The ghosts in the meme machine
Identifieur interne : 000096 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000095; suivant : 000097The ghosts in the meme machine
Auteurs : Gustav JahodaSource :
- History of the human sciences [ 0952-6951 ] ; 2002-04.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Active agents, Active role, Bagehot, Baldwin, Baldwin effect, Biological heredity, Blackmore, Cambridge university press, Cultural evolution, Darwin, Darwinism, Dawkins, Erasmus darwin, Ethical interpretations, Evolutionary, Evolutionary change, Evolutionary psychology, Gabriel tarde, Genetic evolution, Harvard university press, Human capacity, Human sciences, Imitative, Latter part, Meme, Memetics, Mental development, Moral virtues, Natural selection, Older theories, Organic selection, Original emphasis, Oxford university press, Social darwinism, Social development, Social evolution, Social life, Social psychology, Social sciences, Social world, Susan blackmore, Tarde.
Abstract
The notion of `memes' as replicators similar to genes, but concerned with cultural units, was put forward by Dawkins (1976). Blackmore (1999) used this notion to elaborate an ambitious theory designed to account for numerous aspects of human evolution and psychology. Her theory is based on the human capacity for imitation, and although the operation of the `memes' is said to be purely mechanical, the figurative language used implies that their `actions' are purposive. This article will show that imitation had been regarded as important for human advance well before Darwinism. Moreover, at the end of the 19th century descriptions of the functioning of imitation in society had been put forward that closely parallel those given by Blackmore. Hence it is argued that what is convincing about her thesis is not new, and what is new is speculative and highly questionable.
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DOI: 10.1177/0952695102015002126
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ISTEX:E40B6A5E5C3E47DEB26A938E7659881F958D3A64Le document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">The ghosts in the meme machine</title><author wicri:is="90%"><name sortKey="Jahoda, Gustav" sort="Jahoda, Gustav" uniqKey="Jahoda G" first="Gustav" last="Jahoda">Gustav Jahoda</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, University of Strathclyde, 40 George Street, Glasgow, G11QE, UK,</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: G.Jahoda@strath.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:E40B6A5E5C3E47DEB26A938E7659881F958D3A64</idno><date when="2002" year="2002">2002</date><idno type="doi">10.1177/0952695102015002126</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/E40B6A5E5C3E47DEB26A938E7659881F958D3A64/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">000096</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">000096</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">The ghosts in the meme machine</title><author wicri:is="90%"><name sortKey="Jahoda, Gustav" sort="Jahoda, Gustav" uniqKey="Jahoda G" first="Gustav" last="Jahoda">Gustav Jahoda</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Department of Psychology, University of Strathclyde, 40 George Street, Glasgow, G11QE, UK,</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: G.Jahoda@strath.ac.uk</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">History of the human sciences</title><idno type="ISSN">0952-6951</idno><idno type="eISSN">1461-720X</idno><imprint><publisher>SAGE Publications</publisher><pubPlace>Sage UK: London, England</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2002-04">2002-04</date><biblScope unit="volume">15</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="55">55</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="68">68</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0952-6951</idno></series></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0952-6951</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="Teeft" xml:lang="en"><term>Active agents</term><term>Active role</term><term>Bagehot</term><term>Baldwin</term><term>Baldwin effect</term><term>Biological heredity</term><term>Blackmore</term><term>Cambridge university press</term><term>Cultural evolution</term><term>Darwin</term><term>Darwinism</term><term>Dawkins</term><term>Erasmus darwin</term><term>Ethical interpretations</term><term>Evolutionary</term><term>Evolutionary change</term><term>Evolutionary psychology</term><term>Gabriel tarde</term><term>Genetic evolution</term><term>Harvard university press</term><term>Human capacity</term><term>Human sciences</term><term>Imitative</term><term>Latter part</term><term>Meme</term><term>Memetics</term><term>Mental development</term><term>Moral virtues</term><term>Natural selection</term><term>Older theories</term><term>Organic selection</term><term>Original emphasis</term><term>Oxford university press</term><term>Social darwinism</term><term>Social development</term><term>Social evolution</term><term>Social life</term><term>Social psychology</term><term>Social sciences</term><term>Social world</term><term>Susan blackmore</term><term>Tarde</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">The notion of `memes' as replicators similar to genes, but concerned with cultural units, was put forward by Dawkins (1976). Blackmore (1999) used this notion to elaborate an ambitious theory designed to account for numerous aspects of human evolution and psychology. Her theory is based on the human capacity for imitation, and although the operation of the `memes' is said to be purely mechanical, the figurative language used implies that their `actions' are purposive. This article will show that imitation had been regarded as important for human advance well before Darwinism. Moreover, at the end of the 19th century descriptions of the functioning of imitation in society had been put forward that closely parallel those given by Blackmore. 