State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law
Identifieur interne : 001D22 ( Istex/Checkpoint ); précédent : 001D21; suivant : 001D23State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law
Auteurs : RBID : ISTEX:EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6ACAbstract
Much of what constitutes the business of international relations is undertaken by states in response to their perceived self‐interest, and the commitments of states create duties and obligations. This paper assesses critical values that permeate substantive understanding of state duties and obligations. It explores how states traditionally gain community standing and how their choices bind them to existing community norms, even though some are often contested. Assuming a state to be a bona‐fide and recognized member of the international community, its self‐interested activities, praise‐worthy or controversial, create obligation, i.e., a moral and legal duty recognized and actionable by law. In practice, what actually constitutes obligation may not be the same in all situations, or be fulfilled similarly by the same parties, or confer the same rights. It is difficult to establish a uniform reference with which to grapple with state obligation across all situations. This difficulty, however, does not enlighten debates on state responsibilities with regard to the binding force of international law where human rights abuses and other moral/legal violations are concerned. The argument is presented that since community membership, statehood, and state capacity provide the prima‐facie basis for state obligation, attempts by rogue states to raise and frame secondary issues of sovereignty and autonomy in order to fence‐out noncompliance are invalid States, therefore, are obligated and duty bound by community norms despite subsequent defenses that are raised in an effort to expunge transgressions.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1747-1346.2001.tb00600.x
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6ACLe document en format XML
<record><TEI><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title>State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law</title><author><name sortKey="Pufong, Marc G" uniqKey="Pufong M">Marc G. Pufong</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>Valdosta State University</mods:affiliation><wicri:noCountry code="no comma">Valdosta State University</wicri:noCountry></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC</idno><date when="2001">2001</date><idno type="doi">10.1111/j.1747-1346.2001.tb00600.x</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">002727</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Curation">002727</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Checkpoint">001D22</idno></publicationStmt><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">1555-5623</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="eng">Much of what constitutes the business of international relations is undertaken by states in response to their perceived self‐interest, and the commitments of states create duties and obligations. This paper assesses critical values that permeate substantive understanding of state duties and obligations. It explores how states traditionally gain community standing and how their choices bind them to existing community norms, even though some are often contested. Assuming a state to be a bona‐fide and recognized member of the international community, its self‐interested activities, praise‐worthy or controversial, create obligation, i.e., a moral and legal duty recognized and actionable by law. In practice, what actually constitutes obligation may not be the same in all situations, or be fulfilled similarly by the same parties, or confer the same rights. It is difficult to establish a uniform reference with which to grapple with state obligation across all situations. This difficulty, however, does not enlighten debates on state responsibilities with regard to the binding force of international law where human rights abuses and other moral/legal violations are concerned. The argument is presented that since community membership, statehood, and state capacity provide the prima‐facie basis for state obligation, attempts by rogue states to raise and frame secondary issues of sovereignty and autonomy in order to fence‐out noncompliance are invalid States, therefore, are obligated and duty bound by community norms despite subsequent defenses that are raised in an effort to expunge transgressions.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>wiley</corpusName><copyrightdate>2001</copyrightdate><author><json:item><name>Marc G. Pufong</name><affiliations><json:string>Valdosta State University</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><genre><json:string>Serial article</json:string></genre><host><genre></genre><language></language><issn><json:string>1555-5623</json:string></issn><title>Politics & Policy</title><doi><json:string>10.1111/(ISSN)1747-1346</json:string></doi></host><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><abstract>Much of what constitutes the business of international relations is undertaken by states in response to their perceived self‐interest, and the commitments of states create duties and obligations. This paper assesses critical values that permeate substantive understanding of state duties and obligations. It explores how states traditionally gain community standing and how their choices bind them to existing community norms, even though some are often contested. Assuming a state to be a bona‐fide and recognized member of the international community, its self‐interested activities, praise‐worthy or controversial, create obligation, i.e., a moral and legal duty recognized and actionable by law. In practice, what actually constitutes obligation may not be the same in all situations, or be fulfilled similarly by the same parties, or confer the same rights. It is difficult to establish a uniform reference with which to grapple with state obligation across all situations. This difficulty, however, does not enlighten debates on state responsibilities with regard to the binding force of international law where human rights abuses and other moral/legal violations are concerned. The argument is presented that since community membership, statehood, and state capacity provide the prima‐facie basis for state obligation, attempts by rogue states to raise and frame secondary issues of sovereignty and autonomy in order to fence‐out noncompliance are invalid States, therefore, are obligated and duty bound by community norms despite subsequent defenses that are raised in an effort to expunge transgressions.</abstract><title>State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law</title><pubdate>2001-09</pubdate><doi><json:string>10.1111/j.1747-1346.2001.tb00600.x</json:string></doi><id>EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC</id><fulltext><json:item><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><extension>pdf</extension><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><extension>zip</extension><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><json:item><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><extension>txt</extension><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader type="text"><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="alt" xml:lang="">State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><availability><p>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</p></availability><date>2008-11-12</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="">State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law</title><author><persName><forename type="first">Marc G.</forename><surname>Pufong</surname></persName><affiliation>Valdosta State University</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Politics & Policy</title><idno type="pISSN">1555-5623</idno><idno type="eISSN">1747-1346</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1747-1346</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2001-09"></date><biblScope unit="vol">29</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="478">478</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="519">519</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1747-1346.2001.tb00600.