XenakisV1, Istex, Corpus, bibRecord, 000333

Musical Sound as a Model for Husserlian Intuition and Time-Consciousness

Identifieur interne : 000333 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000332; suivant : 000334

Musical Sound as a Model for Husserlian Intuition and Time-Consciousness

Auteurs : F. J. Smith

Source :

Journal of Phenomenological Psychology [ 0047-2662 ] ; 1973.

RBID : ISTEX:336FD85A1980A94FB4E2DBC566FFCC031157C15A

English descriptors

Teeft :
- Amalgamation verschmelzung, Audial perception, Carl stumpf, Classic greek, Classic musicology, Conscious activity, Consonance, Fundamental stratum, Husserl, Individual moments, John cage, Logical investigations, Mental activity, Middle ages, Middle ground, Middle voice, Modern languages, Music theory, Musical aesthetics, Musical composition, Musical consciousness, Musical experience, Musical fantasy, Musical form, Musical model, Musical moment, Musical phrase, Musical proportionality, Musical sound, Musical time, Musical tonality, Musical tone, Musicologist, Musicology, Negative feelings, Other words, Passive, Passive intentionality, Passive synthesis, Passivity, Phenomenal time, Phenomenological, Phenomenological method, Phenomenology, Pure perception, Sense data, Single tone, Speculum musicae, Stumpf, Symphonic form, Temporal, Temporal sequence, Time consciousness, Tonal duration, Tonal psychology, Tonality, Twentieth century, Voice parts.

Url:

https://api.istex.fr/document/336FD85A1980A94FB4E2DBC566FFCC031157C15A/fulltext/pdf

DOI: 10.1163/156916273X00046

Links to Exploration step

ISTEX:336FD85A1980A94FB4E2DBC566FFCC031157C15A

Le document en format XML

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		<p>271 MUSICAL SOUND AS A MODEL FOR HUSSERLIAN INTUITION AND TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS F. J. Smith Introduction Akoumenology, or the phenomenology of sound, is a rela- tively young branch of general phenomenology. It is also a science emergent from the principles of phenomenology coupled with the experience of musical sound. It is a study long overdue. In the past there were more or less sporadic attempts to thematize sound and to develop a phenomenology of sound; yet, to mention but one philosopher, Ortega y Gasset con- sidered it a scandal that this fruitful area of thought had not already been worked on by philosophers of his era, and this in thorough, systematic manner. R. Ingarden's ontology of the musical work of art is the closest we have come to a systematic presentation, but to the musicologist his musical contribution is that of a learned amateur, to be revered mostly for his philo- sophical insightfulness.' Within the last years several of my colleagues and I have shared writings and insights;' but it is still</p>

		<p>272 true that there exists no comprehensive and satisfactory work on the phenomenology of sound, whether applied to music or to language as a system of auditory symbols. The study of language has been a preoccupation of our era, but it is usually done by linguistic scientists interested in morphology, or by language analysts interested in laying bare the conceptual struc- ture embedded in everyday speech.3 Neither has given sufficient attention to the paratactical flow of the sound of the human voice, as it builds sentences in syntactical structures. Moreover, it seems that a comprehensive work can no longer be the result of individual effort; it may have to be a common project under editorial direction. There are those of us, whether acousticians, musicologists, linguists, or philosophers, who could coordinate our efforts in order to produce the desired synthesis. Such a work would take in all sound phenomena and thematize them phenomenologically, stressing music and language. Our theme is necessarily restricted. But I feel it is a theme which is significant for any phenomenology of sound, a sort of modest prolegomenon. Its significance is partly attri- butable to the fact that it takes shape in dialogue with the fundamental work of Edmund Husserl, the founder of con- temporary phenomenology. There are scattered references throughout Husserl's writings bearing on the subject of musical sound, but it is not our present concern to catalogue such references. Rather, we shall refer to several of his works that seem to be crucial to the background of any phenomenology of sound, his lectures on time-consciousness, his writings on passive synthesis, and to some extent his treatment of judgment and experience.4 For, it is clear that in his treatment of both time and of synthesis the musical model is central to his thought, for he deals with the single tone, the musical phrase, melody, and even with the extended symphonic form. In all of this, we do not base our study on Husserl, in such a way that we</p>

		<p>273 end up onlv giving an expose of his thought. Rather, even an "original contribution" takes full cognizance of basic texts, for they formulate insights that must be known and employed by anyone working seriously in the field of akoumenology. This paper is thus not an expose of texts, but it does relate to them. For, whatever we might excogitate on our own out of pure exuberance can hardly be indifferent to the writings of the founder of phenomenology. Phenomenology is not journalism. Moore has a point when he separates philosophy and literature, though I personally feel philosophy suffers when so divorced. There is nothing wrong with philosophical journalism, provided it does not become a substitute for serious effort or an excuse for not familiarizing oneself with basic materials. Husserl is basic to all phenomenological research. 1. The position of the musicologist In this age of specialists there is a felt need for interdisciplinary studies and research, of a wedding of insights from science and philosophy. The marriage of phenomenology and musicology seems to me to be a particularly natural one, and the offspring of such a union will probably be more practical than the former and more theoretical than the latter. Both the practical music- ian and the musicologist have shown signs of considerable intellectual distress within the last decades. Today the situation seems urgent. There is widespread dissatisfaction in the ranks with classic musicological methods and a need to break out of especially historistic and scientific moulds, so that the experi- ence of musical sound can be properly thematized. Husserl himself would recognize this as an attempt to deliver musical experience from the scientific and positivist frameworks of classic science, for musicology is Musik-wissenschaft, the science-of-music. Classic musicology seems entirely imbedded in the "natural attitude." Since the Middle Ages music theory has been based on a mathematical model rather than on an experi- ential one, and even in the Baroque Era the musical Affekten- lehre had a rationalist base. What Husserl styled "die Mathe- matisierung der Natur"5 took place in music theory long before it took hold of physical science, as the Speculum Musicae aptly</p>

