MozartV1, Istex, Corpus, bibRecord, 002D26

Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism

Identifieur interne : 002D26 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 002D25; suivant : 002D27

Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism

Source :

Behavioral Sciences & the Law [ 0735-3936 ] ; 2007-03.

RBID : ISTEX:133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F

Abstract

A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self‐controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Url:

https://api.istex.fr/document/133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F/fulltext/pdf

DOI: 10.1002/bsl.746

Links to Exploration step

ISTEX:133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F

Le document en format XML

<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism</title>
<author><name sortKey="Rachlin, Howard" sort="Rachlin, Howard" uniqKey="Rachlin H" first="Howard" last="Rachlin">Howard Rachlin</name>
<affiliation><mods:affiliation>Distinguished Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Research Professor, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794‐2500, U.S.A.</mods:affiliation>
</affiliation>
</author>
</titleStmt>
<publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno>
<idno type="RBID">ISTEX:133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F</idno>
<date when="2007" year="2007">2007</date>
<idno type="doi">10.1002/bsl.746</idno>
<idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F/fulltext/pdf</idno>
<idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">002D26</idno>
</publicationStmt>
<sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism</title>
<author><name sortKey="Rachlin, Howard" sort="Rachlin, Howard" uniqKey="Rachlin H" first="Howard" last="Rachlin">Howard Rachlin</name>
<affiliation><mods:affiliation>Distinguished Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Research Professor, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794‐2500, U.S.A.</mods:affiliation>
</affiliation>
</author>
</analytic>
<monogr></monogr>
<series><title level="j">Behavioral Sciences & the Law</title>
<title level="j" type="abbrev">Behav. Sci. Law</title>
<idno type="ISSN">0735-3936</idno>
<idno type="eISSN">1099-0798</idno>
<imprint><publisher>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</publisher>
<pubPlace>Chichester, UK</pubPlace>
<date type="published" when="2007-03">2007-03</date>
<biblScope unit="volume">25</biblScope>
<biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope>
<biblScope unit="page" from="235">235</biblScope>
<biblScope unit="page" to="250">250</biblScope>
</imprint>
<idno type="ISSN">0735-3936</idno>
</series>
<idno type="istex">133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F</idno>
<idno type="DOI">10.1002/bsl.746</idno>
<idno type="ArticleID">BSL746</idno>
</biblStruct>
</sourceDesc>
<seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0735-3936</idno>
</seriesStmt>
</fileDesc>
<profileDesc><textClass></textClass>
<langUsage><language ident="en">en</language>
</langUsage>
</profileDesc>
</teiHeader>
<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self‐controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</div>
</front>
</TEI>
<istex><corpusName>wiley</corpusName>
<author><json:item><name>Howard Rachlin Ph.D.</name>
<affiliations><json:string>Distinguished Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Research Professor, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794‐2500, U.S.A.</json:string>
</affiliations>
</json:item>
</author>
<language><json:string>eng</json:string>
</language>
<abstract>A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self‐controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</abstract>
<qualityIndicators><score>6.38</score>
<pdfVersion>1.3</pdfVersion>
<pdfPageSize>468 x 703 pts</pdfPageSize>
<refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative>
<keywordCount>0</keywordCount>
<abstractCharCount>690</abstractCharCount>
<pdfWordCount>8007</pdfWordCount>
<pdfCharCount>45354</pdfCharCount>
<pdfPageCount>16</pdfPageCount>
<abstractWordCount>115</abstractWordCount>
</qualityIndicators>
<title>Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism</title>
<genre><json:string>article</json:string>
</genre>
<host><volume>25</volume>
<pages><total>16</total>
<last>250</last>
<first>235</first>
</pages>
<issn><json:string>0735-3936</json:string>
</issn>
<issue>2</issue>
<author><json:item><name>Alan R. Felthous M.D.</name>
<affiliations><json:string>Department of Psychiatry, Saint Louis University School of Medicine, 1221 South Grand Boulevard, Saint Louis, Missouri 63104‐1094, U.S.A.</json:string>
</affiliations>
</json:item>
</author>
<subject><json:item><value>Research Article</value>
</json:item>
</subject>
<genre></genre>
<language><json:string>unknown</json:string>
</language>
<eissn><json:string>1099-0798</json:string>
</eissn>
<title>Behavioral Sciences & the Law</title>
<doi><json:string>10.1002/(ISSN)1099-0798</json:string>
</doi>
</host>
<publicationDate>2007</publicationDate>
<copyrightDate>2007</copyrightDate>
<doi><json:string>10.1002/bsl.746</json:string>
</doi>
<id>133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F</id>
<fulltext><json:item><original>true</original>
<mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype>
<extension>pdf</extension>
<uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F/fulltext/pdf</uri>
</json:item>
<json:item><original>false</original>
<mimetype>application/zip</mimetype>
<extension>zip</extension>
<uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F/fulltext/zip</uri>
</json:item>
<istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism</title>
</titleStmt>
<publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority>
<publisher>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</publisher>
<pubPlace>Chichester, UK</pubPlace>
<availability><p>WILEY</p>
</availability>
<date>2007</date>
</publicationStmt>
<notesStmt><note>National Institutes of Health - No. 2R01MH04404916;</note>
</notesStmt>
<sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism</title>
<author><persName><forename type="first">Howard</forename>
<surname>Rachlin</surname>
</persName>
<roleName type="degree">Ph.D.</roleName>
<note type="correspondence"><p>Correspondence: Distinguished Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Research Professor, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794‐2500, U.S.A.</p>
</note>
<affiliation>Distinguished Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Research Professor, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794‐2500, U.S.A.</affiliation>
</author>
</analytic>
<monogr><title level="j">Behavioral Sciences & the Law</title>
<title level="j" type="abbrev">Behav. Sci. Law</title>
<idno type="pISSN">0735-3936</idno>
<idno type="eISSN">1099-0798</idno>
<idno type="DOI">10.1002/(ISSN)1099-0798</idno>
<imprint><publisher>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</publisher>
<pubPlace>Chichester, UK</pubPlace>
<date type="published" when="2007-03"></date>
<biblScope unit="volume">25</biblScope>
<biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope>
<biblScope unit="page" from="235">235</biblScope>
<biblScope unit="page" to="250">250</biblScope>
</imprint>
</monogr>
<idno type="istex">133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F</idno>
<idno type="DOI">10.1002/bsl.746</idno>
<idno type="ArticleID">BSL746</idno>
</biblStruct>
</sourceDesc>
</fileDesc>
<profileDesc><creation><date>2007</date>
</creation>
<langUsage><language ident="en">en</language>
</langUsage>
<abstract xml:lang="en"><p>A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self‐controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</p>
</abstract>
<textClass><keywords scheme="Journal Subject"><list><head>article category</head>
<item><term>Research Article</term>
</item>
</list>
</keywords>
</textClass>
</profileDesc>
<revisionDesc><change when="2007-03">Published</change>
</revisionDesc>
</teiHeader>
</istex:fulltextTEI>
<json:item><original>false</original>
<mimetype>text/plain</mimetype>
<extension>txt</extension>
<uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F/fulltext/txt</uri>
</json:item>
</fulltext>
<metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration>
<istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</publisherName>
<publisherLoc>Chichester, UK</publisherLoc>
</publisherInfo>
<doi registered="yes">10.1002/(ISSN)1099-0798</doi>
<issn type="print">0735-3936</issn>
<issn type="electronic">1099-0798</issn>
<idGroup><id type="product" value="BSL"></id>
</idGroup>
<titleGroup><title type="main" xml:lang="en" sort="BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW">Behavioral Sciences & the Law</title>
<title type="short">Behav. Sci. Law</title>
</titleGroup>
</publicationMeta>
<publicationMeta level="part" position="20"><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1002/bsl.v25:2</doi>
<titleGroup><title type="specialIssueTitle">Free Will</title>
</titleGroup>
<numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="25">25</numbering>
<numbering type="journalIssue">2</numbering>
</numberingGroup>
<creators><creator xml:id="sped1" creatorRole="sponsoringEditor" affiliationRef="#sp1"><personName><givenNames>Alan R.</givenNames>
<familyName>Felthous</familyName>
<degrees>M.D.</degrees>
</personName>
</creator>
</creators>
<affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="sp1" countryCode="US" type="organization"><unparsedAffiliation>Department of Psychiatry, Saint Louis University School of Medicine, 1221 South Grand Boulevard, Saint Louis, Missouri 63104‐1094, U.S.A.</unparsedAffiliation>
</affiliation>
</affiliationGroup>
<coverDate startDate="2007-03">March/April 2007</coverDate>
</publicationMeta>
<publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="7" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1002/bsl.746</doi>
<idGroup><id type="unit" value="BSL746"></id>
</idGroup>
<countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="16"></count>
</countGroup>
<titleGroup><title type="articleCategory">Research Article</title>
<title type="tocHeading1">Research Articles</title>
</titleGroup>
<copyright ownership="publisher">Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</copyright>
<eventGroup><event type="firstOnline" date="2007-03-28"></event>
<event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2007-03-28"></event>
<event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:JWSART34_TO_WML3G version:2.3.2 mode:FullText source:HeaderRef result:HeaderRef" date="2010-03-09"></event>
<event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-01-08"></event>
<event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.1.7 mode:FullText,remove_FC" date="2014-10-15"></event>
</eventGroup>
<numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst">235</numbering>
<numbering type="pageLast">250</numbering>
</numberingGroup>
<correspondenceTo>Distinguished Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Research Professor, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794‐2500, U.S.A.</correspondenceTo>
<linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:BSL.BSL746.pdf"></link>
</linkGroup>
</publicationMeta>
<contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="1"></count>
<count type="tableTotal" number="0"></count>
<count type="referenceTotal" number="18"></count>
</countGroup>
<titleGroup><title type="main" xml:lang="en">Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism</title>
<title type="short" xml:lang="en">Free will and teleological behaviorism</title>
</titleGroup>
<creators><creator xml:id="au1" creatorRole="author" corresponding="yes" affiliationRef="#corr1"><personName><givenNames>Howard</givenNames>
<familyName>Rachlin</familyName>
<degrees>Ph.D.</degrees>
</personName>
<contactDetails><email>howard.rachlin@sunysb.edu</email>
</contactDetails>
</creator>
</creators>
<affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="corr1"><unparsedAffiliation>Distinguished Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Research Professor, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794‐2500, U.S.A.</unparsedAffiliation>