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Blackmore (1999) used this notion to elaborate an ambitious theory designed to account for numerous aspects of human evolution and psychology. Her theory is based on the human capacity for imitation, and although the operation of the `memes' is said to be purely mechanical, the figurative language used implies that their `actions' are purposive. This article will show that imitation had been regarded as important for human advance well before Darwinism. Moreover, at the end of the 19th century descriptions of the functioning of imitation in society had been put forward that closely parallel those given by Blackmore. Hence it is argued that what is convincing about her thesis is not new, and what is new is speculative and highly questionable.</p></abstract><textClass><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>Darwinism</term></item><item><term>early social psychology</term></item><item><term>imitation</term></item><item><term>memes</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2002-04">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/E40B6A5E5C3E47DEB26A938E7659881F958D3A64/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus sage not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.3 20070202//EN" URI="journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="2.3" xml:lang="EN"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="hwp">sphhs</journal-id><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">HHS</journal-id><journal-title>History of the Human Sciences</journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">0952-6951</issn><publisher>
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<contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Jahoda</surname><given-names>Gustav</given-names></name><aff>Department of Psychology, University of Strathclyde, 40 George Street, Glasgow, G11QE, UK, <email xlink:type="simple">G.Jahoda@strath.ac.uk</email></aff></contrib></contrib-group>
<pub-date pub-type="ppub"><month>04</month><year>2002</year></pub-date><volume>15</volume><issue>2</issue><fpage>55</fpage><lpage>68</lpage><abstract><p>The notion of `memes' as replicators similar to genes, but concerned with cultural units, was put forward by Dawkins (1976). Blackmore (1999) used this notion to elaborate an ambitious theory designed to account for numerous aspects of human evolution and psychology. Her theory is based on the human capacity for imitation, and although the operation of the `memes' is said to be purely mechanical, the figurative language used implies that their `actions' are purposive. This article will show that imitation had been regarded as important for human advance well before Darwinism. Moreover, at the end of the 19th century descriptions of the functioning of imitation in society had been put forward that closely parallel those given by Blackmore. Hence it is argued that what is convincing about her thesis is not new, and what is new is speculative and highly questionable.</p></abstract><kwd-group><kwd>Darwinism</kwd>
<kwd>early social psychology</kwd>
<kwd>imitation</kwd>
<kwd>memes</kwd></kwd-group><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>sagemeta-type</meta-name><meta-value>Journal Article</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>search-text</meta-name><meta-value>55 The ghosts in the meme machine SAGE Publications, Inc.200210.1177/0952695102015002126 GustavJahoda Department of Psychology, University of Strathclyde, 40 George Street, Glasgow, G11QE, UK, G.Jahoda@strath.ac.uk The notion of `memes' as replicators similar to genes, but concerned with cultural units, was put forward by Dawkins (1976). Blackmore (1999) used this notion to elaborate an ambitious theory designed to account for numerous aspects of human evolution and psychology. Her theory is based on the human capacity for imitation, and although the operation of the `memes' is said to be purely mechanical, the figurative language used implies that their `actions' are purposive. This article will show that imitation had been regarded as important for human advance well before Darwinism. Moreover, at the end of the 19th century descriptions of the functioning of imitation in society had been put forward that closely parallel those given by Blackmore. Hence it is argued that what is convincing about her thesis is not new, and what is new is speculative and highly questionable. Darwinism early social psychology imitation memes ABSTRACT In the middle of the 18th century the physician Julien La Mettrie (1709–51) shocked his contemporaries by boldly chopping off the spiritual half of Descartes' dualism and declaring in his L'homme machine (1748) that not only animals but also humans are mere machines. Some 250 years later Susan Blackmore (1999) published The Meme Machine, seeking to show that humans are mere creatures of entities known as `memes'. Like its distant predecessor, Blackmore's work also made a considerable impact and has been widely 56 discussed (cf. Aunger, 2000 and the Memetics discussion list maintained by the Journal of Memetics). This article will sketch the historical background of current debates and critically compare Blackmore's with older approaches. During the latter part of the 19th and the early years of the 20th centuries, Darwinism stimulated the rise of evolutionary theories in the emerging social sciences, notably psychology and sociology. During that period, evol- utionary interpretations of social life and social change were put forward, with `imitation' regarded as a central mechanism. By the end of the First World War the tide of evolutionism in the social sciences had receded. The once popular `instinct' theories gave way to a pervasive environmentalism, typi ed in psychology by behaviourism. This in turn was superseded by the `cognitive revolution' that began with information-processing and then bifurcated: one strand returned to the problem of `meaning', while the other moved towards neurophysiology, and also a renewed wave of evolutionary thought. The cumulative accretion of knowledge, and notably the discovery of genes, had raised the latter to an altogether different plane from that of its 19th-century forerunners. Yet in one sense there was also a return to a pre- Darwinian issue, in as much as the old `social evolution' re-emerged in the guise of `cultural evolution'. A key question, which continues to be widely debated by both biological and social scientists, concerns the relationship