		<p>274 demonstrates.6 Ever since the theory of musical proportionality was formulated by such mathematicians as Johannis de Muris and by Jacques de Liege, both of the Ars nova (early fourteenth century), and made more practical by Gafforius (fifteenth cen- tury), musicians have played in accord with a detailed musical mathematics. Indeed, the interplay of proportions is still used by Kant in Kritik III to explain musical form, even though it had subsided into the background in music theory as such.' Functioning in their role of objective historians and guard- ians of musical aesthetics, musicologists have made the modem world aware of medieval and Renaissance music, and this in formidable studies that are important to the modem scholar. Their message is apparently of import also to certain contemp- orary composers, like M. Babbitt, who loves to play with mathematical formulae, it appears. There is, in fact, a curious continuity of interest between the mathematicizing of (musical) nature, as conceived by historical figures, and as presently being effected by theorists of a certain slant. Even in the Baroque Era, the time of Bach, there was a strong and persistent mathemati- cal stratum operative beneath the overt affectivity which made music "the language of the emotions." The question asked by the thoughtful musicologist is, to what extent does this ideal- ized world of numbers (called "sounding numbers" in the Renaissance!) actually relate to, aid, or obstruct the musical experience? Does mathematicized consciousness block percep- tion ? Or does it merely structure it too rigidly? At this point the musicologist is already a potential phenomenologist, as ly needs to be stated. To what extent does any cognitive framework aid or block the experience of any sound? In the Middle Ages sound qualified as musical sound only after being subsumed into the mathematical system. In our age John Cage has effectively demonstrated that any sound can be utilized for musical purposes. To what extent do mental sets help sharpen our intellects for analysis, and in how far do they dull our perceptivity, especially with regard to musical sound? It is obvious that the services of the phenomenologist are required at this juncture. For although the musicologist can</p>

		<p>275 muster a formidable array of knowledge with regard to sonata, symphony, and quartet, he needs more than the facts of music history, more than what the psychology of music can offer him in its interpretations of musical consciousness. Facts need to be "refacted," made over, delivered from remaining only "facts from which come more facts." The latter phrase is obviously Husserlian and any beginning student can identify its source. If one is plagued by such problems, one has two options: 1.) to think entirely for oneself, independently of sources that are available, or 2.) dialogue with fundamental sources, as one con- tinues with one's own inspirations. I believe the practical musi- cologist will opt for the second solution, even though the first alternative tempts one's natural impulses to "go it alone" and relieves one of the need for background studies. Such studies need not dominate or obstruct original insight; it may well fructify and amplify one's own theorizations. Indeed this was the path followed by our phenomenological mentors them- selves ; and in their apprenticeship with great teachers like Brentano they launched their own speculative endeavours. For Husserl one such great teacher was also Carl Stump f. 2. The Example of Carl Stumpf Professor Stumpf is known both to phenomenologists and to musicologists, though this fact itself seems to be unknown to either of these groups. Every introductory student of musi- cology hears of Stumpf's theory of consonance, the amalga- mation of musical sounds (Tonverschmelzung); and graduate students in phenomenology know that Husserl dedicated his Logical Investigations to Carl Stumpf. Moreover, the word, Verschmelzung, i.e., the fusion or amalgamation of objects in perception, figures constantly and importantly in Husserl's treatment of passive synthesis, making it a kind of theory of philosophical as well as of musical consonance. But until H. Spiegelberg's history of phenomenology few philosophy stu- dents knew that Stumpf's tonal psychology figured significantly in the early days of phenomenology itself,' in that Stumpf</p>

		<p>276 departed from the acoustical preoccupations of Helmholtz and began to clear a phenomenological path toward the understand- ing of the experienced amalgamation, as opposed to the merely physical fusion, of concordant tonalities. Unfortunately very few musicologists get to know the importance of the philo- sophical dimension of Stumpf's work; and our greatest and most voluminous musicological encyclopedia omits all mention of Husserl in its article on Stumpf, though it does give deserved prominence to musical students of Stumpf, such as Hornbostel, Sachs, Lachmann, et al.9 These are well known musicological names; but they are largely unknown in philosophy. (We live in adjacent but hermetically sealed compartments in our depart- ments of philosophy and of musicology!) Musicologists are likewise aware of Stumpf's musical background, and of the fact that he can be considered one of the chief founders of ethno- musicology. But they fail to learn of the important link be- tween Stumpf and his student, Husserl, the founder of phe- nomenology. Neither do students register the importance of the dedica- tion of Logical Investigations to Carl Stumpf. It is not an idle dedication. Rather, it is a dedication that embodies the devo- tion of the student for his great mentor, a devotion to Stumpf's own method and a proposal for the way out of psychology as such, including Stumpf's tonal psychology. In this book Husserl could have brought Stumpf out of psychologism toward reduc- tive phenomenology, which is in specie different from Stumpf's own phenomenology. That Stumpf had negative feelings toward Husserl's type of phenomenology, as it gradually unfolded, is sufficiently well known, thanks to Spiegelberg. This is not unlike Husserl's own negative feelings for the work of his student, Heidegger. Stumpf was primarily a scientist, and he held philosophical speculation, divorced from scientific studies, in suspicion. To Stumpf with his background in music, both as an art and as a science, the work of Husserl must have looked like pure speculation, just as Heidegger's work must have ap- peared to Husserl as a "metaphysical adventure." Yet from our vantage point Stumpf appears as a prephenomenological figure.</p>

