BernheimV1, Istex, Corpus, bibRecord, 000648

Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals with Asymmetric Information

Identifieur interne : 000648 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000647; suivant : 000649

Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals with Asymmetric Information

Auteurs : Xiaodong Wu

Source :

Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy [ 1538-0645 ] ; 2003-12-31.

RBID : ISTEX:CB598FDFC2CAFB52ED0E094A1D97BFC85B5B07AB

English descriptors

Teeft :
- Adverse selection, Adverse selection problem, Agency problem, Asymmetric, Asymmetric information, Asymmetric information works, Cambridge university press, Chapel hill, Claudio mezzetti, Common agency, Common agency model, Common agency models, Common agency problem, Comparative advantage, Competitive industry, Cooperative equilibrium, Cooperative governments, Cooperative outcome, Cost function, Development economics, Different technologies, Direct mechanism, Direct mechanisms, Dirty industry, Disutility, Domestic production, Economic analysis, Economic analysis policy, Economic growth, Economic studies, Economic theory, Empirical implications, Empirical studies, Environmental economics, Environmental regulation, Environmental regulations, Equilibrium, Equilibrium output levels, Externality, Extraction, Foreign country, Foreign government, Foreign governments, Foreign maximization problem, Foreign objective function, Foreign output, Foreign output scheme, Foreign production, Foreign residents, Foreign schemes, Free trade, Freer trade, Full information, General case, Global implementability, Gresik, Grossman, Henk folmer, Higher information rent, Home attempt, Home country, Home government, Home maximization problem, Home output, Home output level, Home production, Home rent extraction attempt, Home residents, Imperfect information, Implementability, Implementable, Incomplete information, Individual welfare, Information cost, Information rent, Information rent extraction behavior, Information rents, International economics, International trade, Jean tirole, Joint welfare, Last term, Lower output, Marginal cost, Marginal disutility, Martimort, Mezzetti, Monotonicity, Monotonicity condition, Moral hazard, Moral hazard problem, More pollution, Multinational, Multinational firms, Multinationals, Multiple equilibria, Nash, Nash equilibrium, Objective function, Objective functions, Optimal choice, Optimal output, Order condition, Order conditions, Other hand, Output levels, Output scheme, Overall effect, Perfect information, Pollution, Pollution emissions, Pollution haven, Pollution haven hypothesis, Pollution havens, Pollution intensity, Pollution reduction, Private information, Production technology, Public economics, Rand journal, Regulatory agencies, Regulatory regime, Rent extraction, Rent extraction behavior, Rent extraction effect, Rent extraction incentive, Resource economics, Resource users, Revelation principle, Right hand side, Same output, Same technology, Scale effect, Second order derivatives, Second term, Single problem, Social welfare, Special case, Standard result, Strategic interaction, Superior information, Technique effect, Third term, Total output, Transboundary, Transboundary pollution, Transfer scheme, Transfer schemes, Transportation costs, True technology, Uninformed, Uninformed government, Uninformed principals, World bank, World price, World welfare.

Abstract

This paper develops a common agency model to analyze the strategic interaction between governments in regulating polluting multinationals. We show that when a firm has private information about its production technology relating output to pollution that is difficult to monitor, the information rent extraction behavior of non-cooperative governments will work against the "pollution haven" hypothesis in a Nash equilibrium with or without pooling. The "pollution haven" result is more likely to be reversed in a separating equilibrium than in a pooling equilibrium as a firm's output is further away from the most efficient outcome. This result provides an explanation for why many empirical studies do not support the "pollution haven" hypothesis even after controlling for private non-environmental cost differentials.

Url:

https://api.istex.fr/document/CB598FDFC2CAFB52ED0E094A1D97BFC85B5B07AB/fulltext/pdf

DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1265

Links to Exploration step

ISTEX:CB598FDFC2CAFB52ED0E094A1D97BFC85B5B07AB

Le document en format XML

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<abstract>This paper develops a common agency model to analyze the strategic interaction between governments in regulating polluting multinationals. We show that when a firm has private information about its production technology relating output to pollution that is difficult to monitor, the information rent extraction behavior of non-cooperative governments will work against the "pollution haven" hypothesis in a Nash equilibrium with or without pooling. The "pollution haven" result is more likely to be reversed in a separating equilibrium than in a pooling equilibrium as a firm's output is further away from the most efficient outcome. This result provides an explanation for why many empirical studies do not support the "pollution haven" hypothesis even after controlling for private non-environmental cost differentials.</abstract>
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Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals with Asymmetric Information

Pollution Havens and the Regulation of Multinationals with Asymmetric Information

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