between genetic and cultural evolution. In order to be able to deal with this issue the global, undifferentiated and often disputed concept of `culture' had to be broken down into smaller units, sometimes viewed as constituting ana- logues to genes. There were numerous proposals for labelling such units, including `mnemotype', `idene', `symbol', `sociogene', `culturegen', `idea' or what will be the main focus here, namely `memes'. Corresponding to these units are a variety of different models dealing with the relationships between genetic and cultural evolution, but for the present purpose it is neither neces- sary, nor would I be competent, to critically survey the vast literature (useful summaries are provided by Ingold, 1986 and Janicki and Krebs, 1998). However, it will be useful to indicate very roughly what seem to be salient contrasts between the various approaches, with of course many intermediate positions. Genetic and cultural evolution can be viewed as intimately connected (e.g. Lumsden and Wilson, 1981); genes are sometimes regarded as by far the dominant partner (especially Tooby and Cosmides, 1992), but they can also be seen as largely independent (Dawkins, 1982). Then there is also mechani- cal versus organic selection, a dichotomy needing a little more comment. The current ethos tends towards a rigidly mechanical conception of genetic evol- ution, typi ed by the phrase `the Darwin machine', though there are different interpretations of Darwinism. Without denying the mechanical aspect, organic selection leaves room for some in uence of human thought and action on the course of genetic evolution. This is the so-called `Baldwin 57 effect', on which more later; for a recent formulation, cf. Deacon (1997). In the present context it is important to note that from Darwin onwards the lan- guage used has commonly been metaphorical. Thus Darwin himself wrote that `natural selection is daily and hourly scrutinizing . . . every variation' (cited in Young, 1985: 94). The same applies to the title of Dawkins's (1976) renowned book The Sel sh Gene, where he rst put forward his notion of `memes'. In this book Dawkins was mainly concerned to expound the modern neo- Darwinian view that genes are in competition with other genes for trans- mission to the next generation. He described genes as `replicators', whose differential survival constitutes the basis of evolution. `Replicator' is a term he used to characterize any entities of which copies are made. Towards the end of the book he voiced the opinion that genes are not the only replicators involved in evolutionary change, and that there are entities evolving much faster. He described these in a orid passage: The new soup is the soup of human culture. We need a name for the new replicator, a noun which conveys the ideas of a unit of cultural transmission, or as a unit of imitation [which he calls `memes']. . . . Examples of memes are tunes, ideas, catch-phrases, clothes fashions, ways of making pots or of building arches. Just as genes propagate themselves in the gene pool via sperm or eggs, so memes propagate themselves in the meme pool by leaping from brain to brain via a process which, in a broad sense, can be called imitation. (Dawkins, 1976: 206; original emphasis) Just as the only concern of the `sel sh genes' is their own survival and repli- cation, so memes pursue their own interests (1976: 213), which they advance by making use of our brains. What enables them to do that is our uniquely human capacity for imitation. But, once again by analogy with genes, the interests of different memes are often con icting and therefore memes struggle for possession of our brains: `If a meme is to dominate the attention of a human brain, it must do so at the expense of “rival” memes' (1976: 211). It should be mentioned that many writers who have adopted the term `memes' do not attribute to them any active tendencies; thus with certain exceptions due to cultural pressures, their kinds of memes can be imitated or ignored (e.g. Durham, 1991; Hinde, 1999). In a later work Dawkins (1982) introduced a distinction between the meme itself as a replicator, and `meme products' or phenotypic effects. This seems quite a difficult distinction to maintain, as a short example will show. Suppose a person comes across a catch-phrase in a newspaper and repeats it. Presumably the original meme comes from the writer's head, and the phenotype could be anything up to and including the printed words. But when these are read by the person, they become transformed into a meme; 58 when read by another person who does not repeat them, they remain phenotypes. Surely this is paradoxical! Blackmore, wisely, did not make such a distinction. Dawkins's idea (his meme?) was further developed by the philosopher Dennett (1995), who suggested the possibility of a science of `memetics'. The notion was also taken up by others, sparking off numerous discussions and the foundation of a Journal of Memetics. One of Dawkins's most enthusiastic and creative followers is Susan Blackmore (1999), who set herself a highly ambitious objective. In a majestic sweep she sought to account for the evol- ution of the brain, the emergence of language, altruism, sex and religion, moreover declaring the `self' to be an illusion. All this was explained in terms of the competition between bits of information (i.e. memes) to get themselves copied, mediated by the fundamental human tendency to imitate. Here the focus will be on Blackmore's characterization of the behaviour (?) of memes, and its antecedents. Apart from a single exception – a concise exposition of the so-called `Baldwin effect' – Blackmore displayed no awareness of the fact that she had a number of predecessors who discussed imitation in much the same way as she did. SOME CLASSICAL WRITINGS ON IMITATION AND SOCIAL LIFE As usual one might start with Aristotle who noted that humans are imitative, but it will be necessary to skip some two millennia to the 18th century. It is a piquant coincidence that the main gure that needs to be considered is Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802), grandfather of Charles. He was a free-thinking physician and poet who propounded a theory of evolution that