		<p>277 We can learn from him, and not just as a historical figure. For, his method of working is still a model viable for those who would bring phenomenology to the arts and sciences, without thus turning it into a "service philosophy." Stumpf's psycho- logy of musical sound was the more convincing to his era because its creator worked actively in both music and psychol- ogy. To Stumpf phenomenology was not an independent re- search, carried on apart from the facts of art and science; rather, the phenomenological method he espoused was a fundamental stratum of his musico-psychological studies. In this sense it was a pre-science, which kept science as such from being denuded of philosophical insight, as it became preoccupied with empirical data. Hence, there seems to be more than what Spiegelberg calls the "common ground" obtaining between these two types of phenomenology. Rather, regarding phenomenology as a basic stratum in our study of reality, including that experienced in the arts, may be an effective way of keeping us "practical" as philosophers, by helping us keep our theorizations "down to earth" and relevant, as we work in the areas of a phenomen- ology of science or of sound. This essay adopts Stumpf's insight into the manner of working in a given science. The musicologist thus remains a musical scientist (as the psychologist remains a psychologist), and follows Stumpf's manner of working, while relying on Husserl's method. The essay is thus Husserlian in character, but hopefully it will maintain the practicality and relevance char- acteristic of Stumpf's work. This seems the only meaningful approach for a working musicologist, who identifies both with science and with philosophy in evolving a phenomenology of musical sound. 2. Akoumenology or the Phenomenology of Sound In order to understand the significance of Husserl's use of musical sound as a model both for intuition and for time- consciousness, we must speak briefly of akoumenology as such. It is a musico-philosophical science of sound that has prede- cessors in historic music theory, in acoustics, and-after Stumpf-in phenomenological psychology. But it is also an expansion of classic musicology and is understood best from</p>

		<p>278 this source. The intellectualist position of music theory, as best represented in the Speculum Musicae (1330-40), is philoso- phical in the extreme, i.e., it is a metaphysical adventure. But this medieval metaphysics of music, fascinating to the musico- logist and student of culture for its amalgamation of phil- osophy, theology, music, and mathematics, in effect stressed the cognitive level to the detriment of perception. Physical sound was subsumed into an intellectual grid and became math- ematicized. Thus not the sheer aesthetic perception of sound but "numbered sound" (sonus numeratus) became essential. The musician was not one who played an instrument as much as one who delighted in the interplay of musical proportions that constituted musical consonances. The educated listener thus departed from a concert intellectually rather than aesthetically satisfied. One suspects that ordinary listeners simply enjoyed the music. Medieval music theory was a kind of rationalization of musical practice. In the Baroque Era the theory of propor- tions was still in the background, but now everything was subservient to the theory of musical affectivity, called Affekten- lehre. " According to this theory music was the "language of the affects," meant to move man's soul. In Kritik III Kant still bore witness to both musical proportionality and to the theory of affects, though by now it was musically obsolete; for the musical world had already been enjoying Mozart at his best. 11 I With Kant the mathematicizing of music was replaced by aes- thetics. And yet philosophical aesthetics regarded musical aes- thetics as a poor relation, to the point that a musicological pioneer like F. Chrysander advised musicians to create their own theory of musical aesthetics, to correspond with their experience rather than with some crystal palace of philosophical speculation. At the same time-with the rise of the sciences- acoustics became important, and Helmholtz became famous. It was here that Carl Stumpf made his entry into the history of music theory, making an incipient phenomenology of sound possible. In a twentieth century definition of musical sound one has to take into consideration such diverse people as Schoenberg,</p>

		<p>279 Stravinsky, Ussachevsky, John Cage, Xenakis, et al. They are all totally different from one another. It is impossible to speak of a unity of styles, as it may have been in e.g., the classical era, with Haydn and Mozart. A phenomenology of sound would have to be redefined in terms of the experiences of twentieth century music with all its contradictory phenomena. A unitary math- ematicizing of musical experience seems impossible in a century such as ours. Frustrated at not being able to find a category to cover all cases, theorists feel at sea. And yet, though we need a general theory of twentieth century music, there is no need for us to go begging at the portals of mathematics or aesthetics for some regulative or unifying idea that will save us from utter fragmentation. Instead of searching for yet another intellectual grid, we might look at sound as such, and make it primary. Its rich diversities discourage intellectualization but invite phenom- enological analysis, in that it gets "back to the things them- selves," in this case to sound, relieved of the theoretical sedi- mentation imposed by history. Instead of feeding sound into some intellectual grid, there to be converted into "musical" sound (as opposed to the ordinary sounds of life and of work), we might follow John Cage's indications, that all sounds are material for musical composition. In the presence of sheer musical experience intellectual grids seem to be automatically reduced, i.e., they do not hold up in the face of actual experi- ence. Experiencing Cage's Indeterminacy or Xenakis' Akrata is sufficient to illustrate the point. Akoumenology thus examines sound as such, whether it emerges as language or as music, and this in ordinary life and work. An analysis of what John Cage has done in his various musical "works" will lead one to suspect, that for the tradition- alist he is a kind of anarchist, or a court jester. For, in Indeter- minacy, which is "scored" for any and all sounds, including the narrator's voice, mere intellectual meaning seems irrelevant. And even as one understands the words of the narratives, one realizes that the mere sound of the narrator's voice is what is significant, not anything he has to "say," however amusing the anecdotes. Thus the "sense" of the narration is often "sense- lessly" interrupted by random sounds, produced by a piano, a radio, the tape of a dog barking, noises concocted on an electronic synthesizer, etc., making it clearly difficult and oc- casionally impossible to "follow the meaning" of the words. In</p>

