The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges
Identifieur interne : 000706 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000705; suivant : 000707The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges
Auteurs : Shawkat Alam ; Pundarik Mukhopadhya ; Md. Rizwanul IslamSource :
- The Journal of World Investment & Trade [ 1660-7112 ] ; 2013.
Abstract
In 2007, Australia and India began a joint feasibility study to assess the prospect of an Australia-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Agriculture will be a crucial negotiation point in any such FTA. Agriculture is a key sector of the Australian economy, and an important and lucrative export, with more than half of the sector’s output exported. The scope of increased domestic demand in agriculture is limited for a significant segment of the sector. Therefore, sustained growth of the industry requires new export markets to be opened. This paper will analyse the prospects of boosting agricultural exports from Australia via the proposed FTA. This paper will assess the tariff and non-tariff barriers in agriculture in India and critically assess how an FTA could reduce these barriers. The benefits of increased liberalisation of agricultural trade in India will also be discussed to demonstrate the mutually beneficial opportunities that reduced trade barriers could provide.
Url:
DOI: 10.1163/22119000-01401006
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCABLe document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title>The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges</title><author><name sortKey="Alam, Shawkat" sort="Alam, Shawkat" uniqKey="Alam S" first="Shawkat" last="Alam">Shawkat Alam</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>LLB (Hons) (Rajshahi), LLM (Dhaka), PhD (Macquarie); Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for International and Environmental Law, Macquarie University Sydney, Australia, Email: shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Mukhopadhya, Pundarik" sort="Mukhopadhya, Pundarik" uniqKey="Mukhopadhya P" first="Pundarik" last="Mukhopadhya">Pundarik Mukhopadhya</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>BEc (Hons) India, MEc India, PhD, NSW; Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, Email: pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Islam, Md Rizwanul" sort="Islam, Md Rizwanul" uniqKey="Islam M" first="Md. Rizwanul" last="Islam">Md. Rizwanul Islam</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>LLB (Hons) (Dhaka), LLM (National University of Singapore), PhD (Macquarie) Assistant Professor, School of Law, BRAC University, Bangladesh, Email: rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB</idno><date when="2013" year="2013">2013</date><idno type="doi">10.1163/22119000-01401006</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">000706</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">000706</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a">The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges</title><author><name sortKey="Alam, Shawkat" sort="Alam, Shawkat" uniqKey="Alam S" first="Shawkat" last="Alam">Shawkat Alam</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>LLB (Hons) (Rajshahi), LLM (Dhaka), PhD (Macquarie); Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for International and Environmental Law, Macquarie University Sydney, Australia, Email: shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Mukhopadhya, Pundarik" sort="Mukhopadhya, Pundarik" uniqKey="Mukhopadhya P" first="Pundarik" last="Mukhopadhya">Pundarik Mukhopadhya</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>BEc (Hons) India, MEc India, PhD, NSW; Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, Email: pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author><author><name sortKey="Islam, Md Rizwanul" sort="Islam, Md Rizwanul" uniqKey="Islam M" first="Md. Rizwanul" last="Islam">Md. Rizwanul Islam</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>LLB (Hons) (Dhaka), LLM (National University of Singapore), PhD (Macquarie) Assistant Professor, School of Law, BRAC University, Bangladesh, Email: rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</mods:affiliation></affiliation><affiliation><mods:affiliation>E-mail: rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">The Journal of World Investment & Trade</title><title level="j" type="sub">Law, Economics, Politics</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">JWIT</title><idno type="ISSN">1660-7112</idno><idno type="eISSN">2211-9000</idno><imprint><publisher>Martinus Nijhoff Publishers</publisher><pubPlace>Leiden</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2013">2013</date><biblScope unit="volume">14</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">1</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="167">167</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="197">197</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">1660-7112</idno></series><idno type="istex">C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1163/22119000-01401006</idno><idno type="href">22119000_014_01_S06_text.pdf</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">1660-7112</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract">In 2007, Australia and India began a joint feasibility study to assess the prospect of an Australia-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Agriculture will be a crucial negotiation point in any such FTA. Agriculture is a key sector of the Australian economy, and an important and lucrative export, with more than half of the sector’s output exported. The scope of increased domestic demand in agriculture is limited for a significant segment of the sector. Therefore, sustained growth of the industry requires new export markets to be opened. This paper will analyse the prospects of boosting agricultural exports from Australia via the proposed FTA. This paper will assess the tariff and non-tariff barriers in agriculture in India and critically assess how an FTA could reduce these barriers. The benefits of increased liberalisation of agricultural trade in India will also be discussed to demonstrate the mutually beneficial opportunities that reduced trade barriers could provide.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>brill-journals</corpusName><keywords><teeft><json:string>ibid</json:string><json:string>alam</json:string><json:string>world investment trade</json:string><json:string>gatt</json:string><json:string>appellate</json:string><json:string>exporter</json:string><json:string>usitc</json:string><json:string>november</json:string><json:string>trade policy review</json:string><json:string>liberalisation</json:string><json:string>agricultural products</json:string><json:string>xxiv</json:string><json:string>agricultural sector</json:string><json:string>appellate body</json:string><json:string>appellate body report</json:string><json:string>market access</json:string><json:string>december</json:string><json:string>september</json:string><json:string>dfat</json:string><json:string>scientific evidence</json:string><json:string>indian government</json:string><json:string>trade remedy measures</json:string><json:string>precautionary principle</json:string><json:string>agricultural exports</json:string><json:string>article xxiv</json:string><json:string>domestic producers</json:string><json:string>other sectors</json:string><json:string>customs union</json:string><json:string>domestic industry</json:string><json:string>world tariff profiles</json:string><json:string>world trade organization</json:string><json:string>state trading enterprises</json:string><json:string>international standards</json:string><json:string>foreign affairs</json:string><json:string>tariff</json:string><json:string>multilateral