in some ways was remarkably modern (cf. King-Hele, 1963). Erasmus Darwin believed that imitation plays a key role in human social life, both directly and indirectly. The indirect effect stems from the fact that imitation gives rise to sympathy, regarded by Adam Smith as the origin of all social bonds. Erasmus Darwin distinguished several types of imitation, some of them independent of the will. He attributed the origin of imitation in the child to intersensory connections. Thus when a child observes an action such as threading a needle, the component parts of the action are played out in the retina, and it is therefore easier for the child to repeat what took place in the retina by means of muscle bres than to invent a new action. Darwin's attempted explanation of the greater use of imitation by humans as com- pared with animals is equally quaint: we have a greater facility for discover- ing the outlines of objects by means of touch, and can afterwards transfer these to the sense of sight. This explains the rst lines of the poem cited below: 59 Hence when the inquiring hands with contact ne Trace on hard forms the circumscribing line; Which then the language of the rolling eyes From distant scenes of earth and heaven supplies; Those clear ideas of the touch and sight Rouse the quick sense to anguish or delight; Whence the ne power of IMITATION springs, And apes the outlines of external things; With ceaseless action to the world imparts All moral virtues, languages and arts. First the charmed Mind mechanic power collects, Means for some end, and causes of effects; Then learns from other Minds their joys and fears, Contagious smiles and sympathetic tears. (E. Darwin, 1824[1803]: 39) The quasi-mechanical processes of the mental machinery envisaged by Erasmus Darwin are distantly mirrored in The Meme Machine, as is the claim that imitation is responsible for `all moral virtues, languages and arts'. It might also be mentioned in passing that when phrenology came upon the scene, the `organ of imitation' was given a signi cant, though not central, place (cf. Combe, 1850). During the latter part of the 19th century, imitation came to be examined more concretely in relation to child development, notably by William Preyer (1841–97) and Baldwin, about whom more anon. Imitation was also considered – together with suggestion, to which it is closely related – in therapeutic contexts by Hippolyte Bernheim (1840–1919) and Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–93). It will be clear, therefore, that imitation has long been regarded as a key feature of human psychology, and its import- ance was also acknowledged by Charles Darwin. Several followers of Darwin elaborated theories in which imitation was treated as the driving force of social development and social evolution. One of the rst was Walter Bagehot (1826–77), a gifted amateur typical of the Victorian period. Trained in mathematics and law, he later became editor of the Economist and was an expert on constitutional law. Like many of his con- temporaries, he came under the in uence of evolutionary ideas, as indicated by the subtitle of his book Thoughts on the application of the principles of `natural selection' and `inheritance' to political society (Bagehot, 1905[1872]). It consists of a series of essays re ecting on the human past, as it was then perceived. In the optimistic vein of his period he sketched the progress from early rigidity in social organization for which he coined the phrase `the cake of custom', to his own time which he dubbed `the age of discussion'. Bagehot made some shrewd comments on such topics as the probable origins of super- stitions, but his use of Darwinism tended to be rather crude: military and 60 political con icts result in the survival of the ttest. The reason why he is included here are his views about the powerful impact of imitation on socio- political processes, and further details will be given later in a comparative context. By contrast William James (1841–1910), one of the great ancestor gures of psychology, is invoked here because he was one of the pioneers of the application of evolutionary theory to the subject. During the 1870s and 1880s he developed this theme in lectures and papers, the core argument being that if conscious mental activity is a product of evolution, then it must have an adaptive function. Although in his Principles James (1891) made only oc- casional reference to his evolutionary orientation, it underlay his approach to many topics (cf. Plotkin, 1994). It is highly likely that this also applies to his treatment of `imitation', which he traced from its onset in early childhood: `And from this time [i.e. child- hood] onward man is essentially the imitative animal. His whole educability and in fact the whole history of civilization depend on this trait' (James, 1891: II, 408). James distinguished three types of imitation, two peculiar to humans and another shared with gregarious animals and as such `an instinct in the fullest sense of the term' (ibid.). Most other writers in this general area, such as Tarde who will be discussed next, simply contrasted invention and inno- vation with imitation, without trying to explain how novelty comes about. It is a critique that might also apply to Blackmore. William James put forward an ingenious, though questionable, suggestion: new ideas do not come from the outside, but are the result of internal random variations in thought pro- cesses, by analogy with natural selection. Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904) began as a judge and criminologist, fascinated initially by criminal behaviour. Then he became interested in problems of social behaviour in general and, accordingly, turned to sociology. His best- known work was Les Lois de l'imitation [The Laws of Imitation] (1895), in which he contended that imitation constitutes an overarching explanatory concept that covers phenomena ranging from the animal world to world history. For instance, he referred to Espinas (1877) who had declared that the works of ants can very well be explained by the principle `of individual initiative followed by imitation' (Tarde, l895: 4; original emphasis). This was in effect the key phrase of Tarde's whole opus, and for him the elementary basis of social life consisted of interactive dyads, one of whom copied the other. This individualistic view was diametrically opposed to that of Durkheim, who gave priority to social collectivities, a top-down scheme versus Tarde's bottom-up one. They carried on a rather ill-tempered debate for about a decade (cf. Lukes, 1992) which, incidentally, later in uenced Piaget (cf. Jahoda, 2000). Tarde was, of course, familiar with Darwinism, but among all the post-Darwinians dealt with here, he was the only one whose work was barely in uenced by evolutionary theorizing. This was because 61 he misunderstood Darwinism as proclaiming that the ascent of civilization was exclusively the outcome of combat and struggle, thereby identifying it with so-called `social Darwinism' (Tarde, 1999[1898]: 282–3). James Mark Baldwin (1861–1934) elaborated an evolutionary biopsychol- ogy of individual and social development, based on imitation. It was in u- enced by Tarde, though Baldwin criticized the vagueness of Tarde's concept. He himself was exceptional in using an empirical approach. He began with observations of his children and noted different types of imitation at various stages of development. From an initial inchoate state that Baldwin called `projective' , there was said to occur a transition `to a subjective sense of per- sonality and the method of it is the principle of imitation'. `And of course [the child] imitates persons' (Baldwin, 1895: 336), since these are the most interesting objects in the environment. This process results in the crystal- lization of a subjective self and the beginnings of `persistent imitation' pro- duced by an effort of will, and this in turn creates an awareness of other persons as similarly subjective selves. `Both ego and alter are thus essentially social; each is a socius, and each is an imitative creation' (Baldwin, 1895: 338). In the course of development one thus nds a range of increasingly complex forms of imitation, from crude `subcortical' ones to those requiring intricate cognitive preparations. Concluding, he nds imitation to be `a true instinct, a race [in the sense of “human race”] habit' (Baldwin, 1895: 356). In the companion volume on Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development Baldwin (1897) spelled out the evolutionary implications of his scheme, by postulating a parallel between social and biological heredity, with the former complementing the latter. The individual is immersed from the outset in a social setting that shapes her as well as those around her: `Every- thing that is learnt is copied, reproduced, assimilated, from one's fellows' (1897: 87). In so far as social groups, from tribes to nations, are internally homogeneous, there is competition and selection in the strict Darwinian sense of natural selection, and one nds here an analogy between social and biological processes. But there is a quite different mode of selection `in social life, which operates by conscious choice and imitation' (Baldwin, 1897: 182). What this means is elaborated in the following passage: In so-called `imitative selection' . . . – the imitative propagation of ideas in society – we have a phenomenon for which biology shows us no analogies. What survives in this case is not individuals, but ideas; and these do not survive in the form in which the rst thinker conceives them, but in the form in which society applies them. Again, their tness is not in any sense a tness for struggle; it is a tness for imitative repro- duction and application. And nally, they are not physically inherited, but handed down by `social heredity' as accretions to the store of tra- ditions. (Baldwin, 1897: 182–3) 62 There is a revealing phrase here, namely `the rst thinker', implying a recog- nition that not everything can happen by mere imitation. Baldwin sought to incorporate this into a broader scheme, once again comparing biological and social processes. In biology, he called the tendency of heredity to converge on the mean a `generalizing force', while the variations on which natural selection acts constitute the `particularizing' force. In society, the particular- izing force is the innovative individual who produces variations, and this `supplies the essential material of all human and social progress' (Baldwin, 1897: 460; original emphasis). According to Baldwin, one cannot really separ- ate imitation and invention, since these are integral parts of the same cycle: This process of taking in elements from the social world by imitation and giving them out again by a reverse process of invention (for such a sequel proves invention to be: the modi ed way in which I put things together in reading the elements which I get from nature and other men, back into nature and other men again) – this process never stops. (Baldwin, 1897: 431) He also noted that unless the innovation is one that nds acceptance within the culture, it will fail to exert any in uence. In sum, Baldwin argued that there are some similarities, but also substantial differences, between bio- logical and social evolution. It was at the time when Baldwin was writing these books that he conceived an idea about `a new factor in evolution', by which he meant the capacity of consciousness and intelligence to affect the direction of evolutionary change. He showed how learned behaviours may become instinctive ones over the course of generations without having to fall back on Lamarckianism. This was the `Baldwin effect' referred to by Blackmore. Although the above review has been brief and sketchy, it will have served its purpose of showing that evolutionary thought, (usually) associated with imitation as a mechanism, is far from new and was ourishing more than a century ago. There is some reference to the existence of `forefathers' in the memetics literature (e.g. Marsden, 2000), but no indication that the full extent of some of the correspondences has been appreciated. These will now be illus- trated in more detail, including sources from a somewhat wider eld than those mentioned above. SOME STRIKING ECHOES FROM THE PAST At the outset, Susan Blackmore explains that `The thesis of this book is that what makes us different is our ability to