and has lost its authority. It presumes a strong human agency in a compli- cated, interrelated globe. Privileging linear rationality in professional and practical ethics does not enable us to address institutional and structural issues. Dramatic technological innovation and the negative side of market- Christians / SOCIAL ETHICS OF AGNES HELLER 421 driven global commerce have pulled the media professions away from their traditional role of providing neutral information to facilitate democratic life. Agnes Heller points us to a new model of communication ethics. Rather than searching for neutral principles to which all parties can appeal, or accepting moral relativism uncritically, the feminist social ethics that she rep- resents is rooted in a complex view of moral judgments as integrating facts, principles, and feelings in terms of human wholeness. She escapes the reductionistic and static view of humans as rational beings while bringing our humanness decisively into the public arena. Heller's model of good per- sons, everyday life, and dynamic justice advocates an integrated view of humans as whole beings--body, mind, and spirit. Her philosophical anthro- pology reorients accountability and autonomy to contemporary conditions rather than discrediting them. Habermas's Discourse Ethics Habermas's discourse ethics is another alternative to traditional utilitar- ian rationalism and has dominated the media ethics literature since the 1990s. The translation of his Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln (Habermas, 1990) in 1990 and publication of The Communicative Ethics Contro- versy (Benhabib & Dallmayr, 1990) in the same year set the stage for the most important debates so far in communication ethics for more than a decade. Habermas (1990, 1993) replaced Kant's universalizability criterion of noncontradiction with a communication community representing their com- mon interests. He developed a procedural model of moral argumentation; "justification is tied to reasoned agreement among those subject to the norms in question" (Habermas, 1990, p. viii). Habermas understood language to be an agent of culture and social organization. Discourses are symbolic forms through which we think, argue, persuade, display convictions, and establish our identities. Narratives contain in a nutshell the meaning of our theories and beliefs. Therefore, the overriding question is whether our myriad linguis- tic forms allow everyone's interests a representative hearing. Is the moral con- sciousness of the community's members reflected in our practical discourse? Competing normative claims can be fairly adjudicated in the public sphere under ideal speech conditions such as reciprocity and openness. Habermas's critical theory contradicts the liberal democratic politics pre- sumed by traditional approaches to communication ethics. Nearly all the lit- erature in communication ethics in the West during the 20th century has taken for granted a liberal democratic political philosophy. For Habermas, moral consciousness must be nurtured instead under conditions of technoc- racy and institutional power that stifle autonomous action in the public arena (Habermas, 1998). 422 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 But is media ethics thereby home free, repositioned through Habermas for intellectual leadership as the 21st century dawns? In Nancy Fraser's (1992, 1997) view, Habermas's public sphere is an abstraction that is not deeply holistic, gender inclusive, or culturally constituted. It presumes a private- public dichotomy, with the nurturance of human intimacy constrained within the private domain. Indeed, cutting through our political assumptions is a major corrective but still insufficient in terms of the current debates in philosophical ethics as a whole. Social and Feminist Ethics During the past decade, social and feminist ethics have made a radical break with the individual autonomy and rationalist presumption of canoni- cal ethics. The social ethics of Agnes Heller, Charles Taylor, Carole Pateman, Edith Wyschogrod (1974, 1990, 1998), and Cornel West (1991) and the feminist ethics of Carol Gilligan, Ned Noddings, Virginia Held, Martha Nussbaum, and Seyla Benhabib (1992) are fundamentally reconstructing ethical theory. Rather than searching for neutral principles to which all parties can appeal, social ethics rests on a complex view of moral judgments that integrate every- day experience, beliefs about the good, and feelings of approval and shame into an organic whole in terms of human relations and social structures. This is a philosophical approach that situates the moral domain within the general purposes of human life that people share contextually and across cultural, racial, and historical boundaries. Ideally, it engenders a new occupational role and normative core for communication research. Carol Gilligan (1982, 1983; Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988) characterized the female moral voice as an ethic of care. This dimension of moral develop- ment is rooted in the primacy of human relationships. Compassion and nurturance resolve