trade negotiations</json:string><json:string>agricultural goods</json:string><json:string>economic cooperation</json:string><json:string>trade liberalisation</json:string><json:string>uruguay round</json:string><json:string>gatt article</json:string><json:string>agricultural trade</json:string><json:string>scientific principles</json:string><json:string>joint feasibility study</json:string><json:string>panel report</json:string><json:string>notification</json:string><json:string>cambridge university press</json:string><json:string>australian exporters</json:string><json:string>legal texts</json:string><json:string>agricultural trade liberalisation</json:string><json:string>bilateral trade</json:string><json:string>industrial products</json:string><json:string>world bank</json:string><json:string>doha round</json:string><json:string>meat products</json:string><json:string>european commission</json:string><json:string>trade commission</json:string><json:string>domestic production</json:string><json:string>phytosanitary measures</json:string><json:string>technical barriers</json:string><json:string>gatt panel report</json:string><json:string>tariff rate</json:string><json:string>regional trade agreements</json:string><json:string>export</json:string><json:string>other products</json:string><json:string>article xxviii</json:string><json:string>grain sorghum</json:string><json:string>australian government austrade</json:string><json:string>indian farmers</json:string><json:string>agricultural trade policy reforms</json:string><json:string>successful conclusion</json:string><json:string>australian government</json:string><json:string>rural development</json:string><json:string>australian government department</json:string><json:string>total import</json:string><json:string>export markets</json:string><json:string>centage share</json:string><json:string>quantitative restrictions</json:string><json:string>indian economy</json:string><json:string>middle class</json:string><json:string>significant segment</json:string><json:string>domestic demand</json:string><json:string>indian market</json:string><json:string>article xvii</json:string><json:string>alcoholic beverages</json:string><json:string>indian imports</json:string><json:string>australian economy</json:string><json:string>australian bureau</json:string><json:string>other livestock</json:string><json:string>trade policy review body</json:string><json:string>plant life</json:string><json:string>agricultural tariff</json:string><json:string>study notes</json:string><json:string>agricultural policy</json:string><json:string>dispute settlement mechanism</json:string><json:string>treaty provisions</json:string><json:string>local farmers</json:string><json:string>states restrictions</json:string><json:string>world trade</json:string><json:string>trade policies</json:string><json:string>foreign trade policy</json:string><json:string>martinus nijhoff publishers</json:string><json:string>tariff rates</json:string><json:string>shawkat alam</json:string><json:string>trade agreement</json:string><json:string>free trade agreements</json:string><json:string>sheep meat</json:string><json:string>such measures</json:string><json:string>trade barriers</json:string><json:string>food safety</json:string><json:string>international trade</json:string><json:string>dairy products</json:string><json:string>world organization</json:string><json:string>growth hormones</json:string><json:string>adequate risk assessment</json:string><json:string>australia email</json:string><json:string>european communities measures</json:string><json:string>milk products</json:string><json:string>higher standards</json:string><json:string>export subsidies</json:string><json:string>gatt article xxiv</json:string><json:string>free trade agreement</json:string><json:string>australia india</json:string><json:string>alternative concessions</json:string><json:string>press release</json:string><json:string>rizwanul islam</json:string><json:string>customs tariff</json:string><json:string>material injury</json:string><json:string>minimum threshold</json:string><json:string>antidumping duty</json:string><json:string>other party</json:string><json:string>advance notification</json:string><json:string>agricultural costs</json:string><json:string>long term</json:string><json:string>domestic outputs</json:string><json:string>importation</json:string><json:string>australia</json:string><json:string>australian</json:string><json:string>precautionary</json:string><json:string>negotiation</json:string></teeft></keywords><author><json:item><name>Shawkat Alam</name><affiliations><json:string>LLB (Hons) (Rajshahi), LLM (Dhaka), PhD (Macquarie); Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for International and Environmental Law, Macquarie University Sydney, Australia, Email: shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</json:string><json:string>E-mail: shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Pundarik Mukhopadhya</name><affiliations><json:string>BEc (Hons) India, MEc India, PhD, NSW; Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, Email: pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</json:string><json:string>E-mail: pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Md. Rizwanul Islam</name><affiliations><json:string>LLB (Hons) (Dhaka), LLM (National University of Singapore), PhD (Macquarie) Assistant Professor, School of Law, BRAC University, Bangladesh, Email: rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</json:string><json:string>E-mail: rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><subject><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>India</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>Australia</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>free trade agreements</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>WTO</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>trade in agriculture</value></json:item></subject><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>research-article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>In 2007, Australia and India began a joint feasibility study to assess the prospect of an Australia-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Agriculture will be a crucial negotiation point in any such FTA. Agriculture is a key sector of the Australian economy, and an important and lucrative export, with more than half of the sector’s output exported. The scope of increased domestic demand in agriculture is limited for a significant segment of the sector. Therefore, sustained growth of the industry requires new export markets to be opened. This paper will analyse the prospects of boosting agricultural exports from Australia via the proposed FTA. This paper will assess the tariff and non-tariff barriers in agriculture in India and critically assess how an FTA could reduce these barriers. The benefits of increased liberalisation of agricultural trade in India will also be discussed to demonstrate the mutually beneficial opportunities that reduced trade barriers could provide.