imitate' (Blackmore, 1999: 3). This is a view that was shared by Burnett (1773: I, 497) who referred to `that predominant quality of the human composition, by which man is so evidently 63 distinguished from all other animals, the power of imitation'. Again, accord- ing to Bagehot (1905[1872]: 92), `the propensity of man to imitate is one of the strongest parts of his nature'. Blackmore's general approach takes it for granted that imitation is usually not conscious or deliberate. Since she tends to write from the perspective of the memes, this is seldom spelled out directly, but is implicit throughout. For instance `each [meme] is using your behaviour to get itself copied. . . . Those words [of a tune] affect you, probably quite without any conscious intention on your part' (Blackmore, 1999: 7); or again `Not everyone will be infected by this meme' (Blackmore, 1999: 167). The view that in uences impinge upon the individual from the outside, in the absence of any awareness, was also shared by Bagehot: We must not think that this imitation is voluntary, or even conscious. On the contrary, it has its seat in the very obscure parts of the mind, whose notions, so far from being conceived beforehand, are not even felt at the time. (Bagehot, 1905[1872]: 92–3) Tarde similarly held that `imitation can be conscious or unconscious, re ec- tive or spontaneous, voluntary or involuntary' (Tarde, 1895: 209). Moreover, `everything that is social and not biological or physical in societal phenom- ena . . . is caused by imitation' (Tarde, 1895: 54). Although Blackmore's pro- nouncements along these lines are somewhat different, since they are based on the assumption that what we call `consciousness' can itself be reduced to memes, the general thrust of the argument is similar: When human beings act, our actions have effects on memetic selection, but this is not because we were conscious. Indeed, the most mindless and least conscious of our actions can be imitated just as easily as our most conscious ones. Cultural and social variation is guided by the replicators and their environment, not by something separate from them all called consciousness. (Blackmore, 1999: 239) It might be objected that Blackmore's formulation, unlike that of her prede- cessors, attributes an active role to memes; but that is not the case. One can even go back to Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841) and his discussion of Vorstellungen, a term that can roughly glossed as `ideas', though its range of meaning is somewhat wider (cf. Boudewijnse et al., 1999). Herbart was quite clear that the whole mass of Vorstellungen to be found in individuals comes, like language, from the social world outside, though he did not make any explicit references to imitation (Herbart, 1890[1821]: 17). The Vorstellungen were described as struggling to gain ascendancy and avoid being pushed out of consciousness, and Herbart constructed mathematical models of the process. 64 Bagehot, without directly suggesting agency, wrote as though a style came to be imposed on persons through external in uences: Most men catch the words that are in the air, and the rhythm which comes to them they do not know from whence; an unconscious imi- tation determines their words, and makes them say what of themselves they would never have thought of saying. (Bagehot, 1905[1872]: 33) Tarde went much further, claiming that the social human is a kind of somnambulist who imagines that his ideas are his own when in fact they are the result of suggestions (Tarde, 1895: 83). He also stressed that there are often oppositions between what he called `social entitities' resulting in struggles: . . . social entities of any kind, a dogma, a phrase, a scienti c principle, a moral feature, an industrial process, etc., tend to propagate themselves geometrically through imitative repetition; fortunately or unfortu- nately there is interference among them, i.e. ones with dissonant aspects encounter each other in certain brains, where they give rise to logical or teleological duels. (Tarde, 1999[1898]: 101–2) Tarde also mentioned `thousands and thousands of [ideas] . . . which ght' for supremacy (Tarde, 1999[1898]: 127–8). This is closely comparable to the theme of competition between memes that runs as a constant thread through Blackmore's book, as in the example below: If a meme can get itself successfully copied, it will. One way to do so is to command the resources of someone's brain and make them keep on rehearsing it, so giving the meme a competitive edge over memes that do not get rehearsed. . . . millions of memes are competing for the space in `my' brain. (Blackmore, 1999: 40–1) All this should be suf cient to demonstrate that many, if not most, of the phenomena described by Blackmore had been previously discussed in closely similar ways. There is, however, one critical difference between her and her predecessors that calls for close scrutiny. WHEN IS A METAPHOR MORE THAN A METAPHOR? Let me return brie y to the last example, where Tarde's `ideas' and Black- more's `memes' both ` ght' or `compete' respectively. The question arises whether such expressions are to be taken literally or just metaphorically. In other words, to what extent are ideas/memes not merely described as though they were active agents, but really taken as such? 65 As far as Blackmore's predecessors are concerned, there can be no doubt that, with the sole exception of Herbart, for them the inventing, innovating and imitating individuals constituted the active agents. This is not inconsis- tent with the view that imitation is not necessarily conscious and deliberate. Thus their usage was clearly metaphorical, which as Blackmore rightly main- tains, is a convenient short-cut. But although she explains more than once that when she writes from `the meme's eye view' she does not really mean it literally, the very phrasing of the denials tends to be ambiguous: . . . all that counts in the life of a meme is whether or not it survives and replicates. I shall nd myself saying that memes `want', `need', or `try to do' something. But we must remember that this is only short- hand for saying that the `something' will improve the chances of the meme's being copied. . . . Memes may be successfully