IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: HELMHOLTZIAN PERCEPTION AND THE ORIGINS OF FREUD'S 1900 THEORY OF TRANSFERENCE
Identifieur interne : 000314 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000313; suivant : 000315IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: HELMHOLTZIAN PERCEPTION AND THE ORIGINS OF FREUD'S 1900 THEORY OF TRANSFERENCE
Auteurs : George J. MakariSource :
- Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association [ 0003-0651 ] ; 1994-04.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Analytic press, Available perception, Basic books, Beholder, Biophysics movement, Creative synthesis, Critique, Disciplinary development, Dream book, Early history, Empirical theory, Empiricist vision, External object, External objects, External quantities, External quantity, External world, False connection, False connections, Freud, German biophysics, German philosophy, German psychology, Hallucination, Helmholtz, Helmholtz school, Helmholtzian, Helmholtzian perception, Hermann, Hippolyte taine, Hist, Hlakari schopenhauer, Holt williams, Human physiology, Inner qualities, Intellectual life, Johns hopkins univ, Kant, Kantian, Larger transformation, Lipps, Little attention, Mental life, Modern physiology, Monism, Neiv, Neiv york, Nervous system, Neurological, Neurological education, Neurological usage, Neuronal motion, Neuroscientific articles, Nineteenth century, Omega system, Optic nerve, Organic foundation, Other hand, Outer world, Partial negations, Passive model, Past experience, Perceptual, Perceptual illusion, Perceptual knowledge, Perceptual memory, Perceptual theory, Physical world, Physiology, Preconscious, Preconscious representation, Projective perception, Psychic, Psychic content, Psychic process, Psychic quality, Psychical qualities, Psychoanalytic theory, Psychological idealist, Psychological phenomenon, Pure reason, Quantitative stimuli, Real world, Same time, Schopenhauer, Scientific discourse, Scientific knowledge, Scientific psychology, Sense organ, Sense organs, Sensory organ, Sensory perception, Sensory physiology, Sigmund, Sigmund freud, Solitary genius, Specific energies, Subjective idealists, Taine, Theodor lipps, Topographic model, Transference, Transference freud, Transference theory, Transference thoughts, Unconscious idea, Unconscious inference, Unconscious inferences, Unconscious processes, Unconscious quantities, Unconscious stimuli, Univ, Unknowable, Unknowable essence, Unknowable stimuli, Unusual stimulus, Visual illusion, Visual illusions, Visual perception, Wesleyan univ.
Abstract
Freud's 1900 theory of transference was indebted to the convergence of philosophy and physiology found in nineteenth-century theories of visual perception. The author maps out the post-Kantian philosophical and German physiological currents that gave rise to Hermann von Helmholtz's influential work on perception, and proposes that Freud's 1900 theory of transference was a creative synthesis of novel notions like unconscious wishing and psychic defense with a Helmholtzian model of visual illusion.
Url:
DOI: 10.1177/000306519404200210
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ISTEX:EA08D0B3DEC975269004D50740205D0F9E705E69Le document en format XML
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Makari M.D.</name><affiliations><json:string>525 East 68th Street New York, NY 10021</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><articleId><json:string>10.1177_000306519404200210</json:string></articleId><arkIstex>ark:/67375/M70-D5DV4DFX-0</arkIstex><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>research-article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>Freud's 1900 theory of transference was indebted to the convergence of philosophy and physiology found in nineteenth-century theories of visual perception. The author maps out the post-Kantian philosophical and German physiological currents that gave rise to Hermann von Helmholtz's influential work on perception, and proposes that Freud's 1900 theory of transference was a creative synthesis of novel notions like unconscious wishing and psychic defense with a Helmholtzian model of visual illusion.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>7.852</score><pdfWordCount>9998</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>61250</pdfCharCount><pdfVersion>1.4</pdfVersion><pdfPageCount>33</pdfPageCount><pdfPageSize>437.759 x 650.88 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractWordCount>71</abstractWordCount><abstractCharCount>501</abstractCharCount><keywordCount>0</keywordCount></qualityIndicators><title>IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: HELMHOLTZIAN PERCEPTION AND THE ORIGINS OF FREUD'S 1900 THEORY OF TRANSFERENCE</title><genre><json:string>research-article</json:string></genre><host><title>Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association</title><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><issn><json:string>0003-0651</json:string></issn><eissn><json:string>1941-2460</json:string></eissn><publisherId><json:string>APA</json:string></publisherId><volume>42</volume><issue>2</issue><pages><first>549</first><last>580</last></pages><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre></host><namedEntities><unitex><date><json:string>1898</json:string><json:string>the seventeenth century</json:string><json:string>1890</json:string><json:string>the nineteenth century</json:string><json:string>1895</json:string><json:string>1994</json:string><json:string>1862</json:string><json:string>in the nineteenth century</json:string><json:string>nineteenth century</json:string><json:string>1892</json:string><json:string>1870</json:string><json:string>1900</json:string></date><geogName></geogName><orgName><json:string>Psychiatry Section Research Seminar</json:string></orgName><orgName_funder></orgName_funder><orgName_provider></orgName_provider><persName><json:string>Hermann</json:string><json:string>Johannes Miiller</json:string><json:string>Sander Gilman</json:string><json:string>Freud</json:string><json:string>Ernst Brucke</json:string><json:string>Josef Breuer</json:string><json:string>Theodore Lipps</json:string><json:string>Immanuel Kant</json:string><json:string>o Pure</json:string><json:string>Arthur Schopenhauer</json:string><json:string>J. P. C. Southall</json:string><json:string>Wilhelm Wundt</json:string><json:string>Fliess</json:string><json:string>Theodor Lipps</json:string><json:string>Emil DuBois-Reymond</json:string><json:string>W. Baly</json:string><json:string>Hermann von Helmholtz</json:string><json:string>Ida Bauer</json:string><json:string>Sigmund Freud</json:string><json:string>Claude Adrien</json:string><json:string>Whitney Clinic</json:string><json:string>Meynert</json:string><json:string>Johann Fichte</json:string><json:string>John Locke</json:string><json:string>Helmholtz</json:string><json:string>Sigmund Exner</json:string><json:string>Charles Bell</json:string><json:string>Friedrich Jacobi</json:string><json:string>Herman von Helmholtz</json:string><json:string>By</json:string><json:string>Nonetheless</json:string><json:string>Hippolyte Taine</json:string><json:string>Ernst Briicke</json:string><json:string>Theodore Shapiro</json:string><json:string>P. Heath</json:string><json:string>Johannes Muller</json:string><json:string>Schopenhauer</json:string><json:string>J. Lachs</json:string><json:string>An Essay</json:string></persName><placeName><json:string>Potsdam</json:string><json:string>Europe</json:string><json:string>Jerusalem</json:string><json:string>Vienna</json:string></placeName><ref_url></ref_url><ref_bibl><json:string>Sight and Colors (1815)</json:string><json:string>Solms and Saling, 1990</json:string><json:string>see Lenzen, 1947</json:string><json:string>Jones, 1953</json:string><json:string>Hatfield, 1990, p. 168</json:string><json:string>Helmholtz, 1894</json:string><json:string>1964, 1971</json:string><json:string>Breuer and Freud, 5895</json:string><json:string>Kantor, 1969</json:string><json:string>see Herzog, 1988</json:string><json:string>1944, 1949</json:string><json:string>see also Neuhouser, 1990</json:string><json:string>Muller (1833)</json:string><json:string>Chertok and d e Saussure, 1979</json:string><json:string>Masson, 1985, p. 129</json:string><json:string>Rubenstein, 1965</json:string><json:string>Cranefield, 1970</json:string><json:string>1883,1905</json:string><json:string>Freud, 1894</json:string><json:string>Amacher, 1965</json:string><json:string>Ellenberger, 1970</json:string><json:string>Helmholtz, 1868, p. 222</json:string><json:string>Freud, 1888</json:string><json:string>1898, 1899, 1900</json:string><json:string>Helmholtz, 1869</json:string><json:string>McGrath, 1986</json:string><json:string>Helmholtz (1868)</json:string><json:string>Pastore, 1974, 1978</json:string><json:string>Heimann, 1974</json:string><json:string>Chertok, 1968</json:string><json:string>see Aarsleff, 1982</json:string><json:string>Masson, 1985, p. 325</json:string><json:string>Leary, 1978</json:string><json:string>Jones, 1953, p. 275</json:string><json:string>1966a, 1966b</json:string><json:string>Makari, 1992</json:string><json:string>Boring, 1942,1950</json:string><json:string>Helmholtz, 1891, p. 285</json:string><json:string>Silverstein, 1985</json:string><json:string>Fichte, 1802</json:string><json:string>Jones, 1953, p. 41</json:string><json:string>Wallace, 1992</json:string><json:string>Lipps, 1903</json:string><json:string>Masson, 1985, p. 324</json:string><json:string>Makari, 1991</json:string><json:string>Vogt, 1993</json:string><json:string>Kravis, 1992</json:string><json:string>Solms and Saling (1990, p. 119)</json:string><json:string>Freud (1915)</json:string><json:string>see also Hunsdahl, 1967</json:string><json:string>Turner, 1977</json:string><json:string>see Riese and Arrington, 1963</json:string><json:string>Holt, 1989</json:string><json:string>Breuer and Freud, 1895</json:string></ref_bibl><bibl></bibl></unitex></namedEntities><ark><json:string>ark:/67375/M70-D5DV4DFX-0</json:string></ark><categories><wos><json:string>1 - 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<publisher-loc>Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA</publisher-loc>
</publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1177/000306519404200210</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">10.1177_000306519404200210</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: HELMHOLTZIAN PERCEPTION AND THE ORIGINS OF FREUD'S 1900 THEORY OF TRANSFERENCE</article-title></title-group>
<contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Makari</surname><given-names>George J.</given-names></name><degrees>M.D.</degrees><aff>525 East 68th Street New York, NY 10021</aff></contrib></contrib-group>
<pub-date pub-type="ppub"><month>04</month><year>1994</year></pub-date><volume>42</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>549</fpage><lpage>580</lpage><abstract>
<p>Freud's 1900 theory of transference was indebted to the convergence of philosophy and physiology found in nineteenth-century theories of visual perception. The author maps out the post-Kantian philosophical and German physiological currents that gave rise to Hermann von Helmholtz's influential work on perception, and proposes that Freud's 1900 theory of transference was a creative synthesis of novel notions like unconscious wishing and psychic defense with a Helmholtzian model of visual illusion.</p>
</abstract><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>sagemeta-type</meta-name><meta-value>Journal Article</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>search-text</meta-name><meta-value> JAPA 4212 I N T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER: HELMHOLTZIAN PERCEPTION AND T H E ORIGINS OF FREUD'S 1900 THEORY OF TRANSFERENCE GEORGE MAKARI, J. M.D. Freud's 1900 theory of transference was indebted to the convergence o philosophy and physiology found in nineteenth-century theories f of visual perception. The author maps out the post-Kantian philosophical and Cennan phjsiological currents that gave rise to Hermaitn von Helmholtz's influential work o n perception, and proposes that Freud's I900 theory of transference was a creative synthesis of novel notiow like unconscious wishing and psyliic defeilse with a Helmholtzian model of visual illusion. to the UnCOnSCiOUS, then transference is the path most taken, the beaten trail clinicians follow everyday. How did transference come to assume such a central position within psychoanalysis? How did the marginally significant concept Freud presented in Studies in Hysteria develop into one of the critical issues of psychoanalytic technique? In approaching these questions one enters difficult terrain, for the years that followed Studies in Hysteria were cataclysmic ones in which Freud built his topographic model of mind. In this paper, I shall focus on an aspect of this larger transformation that pertains to the development of transference theory. HOW, at all, did Freud's intellectual life between I895 and if 1900-his desire to build a model of mind which culminated in Chapter 7 of the Interpretation of Dream-contribute to a reworking of his 1895 model of transference? F DREAhlS ARE T HE ROYAL ROAD I During the period of preparation Dr. hfakari was a Reader's Digest Research Fellow at the Payne IVhitney Clinic. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the History of Psychiatry Section Research Seminar at the Payne Whitney Clinic. T h e author would like to express his gratitude to Theodore Shapiro, hl.D., Sander Gilman, Ph.D., and the members of the History Section for their support and thoughtful comments. Accepted for publication June 9, 1993. 549 550 GEORGE 1. hlAKARI By proposing to examine this change in Freud's theory from the standpoint of intellectual influences and contexts, I am vulnerable to the complaint that I have ignored the crucial aspect of Freud's experience, namely his clinical work. What if Freud's interaction with patients moved him to rethink his model of transference as a false connection? This question is reinforced by a well-known lineage, the "Great Patient" theory of transference history. I n this narrative, Josef Breuer's failed treatment of Anna 0. leads to the anonymous woman who embraced Freud in 1892 (Jones, 1953, p. 275)' Freud's experience with Fliess in his self-analysis, and the Dora case. Generally this history neglects or rejects intellectual history, and treats Freud as a solitary genius who synthesized these experiences into a radically new theoretical construct that was outside of his contemporaries' intellectual discourse (e.g., Chertok, 1968; Chertok and d e Saussure, 1979). Sulloway has criticized such histories as mythic constructions predicated on Freud's absolute originality (1979, pp. 6-13). While not discounting the likelihood that both clinical and personal experiences influenced Freud, others have argued that in fact the early history of transference had important intellectual antecedents (Ellenberger, 1970; Kravis, 1992). I n this vein, I argued that Freud's 1895 theory of transference emerged from debates over hypnotic suggestability (Makari, 1992). Here I shall extend this contextualist history of transference theory. By examining nineteenth-century theories of perception, I hope to illuminate some guiding assumptions that Freud utilized while shifting his notion of transference from the more narrow clinical construct of 1895 to a metapsychological model of mis-knowing essential to dreaming and irrational inner life. I n the Studies in Hysteria Freud's concept of transference as a false connection was predicated on associationalism, a passive model of perception and ideation widely employed by nineteenth-century neurologists and hypnotists. By this model, Freud thought of false connections as the result of a n internal IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 55 1 disassociation in the normally stable associations of the ego, which then allowed for a false reassociation of that affectively charged and now unconscious idea with a readily available perception. In the case of transference, the readily available perception m s , of course, the physician (Breuer and Freud, 1895, pp. 302-303; see also Makari, 1992). T h e next five years found Freud obsessed with his "hobbyhorse" which, he confessed to Fliess, was the building of a model of human psychology (Masson, 1985, p. 129). Hence Freud can be found wrestling in both the "Project" (1895), and his published work (1898, 1899, 1900) with some traditional problems of psychology such as consciousness, perception, and memory. In these works Freud has clearly abandoned passive models of mentation and perception. A passive model of mind was powerfully heuristic for hypnotists employing suggestion, but it must have been increasingly untenable for a man who had already postulated psychic defenses (Freud, 1894). And in this unhappiness with a passive notion of perception and ideation, Freud would not have been alone. For in the latter half of the nineteenth century two powerful currents converged and ushered in new ways of thinking about the psychology of perceptual knowledge. These converging currents originated from post-Kantian philosophical discourse and German physiological research. Space in Our Heads: Perception After Kant Freud, quoting Heine, scorned metaphysical philosophers by characterizing their work as attempts to patch u p gaps in the structure of the universe (1933, p. 161). But by the middle of the nineteenth century, as Freud well knew from his education and reading, many in German academic philosophy had given up on the speculative metaphysics of Schelling and Hegel, and were much more interested in a post-Kantian attempt to understand how humans patched up gaps, not in the universe, but in perceptual knowledge and spatial experience. 