Musicology and Psychomusicology: Two Sciences of Music
Identifieur interne : 000329 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000328; suivant : 000330Musicology and Psychomusicology: Two Sciences of Music
Auteurs : Otto E. LaskeSource :
- Psychology of music [ 0305-7356 ] ; 1977-10.
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DOI: 10.1177/030573567752002
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MUSICOLOGY AND PSYCHOMUSICOLOGY:
TWO SCIENCES OF MUSIC
OTTO E. LASKE
Abstract
The distinction between structure and process in music is explored. Musicoiogy
is defined as a science of musical structures represented in musical miemory
It is shown that traditional music theory is syntax-centric and why, on account
of that orientation, it has failed to raise many essential questions about musics
Finally, the relationship between musicology and psychomusicology is defined,
and some general conclusions concerning a theory of mtusical institoctiott arte
drawn.
In the present essay it is my intention to introduce a new scientific approacil to
music, that of psychomusicology. I intend to outline the purpose and the scope
of the new science, and link its viewpoint to that adopted by the established
musical disciplines of musicology, music theory, and music analysis. I shall
largely disregard the many technical distinctions between these three muisical
disciplines and, instead, shall concentrate on what they share. In positive rather
than critical terms, I shall discuss the reasons whv a procedural approach to
music, as it is exemplified by psychomusicology, is needed. I shall elaborate
upon the structure of a theory of music, and upon the link that binds the theors t
instructional applications.
I can conceive of many valid reasons for adopting the iine ol researchl allni
thinking I am following in psychomusicological investigation. In particular, I adii
motivated by a strong interest in the procedures employed in imiusical activiti.
and their relationship to musical structures that result from them. A theoretical
approach to music that pays primary attention to this relationship is best called
"'procedural". To explain what I mean by this term, let me quote a few sentences
by Jean Piaget (1964): "'To know an object is to act on it. To know is to modifsi
to transform the object, and to understand the process of this transformation-
and as a consequence, to understand the way the object is constructed." Indeed, as
a composer living in the present rather than in the past of music, I am naturally
interested in musical activities. However (and this makes my interest moi e
epistemological than psychological), I am not interested in behavioui per se. buti
rather in the lawful, systematic link of behaviouLr with te stiuctural jesuilts
that it produces before my eyes and ears.
As a composer, it has been my natural occupation for a long time to obsei vc
musical activities. I have been profoundly astonished to find the process I
observed, and the structure emerging from it, linked in many systematic (although
not immediately obvious) ways. As a listener, when mapping out the set of a
music's real or imaginary pasts in my memory, and as a music analyst, whlen
making decisions about what the generative components of a musical structuie
are, the same astonishment has overtaken me. External tokens of musical
artifacts notwithstanding, such as notation, written analyses, tape recordings, and
computer printouts, I came to the realisation that music is only what one is doing,
"modifying and transforming the object and, as a consequence, understanding
how the object is constructed". Going one step beyond my astonishment, I
stipulated that there be a science of this interrelation of musical structure and
The present essay is the basis of chapter one of Music, Menmory and Thought, Ann Arboi-.
Michigan, USA: Xerox University Microfilms, 1977. It first appeared in In TheorY Onil YnTi Arbor
Michigan, School of Music, University of Michigan (vol. 1. I - 12 t976)
lil
process, that could be called a theory of music. Finally, I searched for scientific
means that were available for explicating the relationship between musical
activities and their lawful structural results. Having found these means, I can now
say that a procedural theory of music is possible, viable, teachable, and applicable
to the learning and teaching of music.
I
I have implicitly defined a theory of music as a discipline that explicates the
systematic relation linking activities called musical to their products, also called
musical. Imagine now that the study of musical products, or artifacts, and the
study of the mental processes that give rise to them are carried out by two separate
disciplines: call the former "musicology", and the latter "psychomusicology".
The theory of music is, then, a discipline whose task it is to link systematically
what we know about music as an object or structure to what we know about music
as an activity or process. Effecting this linkage is indeed what musicians are doing
when they are engaged in listening to or making music. The scientific challenge
lies in showing explicitly what the relationship is between the two aspects, or
representations, of music. The fact that two different representations of one and
the same music exist seems astonishing at first. But upon further thought, it
becomes evident that this twofold representation music as product, and music
as process-derives from a well-known phenomenon, viz. the dichotomy involved
in all of human existence between perceiving the environment and acting upon
it (Simon, 1962). Clearly, if there is any systematic link between musical activity
and musical artefact, then it exists because both in perceiving and in acting upon
our environment, we use essentially the same mental faculties. Musical man, as
revealed in his works, is just a particularly striking example of this generative
dichotomy. In linking the perceiving to the acting musician, a procedural theory
of music pays homage to his undivided self.
I have, so far, discussed the link between musical process and artefact with
regard to possible connections between the two theories called musicology and
psychomusicology. Let us now consider the phenomenon of the structure-process
distinction in music more directly. Acting and perceiving are equally involved in
all that humans do, and it is only if one proceeds to invent separate mental
representations for their outcomes that their linkage becomes unclear. Over the
centuries, musicians have found ingenious ways of objectifying what is perceived
by ear. For instance, they represent musical objects graphically, by notation,
or verbally, by calling them a structure; or else, they represent them on digital or
analog tape and call them sounding. A comparable representation for musical
action would require film or video tape, or some action notation. Even so, only
the surface structure of the action would be elucidated. Obviously, then, one
needs to employ some mechanism, or set of rules, to describe the action part of
music satisfactorily.