		<p>280 this composition, as in others like it, the sounds are all that count, whether they be noise, instruments, voice, or a catch-all of random sounds. In other words, only sound emerges as a proper phenomenon for phenomenological analysis. All else, including "meaning," is bracketed. Only sound is thematized. Hence there exists no meaning in the traditional sense, and one begins to realize what Husserl's conception of noema implies for such a study as this. Any merely semantic meaning is secondary to the sound in its noematic significance. Husserl himself was a musical traditionalist, and he employed the example of classic tonality as his model for time-consciousness and for passive synthesis, as temporal. But we could hardly have expected Husserl to envision the achievements of Cage, Babbit, Davidov- sky, or Penderecki. His model is thus dated, as far as the contemporary musician is concerned, but phenomenologically it is still of import for our studies on musical time and synthesis. 3. Husserl's Model: Musical Tonality and Melody Husserl modeled his conception of time on the "protensive" character of a musical melody, extending in sequence from past through present into the future, and leaving a "retensive" trail in memory. Musical time was originally taken from a meta- physical conception, as is again evident in the Speculum Musicae; and according to this now-points succeed one another in a series starting in the infinite past and proceding into an open or "empty" future horizon. Because of Stumpf's influence Husserl did not begin either at the physical (acoustical) nor at the metaphysical level, i.e., in objective time. Rather, he began with time as actually experienced in the temporal sequence of a musical composition, as it builds toward musical form in its successive moments, thus in time as "subjective." Husserl, the general phenomenologist, was more radical than Stumpf, the phenomenological psychologist, it goes without saying. Yet Stumpf spoke more convincingly from musical experience than did his student. For all his expert handling of the subject of musical consciousness Husserl speaks more from speculation than from actual musical experience. Nevertheless, his penetra- tion into the core of the conscious experience of time is crucial to a reevaluation of musical time as such. His "speculative" analyses are phenomenological, not ontic.</p>

		<p>281 Concretely, what was Husserl's model? In different con- texts, specifically in his treatment of time-consciousness and of passive synthesis, Husserl continually makes use of musical tonality. Because he writes of musical "tone" one should not conclude that he is working, like an acoustician, with a single tone, though this can be one meaning. Instead, musical tone must be taken in terms of general musical tonality and the phrase building that begets melody. The latter word is fre- quently used, and it implies a sequence of tones, rather than a solitary one. In fact the temporal sequence of single and multi- ple tones is the heart of this musical model. A given musical melody, as e.g., Schumann's "Du Ring an meinem Finger" from Frauenliebe und -leben, is extended in the time-consciousness of the experiencing and perceiving subject, in this case a husband in love with his wife (a fact we will not bracket!). The extension is not that of a res extensa but of the subject expanding in consciousness, the latter interpreted also affectively. As he knew from experience and as he learned more in detail from Stumpf (for Stumpf knew his music theory), musical time as represented in the printed score is not merely linear. The score is only meant to abet the restoration of an experience, in this case one in which affectivity is primary. And it is to this re-creating that performers give all their time. The experience of musical time embodies a whole network of temporal phenom- ena in a pattern of thrust and trail. Whereas the objective score is linearly conceived-and in traditional music it is quintilinear- in the consciousness of the perceiver it becomes a "subjective" experience. The music is like a comet plumeting through subjec- tive space, leaving a trail of after-echoes, a musical tail (Zeit- schwanz) that is retained in memory. 12 But memory is not merely an electronic storehouse for sense-data; memory is a part of consciousness, in that it is a form of elemental awareness. Even the original word tells us this (memor esse= to be aware of). This memory awareness is a sublevel of consciousness, into which the patterns of perception temporarily vanish, until they are consciously recalled or are suddenly awakened, often pas- sively without any activity of the mind. But musical memory is not to be taken as a thing apart from the consciousness of the</p>

		<p>282 perceiving subject, as it seizes on the passing musical moment, is not to be taken as a thing apart from the consciousness of the perceiving subject, as it seizes on the passing musical moment, creating, as it were, a moment musicale. The forward thrust of musical time builds a horizon of expectations and possibilities for the composer and for the listener; and, as the musical tone unfolds in its foreward movement or "protension," it leaves in its wake a whole series of tonal shadows (Abschattungen), that spread out in ever diminishing diagonal lines behind it. The nature of musical time serves as an apt model for the phil- osopher, in this case Husserl. Combining what he had learned from his teacher, Carl Stumpf, with his own experience of sound, and analyzing it with his phenomenological method, Husserl produced the treatise known as the lectures on time consciousness. If we examine Husserl's model even more closely, we dis- cover interesting details, important both musically and phil- osophically. In the lectures on time-consciousness Husserl ex- pressly pays a debt of recognition to both Brentano's philos- ophy and to Stumpf's tonal psychology. 13 But he parts ways with natural psychology as well as with Kantian subjectivity, as he unfolds his conception of immanent time as phenomenal (erscheinend). The first example he gives of phenomenal time, i.e., time as it appears in experience, is that which occurs in the process of tonal duration. A musical phrase or melody appears in consciousness as a "serial phenomenon" (Nacheinander), i.e., in a temporal sequence specifically different from objective time. For our awareness of musical sound is not limited to linear objectivity; we hear globally, synthetically, not as the mind actively turns toward phenomena conceived in linear terms, but passively as the melody takes shape in audial percep- tion. At this point we might digress briefly concerning the little there is to offer on musical sound as a model for intuition as such. Textually, it is little; factually it is most significant. In his famous Logos essay on philosophy as a strict science, Husserl delivered his epoch-making pronouncement on the "naturalizing of consciousness," in which he criticized psychology as the</p>