552 GEORGE J. hIAKARI These efforts can only be fully understood by contrasting them with the organizing assumptions that preceded Kant. T h e Scholastics of the seventeenth century followed Aristotle in believing that there was a complete identity between an object perceived and its internal perception. This model of "immaculate perception" began to crack with John Locke's (1632-1704) An Essay Concerning Human Undersfanding (1690).' Locke attempted to preserve the correspondence theory of truth, while at the same time introducing actively created internal representations. Despite his attention to both passive and active mental processes, Locke's model of mind became equated with a mimetic purity of perception, one in which what was "out there" got into consciousness without mediation or distortion. Although even a cursory reading makes it clear that Locke's model was not only one of passive mimesis, his passive metaphors of the mind as a tabtila rusa or a "mirror" became synonymous with his name (see Aarsleff, 1982; Vogt, 1993). Actually, Locke's limited introduction of mediated representation forced naive realism into a corner. Taken to its logical end, such a "veil of ideas" once introduced into perceptual knowledge could make the real world disappear, as it did in the work of George Berkeley (1685-1753). On the other hand, sensationalists like Claude Adrien HelvCtius (1715-1771) and Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (17 15-1 780) reduced Locke's legacy to a model of mind that was only passive. This utter passivity of mind that often was termed "Lockean'' was radically undercut by Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism. In the Critique o Pure Reason (1781)' Kant (1724-1804) proposed that mental f activity was essential to perception due to a prioris that structured and gave form to time, space, and causality. For Kant it 'Like Aristotle, Locke believed that the "primary"qualities of an object were perfectly perceived without mediation, that in these cases the idea and the thing corresponded completely. Hence no illusions were possible ivitli regard to primary qualities. However, Locke also posited secondary qualities in which representations were mind-mediated and hence could go askew. As Rorty (1979) pointed out: "Locke was balancing awkwardly between knowledge-as-identity-with-object and knowledge-as-true-judgement-about-object" (p. 144). IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 553 was this a priori process of internally structuring experience that made the world out there knowable and representable as phenomena, but unknowable as noumena or things-in-themselves. Kant's "Copernican revolution" came to dominate middle European philosophy for a good part of the nineteenth century. It has been said that after Kant the active observer once and for all entered epistemology; no longer could perception of the world be thought of as simply pure and passive. That cataclysmic change, it seems, Kant intended. However he did not at all mean to subjectify reality via his a priori categories. For Kant, that there was a realm beyond the powers of understanding did not mean the knowledge gained from perception was flimsily subjective. Rather, these were universally held, ahistorical, transcendental ways of seeing the world. Reading the history of post-Kantian philosophy tempts one to conclude that the history of philosophy is a history of misreadings. For it is hard to imagine the range of novel philosophical endeavors that marched under Kant's banner. For example, post-Kantian subjective idealists like Johann Fichte (17621814), Friedrich Shelling (1775-1854) and Friedrich Jacobi (1 743-1 8 19) took Kant's critique of knowledge (his "negative critique") and used it to transform the observer into the creator of knowable experience. Fichte argued that by taking Kant's a prioris to their natural conclusion, one was necessarily led to the subjectification and "ego" mediation of all knowledge of the phenomenal world (Fichte, 1802; see also Neuhouser, 1990). In the eyes of Subjective Idealists, perceptual knowledge of reality became, in the favorite analogy of the time, like a dream. Another crucial misreading of Kant came from a student of Fichte's, Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer ( 1 788-1 860) was a Gottingen medical student turned philosopher, who remained intensely interested in biology and physiology throughout his life. As one commentator put it: "Never has an idealist been so immersed in the details of corporeality, or alluded to such a large range of texts about human physiology . . ." (Crary, 554 GEORGE J. hlAKARI 1990, p. 76). Schopenhauer accepted Kant's framework of noumena and phenomena, and believed a priori categories limited perceptual knowledge. However, fundamentally misconstruing Kant, the former medical student claimed that Kant's a priori categories were aspects of brain activity. As Mandelbaum (1971) pointed out, this dissolution of the transcendental subject was surely not what Kant intended (p. 3 17). Nonetheless, Schopenhauer wrote: "Kant . . . showed everything that makes real perception possible, namely space, time and causality, to be brainfunction. He refrained however, from using this physiological expression, to which our present method of consideration necessarily leads to" (1844, p. 285). From this physiological reading of Kant, Schopenhauer developed a theory of perception in On Sight and Colors (1815) which became central to his epistemological program (see Mandelbaum, 1971, pp. 315-325; Lauxtermann, 1987; Crary, 1990, pp. 73-85). In many ways a response to Goethe's theory of color, Schopenhauer's work proclaimed that the colors that clothed objects were only in the eye of the beholder. If a closed eye was manually pressured, the perception of color resulted. So, Schopenhauer argued, color perception occurred within the brain, and was wrongfully apprehended as occurring out in the world (1815, pp. 50-51). Perception occurred when the retina reacted to stimuli, Schopenhauer proposed. Perception was not consciously experienced; instead, such internal brain and retinal activity was projected and appeared external to the perceiving subject. Objects seemed to be located "out there" in space and time, when in fact they were given this order and were causally linked via the functioning of the observer's brain (1815, pp. 50-51). This model of perception laid the groundwork for Schopenhauer's famous equation of Kantian noumena with Will in his World as Will and Idea (1819, pp. 95-165). The Schopenhauerian Will was the embodiment of the internal, irrational, biological forces within all of us, and the projection of that Will distorted and subjectified perception of the world. IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 555 Despite a seemingly sincere belief that he was returning to the master from Konigsberg's teachings, Schopenhauer's notion of perception was actually more related to Fichte's heresy with a crucial, additional un-Kantian twist; for Schopenhauer the projection of subjectivity onto external objects was physiologically rooted in the brain and body. As a result of the physiological underpinnings of his work, Schopenhauer stands at the crossroads of German philosophy and nineteenth-century physiological studies of perception. Helmholtz's Psychology o Perception f It is commonly held that the modern science of psychology came about from the crossfertilization of European philosophy and physiology during the mid-nineteenth century (Boring, 1942,1950; Kantor, 1969; Leary, 1978).Yet in writing the early history of psychoanalysis we have managed to set ourselves apart from this larger transformation, and in so doing we have neglected one half of this crucial synthesis-philosophy. The neglect of philosophy in the reconstruction of psychoanalysis' past has many roots (see Herzog, 1988; McGrath, 1986; Makari, 1991). For our purposes here, one stands out. As Cranefield (1966a, 1966b) has shown, Bernfeld's (1944, 1949) pioneering work in the history of psychoanalysis has seriously misrepresented the unfortunately named "School of Helmholtz" and obscured the German Biophysics Movement's important relationship to, among other things, post-Kantian philosophy.2 2Bernfeld's work has been extraordinarily influential, and is embedded in major works of psychoanalytic history (e.g., Jones, 1953; Amacher, 1965), creating what Sulloivay (1979) has called "the myth of the Helmholtz School" (PP. 65-66). IVith regard to the philosophical influence on these scientists, it is certainly true that Emil DuBois-Reymond and Hermann yon Helmholtz despised the speculative excesses of romantic metaphysics. But it cannot be forgotten that their repugnance was in part due to an adherence to Kant's epistemological critique. See, for instance, hlandelbaum (1964, 1971), who has championed the view that the history of sensation and perception must necessarily be seen as part of both the history of philosophy and the history of science. 