It is quite revealing that in his course of development (of which this century
has seen important new stirrings) musical man has developed one piece of
technology after another for linking musical perception to musical action and for
establishing various kinds of feedback between them. The most important piece
of technology yet developed is what is called a "compositional rule". Com-
positional rules are also called "syntactic rules", viz. rules that specify how items
can be put together under certain contextual conditions. We say, for instance,
"it is a rule in (most of) sixteenth-century counterpoint that two simultaneously
descending or ascending tones should not be at a distance of the interval of a
fifth". I will not discuss here whether such a rule can be considered a music-
*A music-grammatical rule claims universal validity within the scope of some musical tradition,
whereas a stylistic rule is part of a set of rules defining a personal style.
11
grammatical rule, or whether it is better understood as a stylistic rule. [he
lawful character of the rule will be preserved under either of these interpretations.
It is more important to pay attention to what such a rule does: directly, with
regard to musical action, the rule defines a procedure, or a subroutine, for
linking sounds or layers of sound. However, it does so in a neutral way, without
imposing any restrictions on the acoustic source or the semadntic relevance oi
the sounds so linked. This neutrality is characteristic of syntactic i ules. One
can say that, in terms of the structural side of music, the rule implicitly links two
different representations, viz. a sonic (or, better, a sonological) and a semantic
representation of music. The sonological representation of a music states how thc
music sounds in terms of perceivable features; it is a scientific kind of solfege
The semantic representation of a music states what the conceptual components
are that make a music seem lawful, lawlike, or consistent with its own remete C3
recent past. A syntactic rule thus defines a link between the sound of a (perceived
music and its sense or meaning; it has both a musicological (structural) and
psychomusicological (procedural) significance. I can now make clear wxhai I
meant by calling compositional rules an instance of nmusical technologyv
1I
You may know of the question asked by Charles Ives in one of his LEss1i .
Before a Sonata: "What does music have to do with souind?!" This questiols
is usually taken to express a transcendentalist credo. Be that as it may, the ques-
tion implies a relationship, although in a rhetorical, implicitly negative form
One might equally well ask: "What does language have to do with speech ?'^
Is it a pure chance result of human evolution that language and music came to
link up with sound for the purpose of conveying meaningful messages? That
would be curious indeed. It is true, we do know of sign languages in whicl tihe
auditory component has been replaced by a visual component (i.e. gestures)*
and we know of people capable of reading music silently as one reads a book,
and of people following the weird suggestions of musical notation in writing a
triple canon. Nevertheless, most of us regard music as being intrinsically related
to the occurrence of sound events. But what precisely does music have to do with
sound? Or, to give a pragmatic twist to the question: lhow do miiusicians link
sound and intellect?
The answer to this question is simple or complex depending on whethel- one
takes it to be an end in itself, or whether one explores the answer further. The
answer is: musical man has a memory*. When pursuing the series of psychological
questions that this metaphorical answer implies, one realises that man has
whole battery of memories. Each of these memories has its own time constant
(i.e. can hold information for different periods of time), and a different structure
(i.e. holds different kinds of information, or the same information in different
forms of internal representation). What, however, is a memory? It is a goal-
oriented mechanism that: first, stores information; second, interprets information
it receives; third, compares received information with what it already contains ot
"knows"; and fourth, evaluates the truthfulness or consistency of what it receives
in terms of past experience. Information stored in memory can take two different
forms: that of procedures (or programmes), and that of data. More generally,
memory comprises two equally important parts: a data base where the sttuff
memory contains is stored, and the interpretive process that uses the information
stored in the data base. The latter is the procedural component of memory, the
former, the structural component (Lindsay, 1972; pp. 385-6).
The previously made distinctions between structure and process on the one
*For an excellent overview of the developmental literature, and for considerations of involuntai-y
versus deliberate memory, see Brown (1975); for the close relationship of memory and intelligenc
(musically speaking, semantics and syntax), see Piaget (1973), especially pp. 400-401t
12
hand, and sound and intellect on the other, now begin to take on manageable
proportions. Although the two distinctions are in no way synonymous, they
shall presently reveal their inherent relatedness. Of the two distinctions, that
between structure and process is the overriding, more general one. It is a distinc-
tion that can be maintained only outside of memory. Within memory, structure
or data and process or program are intrinsically related and nearly indistinguish-
able. They are two aspects of the workings of the central nervous system, in
information-processing terms the central processor. One speaks of structure
when one assumes the performing system to be at rest and objectifies the content
it has processed so far. One speaks of process when one views the performing
system as being in action and as working on some object or structure. This
"acting upon, modifying, and transforming of" an object, according to Piaget, is
knowledge. In music, the objects worked upon, modified, and transformed are
"sound objects". There would be no way of relating sound objects to the human
intellect, nor even conceiving of sound objects, if it were not for the fact that
humans have a memory. The sensory buffers that receive acoustic information
can hold that information for only minimal amounts of time. Even sensory
images, produced in a preperceptual store within memory, last only up to 250
msec., or a quarter-second (Massaro, 1975; pp. 439ff). Therefore, linking sound
to the intellect is really a matter of: first, storing sound in various memories
until it reaches long-term memory (i.e. makes contact with past experience);
and second, acting upon that stored information or structure. From the point
of view of memory research, then, musical structure and musical process can
not be separated, and a theory of music concerned with asking the crucial
questions about music cannot afford to accept the conventional distinction
between structure (artefact) and process (procedure). The question is not whether
or not, but how structure and process are related in musical memory.