		<p>283 science of experience, proposing a phenomenology of con- sciousness as a means of overcoming empiricism, a "pure" consciousness to counteract scientism, an intentional line of temporal experience as opposed to the chronometric line. 14 In pursuing this theme he states that phenomenology seeks to present the "essence" of things in the same immediate manner "as one hears a (musical) sound."15 In this direct and unencum- bered manner we seek to intuit (schauen ) any essence whatso- ever. The immediate intuition of musical sound as an object of experience is thus the ideal model for the intuition of the essence of any phenomenal thing, whether a visual object, or the essence of an ideal entity such as judgment or will. The primacy of audial perception and intuition seems to be clear to Husserl at this point, though he never developed the insight in radical and systematic manner. The reason for this is that his classic vocabulary, heavy with visual metaphor, masked out the audial models and images; and thus Wesenschau took prece- dence over hearing, even though at least in this one significant instance he had modeled the former on the latter. What Husserl bore witness to at this juncture was the supposed effortless experiencing of sound as opposed to the more difficult intuition of real or ideal objects. For the visual world is mostly a world of clear and distinct things, and its correlative mental world is one of clear and distinct concepts. Even in phenomenology we speak of the "ray of light" which the subject casts on the given object to reduce it to noematic meaning. And this ray of light rather than a global wave of sound is the symbol of phenomen- ological intentionality. Moreover, the ray is cast by the subject in its intuiting of reality; in the experience of musical sound there is a passivity at work, a deeper layer of experience, a hidden stratum of the same intuitional intentionality. Yet even had Husserl stayed with his audial model and developed a more convincing akoumenology (less fascinated with the activity of the subject and more with the "passivity" of hearing), his musical model would have remained more convicing to the phenomenologist than to the musicologist. For</p>

		<p>284 the latter knows that, at least historically, intellectual filters of various sorts already described were capable of interfering with perception. We must conclude that perception is a subtle and delicate affair that can be obstructed or masked when intellec- tual categories grow too powerful. Mental categories seem to function as a perceptual depressant and are probably suppres- sant of the natural erotic content of musical sound. Few musi- cians in western history were capable of the pure perception of sound precisely because of such mental blocks. Hence it is difficult to agree with Husserl that pure perception is as auto- matic as he postulates as regards musical sound. In fact it is now necessary to conduct seminars, in order to help musicians re- duce their intellectual categories, so as to let the pure experi- ence of sound as such break in on them, aiding them in disengaging their theoretical prejudices as a prelude to the reception of sound for its own sensuous sake. Husserl himself admitted that the "naturalization of ideas" makes intuition (and we might add, inhearing) difficult; yet he claimed that intuition was no "mystic secret" if we understood perception. And, of course, this may apply also to language. In a little quoted passage in the Logos article Husserl makes startling statements that one would expect from John Cage himself. For in defending himself against charges of scholasticism, he writes that the phenomenological analyst does not deal with judg- ments based on words, but rather that he looks directly at the phenomena which speech conjures Up.16 In other words the phenomenologist is not intent on building a conceptual empire, as was scholasticism. Rather, he looks at things themselves, as they begin to appear in the web of words we weave about them. Words, as it were, have no other function than to serve as indices for a whole context of phenomena, for a whole world of noematic meaning. In themselves words are and remain only sounds that indicate things in a world context, but not in the manner of Augustine or Abelard. This position appears to have some affinity with that of Wittgenstein, one is tempted to state. Husserl's point is that a final fixation of scientific language and meaning presupposes a completed analysis of phenomena; and such a final analysis has simply not taken place; nor will it ever.</p>

		<p>285 This might well hold also for ordinary language in an allied sense, insofar as it represents a static world of words and objects. Husserl calls for an analysis of things rather than of words only, and this might qualify as "extra-linguistic analy- sis. ,,17 Musical tonality is thus important for the cardinal concept of Wesenschau; but the musical model is traced out much more in detail in the lectures on time-consciousness and on passive synthesis. For here consciousness is regarded as a temporal apriori, which the author seeks to clarify through analysis of musical tones. In presenting and criticizing Brentano's theory of time, Husserl thematizes musical fantasy and imagination.18 He is aware of the possibilities of tonal modulation as a crucial part of musical fantasy, though here he classifies himself as a tra- ditionalist. Yet his conception of musical fantasy is open-ended, and he postulates the possibility of transcending ordinary modulation "toward musical sounds never before heard." In- deed, had Husserl been more aware of contemporary music, he could have fleshed this out in considerably more detail. And were he alive today to hear the unusual sounds of an electronic synthesizer or of a traditional orchestra playing Penderecki or Xenakis, he might have had additional problems about musical sound itself. In discussing tonal apprehension (Auffassung) Husserl follows W. Stern, emphasizing the fact that apprehension is not instantaneous, a thing of the moment, but that it builds up gradually." A melodic line, though indeed a series of tones, is in reality a gradual build-up even for the faculty of apprehen- sion. In other words, progressive apprehension is a facet of the temporality of consciousness; it is not merely an automatic fact of momentary response to stimuli. A series of musical tones builds a successive unity, which is apprehended as such.2° This, I feel, is significant for the proper understanding of such a thing</p>

		<p>286 as sonata-allegro form, particularly as illustrated in the sym- phony. This need not be a classical symphony; perhaps such a symphony as Sibelius' IV illustrates it even better. For this composition, though analyzable in strict sonata form-except that the recapitulation commences with the second rather than with the first theme-is hardly recognizable to the classic ear as sonata form. Instead the symphonic form builds gradually from motives enunciated by the cello in the opening bars. Sibelius expressly intended form to take shape gradually, to build, to synthesize, to constitute itself, as does nature itself. This build- ing process is more immediately true of the themes introduced in the classic and Romantic symphony. For a theme is not just a series of notes physically independent of one another. Rather, a good classic theme builds toward an arch, as easily exemplifed in Mozart, Beethoven, and later in Bruckner. The unity of such a theme is a matter of perceptive consciousness rather than of physical unity or of intellectual form. The form of the sonata is not a mould to be filled with content but rather a progressive building of temporal unity in the consciousness of the composer and perceiver, a unity held together as primary impression, memory, and expectation. Any building of form counts heavily on expectation, and the sonata form as such depends on mem- ory for the reprise of the principal themes. Tones are in them- selves, as it were, dead entities, regarded acoustically, easily identifiable as the same continuous tones; but in phenomenal flux, as they appear in immanent time, tones are alive and fluid; and so is the form they thus generate. The importance of temporal unity in musical tonality be- comes thematic in Husserl's treatment of passive synthesis, and detail emerges more convincingly.21 Again, it is useful to recall that this essay is not merely expository in character, an expose of accessible works of Husserl. What is treated here is only what is found to be useful to clarify the musical model he had in mind. What is "passive synthesis"? And in what sense does this bear on the musical model being employed, i.e., the musical tone as extended in subjective space from past through to future, building a progressive unity, that in musical composition becomes form? Both in his work on passive synthesis and on</p>