556 GEORGE J. hlAKARl The work of Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) presents a compelling case for the importance of Kantian and postKantian thought on the revolutionary explosion of scientific knowledge that proceeded to map out so much of human physiology in the nineteenth century. Helmholtz was a late bloomer who did poorly in school and was tutored at home by his father Ferdinand, a Potsdam gymnasium teacher and an ardent follower of Fichte (Helmholtz, 1891, p. 285; Turner, 1977). Helmholtz began seriously studying Kant at the age of seventeen, and considered his own mature work an extension, and in some manner, a correction of the professor from Konigsberg's theory of perceptual experience. Rejecting the vulgar materialism of some of his more zealous scientific confreres, Helmholtz can be credited with smuggling philosophy into his fundamentally materialistic times by adhering to dual-aspect monism. Dual-aspect monism is a philosophical approach that is metaphysically monistic (there is only one material reality), but epistemologically dualistic (there are two fundamentally different ways of knowing that reality). Following Kant's positive critique, Helmholtz held that the external, physical world could only be known by mathematical, scientific study of the quantifiable causes of phenomena (Helmholtz, 1869). On the other hand, the world as we know and perceive it daily was based on phenomenal knowledge of-not the objective quantities of nature-but the qtialities with which our sense organs internally registered these outer excitations (Helmholtz, 1868, pp. 168-169; 1878, p. 369). Like Kant's a prioris which restricted any knowledge of things-in-themselves, for Helmholtz perceptual knowledge could not be knowledge of physical reality. Helmholtz, like Schopenhauer, believed perception was For the import of idealism to the supposedly antiphilosophical Biophysics hfovement see Culotta's excellent work (1974). Among historians of psychoanalysis, hicGrath (1986) has been an incisive revisionist who has seen the import of philosophy (Kant and Schopenhauer in particular) for such scientists as DuBois-Reymond, Helmholtz, Theodore hieynert, and Sigmund Freud. IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDEK 557 necessarily subjectified by the vicissitudes of each individual's nervous system. By distinguishing between scientific knowledge of physical quantities and a psychology of perceptual knowledge based on subjective qualities, dual-aspect monism allowed Helmholtz to be simztltmeoztsly and without contradiction a staunch biological materialist as well as a psychological idealist. Dual-aspect monism preserved a place for scientific truth, but did not force its adherents to accept the naive realist assumptions of "immaculate" perception. Helmholtz could preserve an empirical "real world" from sophistry without claiming that human perceptual knowledge was veridical. Inner error, subjective distortion, hallucination, and illusion could now be accommodated by transforming the idealist critique of knowledge into a psychology of qualitative perception (Helmholtz, 1868, p. 222). With its elegant finesse of both reductive monism and Cartesian dualism, dual-aspect monism gained some popularity among German-speaking scientific psychologists in the last decades of the nineteenth century. By thejtz de si2cZe, more than a few followed this post-Kantian methodology which allowed one to be at the same time, and without contradiction, a scientific materialist and a psychological idealist. That is why the Viennese philosopher Wilhelm Jerusalem (1905) could make the claim that staunchly dedicated materialists such as "Rokitansky and Meynert as well as Helmholtz and DuBois-Reymond are firm idealists and true adherents of Kant and Schopenhauer" (p. 151). It was not simply the prestige of Helmholtz and his allies that forced philosophical idealism into scientific discourse on perception. It is unlikely that this dual methodology would have fared so well in the antiphilosophical mid-nineteenth century had it not been for the physiological research that many believed had scientifically verified the basic tenet of idealism. This watershed scientific proof came from Helmholtz's teacher, Johannes Muller, the man commonly called the father of modern physiology. 558 GEORGE 1. MAKARI Muller ( 1 80 1-1 858) in his influential Handbook o Hzitnan f Physiology (1833) set forth his law of the specific energies of the sense^.^ Following the work of Sir Charles Bell, Muller argued that the nerves of different sensory organs had unique qualities specific to that mode of sensation. Muller went on to show that a uniform cause generated different sensations from one nerve to the next. For instance, electricity applied to the optic nerve yielded the experience of light, while electricity to the skin resulted in the experience of touch. But then, to the shock of his contemporaries, Muller demonstrated the converse; he found that wildly different stimuli produced the s u m sensation in one sensory nerve. One could stimulate the optic nerve with a lit object or electricity or pressure, and in all cases the result would be the same; the subject saw light. Astonishingly, Muller had shown that the actzial cause of sensations was relatively arbitrary; what was important was the nerve being acted on. Hence it followed that knowledge derived from the senses could not be assumed to have any direct relation to the actual causes of sensations. As Muller (1833) wrote: "Sensation consists i n . . . a knowledge of certain qualities or conditions, ?tot o external bodf ies, but o the nemes o settse titetnselves'' (p. 1065; italics added). f f In much of the psychoanalytic writing on the Biophysics Movement, too much emphasis is laid on the rejection of Muller's vitalism by his rebelliously antimetaphysical students (e.g., Jones, 1953, p. 41), whereas little attention is paid to the crucial aspects of Muller's work that these men adopted. Helmholtz believed that Muller's work proved that sensations were relative not to their causes, but to the inner bodily organs of sense which were affected. Helmholtz (1868) wrote: "We have already seen enough to answer the question whether it is possible to maintain the natural, innate conviction that the qualities of our sensations, especially our sensations of sight, 3There are problems with the English translation of hluller's Handbucfi des Phjsiologie des Aferuchen (see Riese and Arrington, 1963). IVilliam Baly translates the title as Elemenk o Phjsiology, rather than the more literal translaf tion I use here. IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 559 give us a true copy of corresponding qualities in the outer world. It is clear that they do not. The question was really decided by Johannes Miiller's inference, from well ascertained facts, of the law of specific nervous energy" (p. 184). Given this belief in the correctness of his teacher's work, we should not be as surprised as those who think of a vulgarly antiphilosophical "Helmholtz School" to find Helmholtz putting forward a postKantian and Mullerian psychology of perception. The properties we ascribe to objects in the physical world are not actually properties ofthe object, but rather they signify effects these objects produce on our sensory organs, Helmholtz proclaimed (1866/1910, pp. 19-20; 1868, pp. 186-187). The quality of a sensation was not a mimetically pure representation or image of something "out there" intrinsic to the object, but was, in Helmholtz's words, a sign which must be interpreted (1868, p. 192). Helmholtz proposed: "sensations have been described as being simply symbols for the relations in the external world. They have been denied every kind of similarity or equivalence to the things they denote" (1866/1910, p. 18). In Helmholtz's work, perception was not an unmediated knowledge of objects, but was a psychic process by which objects were clothed with the observer's inner qualities. Perceiving an object entailed perceiving the quality that the observer provided and projected. But what then was this quality? In an important departure from Kantian notions of innate categories (one that would embroil him in controversy with "nativists" like Ewald Hering), Helmholtz argued that these qualitative signs were not universal or transcendental categories, but were a prioris built up through experience. Qualities were, in short, memories. Hence Helmholtz called his model of human vision based on remembered, learned experience an "Empirical Theory of Vision" (1866/1910, pp. 10-12; 1868, pp. 213-217)? 4With his "Empirical Theory of Vision," Helmholtz would seem to have left Kant behind by denying innate transcendental a prioris. But Hclmholtz's notion of unconscious inference preserved Kant's notion that causation was an a priori. In Helmholtz's model of perception every internal effect must have a cause, And causes are nothing more than our own unconscious infer- 560 GEORGE J. hlAKARl Although he himself objected to the term, Helmholtz inf forms us. that his theory of vision "is spoken of as a tkeoiy o projection, because according to it the perceptual images of objects are projected in space by means of a psychic process" (1866/1910, p. 17). This theory of projection was attacked from two sides. Almost immediately, the elderly Arthur Schopenhauer and his followers accused Helmholtz of plagiari~m.~ Schopenhauer's claim to priority irked Helmholtz, but not as much as the antipsychological critiques that focused their displeasure on a central aspect of Helmholtz's "projective" theory called an "unconscious inference" (ui26ewtcsster S c h l u ~ s ) . ~ For Helmholtz sensation per se was unmediated; it was the process of knowing sensation, of perceiving, that resulted in subjectively mediated knowledge. That mental process of interpreting sensation Helmholtz characterized as an unconscious inference. The proof that perception relied on unconscious inferences rested on Helmholtz's study of visual illusions. How do illusions occur? Helmholtz's answer was that when manual pressure stimulates the right retinal field, our usual, remembered experience, repeated millions of times, leads to an unconscious inference that there is a luminous body on the ences. By preserving the causal a priori and strictly adhering to Kant's epistemological distinctions, Helmholtz considered himself within the Kantian tradition (see Lenzen, 1947; Heimann, 1974; Pastore, 1974, 1978; Hatfield, 1990, p. 168). 