III
Having just arrived at the top of the magical mountain we are climbing, let
us look around, to see what we have left behind us, and what we have achieved.
First, we have left behind us (rather far in the distance, I am afraid) this century's
music theory, including twentieth-century music theory; or, to be more fair, we
have left behind its way of posing and answering questions, though not the
substance of its questions. Second, we have established the need for a theory of
musical memory, or a musical semantics. Third, we have indicated that in order
to ask (and even more, to answer) questions about structure in music, one needs
to ask (and even more, to answer) questions about process in music. And finally
we have committed ourselves to showing that all this is not only conceivable,
but also possible, and that there is a technology by which one can approach
the questions posed by a procedural theory of music experimentally.
It is impossible, at this point, to enter into an extensive critique of traditional
theory and its extensions into twentieth-century theory. However, I shall intro-
duce the definition of a theory of music that I call procedural e contrario, by
pointing out the crucial ways in which it differs from traditional theory. Tradi-
tional theory has developed into what, epistemologically speaking, are three
loosely connected branches. These branches of music theory represent partial
theories, or descriptions, of musical thought. Let me label them the branches of
an initial-state, a goal-state, and an intermediate-state description of musical
thought. All of these descriptions are essentially syntax-centred and, in a way to
be specified, reductionistic.
An initial-state description of musical thought is pre-compositional; it is
concemed with compositional resources (often, with some exaggeration, called
musical systems). A goal-state description of musical thought is an analytical
13
description of produced music. Only in its most rigorous form is such a descrip-
tion free from the inconsistency of expressing, at times, the view of a precomposi-
tionally instructed composer, and at other times the view of an idealised listener
subservient to such a composer; usually, the description vacillates between these
points of view. Both theories mentioned so far deal with musical competence,
that is, unobservable knowledge. Up to the present day, the practitioners of these
theories have not cared to substantiate their hypotheses by way of investigating
actual human performances. (Actually, these branches of theory are concerned
with hypotheses concerning syntactic competence only, viz. with operations of
the musical intelligence that provide the opportunity to transform some present
stimulus configuration.)
Finally, an intermediate-state description of musical thought results from an
attempt to explicate the link between initial musical states (such as plans and
resources) and goal states (such as scores). This kind of description is formulated
on the basis of assumptions as to what constitutes music-syntactic competence,
usually in the form of computer programmes for composition.* To the extent
that intermediate-state descriptions neglect actual human performances (although
they pretend to model them), they, too, cannot do justice to the complete scope of
compositional, and even less musical, thought. The point important to my
argument is that although all of these partial theories implicitly or explicitly
claim to account for musical thought, the creators of these theories have not
cared to develop a methodology by which the competence hypotheses the theories
state can be substantiated empirically, viz. as hypotheses having psychological
validity with regard to observable human problem solving.
In my comprehensive view of music theory as a theory of musical thought,
its products, and the relation of these products to thought processes, the lack of
such a methodology is synonymous not merely with incompleteness, but with
reductionism. By this harsh judgement I mean that traditional music theory has
never raised the question of what is the function of musical syntax within the
framework of the total memory system involved in musical listening, composi-
tion, and reproduction. Instead, the theory reduces musical thought as well as
musical products to syntactic structures and shows itself incapable of dealing
with semantic and sonological processes, that is, with the reconstruction of a
music's past in semantic memory, and with the construction of perceptions and
images in perceptual memory. Consequently, the theory fails even in its own
domain, that of explicating musical products adequately, viz. comprehensively.
I have indicated that syntactic rules are necessary in music in order to relate
transmitted sound to stored meaning. In contrast to this function of syntax.
music theorists have always treated syntax as an end in itself. Music theorists
have dealt with syntax as if its function, linking the transmission terminal of
music (viz. the vocal tract, instruments, and the auditory system) to the receiving
terminal (viz. musical memory), were of negligible relevance. However, it is
evident that the constant development of musical rule systems and styles,
sociological reasons aside, takes place because developmentally, the two terminals
are in no pre-established harmony. Musical art is the human attempt to match the
two terminals. Music-syntactic rules are necessary precisely because without
*For an example of initial-state theory, see Allen Forte, The Structure of Atonal AIusic (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). Goal-state descriptions of music abound and have been
formulated from various points of view and with differing degrees of explicitness. For a theory of
goal-state analysis see Jean-Jacques Nattiez, Fondements d'une semiologie de la musique (Paris:
Union Generale d'Editions, 1975). Intermediate-state theory, too, has espoused differing points of
view; for examples, see Lejaren A. Hiller and Leonard M. Isaacson, Experimental Music (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1959); lannis Xenakis, Formalized Music (Bloomington: Indiana University,
1972; original French ed., 1963); G. M. Koenig, "Project Two: A Programme for Musical
Composition", Electronic Music Reports, no. 2 (Utrecht: Institute of Sonology, Winter 1970)-
and Stephen W. Smoliar, "A Parallel Processing Model of Musical Structures", Technical Report
no. TR-242 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory? 1971),
14
them "the number of messages that the most prolific intellect could send [would
be] severely limited by the ... rather small number of distinctively different
signals that a poor transmission system can cope with" (Liberman, 1975, p. 4).