conflicting responsibilities among people, a standard totally the opposite of merely avoiding harm. Nel Noddings's (1984, p. 5; cf. 1989, 1990) Caring rejected outright the "ethics of principle as ambiguous and unstable," insisting that human care should play the central role in moral decision making. However, while sharing in this turn away from an abstract ethics of calculation, Charlene Seigfried (1996) argued against the Gilligan- Noddings tradition. Linking feminism to pragmatism, in which gender is socially constructed, she contradicted "the simplistic equation of women with care and nurturance, and men with justice and autonomy" (p. 206). Gender-based moralities actually make one gender subservient to another. In Seigfried's social ethics, gender is replaced with engendering: "To be female or male is not to instantiate an unchangeable nature but to participate in an ongoing process of negotiating cultural expectations of femininity and mas- culinity" (p. 206). She challenged us to a social morality in which caring val- Christians / SOCIAL ETHICS OF AGNES HELLER 423 ues are central but contextualized in communities with "more autonomy for women and more connectedness for men" (p. 219). Daryl Koehn (1998) also critiqued the feminist ethics of care, trust, and empathy. She likewise supported the emphasis on a relational rather than individualistic self and insisted on an empathic rather than legalistic approach to community life. However, in her view, feminist ethics shares many of the weaknesses of traditional male ethics and tends to favor the care- giver over those on the receiving end. Rethinking Feminist Ethics argued for a dialogic ethics that makes feminist ethics more credible intellectually and more viable in practical application. CONCLUSION Agnes Heller's feminist social ethics provides an ethical framework to lead us forward at this juncture.11 This is a normative model that serves as an antidote to individualist rationalism and avoids the weaknesses in Habermas's discourse ethics. This linkage takes seriously the criticisms of Koehn and thereby strengthens feminist ethics. The power of Heller's empha- ses on everyday life and dynamic justice is reaffirmed by Martha Nussbaum's similar appeals in her human capabilities approach. It parallels Seigfried's strategy although contextualizing social ethics within critical theory rather than within pragmatism. Practical and professional ethics are being situated at present in an ethics of reason. Agnes Heller's social ethics of everyday life reconceptualizes the theory-practice relationship and inscribes it in a normative model instead. The result is a new set of ethical demands for communications that are given priority over our mainstream preoccupations with privacy, accuracy, decep- tion, confidentiality of sources, informed consent, and so forth. The strategic direction of her work helps us avoid the conundrums facing Habermas, and it provides a radical alternative to ethical rationalism. NOTES 1. "The binding example in this respect was Lukcs own aesthetics" (Mrkus, 1994, p. 268). 2. The Institute years were "not barren," even though they meant "virtual internal exile" as a troublesome intellectual. For a summary of Heller's work during this decade and her intellectual struggles with Lukcs and Marx, see Mrkus (1994, pp. 265-268). 3. For two examples of how their work intersects, see Heller's inaugural address (Heller, 1990a) and an essay of hers devoted to Arendt's final work (Heller, 1987b). 4. "Care for other human beings: this is the universal orientative principle of mor- als" (Heller, 1990b, p. 41). Heller described several concrete orientative principles derived from the universal one: "Have a proper regard for other persons' vulnerabil- 424 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 ity," "do your best to alleviate another person's suffering," "help others achieve greater autonomy," and so forth (Heller, 1990b, pp. 44-49). 5. Philosophical anthropology is the branch of philosophy that reflects on the nature of our humanness. This enterprise is understood here broadly "as the philo- sophical examination of the human race." It investigates "what characteristics (if any) are both common and unique to human beings as such" or, in other words, "what the necessary and sufficient conditions of being a human being are." However, philosophi- cal anthropology is not narrowly and strictly limited to those questions, nor does it pre- suppose that there is "a human essence of some sort" (Schacht, 1990, pp. 157-158). For Richard Schacht (1990), philosophical anthropology has received little attention in Anglo-American philosophy because of the influence of positivistic thought and the fact that the philosophy of mind filled in its intellectual space (p. 155). However, it has been "part of the European landscape for the past century and a half, emerging as a main interest and focus of post-Hegelian philosophers from Feurbach and Marx to Nietzsche and Dilthey" (p. 155). In this sense, Heller's grounding her social theory in philosophical anthropology reflects the European roots of her philosophy. 