		<p>287 experience and judgment Husserl grappled with the difficulties of the word, passive, in his attempt to portray what was happening phenomenologically. Passivity is not merely passive behaviour (passives Verhalten), and this is apparent in the musical experience, specifically in listening to music. In Erfah- rung und Urteil Husserl called for a more radical concept of passivity, one not confused with cognitive conceptuality, one explanable more as affectivity, as passive "belief," as passive doxa.22 This seems eminently adaptable to the musical situ- ation ; or rather, the musical situation can serve as an excellent model for such theorization. For here cognitive aspects seem secondary to the musical unity which is passively effected, before a given composition, as e.g., a classical sonata, is ana- lyzed by the activity of the mind. What is presupposed in active analysis is a transition from a primordial aisthesis, i.e., from pure sensual awareness, to the cognitive categories of evalu- ation.23 The engagement of cognitively oriented analysis pre- supposes the activation of this fundamental aisthesis, of passive urdoxa, which Husserl calls "the primary stratum which is the basis of all experiencing in the concrete sense. "2a The pure awareness of sound brought about by the musical experience is not mere passivity, any more than perception itself is mere sense-perception, i.e., mere receptivity for sense data. According to Husserl perception has its own type of intentionality, independent of mental activity, and it is in fact a precondition for any such activity.25 Sounds come together, as it were, of themselves, without the intervention of an active agent. The synthetic character of perception must be themat- ized. for it is a stream of impressions, not an isolated phase. And in musical sound original impression, retention, and pro- tention acquire a synthetic unity of their own in a temporal process of continual self completion independently of what we traditionally call conscious activity. And here the language used by Husserl is illuminating. If heretofore he has made use of (or rather coined) the tribal language of phenomenology, he now departs from it and em-</p>

		<p>288 ploys ordinary language to describe the unifying process of passive synthesis. Accordingly, he writes that a thing "builds itself" (sich bauen) in consciousness, a thing "produces itself" (sich herstellen), "fulfills itself" (sich erfûllen), "achieves itself" (sich leisten), and "constitutes itself primordially" (sich ur- sprünglich konstituieren).26 One notices immediately that these are all reflexive forms of the verb. Passivity is self-action, and the "passivity" of the musical experience is a shaping up of the music itself, as it presents itself to consciousness. This synthetic "activity" is a prelude to the more complicated discussions on the fusion of sounds ( Verschmelzung), so important to Stumpf and now also to Husserl in his explanations of what happens in musical temporality, as exemplified in a melody or symphony. Let us take a closer look at both words in the phrase, passive synthesis. Husserl showed great uneasiness with the classic distinction between active and passive voices. Here we see the difficulty of expressing insights in ordinary language. The rigidities of classic grammar wished on us the speculative distinction between activity and passivity, between analysis and synthesis. In modern languages it is hard to grasp not just the subtlety but the utter necessity of a middle voice between the poles of activity and passivity, a voice that mediates between the polarities imposed on language and thought patterns by the classic tradition. Taking the advice of an analyst friend who admires the subtleties of classic Greek, I shall allow myself a short diversion into something lost to philosophy in the English translations of Greek thought: the middle ground between active and passive as embodied in the Greek Middle Voice. In classic Greek there was no "relation" between subject and object, the establishing of which led to the discovery of truth. Rather, there was a mediation between the passivity (pathe- mata) of the soul and things-to-be-done (prdgmata). The passive mind and active things came together in a process in which the mind was "assimilated" to things, so that passivity became in fact a "likening" to things (homo16mata). Thus Aristotle's defi- nition of truth has little to do with the relating of the subject to the object; rather he speaks of the "passive assimilation" of the</p>

		<p>289 soul into the world of things. 27 This passivity of the mind was best expressed by the middle voice, in which strictly speaking there is neither mental activity nor mere receptivity. The middle voice emphasizes the subject acting either for itself or for others, we might say, intersubjectively.28 This self-action is expressed in modern languages by means of the reflexive form. The Greek word, phaino, means simply to demonstrate or show; but the middle form, phainomai, means to show oneself, thus to appear. To the Greek philosopher phenomena, or things that appear, were conceived as appearing on this middle ground, as being there in appearance, as showing and constituting them- selves prior to any mental activity or receptivity. And this seems to be the case as regards listening to musical sound. This experience of things as they appear on middle ground, as they become phenomenal, so to speak, by appearing in phenomenal time (erscheinende Zeit), is already phenomenological, at least noematically. (And as I have pointed out elsewhere, the word, phenomenon, also means things that ring clear as sound as well as appearing-in-light.) 29 The mediation between subjective lis- tener and objective sound is a kind of passive intentionality, a passive "belief," in which the subject is drawn into the world of sound and becomes part of it, "assimilated" to it, as it were. This passive intentionality is perceptually affective and prepares the ground for any fruitful epistemic achievements. As to the word, synthesis, it is a word the Greeks made considerable use of, and mainly in the middle voice. Something "happens to me," is constituted for me as a unified and struc- tured happening. Musical sounds fall together or pull themselves, together (sich zusammen schliessen) for me in synthetic patterns in the experience of listening to a sonata or to the sonata-allegro movement of a given symphony. I am thus "passive," in that</p>