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>6.812</score><pdfVersion>1.3</pdfVersion><pdfPageSize>439.37 x 666.142 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>false</refBibsNative><keywordCount>5</keywordCount><abstractCharCount>980</abstractCharCount><pdfWordCount>11065</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>70235</pdfCharCount><pdfPageCount>31</pdfPageCount><abstractWordCount>151</abstractWordCount></qualityIndicators><title>The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges</title><genre><json:string>research-article</json:string></genre><host><volume>14</volume><pages><last>197</last><first>167</first></pages><issn><json:string>1660-7112</json:string></issn><issue>1</issue><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>2211-9000</json:string></eissn><title>The Journal of World Investment & Trade</title></host><publicationDate>2013</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2013</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1163/22119000-01401006</json:string></doi><id>C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB</id><score>0.046521787</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a">The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges</title><respStmt><resp>Références bibliographiques récupérées via GROBID</resp><name resp="ISTEX-API">ISTEX-API (INIST-CNRS)</name></respStmt><respStmt><resp>Références bibliographiques récupérées via GROBID</resp><name resp="ISTEX-API">ISTEX-API (INIST-CNRS)</name></respStmt></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Martinus Nijhoff Publishers</publisher><pubPlace>Leiden</pubPlace><availability><p>© 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands</p></availability><date>2013</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a">The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges</title><author xml:id="author-1" corresp="yes"><persName><forename type="first">Shawkat</forename><surname>Alam</surname></persName><email>shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</email><affiliation>LLB (Hons) (Rajshahi), LLM (Dhaka), PhD (Macquarie); Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for International and Environmental Law, Macquarie University Sydney, Australia, Email: shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-2"><persName><forename type="first">Pundarik</forename><surname>Mukhopadhya</surname></persName><email>pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</email><affiliation>BEc (Hons) India, MEc India, PhD, NSW; Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, Email: pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-3"><persName><forename type="first">Md. Rizwanul</forename><surname>Islam</surname></persName><email>rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</email><affiliation>LLB (Hons) (Dhaka), LLM (National University of Singapore), PhD (Macquarie) Assistant Professor, School of Law, BRAC University, Bangladesh, Email: rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">The Journal of World Investment & Trade</title><title level="j" type="sub">Law, Economics, Politics</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">JWIT</title><idno type="pISSN">1660-7112</idno><idno type="eISSN">2211-9000</idno><imprint><publisher>Martinus Nijhoff Publishers</publisher><pubPlace>Leiden</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2013"></date><biblScope unit="volume">14</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">1</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="167">167</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="197">197</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1163/22119000-01401006</idno><idno type="href">22119000_014_01_S06_text.pdf</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2013</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract><p>In 2007, Australia and India began a joint feasibility study to assess the prospect of an Australia-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Agriculture will be a crucial negotiation point in any such FTA. Agriculture is a key sector of the Australian economy, and an important and lucrative export, with more than half of the sector’s output exported. The scope of increased domestic demand in agriculture is limited for a significant segment of the sector. Therefore, sustained growth of the industry requires new export markets to be opened. This paper will analyse the prospects of boosting agricultural exports from Australia via the proposed FTA. This paper will assess the tariff and non-tariff barriers in agriculture in India and critically assess how an FTA could reduce these barriers. The benefits of increased liberalisation of agricultural trade in India will also be discussed to demonstrate the mutually beneficial opportunities that reduced trade barriers could provide.</p></abstract><textClass><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>India</term></item><item><term>Australia</term></item><item><term>free trade agreements</term></item><item><term>WTO</term></item><item><term>trade in agriculture</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2013">Created</change><change when="2013">Published</change><change xml:id="refBibs-istex" who="#ISTEX-API" when="2016-10-10">References added</change><change xml:id="refBibs-istex" who="#ISTEX-API" when="2017-01-17">References added</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="corpus brill-journals not found" wicri:toSee="no header"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//NLM//DTD Journal Publishing DTD v2.3 20070202//EN" URI="http://dtd.nlm.nih.gov/publishing/2.3/journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article article-type="research-article"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="e-issn">22119000</journal-id><journal-title>The Journal of World Investment & Trade</journal-title><journal-subtitle>Law, Economics, Politics</journal-subtitle><abbrev-journal-title>JWIT</abbrev-journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">1660-7112</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2211-9000</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Martinus Nijhoff Publishers</publisher-name><publisher-loc>Leiden</publisher-loc></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1163/22119000-01401006</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name><surname>Alam</surname><given-names>Shawkat</given-names></name><xref rid="aff1" ref-type="aff"><sup>a,*</sup></xref></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Mukhopadhya</surname><given-names>Pundarik</given-names></name><xref rid="aff2" ref-type="aff"><sup>b**</sup></xref></contrib><contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Islam</surname><given-names>Md. Rizwanul</given-names></name><xref rid="aff3" ref-type="aff"><sup>c***</sup></xref></contrib><aff id="aff1"><label>a)*</label>LLB (Hons) (Rajshahi), LLM (Dhaka), PhD (Macquarie); Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for International and Environmental Law, <institution>Macquarie University</institution> Sydney, <country>Australia</country>, Email: <email>shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</email></aff><aff id="aff2"><label>b)</label>BEc (Hons) India, MEc India, PhD, NSW; Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics <institution>Macquarie University</institution>, Sydney, <country>Australia</country>, Email: <email>pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</email></aff><aff id="aff3"><label>c)</label>LLB (Hons) (Dhaka), <institution>LLM (National University of Singapore)</institution>, PhD (Macquarie) Assistant Professor, School of Law, <institution>BRAC University</institution>, <country>Bangladesh</country>, Email: <email>rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</email></aff></contrib-group><pub-date pub-type="epub"><year>2013</year></pub-date><volume>14</volume><issue>1</issue><fpage>167</fpage><lpage>197</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>© 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2013</copyright-year><copyright-holder>Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.