6. "The typology of objectivations is clearly less important to the argument of Gen- eral Ethics than it was in earlier texts. But . . . it has not been discarded, and there is as yet no full-fledged alternative" (Arnason, 1994, p. 62; cf. Heller, 1988b, pp. 36 ff., objectivation for itself). 7. Martha Nussbaum's (1993, 1999, 2000) political ethics is also rooted in Aristotle. She likewise argued that on the whole, philosophy is "so preoccupied with formal modeling and abstract theorizing that it fails to come to grips with the daily reality of poor people's lives" (Nussbaum, 2000, p. xv). Nussbaum focuses on basic human capa- bilities, "that is, what people are actually able to do and to be," based on the "principle of each person as end" (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 5). Her special interest is women in devel- oping countries, using case studies from India and elsewhere to advocate the social goal of getting each citizen above the threshold level of each capability (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 6). Nussbaum's capabilities approach is international and cross-cultural without being detached from particular forms of social life. In her model, various spheres of human experience that are found in all cultures represent questions to answer and choices to make--attitudes toward the ill or good fortune of others, how to treat strangers, man- agement of property, control over bodily appetites, and so forth. And our reflection on each sphere will give us a "thin or nominal definition" of a virtue relevant to this sphere. On this basis, we can talk across cultures about behavior appropriate in each sphere (see Nussbaum, 1999). Heller's work on everyday life also posits universal values--in her case, freedom and life. For Nussbaum (2000), "certain universal norms of human capability" provide "basic political principles" that undergird "a set of constitutional guarantees in all nations" (p. 34; cf. pp. 34-110). 8. This is Heller's argument that "total cultural relativism" is self-contradictory: If the statement "Each and every culture is unique and cannot be either com- pared or ranked" is true, and if the evaluative conclusion drawn from this state- ment ("Cultures should neither be ranked nor compared") is right, then the ranking and comparing of different cultures has already taken place, in that the cul- tures which permit the above statement to be made and the above evaluative con- clusion to be drawn are seen as superior to others: they contain one more true Christians / SOCIAL ETHICS OF AGNES HELLER 425 sentence and one more right injunction than any other culture. (Heller, 1987a, p. 227) 9. Regarding this maxim, Heller concludes, "one formulation of the categorical imperative can never be surpassed by any moral philosophy: that man should never be used as a mere means, but should always be treated as an end-in-itself" (Heller, 1987a, p. 101). 10. For Heller's own struggle with Taylor and multiculturalism, particularly in the context of Eastern Europe, see Heller (1996b). 11. Heller (1994) wrote about herself, I am a Hungarian Jewish female philosopher. These are already four so-called identities. Among my four identities, I have chosen one and re-chosen the other three. . . . The "gender issue" has played an important role in my life since child- hood. . . . I have always considered myself a feminist; it is only now that I have been reluctant to call myself one. For "gender studies" sends us back to the kitchen. This is a kitchen inside the academy and it is quite well paid, yet a kitchen it remains. (pp. 309-310) REFERENCES Arnason, J. P. (1994). The human condition and the modern predicament. In J. Burnheim (Ed.), The social philosophy of Agnes Heller (pp. 57-77). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Bauman, Z. (1994). Narrating modernity. In J. Burnheim (Ed.), The social philosophy of Agnes Heller (pp. 97-120). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Benhabib, S. (1992). Situating the self: Gender, community, and postmodernism in contempo- rary ethics. New York: Routledge. Benhabib, S., & Dallmayr, F. (Eds.). (1990). The communicative ethics controversy. Cam- bridge, MA: MIT Press. Burnheim, J. (Ed.). (1994). The social philosophy of Agnes Heller. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Camps, V. (1994). The good life: Amoral gesture. In J. Burnheim (Ed.), The social philoso- phy of Agnes Heller (pp. 239-248). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Denzin, N. K. (1997). Interpretive ethnography: Ethnographic practices for the 21st century. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Fraser, N. (1992). Rethinking the public sphere: Acontribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), Habermas and the public sphere (pp. 109-142). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fraser, N. (1997). Justus interruptus. New York: Routledge. Freire, P. (1970). Education as the practice of freedom: Cultural action for freedom. Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard Educational Review/Center for the Study of Development. Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and women's development. Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gilligan, C. (1983). Do the social sciences have an adequate theory of moral develop- ment? In N. Haan, R. N. Bellah, P. Rabinow, & W. M. Sullivan (Eds.), Social science as moral inquiry (pp. 33-51). New York: Columbia University Press. Gilligan, C., Ward, J. V., & Taylor, J. M. (1988). Mapping the moral domain. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Graduate School of Education. 426 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 Habermas, J. (1990). Moral consciousness and communicative action (C. Lenhart & S. W. Nicholson, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1993). Justification and application: Remarks on discourse ethics (C. Cronin, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Habermas, J. (1998). The inclusion of the other: Studies in political theory (C. Cronin, Trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Heller, A. (1957). Csernisevskij etikai nzetei [The ethical views of Chernyskevskii]. Buda- pest, Hungary: Kossuth. Heller, A. (1982). The legacy of Marxian ethics today. Praxis International, 1, 346-364. Heller, A. (Ed.). (1983). Lukcs revalued. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Heller, A. (1984a). Everyday life. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. Heller, A. (1984b). A radical philosophy. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Heller, A. (1985). The power of shame: A rational perspective. London: Routledge Kegan Paul. Heller, A. (1987a). Beyond justice. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Heller, A. (1987b). Hannah Arendt on the vita contemplative. Philosophy and Social Criti- cism, 12, 281-296. Heller, A. (1988a). Beyond justice. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Heller, A. (1988b). General ethics. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Heller, A. (1990a). The concept of the political revisited. In A. Heller, Can modernity sur- vive? Berkeley: University of California Press. Heller, A. (1990b). A philosophy of morals. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Heller, A. (1994). Areply to my critics. In J. Bernheim (Ed.), The social philosophy of Agnes Heller (pp. 281-311). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Heller, A. (1996a). An ethics of personality. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Heller, A. (1996b). The many faces of multiculturalism. In R. Baubck, A. Heller, A. Zolberg (Eds.), The challenge of diversity: Integration and pluralism in societies of immi- gration (pp. 25-42). Aldershot, UK: Avebury. Heller, A. (1999). A theory of modernity. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Jacobson, A. J. (1994). The limits of formal justice. In J. Burnheim (Ed.), The social philoso- phy of Agnes Heller (pp. 163-168). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Jay, M. (1994). Women in dark times: A. Heller and H. Arendt. In J. Burnheim (Ed.), The social philosophy of Agnes Heller (pp. 41-55). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Kadarkay, A. (1991). Georg Lukcs: Life, thought, and politics. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell. Koehn,D. (1998). Rethinkingfeminist ethics: Care, trustand empathy. London: Routledge. Mrkus, G. (1994). The politics of morals. In J. Burnheim (Ed.), The social philosophy of Agnes Heller (pp. 257-280). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Mulhall, S., & Swift, A. (1996). Liberals and communitarians (2nd ed.). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Murphy, P. (1994). Civility and radicalism. Pluralism and politics. In J. Burnheim (Ed.), The social philosophy of Agnes Heller (pp. 169-192, 193-238). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: A feminine approach to ethics and moral education. Berkeley: University of California Press. Noddings, N. (1989). Women and evil. Berkeley: University of California Press. Noddings, N. (1990). Ethics from the standpoint of omen. In D. L. Rhode (Ed.), Theoreti- cal perspectives on sexual difference (pp. 160-173). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Nussbaum, M. (1993). Non-relative virtues: An Aristotelian approach. In M. Nussbaum & A. Sen (Eds.), The quality of life (pp. 2-42). Oxford, UK: Clarendon. Christians / SOCIAL ETHICS OF AGNES HELLER 427 Nussbaum, M. (1999). Sex and social justice. New York: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum, M. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach. Cam- bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Schacht, R. (1990, Fall). Philosophical anthropology: What, why and how. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50, 155-176. Seigfried, C. H. (1996). Pragmatism and feminism: Reweaving the social fabric. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Taylor, C., Appiah, A., Habermas, J., Rockefeller, S. C., Walzer, M., Wolff, S., & Gutmann, A. (1994). Multiculturalism: Examining the politics of recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Vajda, M. (1994). A lover of philosophy--A lover of Europe. In J. Burnheim (Ed.), The social philosophy of Agnes Heller (pp. 17-27). Amsterdam: Rodopi. West, C. (1991). The ethical dimensions of Marxist thought. New York: Monthly Review Press. Wolin, R. (1994). Heller's theory of everyday life. In J. Burnheim (Ed.), The social philoso- phy of Agnes Heller (pp. 137-147). Amsterdam: Rodopi. Wyschogrod, E. (1974). Emmanuel Levinas: The problem of ethical metaphysics. The Hague, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Wyschogrod, E. (1990). Saints and postmodernism: Revisioning moral philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wyschogrod, E. (1998). An ethics of remembering: History, heterology, and the nameless oth- ers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Clifford G. Christians is a research professor of communications at the Univer- sity of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. He has been a visiting scholar in philo- sophical ethics at Princeton University and in social ethics at the University of Chicago and a PEW scholar at Oxford University. He is coauthor of Respon- sibility in Mass Communication, Jacques Ellul: Interpretive Essays, Good News: Social Ethics and the Press, Communication Ethics and Universal Values, and Moral Engagement in Public Life: Theorists for Contemporary Ethics. 428 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY / August 2002 </meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><back><notes>
<p>
<list list-type="order">
<list-item>
<p>1. “The binding example in this respect was Lukács own aesthetics” (Márkus, 1994, p. 268).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>2. The Institute years were “not barren,” even though they meant “virtual internal exile” as a troublesome intellectual. For a summary of Heller’s work during this decade and her intellectual struggles with Lukács and Marx, see Márkus (1994, pp. 265-268).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>3. For two examples of how their work intersects, see Heller’s inaugural address (Heller, 1990a) and an essay of hers devoted to Arendt’s final work (Heller, 1987b).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>4. “Care for other human beings: this is the universal orientative principle of morals” (Heller, 1990b, p. 41). Heller described several concrete orientative principles derived from the universal one: “Have a proper regard for other persons’ vulnerability,”“do your best to alleviate another person’s suffering,”“help others achieve greater autonomy,” and so forth (Heller, 1990b, pp. 44-49).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>5. Philosophical anthropology is the branch of philosophy that reflects on the nature of our humanness. This enterprise is understood here broadly “as the philosophical examination of the human race.” It investigates “what characteristics (if any) are both common and unique to human beings as such” or, in other words, “what the necessary and sufficient conditions of being a human being are.” However, philosophical anthropology is not narrowly and strictly limited to those questions, nor does it pre suppose that there is “a human essence of some sort” (Schacht, 1990, pp. 157-158).</p>
<p>For RichardSchacht (1990), philosophical anthropology has received little attention in Anglo-American philosophy because of the influence of positivistic thought and the fact that the philosophy of mindfilled in its intellectual space (p. 155). However, it has been “part of the European landscape for the past century and a half, emerging as a main interest and focus of post-Hegelian philosophers from Feurbach and Marx to Nietzsche and Dilthey” (p. 155). In this sense, Heller’s grounding her social theory in philosophical anthropology reflects the European roots of her philosophy.</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>6. “The typology of objectivations is clearly less important to the argument of General Ethics than it was in earlier texts. But...it has not been discarded, and there is as yet no full-fledged alternative” (Arnason, 1994, p. 62; cf. Heller, 1988b, pp. 36 ff., objectivation for itself).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>7. Martha Nussbaum’s (1993, 1999, 2000) political ethics is also rooted in Aristotle. She likewise argued that on the whole, philosophy is “so preoccupied with formal modeling and abstract theorizing that it fails to come to grips with the daily reality of poor people’s lives” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. xv). Nussbaum focuses on basic human capabilities, “that is, what people are actually able to do and to be,” based on the “principle of each person as end” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 5). Her special interest is women in developing countries, using case studies from India and elsewhere to advocate the social goal of getting each citizen above the threshold level of each capability (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 6).</p>