The fact that in comparison to linguistic syntax, musical syntax is seemingly
much more loose simply reflects the evidence that the sonic transmission system
used in music is comparatively less limited than the phonemic system used by
language. In other words, there is less need in music to impose syntactic con-
straints since the sonic transmission terminal of musical systems can cope with a
greater variety of materials.* Nevertheless, the unlimitedness of the number of
possible sonic messages in music is an illusion of technicians. However expanded
our sonic vocabulary might become, due to technical innovation, it could never
match the number of intellectually possible messages that our stored experience
and cognitive machinery (or "intellect") can generate. And as long as the two
terminals, the sonic and the semantic terminal, are thus disparate, the necessity
for syntax to exist is a reality.
Stating the problem of musical syntax this way certainly raises some questions
in and about music theory. To answer these questions one need not speculate.
There now exists a methodology that enables music theorists to enlarge the scope
of their inquiry, and to proceed toward an empirical verification of their hypo-
theses concerming what is music-syntactic competence. In general terms, this
methodology concerns the explication of music-theoretical statements, as well
as the explication of empirical records of musical behaviour, in terms of pro-
gramming languages. In particular, I am thinking of two recent developments.
The first is the attempt to explicate informally-stated syntactic theories (as is
being done by Stephen Smoliar and Michael Kassler, who deal with the theories
of Heinrich Schenker); the second, the attempt to explicate performance records
of musical subjects in terms of programmes called production systems (as is
being done by this author). As was clearly seen by Chomsky, only an explicit
syntactic theory is falsifiable. To make hypotheses concerning musical syntax
explicit is valuable mainly because it affords one the opportumty to realise the
limitations of the music-syntactic component, compared to the scope of the
larger set of components required for an explication of musical thought processes.
Today, there exists the possibility of dealing with theoretical problems of
music in a more truly comprehensive, as well as in an experimental, fashion.
Many factors, artistic, scientific, and technological, have contributed to this
possibility; I name only those that seem to me to be the most important ones.
First, we have lost a great deal of the ethnomusicological naivetW that formerly
sanctioned the exclusive concern with (European) art music in music theory.
Second, electronic sound synthesis, while it has regretfully not led us to abandon
theoretical models that are really (incomplete) models of notated music only, has
at least engendered the concem for a theory of tone colour and, more generally,
of musical sound comprehension. The existence of the tape medium of musical
(re-)production has prompted an acoulogical viewpoint (that of P. Schaeffer)
to arise that, since it intentionally disregards the cultural variety of sound sources,
leads to the postulate that sonological universals exist. Such a viewpoint prompts
the theorist to deal with the role of syntactic constructs as forming a link between
musical perception and music-semantic understanding. Third, the invention of
digital sound synthesis permits new kinds of sonic designs to arise and provides
research facilities of unknown accuracy both for the investigation into musical
processes and musical structures. Fourth, information-processing psychology
*There is some evidence that suggests that short-term memory is a property of the linguistic,
rather than a musical, processor, or at least that short-term memory is of less relevance for musical
processing than it is for language processing. This could be due to the fact that musical information
is directly written into contextual (intermediate-term) memory and long-term memory, there
being no pre-fabricated music-syntactic units. The problems of musical syntax and of musical
short-term memory are closely related problems.
15
has developed a precise methodology for formulating and testing a theory of
musical memory, and developments in modal logic have brought forth the
attempt to explicate music-semantic memory contents by way of empirically
testable constructs called networks. Finally, developmental psychology, through
its merger with information-processing theory, has opened up new perspectives
for a theory of musical learning and instruction both of which requii-e the
assistance of the theory of music.*
lV
I have indicated that it is the task of a theory of music to relate the knowledge
we have about musical structures to our knowledge concerning the mental
processes and the memory system required for producing and/or understanding
such structures. In order to avoid reductionism of any sort, a theory of music
has to acknowledge the autonomy that characterises musical structures in two
respects. First, such structures (especially when notated) acquire a culturally.
i.e. sociologically caused, autonomy that makes them irreducible to either
acoustic, psychological, or even sociological phenomena. Second, stored in
human (long-term) memory through learning and experience, musical structures
become the actual knowledge base of a specific kind of competence different
from both linguistic and logical competence, viz. musical competence. From a
theoretical point of view, this competence is less a scientifically established
reality than a hypothetical construct that remains to be verified empirically.