5SeeSchopenhauer's letters (1978) as well as Lauxtermann (1987). There seems to be good reason for Schopenhauer's complaint. Take this sentence from his book on vision: "Que I'entendement transforme la sensation en intuition, alors cet effet est bien entendu rapport6 et trumfiri h sa cause, et la lumiere ou la couleur, comme qualit&, c'est-h-dire comme modes d'action sont attribu6es au corps produisant cette sensation" (1815, p. 51; italics added). GIJnbewussterSclilws has also been translated as "unconscious judgement" and "unconscious conclusion." On the significance of this concept, see Pastore, 1978; Turner, 1982; Hatfield, 1990. A historical debate exists over priority for the concept of uiibewusster Schlws. In a work published in 1862, Helmholtz's research assistant Wilhelm Wundt also based a theory of sensory perception on unconscious inference. Richards (1980) argued that IVundt deserves priority. Since, however, Helmholtz outlined this theory in his Konigsberg speech (1855), others have argued that Wundt developed Helmholtz's idea (Hatfield, 1990, p, 198). I N T I I E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 56 1 left (1866/1910, pp. 2-3). Thus, even though there is in fact nothing there, we reach to the left, driven by "the unconscious process of the association of ideas going on in the dark background of our memory. Thus too its results are urged on our consciousness, so to speak, as if an external power had constrained us, over which our will has no control" (p. 26). T o know an object, we unconsciously impose on the unknowable causes of sensation qualities that exist in our memories. This process by which qualities-that is, past experiences-are unconsciously transferred onto stimuli, Helmholtz called an unconscious inference. With illusions this blind matching process revealed itself by going awry; there was an unconscious transfer of a memory to a dissimilar, unusual sensation. "The explanation of the possibility of illusions," Helmholtz argued, "lies in the fact that we apply our notions of external objects, which would be correct under normal conditions, to cases in which unusual circumstances have altered the retinal picture" (1868, p. 216). Elsewhere Helmholtz described the same process as verlegt, i.e., as a transfer of a remembered matrix of visual meaning onto an unusual stimulus (1855, pp. 100-101; also see Pastore, 1978, pp. 360-361). For Helmholtz, unconscious memory inferred the presence of a luminous, external object "out there" where past experience dictated it ought to be. In fact that stimulus could be due to a quite different cause; nothing could be "out there." Hence visual illusions revealed that visual perception was dependent on an unconscious inference. In response to those critics who argued that no inference could be unconscious, Helmholtz asserted: "these are surely not inferences which depend upon our consciously thinking over previous observations. . . . I have therefore called them unconscious inferences" (1868, p. 2 17). So the psychologically unknowable excitation that stimulates the retina is given a false qualitative sign based on the subject's past experience. We infer unconsciously that the unknowable essence that is stimulating our senses is like a familiar, frequently experienced outer cause. As Muller's experiments 562 GEORGE J. hlAKAKI showed, in truth many things may have stimulated this qualitative response. But our "acquired experience" mistakes a new and unusual stimulus for the same old song and dance. For Helmholtz, an unconsciously transferred memory of an external object creates illusion by confusing a familiar past with a foreign present. Quantity and Quality in Fretid For Charcot, Bernheim, and the hypnotists, impressed as they were with the power of suggestion to translate an external idea fully and completely into an internal mental state, the inner mediation and distortion of perception did not present itself as a particularly important problem. These men could be content with passive associationalist models of mind. However, the Kantians, Muller and Helmholtz, led their followers down a different path; their adherents felt that "Lockean" models no longer cohered with the state of scientific knowledge. Jerusalem (1899) prefaced a discussion of Muller and Helmholtz's work on visual illusions by proclaiming that idealism had achieved scientific status; "Strict idealism has received additional confirmation from the modern physiology of the senses" (p. 74). Meynert (1884) in his textbook Psychiatry, was similarly certain of idealism's validity. Meynert wrote: "it should be reiterated that the idealistic conception of the world is supported by physiological facts" (1884, p. 183). So for a psychologically minded theoretician building a model of ideation, perception and memory in late ninteenthcentury Vienna, an obvious starting point would have been the convergence of post-Kantian philosophy and empirical physiology that found voice in Helmholtz's influential notions of perception. Freud, of course, knew Helmholtz's work well (Jones, 1953, pp. 4041,223,292); Sulloway (1979) claimed that in the 1890's Helmholtz was Freud's idol (p. 139). In any case, it would have been hard for a late nineteenth-century Viennese neurologist not to know Helmholtz's seminal discoveries on peripheral IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 563 nerve fibers, the conservation of energy, the velocity of nerve conduction, vision, and audition. After working in Ernst Brucke's laboratory, Freud would have certainly learned of Helmholtz's ideas and methods. So it is little surprise that beginning with his failed "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895) f and culminating with Chapter 7 of the Interpretation o Dream (1900), as Freud sought to establish a model of normal human psychology, he seems to have followed Helmholtz's reliance on dual-aspect monism. It is dangerous to attribute any one mind-body philosophy to Freud simply because his position on this matter was shifting (e.g., Rubenstein, 1965; Silverstein, 1985; Holt, 1989; Solms and Saling, 1990; Wallace, 1992). Nonetheless, I shall argue that while at times it may not be strictly correct to label Freud a dual-aspect monist, it is crucial to understand the influence this philosophy had on him, especially during the last years of the nineteenth century when he built his topographic model of mind. Dual-aspect monism runs throughout Freud's "Project for a Scientific Psychology" (1895). In this work Freud explicitly adopted this dual model of qualifiable subjective perception and quantifiable material truth: "If we keep firmly to the fact that our consciousness furnishes only qualities, whereas science recognizes only quantities, a characterization of the w [omega/ perceptual] neurones emerges. . . . For whereas science has set about the task of tracing all the qztalities of our sensations back to external quantities, it is to be expected from the structure of the nervous system that it consists of contrivances for transforming external quantity into quality . . ." (p. 309).' Like Helmholtz, Freud also assumed that perception was the consciousness of quality; therefore he deduced a third system of neurons, the omega system, to accommodate this assumption. Sensory stimuli were received by nerve endings, 'As we have seen, for Xliiller and Helmholtz these distinctions between inner subjective quality and external quantities were crucial. So when Stratchey complained that Freud referred to these concepts in The Interprefufiono f Dreams (1900) without definition as if they were "as much a matter o f course 564 GEORGE J. h l A K A R I which acted as "screens" and "sieves" (p. 310). These quantitative stimuli were peripherally transmitted in quantity as well as in their "period of neuronal motion" (which was a function of the nerves themselves). Perception, the consciousness of sensation, was the knowledge of this period of neuronal motion, which Freud called quality. T h e omega system perceived what were once quantitative stimuli as qualitative. Consciousness for Freud at this point was nothing more than the "subjective side" of omega's perception of quality (p. 31 1). So we see that in the "Project," Freud followed Helmholtz's distinctions between qualitative perceptual knowledge and quantitative external stimuli. But as numerous authors have pointed out, the "Project" was a failed work, one Freud left unpublished (e.g., Cranefield, 1970). How do we know Freud remained influenced by these approaches to perception after 1895? Here the Fliess correspondence is helpful, for the continuing presence of Helmholtzian assumptions in Freud's intellectual life can be highlighted by examining the reading Freud excitedly reported on during the years leading up to The Interf pretation o Dreams. In an 1896 letter to Fliess, Freud wrote: "I am continually occupied with psychology-really metapsychology; Taine's book L'intelligence suits me extraordinarily well. . ." (Masson, 1985, p. 1'72). Hippolyte Taine (1828-1893), the French psychological philosopher, published his O n Intelligence in 1870. Taine was another nineteenth-century miscegenist who was greatly influenced by both idealism (in this case primarily Hegel) and positivism. Taine employed dual-aspect monism and explicitly based his understanding of sensory perception on the scientific work of Miiller and Helmholtz. "Sensations are projected out of our body and clothe more or less distant objects," Taine proclaimed (1870, pp. 292-293). "We have shown how in sight, the sensation of the retina finds itself