<p>Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is international and cross-cultural without being detached from particular forms of social life. In her model, various spheres of human experience that are found in all cultures represent questions to answer and choices to make—attitudes toward the ill or good fortune of others, how to treat strangers, management of property, control over bodily appetites, and so forth. Andour reflection on each sphere will give us a “thin or nominal definition” of a virtue relevant to this sphere. On this basis, we can talk across cultures about behavior appropriate in each sphere (see Nussbaum, 1999).</p>
<p>Heller’s work on everyday life also posits universal values—in her case, freedom and life. For Nussbaum (2000), “certain universal norms of human capability” provide “basic political principles” that undergird “a set of constitutional guarantees in all nations” (p. 34; cf. pp. 34-110).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>8. This is Heller’s argument that “total cultural relativism” is self-contradictory:</p>
<p>If the statement “Each and every culture is unique and cannot be either com paredor ranked” is true, and if the evaluative conclusion drawn from this statement (“Cultures should neither be ranked nor compared”) is right, then the ranking and comparing of different cultures has already taken place, in that the cultures which permit the above statement to be made and the above evaluative conclusion to be drawn are seen as superior to others: they contain one more true sentence and one more right injunction than any other culture. (Heller, 1987a, p. 227)</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>9. Regarding this maxim, Heller concludes, “one formulation of the categorical imperative can never be surpassed by any moral philosophy: that man should never be used as a mere means, but should always be treated as an end-in-itself” (Heller, 1987a, p. 101).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>10. For Heller’s own struggle with Taylor and multiculturalism, particularly in the context of Eastern Europe, see Heller (1996b).</p>
</list-item>
<list-item>
<p>11. Heller (1994) wrote about herself,</p>
<p>I am a Hungarian Jewish female philosopher. These are already four so-called identities. Among my four identities, I have chosen one and re-chosen the other three.... The “gender issue” has played an important role in my life since child-hood....I have always considered myself a feminist; it is only now that I have been reluctant to call myself one. For “gender studies” sends us back to the kitchen. This is a kitchen inside the academy and it is quite well paid, yet a kitchen it remains. (pp. 309-310)</p>
</list-item>
</list>
</p>
</notes><ref-list>
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</ref-list></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>The Social Ethics of Agnes Heller</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" lang="en" contentType="CDATA"><title>The Social Ethics of Agnes Heller</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Clifford G.</namePart><namePart type="family">Christians</namePart><affiliation>University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Sage Publications</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2002-08</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2002</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract lang="en">Heller’s trilogy developing a theory of social ethics is grounded in the decisive question of how good persons are possible. She disavows an abstract ethics of rules, so she does not build an ethical system but observes the lives of good persons. She focuses on healthy everyday lives rather than constructing an essentialist human nature. The key issue in social ethics is dynamic justice with three dimensions: (a) optimal possibility for developing natural capacities to the maximum, (b) active involvement as a citizen, and (c) emotional intensity in close personal attachments. She refuses to discount the rational and radical and contributes a fresh understanding of emancipatory praxis to social justice.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Qualitative inquiry</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">1077-8004</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1552-7565</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">QIX</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID-hwp">spqix</identifier><part><date>2002</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>8</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>4</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>411</start><end>428</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">CF0A1D456C137E99DBE911A00B8A70490A31CC11</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/M70-7DP896Z6-K</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1177/10778004008004002</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">10.1177_10778004008004002</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-0J1N7DQT-B">sage</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/CF0A1D456C137E99DBE911A00B8A70490A31CC11/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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