As is true for the linguistic competence of native speakers of a language, the
musical competence of practising musicians is an "intrinsic tacit knowledge'"
(according to Chomsky) that is not directly observable. Competence hypotheses
may not be open to proof, but they are certainly open to falsification by way ol
developmental studies and studies in problem solving. By designing appropriate
task environments in which controlled musical processes take place, the intrinsic
tacit knowledge of musicians can be elicited and made observable. To observe
musical competence-in-action is the task of psychomusicology; to observe its
growth, the task of developmental psychomusicology.*,
To summarise, a comprehensive theory of music is a science comprising two
interrelated subdisciplines: first, a theory of musical structures, or musicology;
and second, a theory of cognitive processes resulting in musical structures, or
psychomusicology. Musicology formulates structural descriptions of musical
artifacts (this term taken in the broad sense of all possible sonic designs); to be
operationally relevant, these descriptions must be so formulated that they can
serve as descriptions, or sufficiency analyses, of the competence component of an
actual performance system simulating a musical listener. For brevity's sake, let us
assume that these descriptions form a system S (for 'structures"). Psycho-
musicology formulates structural descriptions, or models, of musical activities, in
the particular sense of problem-solving activities; let us assume that these
descriptions form a system A (for "activities"). We can then formiulate the
following rules of co-ordination for musicology and psychomusicology (Laske,
1975);
I. Every assertion in S (musicology) is independent of the assertions in A
(psychomusicology), and no problem in A is a problem in S;
*For a theory of tone colour, see chapter 4 of Robert Cogan and Pozzi Escot, Seonic Designl
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976). For a statement of the acoulogical viewpoint, see Pierre
Schaeffer, Traitl des objets musicaux (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966). For a reference concerning the
information-processing methodology, see Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, Human Problem
Solving (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), as well as Allen Newell, "Production Systems:
Models of Control Structures", in Visual Information Processing, ed. William G. Chase (New York:
Academic Press, 1973), pp. 463-515. Finally for the use of modal logic in musical semantics, see
Kunst, 1976.
tConcerning the correspondence between the operational levels of intelligence and thie stages of
memory development, see Piaget, 1973, passim.
16
II. Every assertion or problem in S (musicology) produces a problem in
A (psychomusicology), but the solution of the problem in A can only be
obtained by the methods peculiar to A.
A question remains about what it means to co-ordinate the two sciences, of
musical structures and activities, and whether the job of co-ordinating them
falls to a third superordinate science. Regarding language research with respect
to this question, one finds there is a science called linguistics (which is a science
of language structures), and a science called psycholinguistics (which is a science
of the mental processes required for producing and understanding language
structures). There seems to be no third, superordinate science for relating these
two disciplines. I think that the problem of co-ordinating system S (musicology)
with system A (psychomusicology) must be solved on two levels, a methodological
and a substantive level. To make clear what I mean, let me now assume that the
theories called S and A are automata having a definable input and output.
That is, let me assume that S and A can be viewed procedurally, as performance
mechanisms.
On the first level, the input to S is a particular music that is in sounding or
notational form. S itself is a music analyser. Upon receiving some musical input,
the automaton S initiates an interpretive process called music analysis. The
output of S, then, is a theory of the input, i.e. a set of hypotheses about the
structure of the input. In most cases, this set of hypotheses is a structural descrip-
tion of the music. Such a description can take a variety of forms, especially with
regard to the degree of formal rigour it exhibits. I shall not discuss here the many
different forms a music analysis can take; I only wish to say that, naturally, the
more formal and explicit the analysis, the more testable is the set of hypotheses
that it represents. (Merely referring to some notational representation of a music
and appealing to the intrinsic musical knowledge of the (score-reading) reader
of the analysis is not a sufficient verification procedure.) On the methodological
level of the co-ordination of S and A, the output of S is taken to be the input of A,
and the output of A is the verification of the input hypotheses, or musical
(micro-) theory produced by S. A, then, is a verification procedure for outputs of
S. (There is ultimately no other verification procedure for a music analysis
than a procedure that establishes empirically that listeners do indeed hear a
music as the analysis says they do. Therefore it is crucial to make it clear in the
analysis exactly what it is that the listeners are thought to comprehend.)
To understand clearly what it means to verify in A a structural description
produced by S, let us consider more closely the process of music analysis, or
theory formulation. Music analysis is a complex transformation task in the
pursuit of which a sounding or notationally represented music is transformed
from its input representation into a natural-language and/or formal language
representation. (Graphic schemes, such as notational fragments, may comple-
ment the analysis.) The process by which this transformation is accomplished
is to a large extent taken for granted, and thus poorly understood at present;
it can be studied psychomusicologically. Ideally, the music analysis produced by
S is a sufficiency analysis. That is, the analysis is the formulation of a mechanism
that is sufficient for understanding the analysed music. A sufficiency analysis
concems an idealised performance system, viz. one whose memory limitations
and music-strategical specifics have been disregarded. Consequently, the result of
the analysis process activated by S is not an efficient and necessary, only a
sufficient, minimal mechanism for understanding the analysed music. With
regard to the verification of the analysis, the actual processes which are required
for implementing the analysis as a procedure for understanding music have not
been specified. What can it mean to verify a sufficiency analysis of music except
to test its psychological validity with regard to actual understanding systems,
i.e. humans? The fact that most existing music analyses are, or seem to be, very
17
complex does not mean that they are not in principle verifiable. What makes
most of them unverifiable is their cumbersome and sloppy form: most are not
sufficiency analyses. But this deficiency of music analyses is not a burden that
can be placed upon psychomusicology. If musicology indeed is a science, then
it is up to musicologists to provide proper input to psychomusicology, i.e
verifiable theories. If musicology fails to comply with the methodological
requirement to provide verifiable, or at least falsifiable, theories, then it is simply
inefficient. I shall now reformulate the co-ordination rules I and II in order to
summarise their methodological content:
I. A structural description of some music produced by S is a sufficiency
analysis, i.e. the formulation of a mechanism sufficient for, but not
necessarily efficient for, understanding the analysed music. The description
is or implies a set of hypotheses concerning musical competence. Com-
petential hypotheses are independent of assertions concerning psychological
processes, formulated in A. However, the operational relevance of these
hypotheses is determined by their usefulness in, and significance for,
verifying the elements of competential knowledge that they postulate.