</affiliation>
</affiliationGroup>
<fundingInfo><fundingAgency>National Institutes of Health</fundingAgency>
<fundingNumber>2R01MH04404916</fundingNumber>
</fundingInfo>
<abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><title type="main">Abstract</title>
<p>A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as <i>free</i>
 are the same as those seen as self‐controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</p>
</abstract>
</abstractGroup>
</contentMeta>
</header>
</component>
</istex:document>
</istex:metadataXml>
<mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism</title>
</titleInfo>
<titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>Free will and teleological behaviorism</title>
</titleInfo>
<titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism</title>
</titleInfo>
<name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Howard</namePart>
<namePart type="family">Rachlin</namePart>
<namePart type="termsOfAddress">Ph.D.</namePart>
<affiliation>Distinguished Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Research Professor, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794‐2500, U.S.A.</affiliation>
<description>Correspondence: Distinguished Professor of Psychology Emeritus, Research Professor, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY 11794‐2500, U.S.A.</description>
<role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm>
</role>
</name>
<typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
<genre type="article">article</genre>
<originInfo><publisher>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</publisher>
<place><placeTerm type="text">Chichester, UK</placeTerm>
</place>
<dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2007-03</dateIssued>
<copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2007</copyrightDate>
</originInfo>
<language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm>
<languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm>
</language>
<physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType>
<extent unit="figures">1</extent>
<extent unit="references">18</extent>
</physicalDescription>
<abstract lang="en">A teleological and behavioral view is presented of the concept of free will. Free will is not something people essentially have or do not have. Instead, the following question is asked: Why does society find it useful to label some actions free and some actions not free? It is argued that the function of such labels is to aid in assigning responsibility to people for their actions. Responsibility in turn is useful in assigning rewards and punishments. The sort of actions that are typically seen as free are the same as those seen as self‐controlled. Such actions are responsive to environmental contingencies of relatively wide temporal extent. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</abstract>
<note type="funding">National Institutes of Health - No. 2R01MH04404916; </note>
<relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Behavioral Sciences & the Law</title>
</titleInfo>
<titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>Behav. Sci. Law</title>
</titleInfo>
<name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Alan R.</namePart>
<namePart type="family">Felthous</namePart>
<namePart type="termsOfAddress">M.D.</namePart>
<affiliation>Department of Psychiatry, Saint Louis University School of Medicine, 1221 South Grand Boulevard, Saint Louis, Missouri 63104‐1094, U.S.A.</affiliation>
</name>
<subject><genre>article category</genre>
<topic>Research Article</topic>
</subject>
<identifier type="ISSN">0735-3936</identifier>
<identifier type="eISSN">1099-0798</identifier>
<identifier type="DOI">10.1002/(ISSN)1099-0798</identifier>
<identifier type="PublisherID">BSL</identifier>
<part><date>2007</date>
<detail type="title"><title>Free Will</title>
</detail>
<detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption>
<number>25</number>
</detail>
<detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption>
<number>2</number>
</detail>
<extent unit="pages"><start>235</start>
<end>250</end>
<total>16</total>
</extent>
</part>
</relatedItem>
<identifier type="istex">133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F</identifier>
<identifier type="DOI">10.1002/bsl.746</identifier>
<identifier type="ArticleID">BSL746</identifier>
<accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</accessCondition>
<recordInfo><recordOrigin>John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.</recordOrigin>
<recordContentSource>WILEY</recordContentSource>
</recordInfo>
</mods>
</metadata>
<serie></serie>
</istex>
</record>

Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)

EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Musique/explor/MozartV1/Data/Istex/Corpus

HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 002D26 | SxmlIndent | more

HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Istex/Corpus/biblio.hfd -nk 002D26 | SxmlIndent | more

Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri

{{Explor lien
   |wiki=    Wicri/Musique
   |area=    MozartV1
   |flux=    Istex
   |étape=   Corpus
   |type=    RBID
   |clé=     ISTEX:133D870A3ACC0E8EB5089AEB4F14A18BC4EF008F
   |texte=   Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism
}}

This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.20.
Data generation: Sun Apr 10 15:06:14 2016. Site generation: Tue Feb 7 15:40:35 2023

	Serveur d'exploration sur Mozart
	Attention, ce site est en cours de développement ! Attention, site généré par des moyens informatiques à partir de corpus bruts. Les informations ne sont donc pas validées.

Serveur d'exploration sur Mozart

Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism

Free will from the viewpoint of teleological behaviorism

Source :

Abstract

Links to Exploration step

Le document en format XML

Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)

Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri