Token-identity, consciousness, and the connection principle
Identifieur interne : 000127 ( France/Analysis ); précédent : 000126; suivant : 000128Token-identity, consciousness, and the connection principle
Auteurs : Jürgen Schröder [France]Source :
- Behavioral and Brain Sciences [ 0140-525X ] ; 1995-09.
Abstract
Searle's (1990) argument for the “Connection Principle” seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.
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DOI: 10.1017/S0140525X00040139
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