I the set of hypotheses implied by a structural description is not verifiable,
then the hypotheses must remain unconfirmed.
II. (a) Every description problem in S, or structural description of some
music formulated by S, produces a twofold psychomusicological
problem in A. The first problem is general; it concerns the process of
music analysis by which structural descriptions are formulated.
The second problem is specific; it concerns the psychological validity
of claims made in a particular music analysis regarding the existence of
musical competence instantiated by the music.
(b) With regard to the first problem, psychomusicological research must
deal with the fundamental processes of music analysis in order to
ascertain their nature and function. With regard to the second problenm,
psychomusicological research must provide a set of physical task
environments in which the elements of competential knowledge
claimed to exist by S can be elicited and verified.
(c) If the psychological validity of a musicological hypothesis remains
unverified, then either a deficiency in formulating the hypothesis, or
in testing it, or both, has occurred. Whatever the deficiency. the
hypothesis remains speculative.
(d) Finally, successful verification of a hypothesis of S in A causes a
problem of developmental psychomusicology to arise, viz. the problem
of what the ontogenesis is of musical structures such as those formulated
by S and verified by A.
Psychomusicology has been called a verification procedure for outputs of S.
Because of the recent emergence of this science, only very simple hypotheses
can be verified at this time. However, there is every reason to believe that psycho-
musicology is capable of developing to a level of maturity where complex
musicological hypotheses can be tested. The theoretical task, therefore, is two-
fold: first, producing verifiable musicological hypotheses in S; and second.
developing psychomusicological verification procedures in A.
Let me now discuss the second level of the co-ordination of S and A, viz. the
substantive level. In terms of subject matter, the linkage of musical structures
(stored in memory) to musical processes (activated by the musician) is just what
the making of music requires of humans. The ability to effect this linkage is
what is called "understanding music". (To take an example, consider the performer
giving a recital. The performer has the music before him in notational form, or
else has committed its structure to memory. His task in both cases consists of
18
assembling a performance programme that takes the structural description of
the music as input and realises it, i.e. transforms it into some procedural represent-
ation in terms of which sound producing processes can be initiated. When capable
of assembling such a programme and of using it the performer is said to "under-
stand music" or to "be a musician".) Speaking in substantive terms, a theory
of music can be said to accomplish in theoretical form what the active musician
does in actuality. The theory of music is a theory of musical knowledge or,
operationally speaking, of musical understanding. The theory shows how struc-
ture and process relate in musical activities. A second, equally important concern
of the theory of music is how structure and process come to relate in musical
activities, viz. how the mature capacity for relating the seemingly independent
aspects of music is acquired by a human. In asking this developmental question,
the theory of music operates on both the methodological and substantive levels
simultaneously, merging with the science of developmental psychomusicology.
In as far as it is a theory of musical competence, a theory of music ultimately
requires the existence of a theory of the acquisition of musical competence, to
substantiate its claims fully. This entails that the dividing line between the
theory of music and the empirical science of developmental psychomusicology
may be difficult to draw. It is the task of developmental psychomusicology to
verify hypotheses concerning musical competence. Such hypotheses are not
exclusively embodied in the structural descriptions of musical artefacts produced
by experts; they may equally well be hypotheses conceming the elementary
musical competence of children and adolescents, and the development of
musical competence to maturity. One cannot scientifically understand musical
artifacts without understanding the development to maturity of the musical
competence which such artefacts presuppose. To summarise, a theory of music is
ultimately an empirical science that formulates and tests hypotheses about the
nature of musical competence*. The theory of music also investigates what
distinguishes the functioning of musical competence from that of other kinds of
competence, for instance linguistic and logical competence. The theory of music is
therefore an interdisciplinary enterprise. It is, itself, one of the many sub-
disciplines of a comprehensive theory of human knowledge, or a scientific
epistemology.
V
Let me close with some very general remarks concerning musical instruction,
in order to demonstrate the practical significance of psychomusicology. Musical
instruction is a wide field. To gain some orientation in this field, let us distinguish
three different problem areas: curriculum design, strategies for practical instruc-
tion, and theory of instruction. Although a procedural theory of music has
somiething to contribute to all of these, in what follows I restrict myself to the
third-mentioned topic, the theory of instruction. By "instruction" I mean,
following Resnick (1976, p. 51), any environmental conditions that are deliberately
arranged to foster increases in competence. Put most simply, the relation between
psychomusicology (as a study of the mental processes that result in musical
structures) and a theory of instruction is that the former constitutes, or at least
ought to constitute, the scientific basis of the latter. One can consider the
experimental situations studied in psychomusicological research as approxima-
tions of real-world (musical) tasks. Conversely, one can structure classroom
*Hypotheses concerning musical competence do not result from musicological research alone;
they may equally result from research in psychomusicology and developmental psychomusicology.