</copyright-holder></permissions><self-uri content-type="pdf" xlink:href="22119000_014_01_S06_text.pdf"></self-uri><abstract><p>In 2007, Australia and India began a joint feasibility study to assess the prospect of an Australia-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Agriculture will be a crucial negotiation point in any such FTA. Agriculture is a key sector of the Australian economy, and an important and lucrative export, with more than half of the sector’s output exported. The scope of increased domestic demand in agriculture is limited for a significant segment of the sector. Therefore, sustained growth of the industry requires new export markets to be opened. This paper will analyse the prospects of boosting agricultural exports from Australia via the proposed FTA. This paper will assess the tariff and non-tariff barriers in agriculture in India and critically assess how an FTA could reduce these barriers. The benefits of increased liberalisation of agricultural trade in India will also be discussed to demonstrate the mutually beneficial opportunities that reduced trade barriers could provide.</p></abstract><kwd-group><kwd>India</kwd><kwd>Australia</kwd><kwd>free trade agreements</kwd><kwd>WTO</kwd><kwd>trade in agriculture</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><body><sec sec-type="head1" id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_001"><label>1.</label><title>Introduction</title><p>Australia is a highly efficient exporter of agricultural products. Australia belongs to only a handful of developed countries that are endowed with a very efficient agricultural industry which does not depend much on parasitic governmental support. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) finds that Australian agricultural producers are ranked among the lowest in terms of dependence on government support which is a testament to the natural competitiveness of the industry.<xref rid="fn1" ref-type="fn"><sup>1</sup></xref> Australia’s agricultural tariffs on imports are also among the lowest in the world. Its average bound agricultural tariff is as low as 3.4 per cent and its average applied agricultural tariff rate is only 1.3 per cent.<xref rid="fn2" ref-type="fn"><sup>2</sup></xref> Because of Australia’s significant land areas, with relatively low population, and an efficient industry, its agricultural sector is naturally export oriented.<xref rid="fn3" ref-type="fn"><sup>3</sup></xref> More than half of the sector’s total output is exported.<xref rid="fn4" ref-type="fn"><sup>4</sup></xref> Unlike some other sectors, the scope of increased domestic demand in agriculture is limited for a significant segment of the sector. This is applicable to foods, as the consumption is already very high by world standards.<xref rid="fn5" ref-type="fn"><sup>5</sup></xref> Even a growing domestic population in the near future is not likely to create enough demand to consume the high supply. Thus, for a sustained growth of the industry, it is imperative for the opening up of new export markets.</p><p>As in August 2007, the governments of India and Australia launched a joint feasibility study to assess the prospect of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between them,<xref rid="fn6" ref-type="fn"><sup>6</sup></xref> and on 12 May 2011 the two launched formal negotiations.<xref rid="fn7" ref-type="fn"><sup>7</sup></xref> This may be the ideal time for taking up agriculture, a key sector of the Australian economy and analyse its prospect for boosting exports under the FTA. The EU and India have been in negotiations for an FTA, which includes agricultural trade, since 2007 and the parties have made an early notification to the WTO pursuant to the WTO Transparency Mechanism of 2006 signifying their intention to conclude an FTA.<xref rid="fn8" ref-type="fn"><sup>8</sup></xref> However, there has been much resistance from the agricultural sector within India regarding liberalisation of the sector.<xref rid="fn9" ref-type="fn"><sup>9</sup></xref> Critics have argued that it would favour the EU more than India. Indeed,
<disp-quote><p>[a]nalysts and activists fear that a Free Trade Agreements between India and EU-27 will lead to lowering down of tariffs up to an unacceptable level. It will lead to dumping of products in which EU specializes and threaten livelihoods and development in India.<xref rid="fn10" ref-type="fn"><sup>10</sup></xref></p></disp-quote>
Australia is arguably better placed than the EU to negotiate a fairer, and reciprocal FTA with India with respect to agricultural trade. Much of the discontent from Indian lobby groups stems from the fact that the EU will retain their high agricultural subsidies for local farmers, thus making it impossible for Indian farmers to compete on a level playing field. Conversely, an FTA with Australia would be more likely to ensure reciprocity of benefits between the two states, as the Australian government does not provide the same level of financial support to its local farmers, relative to the EU. Moreover, the Australia-India agricultural sector boasts a stronger comparative advantage, relative to the EU. At the outset, it may be mentioned that the two other economies namely Singapore and South Korea with whom India have concluded FTAs both have insignificant agricultural sectors, which may imply that an Australia India FTA may be difficult to be inked.<xref rid="fn11" ref-type="fn"><sup>11</sup></xref> However, that would indeed strengthen, rather than weaken the case for a study on the agricultural sector in such an FTA as there may be significant opportunity for welfare enhancing trade creation.</p><p>This paper will assess the tariff and non-tariff barriers in agriculture in India and critically assess how an FTA could reduce these barriers. Although this paper would assess the benefits of agricultural trade liberalisation in India, this is a study of the scope of augmenting Australia’s agricultural market access in India through an FTA. Therefore, any market entry barriers that Indian agricultural producers or other sectors might face in Australia are beyond its scope.</p></sec><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_002" sec-type="head1"><label>2.</label><title>Australia’s Current and Potential Agricultural Commodities Exports to India</title><p>India is one of Australia’s fastest growing trading partners and according to recent data, it ranks as the eighth largest trading partner of Australia.<xref rid="fn12" ref-type="fn"><sup>12</sup></xref> Over the last few years, Australia’s trade with India has expanded faster than with any of its other major trading partners.<xref rid="fn13" ref-type="fn"><sup>13</sup></xref> In the 2008-09 financial years, India was Australia’s fourth largest export market.<xref rid="fn14" ref-type="fn"><sup>14</sup></xref> However, currently Australia’s main exports to India are non-agricultural products, mineral and other commodities such as gold, coal, copper ores and crude petroleum, silver and non-ferrous metal scrap etc (<xref rid="tab1" ref-type="table">Table 1</xref> in <xref rid="tab1" ref-type="table">Appendix 1</xref>).<xref rid="fn15" ref-type="fn"><sup>15</sup></xref><table-wrap-group><table-wrap position="float" id="tab1"><graphic xlink:href="22119000_014_01_S06_i0003.jpg"></graphic></table-wrap></table-wrap-group></p><p>Currently, India is not one of the major destinations for Australia’s agricultural products.<xref rid="fn16" ref-type="fn"><sup>16</sup></xref><xref rid="fig1" ref-type="fig">Figure 1</xref> (in <xref rid="tab1" ref-type="table">Appendix 1</xref>) presents Australia’s major ten agricultural goods’ export to India. The figures clearly indicate a significantly low value for each goods. The main agricultural exports from Australia to India include wool, chickpeas, dried fruits, peas, pulses, apples etc.<xref rid="fn17" ref-type="fn"><sup>17</sup></xref> The range of exported agricultural products is rather narrow and there appears to be significant scope for diversifying exports. It can be further understood from <xref rid="tab2" ref-type="table">Table 2</xref> (in <xref rid="tab1" ref-type="table">Appendix 1</xref>) that Australia’s potential to export agricultural goods is much higher and diversified.
<fig position="float" id="fig1"><label>Figure 1.</label><caption><p>Australia’s Top 10 Agriculture Export to India: 2008-09: (US $m)</p></caption><graphic xlink:href="22119000_014_01_S06_i0001.jpg"></graphic><attrib>Source: Australia-India Joint Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Study, Australia Governmnet, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Governmnet of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, department of Commerce, 2009.</attrib></fig><table-wrap-group><table-wrap position="float" id="tab2"><graphic xlink:href="22119000_014_01_S06_i0004.jpg"></graphic></table-wrap></table-wrap-group></p><p>Australia’s competitive agricultural sector faces quite high tariff barriers in India and this may partially account for the relatively low export volume of agricultural goods. Due to its relatively low per capita income and land ownership, for some capital and land intensive agricultural products like sugar and edible oil, it is not likely that India has a natural competitive advantage.<xref rid="fn18" ref-type="fn"><sup>18</sup></xref> Despite substantial domestic production, already India is a net importer of sugar and is likely to remain so in near future.<xref rid="fn19" ref-type="fn"><sup>19</sup></xref> There is very high tariff rate on imported edible oil; nonetheless, demand is so large that it consistently ranks as the main imported agricultural product.<xref rid="fn20" ref-type="fn"><sup>20</sup></xref> In a more liberal market, exports from Australia can increase in these products.</p><p><xref rid="tab3" ref-type="table">Table 3</xref> (in <xref rid="tab1" ref-type="table">Appendix 1</xref>) depicts the picture of India’s demand of various agriculture and related commodities in the form of exports from all the countries of the world and the share of Australia on these commodities. Some of the high demand items are cotton, silk and wooden articles – for these items Australia’s share is less than 1 per cent. Maximum share of Australia is observed for cereals.<table-wrap-group><table-wrap position="float" id="tab3"><graphic xlink:href="22119000_014_01_S06_i0005.jpg"></graphic></table-wrap></table-wrap-group></p><p>As the purchasing power of India’s middle class grows, it is possible that their food consumption would grow and this may further augment the scope of Australian agricultural exports to India. There is already an indication of a shift in consumer demand, which is rising for milk and meat over traditional cereal foods (see <xref rid="fig2" ref-type="fig">Figure 2</xref> in <xref rid="tab1" ref-type="table">Appendix 1</xref>).<xref rid="fn21" ref-type="fn"><sup>21</sup></xref> A fast growing population and economy concomitant with a rapidly expanding middle class would probably further increase demand for high value food products like cheese, meat and high value fresh vegetables.<xref rid="fn22" ref-type="fn"><sup>22</sup></xref> It is doubtful as to what extent the domestic agricultural sector of India is capable of meeting this increased demand and at least in the short term imports are likely to rise. This could particularly benefit Australia’s cattle industry. There is also a very fast growing market for alcoholic beverages but imports of alcoholic beverages are restrained by prohibitive tariffs, which generally are 150 per cent or higher and also confront quite high provincial taxes and regulations.<xref rid="fn23" ref-type="fn"><sup>23</sup></xref><fig position="float" id="fig2"><label>Figure 2.</label><caption><p>Change in Indian Imports (selected goods): million US$: 1999-2000 and 2009-10.</p></caption><graphic xlink:href="22119000_014_01_S06_i0002.jpg"></graphic><attrib>Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.</attrib></fig></p><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_003" sec-type="head2"><label>2.1</label><title>Findings of the Joint Feasibility Study on Trade in Agriculture</title><p>The joint feasibility study conducted by the officials of the two governments has noted that the two way trade between the economies consisted of a value of around US$456 million in 2008–09.<xref rid="fn24" ref-type="fn"><sup>24</sup></xref> The Study notes that exports of both countries to each other’s market have expanded in the last few years.<xref rid="fn25" ref-type="fn"><sup>25</sup></xref> However, export of agricultural goods from Australia to India only consists of 1 per cent of Australia’s global agricultural export, which is well below the collective share of Australia’s merchandise goods export to India (6.7 per cent).<xref rid="fn26" ref-type="fn"><sup>26</sup></xref> It notes that although agricultural sector contributes only 2.9 per cent of the Australian GDP, it consists of 14 per cent of the total value of its global export of goods, which are indicia of the efficiency and export-oriented nature of the agricultural sector of Australia.<xref rid="fn27" ref-type="fn"><sup>27</sup></xref> The study notes significant scope for expanding agricultural exports from Australia in products like high value dairy products, inputs for India’s food processing industry and scope of trading in seasonal fruits on a counter-seasonal basis in both directions.<xref rid="fn28" ref-type="fn"><sup>28</sup></xref></p></sec></sec><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_004" sec-type="head1"><label>3.</label><title>Barriers to Market Access for Australian Agricultural Exporters</title><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_005" sec-type="head2"><label>3.1</label><title>High and Unpredictable MFN Tariffs</title><p>Despite its economic policy reform and trade liberalisation, on the whole, the Indian agricultural sector is more protected than most other developing countries. India’s average agricultural applied tariff rate is significantly higher (32.2 per cent) than comparable developing countries like Brazil and China whose applied tariff rates are respectively 10.3 per cent and 15.6 per cent.<xref rid="fn29" ref-type="fn"><sup>29</sup></xref> There is significant water between the applied rate and bound rate with the prospect that the applied rate can be raised to a significant degree without violating the legal obligations under the WTO rules.<xref rid="fn30" ref-type="fn"><sup>30</sup></xref> Indeed, while India has engaged in widespread industrial tariff reduction in recent years, reducing the average tariff by as much as two-thirds, the agricultural sector has been deliberately excluded from such reductions.<xref rid="fn31" ref-type="fn"><sup>31</sup></xref> This is a result of the lobbying power of farmers and other interest groups supported by the Ministry of Agriculture.<xref rid="fn32" ref-type="fn"><sup>32</sup></xref> As about two-thirds of the total population depends on the agricultural sector,<xref rid="fn33" ref-type="fn"><sup>33</sup></xref> it is probable that they are politically a formidable group because of their voting power.</p><p>The prospect of increases of applied tariffs is not merely a possibility but has happened to a number of agricultural products in recent years.<xref rid="fn34" ref-type="fn"><sup>34</sup></xref> India even took the unusual step of raising bound tariffs of some agricultural products, as allowed under GATT Article XXVIII (subject to certain conditions).