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">POLP478</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2008-11-12</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Much of what constitutes the business of international relations is undertaken by states in response to their perceived self‐interest, and the commitments of states create duties and obligations. This paper assesses critical values that permeate substantive understanding of state duties and obligations. It explores how states traditionally gain community standing and how their choices bind them to existing community norms, even though some are often contested. Assuming a state to be a bona‐fide and recognized member of the international community, its self‐interested activities, praise‐worthy or controversial, create obligation, i.e., a moral and legal duty recognized and actionable by law. In practice, what actually constitutes obligation may not be the same in all situations, or be fulfilled similarly by the same parties, or confer the same rights. It is difficult to establish a uniform reference with which to grapple with state obligation across all situations. This difficulty, however, does not enlighten debates on state responsibilities with regard to the binding force of international law where human rights abuses and other moral/legal violations are concerned. The argument is presented that since community membership, statehood, and state capacity provide the prima‐facie basis for state obligation, attempts by rogue states to raise and frame secondary issues of sovereignty and autonomy in order to fence‐out noncompliance are invalid States, therefore, are obligated and duty bound by community norms despite subsequent defenses that are raised in an effort to expunge transgressions.</p></abstract></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2008-11-12">Created</change><change when="2001-09">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley component found"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisherName><publisherLoc>Oxford, UK</publisherLoc></publisherInfo><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1111/(ISSN)1747-1346</doi><issn type="print">1555-5623</issn><issn type="electronic">1747-1346</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="POLP"></id><id type="publisherDivision" value="ST"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" sort="POLITICS POLICY">Politics & Policy</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="09003"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/polp.2001.29.issue-3</doi><numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="29">29</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue" number="3">3</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2001-09">September 2001</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="3" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/j.1747-1346.2001.tb00600.x</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="POLP478"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="42"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1">Articles of General Interest</title></titleGroup><copyright>© 2001 Policy Studies Organization</copyright><eventGroup><event type="firstOnline" date="2008-11-12"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2008-11-12"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:BPG_TO_WML3G version:2.3.2 mode:FullText source:HeaderRef result:HeaderRef" date="2010-03-03"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-02-07"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.1.7 mode:FullText,remove_FC" date="2014-11-03"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst" number="478">478</numbering><numbering type="pageLast" number="519">519</numbering></numberingGroup><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:POLP.POLP478.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="referenceTotal" number="116"></count><count type="linksCrossRef" number="1"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law</title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" affiliationRef="#a1"><personName><givenNames>Marc G.</givenNames><familyName>Pufong</familyName></personName></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="a1"><unparsedAffiliation>Valdosta State University</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><p>Much of what constitutes the business of international relations is undertaken by states in response to their perceived self‐interest, and the commitments of states create duties and obligations. This paper assesses critical values that permeate substantive understanding of state duties and obligations. It explores how states traditionally gain community standing and how their choices bind them to existing community norms, even though some are often contested. Assuming a state to be a bona‐fide and recognized member of the international community, its self‐interested activities, praise‐worthy or controversial, create obligation, i.e., a moral and legal duty recognized and actionable by law. In practice, what actually constitutes obligation may not be the same in all situations, or be fulfilled similarly by the same parties, or confer the same rights. It is difficult to establish a uniform reference with which to grapple with state obligation across all situations. This difficulty, however, does not enlighten debates on state responsibilities with regard to the binding force of international law where human rights abuses and other moral/legal violations are concerned. The argument is presented that since community membership, statehood, and state capacity provide the prima‐facie basis for state obligation, attempts by rogue states to raise and frame secondary issues of sovereignty and autonomy in order to fence‐out noncompliance are invalid States, therefore, are obligated and duty bound by community norms despite subsequent defenses that are raised in an effort to expunge transgressions.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.5"><titleInfo><title>State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative"><title></title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Marc G.</namePart><namePart type="family">Pufong</namePart><affiliation>Valdosta State University</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre>Serial article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">2008-11-12</dateCreated><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2001-09</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2001</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract lang="eng">Much of what constitutes the business of international relations is undertaken by states in response to their perceived self‐interest, and the commitments of states create duties and obligations. This paper assesses critical values that permeate substantive understanding of state duties and obligations. It explores how states traditionally gain community standing and how their choices bind them to existing community norms, even though some are often contested. Assuming a state to be a bona‐fide and recognized member of the international community, its self‐interested activities, praise‐worthy or controversial, create obligation, i.e., a moral and legal duty recognized and actionable by law. In practice, what actually constitutes obligation may not be the same in all situations, or be fulfilled similarly by the same parties, or confer the same rights. It is difficult to establish a uniform reference with which to grapple with state obligation across all situations. This difficulty, however, does not enlighten debates on state responsibilities with regard to the binding force of international law where human rights abuses and other moral/legal violations are concerned. The argument is presented that since community membership, statehood, and state capacity provide the prima‐facie basis for state obligation, attempts by rogue states to raise and frame secondary issues of sovereignty and autonomy in order to fence‐out noncompliance are invalid States, therefore, are obligated and duty bound by community norms despite subsequent defenses that are raised in an effort to expunge transgressions.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Politics & Policy</title></titleInfo><identifier type="ISSN">1555-5623</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1747-1346</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1747-1346</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">POLP</identifier><part><date>2001</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>29</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3</number></detail></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1747-1346.2001.tb00600.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">POLP478</identifier><part><extent unit="pages"><start>478</start><end>519</end><total>42</total></extent><extent unit="references"><total>116</total></extent></part><recordInfo><recordOrigin>WILEY</recordOrigin><recordContentSource>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Linguistique/explor/CharterV3/Data/Istex/Checkpoint
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 001D22 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Istex/Checkpoint/biblio.hfd -nk 001D22 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Wicri/Linguistique
|area= CharterV3
|flux= Istex
|étape= Checkpoint
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:EBBDD42276B54CED2CA71FBD7FB12A7CB040F6AC
|texte= State Obligation, Sovereignty, and Theories of International Law
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.07. |  |