projected to his readers as they were to himself' (S. E., 4, p. xvi), he overstated Freud's originality and understated Freud's knowledge of his own readership. IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 565 in appearance beyond our sentient surface to become incorporated with the object that excites it . . . it seems to us a quality of the object. . . such are the visual and really internal phantoms which when we open our eyes, seem to us external objects . ." (p. 33 1). Taine concluded his thoughts on perception by saying: "we have found objects are illusions, fragments of the Ego" (pp. 33 1-332). Along with this derivative theory of projective perception, the French philosopher also adopted Helmholtz's theory of how illusions occurred; there was a "transfer" to bodies, not by a Kantian "innate and inexplicable structure of mind" but "an acquired disposition, instituted in us by experience" (p. 329). Taine went on to describe a developmental schema that allowed for a learning process-a way of sloivly rising out of the realm of mistaken subjective illusion, much of which can also be found in Helmholtz's later work (Helmholtz, 1894). For Taine the perceptual world was a world of phantoms that over time was rectified by the "partial negations" of experience. Due to these constant rectifications, partial negations of the illusion by reality's contradictions, a child perceived the illusory quality of his own perceptions. As Taine put it: "In the healthy and awake, the mind can be defined as a series of hallucinations that d o not become developed.. (1870, p. 230). Dreams were the model by which Taine saw the untutored mind at work; awake, we learn to refrain from dreaming. Taine's notions would find parallels in the Freudian concepts of hallucinatory wish fulfillment and the development of secondary process found in both the "Project" (which seems to have been written before Freud read Taine) and the dream book. In August of 1898 Freud wrote Fliess about another psychological philosopher who had caught his interest: "I have set myself the task of building a bridge between my germinating metapsychology and that contained in the literature and have therefore immersed myself in the study of Lipps, who I suspect has the clearest mind among present day philosophical writers'' (Masson, 1985, p. 324). . ." 566 GEORGE J . hlAKAKI Theodore Lipps (185 1-19 14)' the German psychologist and aesthetician, is remembered today for his work on jokes as well as his aesthetic theory of eiizfiiihltrng or empathy (Lipps, 1903; see also Hunsdahl, 1967). Lipps clearly left an indelible mark on Freud, and yet he has received little attention from Freud scholars save Kanzer (1981) and Gilman (1991). Masson (1985, pp. 324-325) tells us that Freud carefully read and annotated Lipps's Basic Facts of Psjcizic Life (1883), a work in which the author developed notions of unconscious processes underlying consciousness and dreams. What Masson does not note is that over numerous pages directly preceding Lipps's discussion of the unconscious, this author developed a perceptual theory that, like Helmholtz's, involved a transfer of meaning onto an objectively different sensation. Lipps called this process over and over again, iibertragung or transference (pp. 87-95). Lipps would later write extensively on problems of visual illusions and how the imagination and other higher cortical processes played a part in these phenomena. He generally concurred with the basic Kantian position on psychology and scientific knowledge, and employed distinctions between quantity and quality though he subcategorized and personally developed these concepts (1883,1905). For Lipps, quality was assimilated not by "unconscious inferences" but by a somewhat different process of psychic ordering he called "transference" (Obertragung) along "relationship-dispositions" (Bezielzungsdisposition). For instance, color tones were "transferable within limits, to a representation that never existed in perception" when guided by these central relationship-dispositions (1883, p. 88). A strange tone was transferred into the memorized relationship-disposition of a tonal system, a paradigm of known tonal relationships that then gave a familiar meaning to this unfamiliar stimulus. Lipps's theory of Ubertragung, like Helmholtz's unconscious inferences, conceptualized psychologically subjectified knowledge as the result of a transfer of a past paradigm of meaning onto what was in fact a different object. IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 567 So we see that in late nineteenth-century middle Europe an influential model of perception rooted in dual-aspect monism arose that: (1) dismissed passive "immaculate" perception as nai've, (2) preserved objective truth for the scientifically quantifiable, and (3) incorporated idealist critiques of knowledge into their psychologies of perception. After Muller's law of specific energies of the senses, a physiologized Kantian critique of perception was considered by some to be empirically verified. It was thought, following Schopenhauer and Helmholtz, that perception was a process by which the nervous system necessarily projected its inner qualities onto a psychologically unknowable (but scientifically knowable) object. This precarious mode of perceiving could easily go wrong via what Helmholtz called an unconscious inference. In the late nineteenth century this psychology of misknowledge was applied and revised by other European psychological thinkers such as Hippolyte Taine, Theodor Lipps and, as we shall see, the fin de sikcle Sigmund Freud. The Unknown Inner and Transference Before comparing these models of visual illusion with the theory of transference Freud put forth in his dream book, it is necessary to deal with a crucial difference. What, it might be asked, do the problems of sensory illusion have to do with Freud's 1900 model of transference which was, after all, centrally based on unconscious wishing? Freud pointed to this difference himself. In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud discussed a theory of dreaming based on Helmholtzian notions of perceptual illusion. Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), Helmholtz's former research assistant, argued that in dreams we interpret external stimuli the way we do in the case of visual illusions. In the dream book Freud (1900) summarized Wundt's thought: "the mind receives stimuli that reach it during sleep.. . . A sense-impression is recognized by us and correctly interpreted-that is, it is placed in the group 568 GEORGE J. hlAKARI of memories to which, in accordance with all our previous experiences, it belongs. . . . I f these conditions are not fulfilled, we mistake the object which is the source of the impression: we form an illusion about it" (p. 29). Near the end of his dream book, Freud agreed with Wundt's Helmholtzian theory, saying that there was no reason to dispute the theory that "dreams interpret objective sensory stimuli just as illusions do," but added, ``we have found the motive which provides the reason for that interpretation, a reason which has been left unspecified by other writers" (p. 589). Freud was referring to the fact that his model of illusion and dream was motivated by an inner cause, a wish.' In the "Project" as well as The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud had added a crucial new dimension to the post-Kantian model of perception. Not only were exogenous stimuli unknowable in their essence, endogenous unconscious stimuli were also not knowable in their essence (1895, p. 312). How did Freud understand this unknowable inner essence and its effects on consciousness? In his dream book, Freud left a clue as to how, by analogy, he might be organizing his thoughts on the commerce between consciousness and the unconscious when he wrote: "irz its innennost .tiatwe it [the unconscious] is as mzcch unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world by the coinmunications of our sense organs" (1900, p. 613). So while Helmholtz and his followers employed Kantian distinctions to comprehend perception of the outer world, Freud turned the process inward and sought via analogy to conceptualize how unconscious inner processes came to consciousness. Conscious knowledge of the unconscious was, he reasoned, subjectively distorted in the same manner that sensory perception of the external world was flawed. `In this turn from an epistemological and perceptual framework to an internally driven motivational one, Freud followed Schopenhauer whose inner Will was the unknowable thing in itself; see hlakari (1991). IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 569 A few pages later Freud was more explicit. Philosophers who accept the unconscious have difficulty giving any role to consciousness, Freud noted. "We, on the other hand, are rescued from the embarrassment by the analogy between our Cs. system ai2d the perceptual systems" (1900, p. 616; italics added). So Freud explicitly constructed his understanding of how we consciously perceive unconscious stimuli based on an analogy with our visual perception of the outer world. And here too Freud adhered to dual-aspect monism, declaring that the unconscious presented its unknowable quantities to consciousness which was a "sense organ for the perception of psychical qualities" (1900, p. 615).' Freud's equation of consciousness