<xref rid="fn35" ref-type="fn"><sup>35</sup></xref> GATT Article XXVIII allows the scope of raising bound tariffs subject to the requirement that other interested contracting parties are consulted and offered alternative concessions in some other products as countermeasures. For a number of agricultural products, India launched re-negotiations with the US, EC and Australian authorities under Article XXVIII of GATT and had increased the bound rate by substantial margin.<xref rid="fn36" ref-type="fn"><sup>36</sup></xref> Negotiations with the EC were concluded in September 1999, while negotiations with Australia and USA were concluded in November-December 1999.<xref rid="fn37" ref-type="fn"><sup>37</sup></xref></p><p>India raised tariffs for rice in the husk from zero to 80 per cent, husked brown rice from zero to 80 per cent, semi-milled or wholly milled rice from zero to 70 per cent, broken rice from zero to 80 per cent, maize from zero to 50 per cent, grain sorghum zero to 50 per cent, millet from zero to 50 per cent, wheat from zero to 50 per cent, fresh grapes from 25 to 35 per cent, apples from 35 to 50 per cent, infant formula preparation from 15 to 35 per cent.<xref rid="fn38" ref-type="fn"><sup>38</sup></xref> While raising bound tariffs entails the offering of concessions in other products, the producers who are affected are not necessarily compensated, as they may not have any trading interest in the products in which the alternative concessions are offered.</p><p>From the viewpoint of exporters, any increase in bound or applied tariff is inimical as it not only reduces the actual market access opportunity but also makes the business environment much less predictable. Furthermore, the average applied tariff in India is somewhat deceptive of the actual level of protection afforded to domestic producers. The reason is that tariffs in agricultural products are decidedly dispersed and around 15 per cent of the tariffs are in the range of 50–100 per cent.<xref rid="fn39" ref-type="fn"><sup>39</sup></xref> The high tariff is likely to be concentrated in those products for which there is fear of competition to the domestic industry from imports in a more liberalised environment. India’s average applied MFN tariff rate in agricultural products, at around 31.8 per cent,<xref rid="fn40" ref-type="fn"><sup>40</sup></xref> is even very high by the standard of most other developing countries.<xref rid="fn41" ref-type="fn"><sup>41</sup></xref></p><p>Globally, Australia’s major agricultural exports are bovine meat, wheat, wine wool, milk and cream, lamb and mutton, lamb and mutton, live animal, animal feed, barley, cheese and curd, cereal preparations, vegetables, fruit and nuts, sugar, cotton, oilseeds, butter etc (See <xref rid="tab1" ref-type="table">Table 1</xref> in <xref rid="tab1" ref-type="table">Appendix 1</xref>).<xref rid="fn42" ref-type="fn"><sup>42</sup></xref> Both bound and applied tariff rates in India, for many of these major products of interest to Australian exporters are quite high (<xref rid="tab4" ref-type="table">Table 1</xref> in <xref rid="tab4" ref-type="table">Appendix 2</xref>). As the applied MFN tariff rate in agriculture in India is quite high, even any marginal reductions in preferential tariff would create an advantageous preferential margin under the FTA. Therefore, benefits to Australian agricultural exporters should be meaningful.
<table-wrap-group><table-wrap position="float" id="tab4"><graphic xlink:href="22119000_014_01_S06_i0006.jpg"></graphic></table-wrap></table-wrap-group></p><p>Article 4.2 of the Agreement in Agriculture allows the imposition of tariff-rate quota and India uses this barrier to restrict imports.<xref rid="fn43" ref-type="fn"><sup>43</sup></xref> India maintains tariff rate quotas for certain agricultural products, namely milk powder; maize; crude sunflower seed and safflower oil; and refined rape, colza and mustard oil.<xref rid="fn44" ref-type="fn"><sup>44</sup></xref> For these products, any imports above the quota limit are subject to much higher tariff than the imports within the limit of quota. This dual tariff rate is a constraint on producers who have the capability for substantial supply.</p><p>Australia and India’s geographical location in two different hemispheres present some opportunities for improving market access to some seasonal agricultural products from Australia, with minor adjustments to India’s tariff system. It may even be feasible that without directly competing with India’s domestic industry; Australian agricultural exports may be substantially increased. This may be done by imposing a variable preferential import tariff, that is, higher tariffs during season and lower preferential tariff during out of season. This style of imposing variable rate of tariffs for seasonal products is levied by EC countries and the US on certain fruit products like bananas and grapes, some vegetables and cut flowers.<xref rid="fn45" ref-type="fn"><sup>45</sup></xref></p></sec><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_006" sec-type="head2"><label>3.2</label><title>Non-Tariff Barriers</title><p>While barriers to trade in the form of tariffs are progressively declining globally, non-tariff barriers and trade remedy measures are creeping in as devices of protectionism. Because of their random and opaque nature, non-tariff barriers are more damaging to the exporters. An FTA could promote Australia’s agricultural exports to India if it can reduce non-tariff barriers prevailing in bilateral trade with India.</p><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_007" sec-type="head3"><label>3.2.1</label><title>Quantitative Restrictions and Other Trade Restrictive Measures</title><p>India traditionally used a number of quantitative restrictions on importation of a large number of agricultural as well as textile and industrial products. In the mid-1990s it has been estimated that around two-thirds of India’s tradable GDP was protected by explicit non-tariff barriers, including about 36 per cent of manufacturing and 84 per cent of agriculture.<xref rid="fn46" ref-type="fn"><sup>46</sup></xref> However, it had to retreat from a very significant number of them on account of the WTO dispute settlement ruling in <italic>India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products</italic>.<xref rid="fn47" ref-type="fn"><sup>47</sup></xref> India argued that these restrictions were maintained for balance of payment reasons. The US challenged the Indian restrictions on the ground that they violate GATT Articles XI: 1 and XVIII: 11 and Agriculture Agreement Article 4.2. The Panel upheld the US claims and the Appellate Body too sustained the findings that were appealed. However, although NTBs were eliminated by India, the protection offered by them were not wiped out as hike in applied tariffs followed.<xref rid="fn48" ref-type="fn"><sup>48</sup></xref> So, the only gain of exporters’ to the Indian market from the ruling is better transparency and predictability in market access but not increased market access.</p><p>There are a number of flexibilities in the GATT and the WTO Agreement on Agriculture with regard to trade in agriculture. India uses them to continue to maintain trade restrictive measures. Article XVII of the GATT allows state trading enterprises (STEs) and basically requires nothing more than that such enterprises function in a manner that is consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment and supply information to other WTO members on request. Hence, a STE by being a sole importer of goods can effectively undermine market access commitments in the WTO.