		<p>290 this symphonic happening comes over me, though I am not overcome. Rather, I am "affected" by the experience, though not merely passively. It goes without saying that this excursion. is meant only to employ the classic Greek middle voice as a model; it is not an attempt to restore ancient Greek. For, it is obvious that this linguistic modality is irretrievably lost to us; and we can only look with admiration and some nostalgia at the subtleties of ordinary Greek as used by Plato and Aristotle. And it fills us with mixed feelings with regard to the present and future of less subtle languages. The genius and subtlety of English lies in other directions. It is in the middle ground between the arbitrary poles of active and passive that such a thing as the musical experience takes place; and it is on this middle ground that Husserl's notion of "passive synthesis" was conceived. We note that throughout his treatment of it he continually refers to musical sound as a temporal phenomenon. He seems to model his conception on the facts of musical experience, where notes put themselves together for us in perception and offer themselves as such to consciousness. This putting-together is literally syn-thesis. Tones and colors are depicted as hyletic data in the consciousness of immanent time; and these data constitute themselves (Greek middle: syn-tithontai) in a process of continuous becoming. Tonalities are not mere data in the sense of empirical data; rather they are Gegebenheiten, i.e., they are given to us in transcendent t manner. In this case "transcendent" means an overcoming of the empirical level of ontic science, so that the data do not remain merely objective but can be subsumed into the immanence of the subject. Now the natural correlate of any giving is a receiving; and it is said to be better to give than to receive. But in order that giving can be accomplished a basic receptivity, an ability to perceive and receive, is required. Even medieval philosophy recognized this. Such receptivity is thus a correlative necessity, if data are to be taken into the subject's consciousness as Gegebenheiten, as givens. To receive a prof- fered gift, we extend the hand with the intention of taking the gift. The image of the extended hand, significative of intention- ality, connotes the activity required to constitute proper recep-</p>

		<p>291 tivity. Receiving is therefore not inert passivity. The hand must close on the gift, else it will fall to the ground. Similarly, in order to listen to either spoken language or to musical sound, we have to "lend our ears." Listening is not merely passive reaction; it is its own kind of activity. It has its own kind of intentionality, seen embodied in the sudden erecting of the ears when the dog hears its master's voice. In sound the voice or the music shapes itself and presents itself bodily to us as hearers. It is there as given; it is not merely a question of sense data affecting our audial apparatus. On the middle ground of the listening process we hear words or music "take shape," i.e., they constitute themselves in our awareness; and the receptivity of the listening subject is a necessary correlate to the activity of the speaker or of the musician. Aaron Copeland spoke of the "creative listener," who is necessary for the sensitive performer. Heidegger has put it rather forcefully, stating that we do not hear because we have ears; rather we have ears because we can hear.31 We are dealing here with what Husserl calls pure passivity, the most funda- mental stratum of pure subjectivity.32 It goes without saying that this is not a flight to the extremes of mere subjectivity; rather, it is "pure" in the sense of having been purified of mundane content, which includes being delivered of the rigid dichotomy of active vs. passive. For the sake of detailing our thesis, let us examine an example used by Husserl. In his treatment of associative synthe- sis, after both praising and criticizing Kant for his masterful treatment of transcendental synthesis ("Transcendental Deduc- tion" in Kritik I), Husserl states that we need to go beyond this point to the laying bare of the constitution of the inner world of the subject, of its stream of experience.33 We have to plumb the depths of the subject as such, i.e., the subject for itself. For, in the process of living from moment to moment the subject achieves an ever higher degree of synthesis.34 Here we see, that</p>

		<p>292 without being consciously aware of it Husserl does indeed put himself on the middle ground we spoke of, viz., that of the subject-for-itself. And it is on this ground that the subject constitutes itself in passive synthesis and builds the synthesis in a process that is neither active nor passive in the ordinary sense. The musical example Husserl employs to describe this is illuminating. Musical sound perdures from moment to moment, he writes, and it is synthetically one throughout all these individual moments. The temporal synthesis comprises the re- tentional tail, the momentary Now, and the protensional edge, fusing them into one continuously conscious structure. Hence tonal duration is not a mere series of sounds, and reality is not just a series of facts. Rather, the musical tone is identical with itself throughout all the individual moments that could frag- ment its identity. Moreover, we are not dealing with only a single tone, studying it, as does the scientist, with the aid of electronic instruments. For in musical composition, obviously, more than one sound may enter, whether we look at such entries vertically as a harmonic chord or horizontally as with the entries of a fugue. In the example Husserl describes there is an interplay between any one tone and all the others that are also present in the temporal process and in synthetic unity. Thus the problem of the simultaneity of time (Gleichzeitigkeit) is discussed.35 For, each musical entry does not have its own isolated time apart from all the others. Instead, all the various entries together form one continuous temporality, achieving identity as one musical composition, however disparate the parts. To initial audial impressions are added additional ones, and they build a continuous temporal unity. Thus there are not as many times as there are entries, but rather there is one time, in which all the temporal processes take place. Time conscious- ness is thus the primordial place (Urstdtte) for the constitution of musical identity and unity, as well as the source of the connective forms of coexistence and succession of objects in consciousness.36 Time consciousness is, in fact, the origin of what we know as "form," for in it entities shape themselves in passive synthesis for consciousness. For the musical analyst such a conclusion is significant. And even for that classic form known as sonata-allegro the example</p>

		<p>293 and the explanation are important. The analyst will be tempted to say that the symphonic form is simply there objectively in the musical score. Actually, it is constituted in passive synthesis at the pre-analytical stage in the perceptive consciousness of the performer and of the listener. 37 Of course, with the larger form of the symphonic sonata-allegro we have the problem of "appre- sentation," i.e., only segments of the symphony are present at one time to the hearer, and it requires some effort to pull it all together into a larger form. 38 Still it is consciousness that makes even this possible, and first-movement form was con- ceived with a double exposition of themes precisely to give the listeners a chance to register the thematic entries twice, so that they could be retained and become part of the develop- mental and recapitulatory process that was to be built on the exposition. When Husserl speaks of the synthetic unity of the sound process, stating that notes share their time though individually fragmented, he speaks from within the concept of the unity of consciousness. This hardly militates against the known facts of music history, according to which the medievalist can easily discover exceptions to the rule. He could object, for instance, that voices in medieval compositions are conceived, composed, and performed independently of one another. And yet even the musicologist knows that these individually conceived voice parts are meant to sound together in accord with the principles of mathematically conceived consonances. Here we see that in the Ars Antiqua especially the mathematizing of musical conscious- ness did not go against the actual ensemble sound of the musical composition, as e.g., in the Codex Bamberg. But the perceptual process was formalized and subsumed under the aegis of a medieval theory of consciousness which was pre-psychological, i.e., it was mathematical and metaphysical. Thus, though the individual voice parts were conceived as independent voices, as it were, none-the-less by force of the mathematically conceived theory of musical proportionality they were meant to come together in consonances, and that at given places above the foundation voice or tenor. This lower voice, probably instru-</p>

		<p>294 mental, was not a basse fondamentale in the sense of the Baroque music theorist and composer, J. Ph. Rameau; nor did it beget functional (or pretonal) harmonies in the sense of the pedagogy of the nineteenth century. But it was indeed the base of a consonantal column or "pillar" (Siiule), which the other voices-for all their independence-were expected to help build.39 What we have here is an architectural model based on exact mathematical proportionality. And this was considered to be the structure of musical consciousness. This rigid structure is a long way from the stream of consciousness advocated in Joycean manner by Husserl. Though mathematically conceived, such consonances were meant for the ear's perception and enjoyment. Despite the greater independence of individual voices in the Middle Ages (I think specifically of the Ars Antiqua and of the Ars Nova, thus of the later thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth centuries) forming consonances pleasant to the ear was a principal preoccupation of the com- poser, as he devised ways to amalgamate the individual voices into one harmonic structure. The intellect may well have de- lighted in the interplay of mathematical proportions, as Jacques de Liege relates in his encyclopedic Speculum Musicae, but the ear's perception was at very least the port of entry to such mathematical consciousness. Finally, a word on the importance of Stumpf's and Husserl's notion of fusion or amalgamation ( Verschmelzung). The word, Verschmelzung, occurs a good many times in Husserl's treat- ment of passive synthesis.4° By it Stumpf had meant the fusion of two simultaneous tones to make a consonant interval in the perception of the listener. Thus the musical interval of a fifth did not consist merely in two concurrent tones, e.g., one at C and the other at G. Rather, they sounded together and in so doing fused together as a new entity, which the harmonic analyst calls a fifth. But Stumpf's conception of consonance was fundamentally different from the mathematical conception of the Ars Antiqua, for it was psychologically conceived and was incipiently phenomenological. For Stumpf the concept of sensation (Empfindung) is central; it is not merely a matter of psychological consciousness. Fusion is something given pri-</p>

		<p>295 mordially in perception; thus it is not a conscious activity in the sense that we consciously put tones together to make a con- sonance. Rather, tones enter consciousness as already fused or amalgamated in perception.41 Improving on this phenomeno- logically Husserl distinguishes two types of fusion, 1.) formal or necessary and 2.) affective.42 Formal or necessary amalgama- tion has to do with primordial continuity and is a hyletic fusing evident in the successive and continuous unity of perception within a given field of sensation. Such fusion is a progressive building of unity (Einheitsbildung), particularly in temporal sequence. Affective fusion has to do with the sense data that directly affect consciousness, even though they may never actu- ally attain the conscious state. In such a context contrast is stressed by Husserl. Thus consciousness is affected by a sudden change, and one cannot but help think of the terrace dynamics of a Baroque concerto grosso or of the dramatic diminished seventh chord at the close of a Bach fugue. The latter has the immediate effect of making the entire fugue present in con- sciousness, and Husserl would go along completely with such an explanation. The diminished seventh chord so employed was crucial to the Baroque Affektenlehre, consciously used by Bach. Affektion is, of course, not "affect" as such. Rather it denotes being "struck" or affected (affiziert) by the sensation. It is constituted for consciousness in passive synthesis, which is a primordial stratum in the progressive build-up of consciousness. Fusion ( Verschmelzung) is a constitutive and unitive process, a plural consciousness (Mehrheitsbewu{3tsein) based on a sensuous context (Zusammenhang).43 And, while Husserl is intent on using musical tone as an example for passive synthesis, he provides us with a phenomenological version of Carl Stumpf's theory of musical consonance as such. Conclusion Phenomenology and material ontologies stand in close alli- ance with one another, Husserl writes at the close of his treatise</p>

		<p>296 on passive synthesis." One sees how important a musical model was for the founder of phenomenology, and how impor- tant phenomenological insights can be for musicology. Phenom- enology seems to be a necessary stratum of one's studies, if one intends to break out of classic frameworks, thus out of histori- cism and psychologism. And yet phenomenology needs the concreteness of such a material ontology as the science-of- music, for ontic sciences have a way of pinning us down to realities, despite their theoretical naivetes. In musicology one gets pinned down to opus numbers, dates, and scores, as well as to manuscripts from the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. However narrow science's purview may appear to the philos- opher, the fact remains that we need this scientific and scholar- ly reality, lest we get caught in foggy postulates and end in irrelevance. Yet the scientific factualist also needs the insights and fluidity of phenomenology, lest he become imbedded in empiricism for its own sake. Without science philosophy risks floundering and becoming mere speculation; without philosophy science overlooks primary questions that may be crucial even to scientific investigation for its own sake. What is needed on all sides today is the interdisciplinary approach; and the philos- opher must identify with his colleagues in the sciences, and bring them to a recognition of the horizons philosophy envi- sions.45 This was the ideal of Carl Stumpf, and the musical models he employed became significant in the unfolding of his student's methodology.</p>

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