An example of hypotheses formulated within the framework of psychomusicology is given in
Laske, 1976, Introduction to Psychomusicology, passim. To derive hypotheses concerning musical
competence from other than musicological sources is obviously necessary for studies in music
analysis; music analysis itself does not formulate hypotheses that can be used to understand
music-analytical processes.
19
experiences in such a way that they yield insight into learning which is both
theoretical (for the teacher-experimenter) and practical (for the student-subject).
Clearly, there is only one way to free the student from being the subject of
instruction in the pejorative sense, that is, a victim: one must engage his natural
heuristic system, his problem-solving apparatus, in the instructional process.
To do so one must know what it means to learn, more specifically, what it means
to learn music. And in order to understand what it means to learn music, one
must first of all understand what it means to perform a musical activity. That is,
to define a model of a music learner, one needs a performance model, or a model
of the musical activity of a musical expert. Three theories are thus involved:
first, a theory of activity (performance); second, a theory of instruction; and
third, a theory of learning. I have just indicated the relation of the first theory to
the third (performance/learning). As to the relation between the second and
the third theory (instruction/learning), it would be mistaken to think that the
development of a theory of instruction can not progress before one has formulated
a comprehensive theory of learning. "What is needed is a model that captures the
essential features of that part of the learning process that is tapped by an
instructional task" (Atkinson, 1976, p. 107). To identify such features, one
needs to have identified the set of fundamental processes which enters into the
performance of the task to be taught. In terms of psychomusicology, one needs
to have performed a task analysis.
A task analysis, in the psychomusicological sense, is an analysis of the problem
determinants, the sources of difficulty, and the kinds of knowledge required for
pursuing a task successfully. There are two kinds of task analysis: abstract or
conceptual, and empirical task analysis (Resnick, 1976, p. 64). In the former, the
analysis concerns idealised performances; one seeks to discover what is a
sufficient mechanism, ideally in the form of a computer-simulation programme,
for performing the task successfully*. In the second, one verifies or disproves and
amplifies the theory formulated in the conceptual analysis by investigating actual
performances of subjects in the task under consideration. The empirical mateirial
for such an investigation can be of different kinds: it may consist of thinking-
aloud protocols, action protocols, reaction-time data, sketches, and other kinds of
behavioural traces.t The purpose of an empirical task analysis is to identify
those fundamental processes, from the set of processes postulated by Tie
conceptual task analysis, that an expert performer has actually used in Ilis
pursuit of a task. Once such processes are known and verified, they can be
taught; teaching successfully means teaching the heuristic processes of experts
(Famham-Diggory, 1972, p. 83).
Instruction, you will agree, is concerned with processes. nin music, instructioni
is concerned with fostering the growth of an inner music-generating system that
fits some musical environment to the point at which the system becomes capable
of modifying the environment. Whether there is a natural "music acquisition
device" that samples the sonic environment, formulates hypotheses as to the
nature of music, and outputs examples of these hypotheses, correcting them by
experience, is not known. But it is a good hypothesis to follow because it elucidates
the problems of musical instruction. If there is a natural music acquisition system,
then we want to make use of it in teaching.
Above, I have utilised the structure/process distinction to clarify problems
*The analogy to music analysis is apparent: a music analysis ideally is a sufficient mechanisn tfoi
understanding some musical artifact. However, the verification of such a mechanism falls outside ots
musicology, viz. into psychomusicology.
tProtocols in the sense of cognitive psychology are lists of natural or formal language statemilenits.
Thinking-aloud protocols are documentations of verbally mediated thought as it occurs during a
problem-solving session. Action protocols document the actions taken by a problem solver
Reaction-time data are recorded measurements of the time subjects take to respond to the onset of
some physical or symbolic stimulus.
20
of a theory of music. It is not astonishing to find that this distinction reoccurs in
educational controversies, viz. in the form of a distinction between teaching
processes of thought versus teaching their products. One would not expect a
procedural theory of music to endorse the teaching of ready-made products and
facts as the primary task of instruction. Let us turn to the processes.
In accordance with Farnham-Doggory (op. cit., p. 81), I distinguish three
kinds of thinking process that occur in education (her text, my examples):
Type 1. A behavioural recipe for obtaining a solution (e.g. for writing a
harmony exercise);
Type 2. A logical process existing in the subject matter (e.g. some theory of
modulation);
Type 3. A process of reasoning that is psychological in nature (e.g. the process
of thinking about, and solving, a problem of modulation, as distinct
from a theory of modulation).
The first two kinds of process apply formal rules; one can write programmes
(algorithms) for them. The third process applies rules of thumb, i.e. a heuristic;
one can attempt to state a set of heuristic rules in terms of a problem-solving
theory formulated as a simulation programme. Many theories of education that
have dealt with the first two processes have been implemented; by contrast, the
teaching of the heuristic processes of experts has not been attempted. The reason
for this is simple: the theory of heuristic processes, known as theory of problem
solving, is relatively young, and its extension into the theory of instruction is just
beginning (Atkinson, 1976; Resnick, 1976). I call a theory that formulates models
of a musical learner and tests them empirically a theory of musical instruction.
Such a theory is a natural consequence of a theory of problem solving that
incorporates adequate notions of human memory.