<xref rid="fn49" ref-type="fn"><sup>49</sup></xref> In India, a substantial amount of agricultural products are traded within the monopolistic control of STEs. It is estimated that the agricultural products controlled by state trading enterprises are equivalent to approximately 40.5 per cent of the agricultural GDP in India.<xref rid="fn50" ref-type="fn"><sup>50</sup></xref></p><p>Indian STEs are engaged in importing wheat, rye, oats, maize, rice, grain sorghum, millet, canary seed, copra, crude oil etc.<xref rid="fn51" ref-type="fn"><sup>51</sup></xref> It is probable that state managed monopolies distort the market.<xref rid="fn52" ref-type="fn"><sup>52</sup></xref> The problem with STEs is further complicated by the lack of furnishing the WTO Secretariat with periodic information, which is an obligation of the WTO members. Its latest notification was submitted in May 2010 which was long overdue.<xref rid="fn53" ref-type="fn"><sup>53</sup></xref> As opposed to independent commercial actors, who operate in pursuit of profit maximisation, the motivations of state controlled enterprises are more varied and may include pursuing government policies and favouring local production.<xref rid="fn54" ref-type="fn"><sup>54</sup></xref> Arguably, STEs are in effect NTBs for imports, as they do not run on the impulse of the market, rather on the pursuit of strategic objectives to artificially managed market. They can lower imports when domestic outputs are high and increase import when domestic outputs are lean and this would reduce business certainty of exporters who supply to the Indian market.</p><p>Some products can only be imported subject to a licence from the government authorities. For instance, import of livestock to India is subject to licensing<xref rid="fn55" ref-type="fn"><sup>55</sup></xref> and if the FTA can eliminate this requirement for imported livestock from Australia that would give Australian exporters a distinct edge over their competitors. Certain food items are subject to blanket ban on importation. Importation of beef in any form or any products that may contain beef is totally banned.<xref rid="fn56" ref-type="fn"><sup>56</sup></xref> More generally, there are also significant bans on other livestock and livestock products, including live pigs, birds, both wild and domesticated, meat products, fat products and tallow among other livestock based products.<xref rid="fn57" ref-type="fn"><sup>57</sup></xref> A recent report by the WTO Secretariat on India’s Trade Policy notes that as of 2007, import restrictions covered 7.7% of agricultural tariff lines.<xref rid="fn58" ref-type="fn"><sup>58</sup></xref></p></sec><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_008" sec-type="head3"><label>3.2.2</label><title>Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Restrictions</title><p>The WTO does recognise the rights of states to protect the health of human, animal and plant life via regulations and standards imposed on imports under the general exceptions provided in GATT Article XX. The Appellate Body in <italic>US - Gasoline</italic> has implied that it would adopt a sort of balancing act between trade liberalisation and other non-trade concerns when assessing the validity of invoking an Article XX exception.<xref rid="fn59" ref-type="fn"><sup>59</sup></xref> Nonetheless, in practice, the exemptions provided for in Article XX have been construed rather narrowly by the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and this may be quite natural, as a general rule, exceptions to treaty provisions are interpreted narrowly so as to ensure that exceptions do not render the treaty provisions meaningless. For trade measures related to health and environmental concerns to be exempt pursuant to Article XX, they must be proven to be:
<list list-type="order"><list-item><label>1.</label><p>Necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health (Article XX:b); or</p></list-item><list-item><label>2.</label><p>Related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption (Article XX:g).</p></list-item></list>
According to Charnovitz, GATT Article XX:(b) originally related to ‘only sanitary restrictions’, though this expanded to environmental considerations over time.<xref rid="fn60" ref-type="fn"><sup>60</sup></xref> Similarly, GATT Article XX:(g) has expanded beyond mere concentration of ‘“raw material” or “mineral”’.<xref rid="fn61" ref-type="fn"><sup>61</sup></xref> For example, the <italic>Shrimp-Turtle</italic> case reinforced that fauna, such as turtles, are included within Article XX:(g).<xref rid="fn62" ref-type="fn"><sup>62</sup></xref></p><p>Emphasis is placed on the ‘necessary’ element of Article XX:(b), that is, a state must be able to prove that it has exhausted all less trade restrictive alternatives and that the measure in place is the least trade restrictive measure that could be taken.<xref rid="fn63" ref-type="fn"><sup>63</sup></xref> However, the Appellate Body in <italic>Korea - Beef</italic> stated that to be considered as necessary a measure need not be <italic>indispensable</italic> and the determination of necessity would entail a <italic>weighing and balancing</italic> approach, which would involve assessing factors, such as what role may the measure play to the enforcement of the law or regulation at issue, the significance of the interests or values to be protected by that law or regulation, and the effect the law or regulation may have on imports or exports.<xref rid="fn64" ref-type="fn"><sup>64</sup></xref></p><p>In relation to Article XX:(g), a state needs to show whether or not a measure comes within the definition of Article XX:(g), including whether it is ‘primarily aimed at’ its key purpose.<xref rid="fn65" ref-type="fn"><sup>65</sup></xref> For both Articles XX:(b) and XX:(g), a state also needs to be able to demonstrate that the measures is not applied to discriminate arbitrarily between countries, and also that they are not a disguised protectionist measure against international trade.<xref rid="fn66" ref-type="fn"><sup>66</sup></xref> Finally, there is also a proportionality test that is the measure must constitute a reasonable and proportional response in line with the policies of the state.<xref rid="fn67" ref-type="fn"><sup>67</sup></xref> In examining a state measure’s compliance with Article XX, a WTO dispute settlement body would adopt a two-layered test, that is, whether the measure at issue may fall under any of the grounds listed in the Article as well as its compliance with the chapeau of Article XX (that is to say that both the measure and its actual application would be the subject of scrutiny).<xref rid="fn68" ref-type="fn"><sup>68</sup></xref></p><p>There are also two related WTO Agreements in this respect, the <italic>Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement</italic> and the <italic>Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement</italic>.<xref rid="fn69" ref-type="fn"><sup>69</sup></xref> Both agreements allow states to determine and set their own standards, but the SPS Agreement requires those standards to be based on scientific evidence, while the TBT Agreement is designed to try and ensure that the standards and regulations do not form an unnecessary obstacle to trade.<xref rid="fn70" ref-type="fn"><sup>70</sup></xref></p><p>As with Article XX, standards imposed in accordance with the SPS or TBT Agreements must be provable as necessary measures pursuing legitimate objectives of health and safety. In regards to SPS measures, Article 2.3 requires that the risk to humans, animals or plants must be based on ‘scientific principles, and not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence’. Where there is a lack of scientific evidence, states are permitted under Article 5.7 to adopt the precautionary restrictions, in acknowledgement of the uncertainties and lack of consensus that can arise within the scientific community. However, such measures can only be provisional, and the state must seek further scientific data within a reasonable period of time.</p><p>India has numerous pieces of domestic legislation under which SPS measures restricting imports can be made by the Indian Government or its various agencies, including:
