PATOČKA'S CONCEPTION OF THE SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Identifieur interne : 000043 ( Francis/Corpus ); précédent : 000042; suivant : 000044PATOČKA'S CONCEPTION OF THE SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Auteurs : RBID : Francis:13-0338887Descripteurs français
- Pascal (Inist)
English descriptors
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Abstract
Jan Patocka appears as a paradoxical figure. A champion of human rights, he often presents his philosophy in quite traditional terms. He speaks of the "soul," its "care," and of "living in truth." Yet, in his proposal for an "asubjective" phenomenology, he undermines the traditional notion of the self that has such rights. The question that thus confronts a reader of Patocka is how to reconcile the Patocka who was a spokesman of the Charter 77 movement with the proponent of asubjective phenomenology. What, in fact, is the conception of selfhood that allows him both to affirm human rights and to deny what has been traditionally conceived as the subject of such rights? This conception, I argue, is that of the self as a specific "motion of existence." By focusing on how, through motion, we actualize our humanity, he avoids both the naturalistic and the idealistic (subjective) conceptions of the self.
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| NO : | FRANCIS 13-0338887 INIST |
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| ET : | PATOČKA'S CONCEPTION OF THE SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS |
| AU : | MENSCH (James R.) |
| AF : | Saint Francis Xavier University/Etats-Unis (1 aut.) |
| DT : | Publication en série; Niveau analytique |
| SO : | Idealistic studies; ISSN 0046-8541; Etats-Unis; Da. 2011; Vol. 41; No. 1-2; Pp. 1-10 |
| LA : | Anglais |
| EA : | Jan Patocka appears as a paradoxical figure. A champion of human rights, he often presents his philosophy in quite traditional terms. He speaks of the "soul," its "care," and of "living in truth." Yet, in his proposal for an "asubjective" phenomenology, he undermines the traditional notion of the self that has such rights. The question that thus confronts a reader of Patocka is how to reconcile the Patocka who was a spokesman of the Charter 77 movement with the proponent of asubjective phenomenology. What, in fact, is the conception of selfhood that allows him both to affirm human rights and to deny what has been traditionally conceived as the subject of such rights? This conception, I argue, is that of the self as a specific "motion of existence." By focusing on how, through motion, we actualize our humanity, he avoids both the naturalistic and the idealistic (subjective) conceptions of the self. |
| CC : | 5194B; 5197; 519 |
| FD : | Patocka (J.); Philosophie politique; Droits de l'homme; Sujet; Moi |
| ED : | Patocka (J.); Political philosophy; Human Rights; Subject; Self |
| LO : | INIST-24585.354000506085620010 |
| ID : | 13-0338887 |
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Francis:13-0338887Le document en format XML
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Mensch</name><affiliation><inist:fA14 i1="01"><s1>Saint Francis Xavier University</s1><s3>USA</s3><sZ>1 aut.</sZ></inist:fA14></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="inist">13-0338887</idno><date when="2011">2011</date><idno type="stanalyst">FRANCIS 13-0338887 INIST</idno><idno type="RBID">Francis:13-0338887</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Francis/Corpus">000043</idno></publicationStmt><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0046-8541</idno><title level="j" type="abbreviated">Ideal. stud.</title><title level="j" type="main">Idealistic studies</title></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="KwdEn" xml:lang="en"><term>Human Rights</term><term>Patocka (J.)</term><term>Political philosophy</term><term>Self</term><term>Subject</term></keywords><keywords scheme="Pascal" xml:lang="fr"><term>Patocka (J.)</term><term>Philosophie politique</term><term>Droits de l'homme</term><term>Sujet</term><term>Moi</term></keywords></textClass></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Jan Patocka appears as a paradoxical figure. 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A champion of human rights, he often presents his philosophy in quite traditional terms. He speaks of the "soul," its "care," and of "living in truth." Yet, in his proposal for an "asubjective" phenomenology, he undermines the traditional notion of the self that has such rights. The question that thus confronts a reader of Patocka is how to reconcile the Patocka who was a spokesman of the Charter 77 movement with the proponent of asubjective phenomenology. What, in fact, is the conception of selfhood that allows him both to affirm human rights and to deny what has been traditionally conceived as the subject of such rights? This conception, I argue, is that of the self as a specific "motion of existence." 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