Modeling local growth control decisions in a multi-city case: Do spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter?
Identifieur interne : 000593 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000592; suivant : 000594Modeling local growth control decisions in a multi-city case: Do spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter?
Auteurs : Katharina Schone ; Wilfried Koch ; Catherine BaumontSource :
- Public Choice [ 0048-5829 ] ; 2013-01-01.
English descriptors
Abstract
Abstract: Our article analyzes the determinants of local growth control decisions, which are modeled as the result of a political struggle between different groups of voters and organized lobbies. We show that under specific hypotheses, a higher homeownership rate can induce lower levels of controls. Considering residential choices as endogenous to growth control policies, the local decisions to control growth become strategically interdependent. Assuming imperfect mobility, we show that a spatial econometric specification can be directly derived from our theoretical model. Our empirical analysis concerning the determinants of the “taxe locale d’équipement”, a French local development tax, is thus naturally based on spatial econometrics. Its results confirm the major predictions of our model.
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9811-1
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ISTEX:DC6582D50F4A3459AB828BF04C45E2513629C13DLe document en format XML
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CorrespondingAffiliationID="Aff1"><AuthorName DisplayOrder="Western"><GivenName>Katharina</GivenName><FamilyName>Schone</FamilyName></AuthorName><Contact><Email>katharina.schone@nancy-engref.inra.fr</Email></Contact></Author><Author AffiliationIDS="Aff2"><AuthorName DisplayOrder="Western"><GivenName>Wilfried</GivenName><FamilyName>Koch</FamilyName></AuthorName></Author><Author AffiliationIDS="Aff3"><AuthorName DisplayOrder="Western"><GivenName>Catherine</GivenName><FamilyName>Baumont</FamilyName></AuthorName></Author><Affiliation ID="Aff1"><OrgDivision>LEF</OrgDivision><OrgName>AgroParisTech-ENGREF</OrgName><OrgAddress><Street>14 rue Girardet</Street><Postcode>54042</Postcode><City>Nancy Cedex</City><Country Code="FR">France</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff2"><OrgDivision>Département des Sciences Economiques</OrgDivision><OrgName>Université du Québec à Montréal</OrgName><OrgAddress><Postbox>Case postale 8888</Postbox><Street>succursale Centre Ville</Street><City>Montréal</City><State>Québec</State><Postcode>H3C 3P8</Postcode><Country Code="CA">Canada</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff3"><OrgDivision>LEG</OrgDivision><OrgName>Université de Bourgogne</OrgName><OrgAddress><Street>2 boulevard Gabriel</Street><Postbox>BP 26611</Postbox><Postcode>21066</Postcode><City>Dijon Cedex</City><Country Code="FR">France</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation></AuthorGroup><Abstract ID="Abs1" Language="En" OutputMedium="All"><Heading>Abstract</Heading><Para>Our article analyzes the determinants of local growth control decisions, which are modeled as the result of a political struggle between different groups of voters and organized lobbies. We show that under specific hypotheses, a higher homeownership rate can induce lower levels of controls. Considering residential choices as endogenous to growth control policies, the local decisions to control growth become strategically interdependent. Assuming imperfect mobility, we show that a spatial econometric specification can be directly derived from our theoretical model. Our empirical analysis concerning the determinants of the “<Emphasis Type="Italic">taxe</Emphasis><Emphasis Type="Italic">locale d’équipement</Emphasis>”, a French local development tax, is thus naturally based on spatial econometrics. Its results confirm the major predictions of our model.</Para></Abstract><KeywordGroup Language="En"><Heading>Keywords</Heading><Keyword>Land use regulation</Keyword><Keyword>Growth control</Keyword><Keyword>Lobbying</Keyword><Keyword>Spatial econometrics</Keyword></KeywordGroup><KeywordGroup Language="--"><Heading>JEL Classification</Heading><Keyword>R52</Keyword><Keyword>C31</Keyword><Keyword>D7</Keyword><Keyword>H7</Keyword></KeywordGroup></ArticleHeader><NoBody></NoBody></Article></Issue></Volume></Journal></Publisher></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Modeling local growth control decisions in a multi-city case: Do spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter?</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Modeling local growth control decisions in a multi-city case: Do spatial interactions and lobbying efforts matter?</title></titleInfo><name type="personal" displayLabel="corresp"><namePart type="given">Katharina</namePart><namePart type="family">Schone</namePart><affiliation>LEF, AgroParisTech-ENGREF, 14 rue Girardet, 54042, Nancy Cedex, France</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: katharina.schone@nancy-engref.inra.fr</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Wilfried</namePart><namePart type="family">Koch</namePart><affiliation>Département des Sciences Economiques, Université du Québec à Montréal, succursale Centre Ville, Case postale 8888, H3C 3P8, Montréal, Québec, Canada</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Catherine</namePart><namePart type="family">Baumont</namePart><affiliation>LEG, Université de Bourgogne, 2 boulevard Gabriel, BP 26611, 21066, Dijon Cedex, France</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="OriginalPaper" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Boston</placeTerm></place><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">2010-05-25</dateCreated><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2013-01-01</dateIssued><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2011</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2011</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><abstract lang="en">Abstract: Our article analyzes the determinants of local growth control decisions, which are modeled as the result of a political struggle between different groups of voters and organized lobbies. We show that under specific hypotheses, a higher homeownership rate can induce lower levels of controls. Considering residential choices as endogenous to growth control policies, the local decisions to control growth become strategically interdependent. Assuming imperfect mobility, we show that a spatial econometric specification can be directly derived from our theoretical model. Our empirical analysis concerning the determinants of the “taxe locale d’équipement”, a French local development tax, is thus naturally based on spatial econometrics. Its results confirm the major predictions of our model.</abstract><subject lang="en"><genre>Keywords</genre><topic>Land use regulation</topic><topic>Growth control</topic><topic>Lobbying</topic><topic>Spatial econometrics</topic></subject><classification displayLabel="JEL Classification">R52</classification><classification displayLabel="JEL Classification">C31</classification><classification displayLabel="JEL Classification">D7</classification><classification displayLabel="JEL Classification">H7</classification><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Public Choice</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>Public Choice</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" displayLabel="Non Standard Archive Journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><originInfo><publisher>Springer</publisher><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2012-12-11</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2013</copyrightDate></originInfo><subject><genre>Journal-Subject-Collection</genre><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="SC4">Business and Economics</topic></subject><subject><genre>Journal-Subject-Group</genre><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="SCW">Economics / Management Science</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="SCW12162">Public Finance & Economics</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="SCX18000">Political Science, general</topic></subject><identifier type="ISSN">0048-5829</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1573-7101</identifier><identifier type="JournalID">11127</identifier><identifier type="IssueArticleCount">11</identifier><identifier type="VolumeIssueCount">4</identifier><part><date>2013</date><detail type="volume"><number>154</number><caption>vol.</caption></detail><detail type="issue"><number>1-2</number><caption>no.</caption></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>95</start><end>117</end></extent></part><recordInfo><recordOrigin>Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2013</recordOrigin></recordInfo></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">DC6582D50F4A3459AB828BF04C45E2513629C13D</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/VQC-TJGNGX49-W</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1007/s11127-011-9811-1</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">9811</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">s11127-011-9811-1</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2011</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-3XSW68JL-F">springer</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, 2011</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/DC6582D50F4A3459AB828BF04C45E2513629C13D/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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