with a sensory organ provided him with a ready-made conceptual framework, taken from perceptual theory, which helped him make sense of unconscious goings on in a language that was scientifically palatable to his peers. It was not odd for Freud to employ a visual metaphor here, for as Rorty has pointed out, much of history of philosophy can be conceived of as "the story of the domination of the mind of the West by ocular metaphors" (19'79, p. 13). Given this venerable tradition in which eye and mind are equated, it should also be no surprise to find that Freud's equation of consciousness with a sense organ was not original. In a fetter to Fliess in 1898, Freud confessed: "I found the substance of my own insights stated quite clearly in Lipps, perhaps rather more so than I would like. `The seeker often finds more than he wished to find!' Consciousness is only a sense organ, all psychic content is only a representation; all psychic processes are unconscious" (Masson, 1985, p. 325). For Freud in 1900, consciousness was a sensory organ sandwiched between one subjectifying screen which obscured gFreud maintained his conviction in this way of conceptualizing consciousness as a sense organ of psychical quality till his death (1940b, pp. 285-286). In An Outline o Pgchoanafpi Freud also laid out dual-aspect mof nism as his mind-brain position (1940a, p. 144), and dedicated a section to the seemingly forgotten topic of "psychical qualities" (1940a, pp. 157-164). 570 GEORGE 1. hiAKAK1 the outer world and another which obscured the inner, unconscious world. With Helmholtz's model of projective perception to guide him, and with the added confirmation from Lipps that one could usefully analogize consciousness to a sensory organ, Freud set out to make explicit the relation between unconscious processes and consciousness. Unconscious quantities, he declared, were only allowed into consciousness and perceived as qualities of pleasure or unpleasure: "By the help of its perception of pleasure and unpleasure it [consciousness] influences the discharge of the cathexes within what is otherwise an unconscious apparatus operating by means of displacement of quantities" (1900, p. 616). In his discussion of wish fulfillment, Freud also postulated another manner by which unconscious quantities could interact with consciousness. I believe the same organizing principles issuing out of Helmholtzian perception also served Freud as a model for understanding this other process he called transference. By Helmholtz's model, illusions took place due to unusual, unknowable stimuli that were mistakenly "known" via the transfer of a memory. Freud admitted in the dream book there was no reason to argue with this conception of how illusions took place. But what is different in my model, Freud claimed, is I have articulated the motive for illusion. Illusion was no longer simply the result of an unusual stimulus from outside fooling the subject into imposing a subjective past on a novel stimulus. Now there was another stimulus that was distorting and unknowable, coming from repressed memories within. Unconscious memories did not just "accidentally" attach themselves to incorrect sensations; Freud's model was of motivated misknowledge. An unconscious wish sought discharge. Unconscious quantities found their way to consciousness and indirectly manifested themselves by cloaking themselves in preconscious representations. In The Interpretation o Dreams, Freud called this process f transference. But five years earlier, in his "Project," the framework for this new model of transference had already been IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 57 1 hatched. There, Freud postulated that endogenous excitation coming from "nuclear neurones" goes to the psi system (1895, pp. 314-315). T h e summation of such stimuli led to a certain urgency within the organism, a state of wishing which transferred its energy to the omega/perceptual system. If unchecked, this wishing forced up a mnemic image of an object that once brought satisfaction. Affected by a transferral of unconscious wishing energy, this image could then cause the perceptual system to experience a hallucination (1895, p. 3 19). That hallucination, Freud argued in the same manner Taine did, was not satisfied by the external world; hence, over time, the child learned to modify it. This model (endogenous stimulation distorting conscious perception via hallucination) in the "Project" can be seen as the precursor of the more modulated model of unconscious wishing and transference Freud used in The Interpretation ofDream. "Excitatory material flows in to the Cs. sense-organ from two directions: from the Pcpt. system, whose excitation, determined by qualities, is probably submitted to a fresh revision before it becomes a conscious sensation, and from the interior of the apparatus itself, whose quantitative processes are felt qualitatively in the pleasure-unpleasure series when, subject to certain modifications, they make their way to consciousness" (1900, p. 616). Hallucination is less likely in this model due to these modifications; the more common route for transference thoughts was for them to attach their quantity onto a preconscious quality and distort it in the manner of illusions. It was only if these repressed "transference thoughts" were strongly cathected that they might not get modified and seek motor discharge or "if the path is open, hallucinatory revival of the desired perceptual identity" (1900, p. 605). Freud (1900) explained: ". . . an unconscious idea is as such quite incapable of entering the preconscious and . . it can only exercise any effect there by establishing a connection with an idea which already belongs to the preconscious, by transferring its intensity on to it and by getting itself `covered' by it. Here we . 572 GEORGE J. hIAKARI have the fact of `transference,' which provides an explanation of so many striking phenomena in the mental life of neurotics" (pp. 562-563). A repressed unconscious wish from the past transferred its quantity of excitation onto a current perception, or in the case of dreams, a day residue. Day residues "offer the unconscious something indispensable-namely the necessary point of attachment for a transference" (p. 564). That preconscious representation was hence altered by the quantitative force of the unconscious wish that had been transferred onto it." Transference thoughts did not simply impose themselves on consciousness like hallucinations; instead, like illusions, they distorted a perceptual representation. Freud, insofar as he equated perception of external objects with consciousness of the unconscious, followed Helmholtz's theory of visual illusion to help reconceptualize transference. Helmholtz's process of illusion was inverted by Freud from an outer unknowable stimulus being clothed in the wrong qualitative memory, to an inner unknowable stimulus being clothed in an inappropriate preconscious psychic content. Illusions might occur due to a perceptual memory being mismatched with an outer stimulus, but now there was another source of illusion, a motivated misknowing based on unconscious distortion of preconscious residues. In Freud's model, perceptual memory (i.e., Helmholtz's learned psychic quality) itself could be distorted by unconscious stimuIi, further problematizing perceptual veracity. Transference accounted for the distortion of available preconscious psychic form. In the case of dreams, this form was a day residue; in waking life, it was "indifferent" recent impressions or ideas (1900, p. 563). While the guiding assumptions Freud followed in mapping out the terrain between the unconscious and the conscious were `OFreud also considered the possibility that the content of the unconscious wish might further alter the content of the idea in the preconscious, but he does not elaborate (1900, p. 563). IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 573 derived from those laid out by dual-aspect monism's employment of quality and quantity and Helmholtzian theories of perceptual illusion, we can see that there is no complete isomorphism between these models. Though Helmholtz's model was based on an unconscious inference, his unconscious was not dynamic; it was equivalent to the Freudian preconscious. Furthermore, the Helmholtzian unconscious was not a source of unknowable stimuli that distorted perceptual memory. Freud's topographic theory was doubly complicated; there was both the unknowable outer and the unknowable inner. Perceptual impressions such as day residues could be distorted in the process of outer perception, or they could be distorted by unconscious transferences. For Freud consciousness was surrounded; it was a feeble, faulty lamp stranded between the unconscious and the darkness of outer reality. Freud's notions of unconscious wishing and psychic defense also clearly and radically distinguish his model of transference from that of his contemporaries. Helmholtz and his followers did not postulate the irrational, motivated distortion that was central for Freud. Despite these crucial differences, Freud's 1900 model of transference was indebted to a postKantian tradition in perceptual theory that helped him incorporate innovations like defense and unconscious wishing into a framework of consciousness and perception. Transference stood near the center of Freud's 1900 model of