copied because they are good [etc.] . . . but they may be successful for other reasons too. (Blackmore, 1999: 162–3; my emphases) The italicized terms are themselves second-order metaphors. The word `replicator' as such suggests an activity, when all it should mean is `capable of being copied'. What the `something' might be is left obscure, and the two rather different attributions of `success' may also be noted. Now it might well be thought that these objections are niggling and pedantic – what is wrong, it might be asked, with more lively metaphorical language? The answer is that there is nothing wrong with it, as long as it is capable of being back- translated into literal discourse. In many of Blackmore's passages, such as the one cited below, this does not seem possible: What becomes obvious . . . is that attention is always being manipu- lated by things outside yourself rather than controlled by you. . . . attention is dragged away . . . most of all [by] thoughts that seem to come from nowhere. These are the memes ghting it out to grab the information-processing resources of the brain they might use for their propagation. . . . you never did control the attention; it controlled – and created – you. (Blackmore, 1999: 243) When one is further told, for example, that `the real driving force behind [progress] is the interest of the memes' (Blackmore, 1999: 213) it becomes evident that, in spite of ostensible denials, intentionality has been transferred away from humans and to the memes. As Costall (1991) showed, such a mechanistic neo-Darwinism also characterized Dawkins, though right at the end of The Sel sh Gene he suddenly and oddly declared that humans can escape the tyranny of the memes. By contrast, Blackmore does not offer any such escape hatch and remains consistent. 66 CONCLUDING COMMENTS In view of the fundamental advances in genetics since the older theories were put forward, it seems reasonable to ask in what respects, if any, Blackmore's version constitutes an advance? In order to provide some perspective, a com- parison of the main features of the several theories will be brie y sketched, indicating convergences and differences. First and foremost there is complete agreement, from at least the 18th century onwards, about the fundamental importance attached to imitation in human life and cultural development. With regard to the processes involved, there is also broad consensus between Blackmore and her predecessors, though there are some differences. All maintain that there is a vast pool of ideas/memes in society, only some of which are selected for imitation; and the adoption of a particular one for imitation is not necessarily or even usually conscious and deliberate. It is worth noting that this consensus is found among the predecessors in spite of the fact that their theoretical positions were in other respects rather diverse. While both Bagehot and Baldwin based their views on Darwinism, Bagehot's conception of evolution was a rather crude kind of social Darwin- ism. Baldwin by contrast was a highly sophisticated evolutionist, who regarded social and biological heredity as separate processes and provided detailed discussions of forms of imitation in developmental as well as social psychology. Tarde, on the other hand, did not link his theory to evolution at all. Yet in spite of that, all the accounts, including that of Blackmore, are essentially similar as regards the above issues. The differences are illuminating, and stem very largely from Blackmore's stress on memes as active and humans as passive. Thus Baldwin pointed out the connection between imitation and suggestion, an issue not mentioned by Blackmore – perhaps because it implies an active role on the part of people. All the other authors, as well as Darwin himself (C. Darwin, 1901[1871]: 198), begin with invention, the creation of novelty by individuals, which then comes to be imitated. Blackmore, while quite reasonably arguing that inven- tions are always related to prior advances, appears to deny the reality of individual contributions: `I would say that the book was a combined product of genes and memes playing out their competition in [the author's] life' (Blackmore, 1999: 239). Finally, it is time to return to the question posed about the relative status of Blackmore's contribution. The bold sweep of her grand edi ce compels admi- ration, but is it really superior to the more modest designs of her predeces- sors, ignorant of replicators? The answer depends on whether or not one accepts her claims of memes as replicators, and their personalization. These claims have an impressive number of supporters, but others are sceptical since there appears to be no solid evidence for the existence of such entities 67 (cf. Aunger, 2000). If the doubters are right, then the older theories, which in many respects were similar to Blackmore's, but treated humans as active agents rather than as pawns, are perhaps better grounded. NOTE Thanks are due to Ivana Markova for her comments on an earlier draft, and to an anonymous referee for a constructive critique. The preparation of the article was supported by a grant from the Nuf eld Foundation. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aunger, R., ed. (2000) Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bagehot, Walter (1905[1872]) Physics and Politics. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner. Baldwin, J.M. (1895) Mental Development in the Child and the Race. New York: Macmillan. Baldwin, J.M. (1897) Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development: a Study in Social Psychology. New York: Macmillan. Blackmore, Susan (1999) The Meme Machine. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Boudewijnse, G.J.A., Murray, D.J. and Bandomir, C.A. (1999) `Herbart's Mathematical Psychology', History of Psychology 2: 163-93. Burnett, James (Lord Monboddo) (1773) Of the Origin and Progress of Language, 4 vols. Edinburgh. Combe, George (1850) Elements of Phrenology, 7th edn. Edinburgh: Maclachlan & Stewart. Costall, A. (1991) `The "Meme" Meme', Cultural Dynamics 4: 321-35. Darwin, Charles (1901[1871]) The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex. London: Murray . Darwin, Erasmus (1824[1803]) The Temple of Nature; or, the Origin of Society: a Poem with Philosophical Notes. London : Jones & Co. Dawkins, R. (1976) The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dawkins, R. (1982) The Extended Phenotype. Oxford : Freeman. Deacon, T. (1997) The Symbolic Species. London : Allen Lane. Dennett, D.C. (1995) Darwin's Dangerous Idea. Harmondsworth , Mx: Penguin. Durham, W.H. (1991) Coevolution: Genes, Culture and Human Diversity . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Espinas, Alfred (1877) Des sociétés animales. Paris : Germer Baillière. Herbart, Johann Friedrich (1890[1821]) Joh. Fr. Herbart's sämmtliche Werke, Vol. 5. Langensalza: Beyer . Hinde, R.A. (1999) Why Gods Persist. London: Routledge. Ingold, T. (1986) Evolution and Social Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jahoda, G. (2000) `Piaget and Levy-Bruhl', History of Psychology 3: 218-38. 68 James, William (1891) The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. London: Macmillan. Janicki, M.G. and Krebs, D.L. (1998) `Evolutionary Approaches to Culture', in C. Crawford and D. L. Krebs (eds) Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. Mahwah, NJ.: Erlbaum, pp. 136-207. King-Hele, D. (1963) Erasmus Darwin. London: Macmillan. La Mettrie, Julien Offray de (1748) L'homme machine [The Man Machine]ß. Leiden. Lukes, S. (1992) Emile Durkheim. Harmondsworth , Mx: Penguin. Lumsden, C.J. and Wilson, E.O. (1981) Genes, Mind and Culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Marsden, P. (2000) `Forefathers of Memetics: Gabriel Tarde and the Laws of Imitation'. URL: httpp://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/jom-emit/2000/vol4/marsden_p.html Plotkin, H. (1994) Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press . Tarde, Gabriel (1895) Les Lois de l'imitation [The Laws of Imitation] , 2nd edn. Paris: Felix Alcan. Tarde, Gabriel (1898) Etudes de psychologie sociale [Studies in Social Psychology]. Paris: Giard and Brière . Tarde, Gabriel (1999[1898]) Les lois sociales [The Social Laws]. Paris: Institut Synthélabo . Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1992) `The Psychological Foundations of Culture', in J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides and J. Tooby (eds) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 19-136. Young, R.M. (1985) Darwin's Metaphor. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE GUSTAV JAHODA is Emeritus Professor of Psychology at the University of Strathclyde. He began as a social psychologist half a century ago and then moved to cross-cultural psychology, carrying out eldwork mainly in Africa. Back home he worked on the development of social cognition, and after retirement turned towards theoretical and historical issues. His recent publi- cations include `Piaget and Levy-Bruhl', History of Psychology 3 (2000): 218–38; `On the Prehistory of Cross-cultural Development Research', in A. L. Comunian and U. Gielen (eds) International Perspectives on Human Development (Berlin: Pabst, 2000); and `Beyond Stereotypes', Culture and Psychology 7 (2001): 181–97.</meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><back><ref-list>
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</ref-list></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>The ghosts in the meme machine</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" lang="en" contentType="CDATA"><title>The ghosts in the meme machine</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Gustav</namePart><namePart type="family">Jahoda</namePart><affiliation>Department of Psychology, University of Strathclyde, 40 George Street, Glasgow, G11QE, UK,</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: G.Jahoda@strath.ac.uk</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>SAGE Publications</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Sage UK: London, England</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2002-04</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2002</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><abstract lang="en">The notion of `memes' as replicators similar to genes, but concerned with cultural units, was put forward by Dawkins (1976). Blackmore (1999) used this notion to elaborate an ambitious theory designed to account for numerous aspects of human evolution and psychology. Her theory is based on the human capacity for imitation, and although the operation of the `memes' is said to be purely mechanical, the figurative language used implies that their `actions' are purposive. This article will show that imitation had been regarded as important for human advance well before Darwinism. Moreover, at the end of the 19th century descriptions of the functioning of imitation in society had been put forward that closely parallel those given by Blackmore. Hence it is argued that what is convincing about her thesis is not new, and what is new is speculative and highly questionable.</abstract><subject><genre>keywords</genre><topic>Darwinism</topic><topic>early social psychology</topic><topic>imitation</topic><topic>memes</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>History of the human sciences</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0952-6951</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1461-720X</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">HHS</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID-hwp">sphhs</identifier><part><date>2002</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>15</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>2</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>55</start><end>68</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">E40B6A5E5C3E47DEB26A938E7659881F958D3A64</identifier><identifier type="ark">ark:/67375/M70-3WT4PSHJ-5</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1177/0952695102015002126</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">10.1177_0952695102015002126</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-0J1N7DQT-B">sage</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/E40B6A5E5C3E47DEB26A938E7659881F958D3A64/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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