What is the relation between a model of musical activity, as formulated by
psychomusicology, and models of a musical learner? A model of some activity,
or performance model, is a model of expert performances. Such a model is a
prerequisite for evaluating and studying the inexpert performances of novices,
for the purpose of arriving at models of learning. In order to formulate a model
of a learner (for some task domain), one must know what the fundamental
processes are by which instructional goals are achieved. "In order to deal effect-
ively with educational problems, we need theories that tell us how knowledge is
represented in memory, how information is retrieved from that knowledge
structure, how new information is added to the structure, and how the system
can expand that knowledge by a self-generative process" (Atkinson, op. cit.,
p. 82).
Clearly, at this point our understanding of the musical learning process, and of
music acquisition, is so limited that it seems impossible to identify truly effective
strategies for musical instruction. And where such strategies exist in naive
(common-sense) form, one cannot say why they work. However, as I shall
demonstrate in a subsequent paper, the analysis of tasks as undertaken by
psychomusicology provides us with means for understanding learning experiences
better, structuring them more adequately, and building curricula on the basis of
insight into the natural heuristic system of students, instead of designing curricula
in terms of sets of artefacts produced by people long dead, or of facts and historical
legends. One might say that all of traditional music analysis and music theory is a
repertory of unconfirmed hypotheses as to how humans think musically; the
behavioural evidence these hypotheses refer to is in the form of musical artefacts.
It is the task of psychomusicology to test, and confirm or reject, these hypotheses,
and in so doing provide a scientific basis for musical instruction.
University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801, USA.
21
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</meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><back><notes><p>*A music-grammatical rule claims universal validity within the scope of some musical tradition, whereas a stylistic rule is part of a set of rules defining a personal style.</p><p>*For an excellent overview of the developmental literature, and for considerations of involuntai-y versus deliberate memory, see Brown (1975); for the close relationship of memory and intelligenc (musically speaking, semantics and syntax), see Piaget (1973), especially pp. 400-401t</p><p>*For an example of initial-state theory, see Allen Forte, <italic>The Structure of Atonal Music</italic> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). Goal-state descriptions of music abound and have been formulated from various points of view and with differing degrees of explicitness. For a theory of goal-state analysis see Jean-Jacques Nattiez, <italic>Fondements d'une semiologie de la musique</italic> (Paris: Union Generale d'Editions, 1975). Intermediate-state theory, too, has espoused differing points of view; for examples, see Lejaren A. Hiller and Leonard M. Isaacson, <italic>Experimental Music</italic> (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959); lannis Xenakis, <italic>Formalized Music</italic> (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1972; original French ed., 1963); G. M. Koenig, "Project Two: A Programme for Musical Composition", <italic>Electronic Music Reports,</italic> no. 2 (Utrecht: Institute of Sonology, Winter 1970)- and Stephen W. Smoliar, "A Parallel Processing Model of Musical Structures", Technical Report no. TR-242 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory? 1971),</p><p>*There is some evidence that suggests that short-term memory is a property of the linguistic, rather than a musical, processor, or at least that short-term memory is of less relevance for musical processing than it is for language processing. This could be due to the fact that musical information is directly written into contextual (intermediate-term) memory and long-term memory, there being no pre-fabricated music-syntactic units. The problems of musical syntax and of musical short-term memory are closely related problems.</p><p>*For a theory of tone colour, see chapter 4 of Robert Cogan and Pozzi Escot, <italic>Seonic Designl</italic> (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976). For a statement of the acoulogical viewpoint, see Pierre Schaeffer, <italic>Traitl des objets musicaux</italic> (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1966). For a reference concerning the information-processing methodology, see Allen Newell and Herbert A. Simon, <bold><bold><italic>Human</italic></bold></bold><italic>Problem Solving</italic> (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), as well as Allen Newell, "Production Systems: Models of Control Structures", in <italic>Visual Information Processing,</italic> ed. William G. Chase (New York: Academic Press, 1973), pp. 463-515. Finally for the use of modal logic in musical semantics, see Kunst, 1976.</p><p>†Concerning the correspondence between the operational levels of intelligence and <bold>thie</bold> stages of memory development, see Piaget, 1973, passim.</p><p>*Hypotheses concerning musical competence do not result from musicological research alone; they may equally result from research in psychomusicology and developmental psychomusicology. An example of hypotheses formulated within the framework of psychomusicology is given in Laske, 1976, <italic>Introduction to Psychomusicology,</italic> passim. To derive hypotheses concerning musical competence from other than musicological sources is obviously necessary for studies in music analysis; music analysis itself does not formulate hypotheses that can be used to understand music-analytical processes.</p><p>*The analogy to music analysis is apparent: a music analysis ideally is a sufficient mechanisn <bold>tfoi</bold> understanding some musical artifact. However, the verification of such a mechanism falls outside ots musicology, viz. into psychomusicology.</p><p>†Protocols in the sense of cognitive psychology are lists of natural or formal language statemilenits. Thinking-aloud protocols are documentations of verbally mediated thought as it occurs during a problem-solving session. Action protocols document the actions taken by a problem solver Reaction-time data are recorded measurements of the time subjects take to respond to the onset of some physical or symbolic stimulus.</p></notes><ref-list><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Atkinson, R. C.</surname></name>
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