mind, for it was a metapsychologic concept that formalized the way unconscious processes invaded and distorted preconscious psychic contents and hence both consciousness and perception. Furthermore, transference was crucial, for it was, as illusion was for Helmholtz, one of the unusual phenomena that allowed Freud to infer the presence of unconscious processes in the awake and nonpsychotic patient (1900, p. 612). Freud wrote: "The unconscious wishful impulses clearly try to make themselves effective in daytime as well, and the fact of transference, as well as the psychoses, show u s . . ." (p. 567). Indeed, 574 GEORGE J. hIAKARI transference "provides an explanation of so many striking phenomena in the mental life of neurotics" (pp. 562-563). Freud's 1900 concept of transference described the manner in which the inner noumena of unconscious mental processes falsely subjectified day residues, impressions, and ideas. In Freud's 1900 model of transference it was not just that an observer misperceived an external object; it was more fundamentally that a subject's very ability to veridically know and perceive had been undercut. T h e unknowable repressed inner was known only by its ability to attack and distort a preconscious representation. In this attachment, unconscious stimuli imbued an idea or a perception-and hence ultimately an outer presence-with feelings of pleasure or uripleasure that were in truth meant for something or someone else. Conclusion Since Plato's cave, Western theories of mentation have often been organized by optical metaphors. I have attempted to show how nineteenth-century theories of vision gave Freud a framework with which to expand his thinking on what had heretofore been a limited clinical construct called transference. By 1900, Freud can be situated in a tradition that posited the active subjectification of perception. Freud acknowledged this heritage and it was one that he did not drop quickly. In his essay, "The Unconscious," Freud (1915) wrote: "In psychoanalysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs . . .Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned . . . so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object" (p. 171). T h e Kantian tradition Freud referred to in this passage underwent a crucial transformation when Schopenhauer argued that Kant's a prioris were in fact brain functions. This IN T H E EYE OF T H E BEHOLDER 575 physiologically rooted, idealistic model of projective perception received scientific bolstering from Johannes Miiller and his law of the specific energies of the senses, and then came to its greatest prominence in the work of Herman von Helmholtz. Helmholtz discussed the ways the nervous system created illusion by imposing its own qualities on external excitations. Theories of projective perception such as Helmholtz's went on to postulate that illusions occurred by an unconscious inference based on the transfer of memory onto an unusual stimulus. Freud knew his Helmholtz well, and between 1895 and 1900 he was impressed by at least two other participants in this discourse, Theodor Lipps and Hippolyte Taine. Freud followed this tradition's demarcation of external quantity and internal quality, but he added an inner realm of unknowable essence, the unconscious. Like Lipps, Freud saw consciousness as a sensory organ for psychic quality, and the unconscious as an unknowable (in any direct sense) source of stimuli. By employing this Helmholtzian framework in his study of dreams, Freud postulated that unconscious quantities, via "transference," reached the preconscious and there marked a conscious quality-an idea, perception, or in the case of dreams, a day residue-with its energies. Freud's transference inverted the problem of external illusion and conceptualized a subjectification and motivated misperception caused by inner unknowable stimuli. Despite its novel aspects, Freud's 1900 model of transference can be situated in the tradition of perceptual theorizing found in Schopenhauer and Helmholtz as well as Taine and Lipps. Rather than being the work of a solitary genius, Freud's 1900 model of transference was an inspired, creative synthesis deeply rooted in the prevailing philosophical and physiological discourse of its time. Understanding this tradition's employment of dual-aspect monism helps us make sense of the changing use of the term Ubertrugung in Freud's early work. Prior to Freud's specific connotation of this term, Ubertrugung had a history of usage within scientific discourse where in general 576 GEOKGE J. hIAKARI it denoted the hypothesized transference of neuronal energy. Freud (1888, p. 56) employed this usage at times in his early neurological articles." In 1895, Freud used the same term for a primarily psychological concept, one based on ideas, affects, and false connections (Breuer and Freud, 5895). In the 1900 dream book, Freud's concept of transference brought together both of these meanings; transference was only knowable as a psychological phenomenon, but it was a psychological phenomenon that was theoretically scientifically knowable as a physiological event. Dual-aspect monism allowed Freud the neurologist to coexist with Freud the psychologist, and allowed one word-transference-to simultaneously lead a psychological and a physiological life. Finally by situating Freud's 1900 metapsychological theory of transference in a nineteenth-century discourse on perception, we gain a context with which to understand a fundamental shift in Freud's thinking that made transference metamorphize from an error and theoretical aside, into a central facet of irrational inner life. Freud's 1900 concept of transference has frequently been treated as a detour in the historical development of this concept. I have tried to show that Freud's 1900 transference theory was, in fact, a crucial conceptualization that resituated this idea near the center of Freud's metapsychology of unconsciously motivated misknowledge. Transference in 1900 not only accounted for a patient's possible distortion of the physician, it more fundamentally proposed a broader, motivated subjectification of perception itself. On December 3 l ? "Amacher (1965), while pointing out this neurological usage among Freud's contemporaries such as Sigmund Exner and Ernst Briicke (p. 45), and arguing for the indebtedness of other Freudian concepts to earlier neurological constructs, believed that transference had no neurological roots (Amacher,.l974, p. 223). Solms and Saling (1990, p. 119) argued that Freud first used Uberfrugung in his article "Gehirn" (Freud, 1888), and hinted that they believed this neurological usage was related to Freud's later constructions, but they did not develop their thoughts on this matter. Kravis (1992) laid out the neurological usage of the French le trunsfert, and argued that transference developed into a concept that was both biological and epistemic, a position I share. 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</ref-list></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: HELMHOLTZIAN PERCEPTION AND THE ORIGINS OF FREUD'S 1900 THEORY OF TRANSFERENCE</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" lang="en" contentType="CDATA"><title>IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER: HELMHOLTZIAN PERCEPTION AND THE ORIGINS OF FREUD'S 1900 THEORY OF TRANSFERENCE</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">George J.</namePart><namePart type="family">Makari</namePart><namePart type="termsOfAddress">M.D.</namePart><affiliation>525 East 68th Street New York, NY 10021</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>SAGE Publications</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1994-04</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1994</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract lang="en">Freud's 1900 theory of transference was indebted to the convergence of philosophy and physiology found in nineteenth-century theories of visual perception. The author maps out the post-Kantian philosophical and German physiological currents that gave rise to Hermann von Helmholtz's influential work on perception, and proposes that Freud's 1900 theory of transference was a creative synthesis of novel notions like unconscious wishing and psychic defense with a Helmholtzian model of visual illusion.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0003-0651</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1941-2460</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">APA</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID-hwp">spapa</identifier><part><date>1994</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>42</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>2</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>549</start><end>580</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">EA08D0B3DEC975269004D50740205D0F9E705E69</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/M70-D5DV4DFX-0</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1177/000306519404200210</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">10.1177_000306519404200210</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-0J1N7DQT-B">sage</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/EA08D0B3DEC975269004D50740205D0F9E705E69/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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