<list list-type="bullet"><list-item><label>•</label><p><italic>Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954</italic>, which is described as ‘the main law on food safety and quality’.<xref rid="fn71" ref-type="fn"><sup>71</sup></xref> The <italic>Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules</italic> were amended in March 2009 to include updated labeling requirements for imported food products;<xref rid="fn72" ref-type="fn"><sup>72</sup></xref></p></list-item><list-item><label>•</label><p><italic>Livestock Importation Act, 1898</italic> and <italic>Meat Food Products Order 1973</italic> respectively regulate livestock and meat product imports;<xref rid="fn73" ref-type="fn"><sup>73</sup></xref></p></list-item><list-item><label>•</label><p><italic>Destructive Insects and Pests Act, 1914</italic> and the <italic>Plant Quarantine (Regulation of Import into India) Order, 2003</italic> issued under that Act;<xref rid="fn74" ref-type="fn"><sup>74</sup></xref> and</p></list-item><list-item><label>•</label><p><italic>Customs Act, 1962</italic>. Under that Act, the Indian Government may order a prohibition on the importation of any agricultural goods for a variety of reasons,<xref rid="fn75" ref-type="fn"><sup>75</sup></xref> including the imposition of health standards.<xref rid="fn76" ref-type="fn"><sup>76</sup></xref></p></list-item></list></p><p>In relation to India’s use of SPS restrictions as a potent NTB, the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) argues that the use of such regulations have been used as a tool to manage the flow of agricultural imports into India since the elimination of the general import licensing system in 2001. It noted three major factors that promote substantive and implementation shortcomings in Indian SPS measures:
<list list-type="order"><list-item><label>(1)</label><p>the non-transparent process for issuing SPS standards;</p></list-item><list-item><label>(2)</label><p>a lack of expertise on the part of the Indian government bureaucracy issuing the standards, which can produce unintended consequences such as overly broad restrictions or unclear benchmarks; and</p></list-item><list-item><label>(3)</label><p>unequal enforcement of Indian SPS standards on domestic and foreign sources.<xref rid="fn77" ref-type="fn"><sup>77</sup></xref></p></list-item></list></p><p>Seven concerns were raised against India’s SPS standards within the WTO’s SPS committee hearings between 1995 and 2006.<xref rid="fn78" ref-type="fn"><sup>78</sup></xref> Furthermore, India was subject to a Trade Policy Review in 2007 and this review featured questions and concerns relating to India’s SPS policies from Australia, the US, Canada, Japan the EU and New Zealand among other countries.<xref rid="fn79" ref-type="fn"><sup>79</sup></xref> The concerns primarily related to India’s compliance with international standards, and questions over whether the standards imposed by India were based on reliable scientific principles and analysis (lack of notification was another concern raised in the Review).<xref rid="fn80" ref-type="fn"><sup>80</sup></xref></p><p>The USITC notes that the Indian import standards regarding organic contaminants often exceed the widely accepted international norms on the issue without providing sufficient scientific justification or alternatively exceed standards the Indian government imposes for corresponding domestic products.<xref rid="fn81" ref-type="fn"><sup>81</sup></xref> As noted above, SPS measures are only permissible under the SPS Agreement if they have undertaken adequate risk and scientific assessment. Also SPS measures must be consistent with the GATT’s non-discrimination principles of most-favoured nation (Article I), and national treatment (Article III), and cannot be disguised restrictions on international trade.</p><p>The issues raised by Member states to the WTO’s SPS Committee related primarily to concerns regarding India’s policy on restrictions concerning the importation on various forms of agricultural product, including poultry and swine; dairy products, and barley, corn (maize) and wheat.<xref rid="fn82" ref-type="fn"><sup>82</sup></xref> Importantly, all these items are among the major agricultural export commodities of Australia.</p><p>The USITC contends that India’s continued ban on US poultry and swine products because of the presence of low-pathogenic avian influenza in the United States is contrary to internationally accepted health standards set by the World Organization for Animal Health and therefore, unjustified.<xref rid="fn83" ref-type="fn"><sup>83</sup></xref> Furthermore, it notes that there have been several requests made in the international community for India to provide scientific justification for its avian influenza ban but to date no explanation acceptable to the US, Canada, and European Commission has been provided.<xref rid="fn84" ref-type="fn"><sup>84</sup></xref></p><p>This scenario is not dissimilar to the <italic>Beef Hormone</italic> dispute<xref rid="fn85" ref-type="fn"><sup>85</sup></xref> that was raised within the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The EU imposed an import ban on American beef that had been treated with growth hormones. The measure was sought to be justified by public health policy and food safety concerns related to the use of such hormones. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body found that the ban had not been based on adequate risk assessment, and was not sufficiently backed by scientific evidence. Also relevant in regard to the Indian poultry and swine ban was the assertion upheld by the Appellate Body that the precautionary principle has been incorporated within Articles 3.3 and 5.7, and that beyond this incorporation it could not override the specific wording of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 which require risk assessments undertaken with scientific evidence and taking into account the assessments conducted by international bodies (such as the World Organization for Animal Health).<xref rid="fn86" ref-type="fn"><sup>86</sup></xref> Regarding the status of precautionary principle as a customary international law the Appellate Body expressed its doubts in the following terms:
<disp-quote><p>The status of the precautionary principle in international law continues to be the subject of debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators and judges. The precautionary principle is regarded by some as having crystallized into a general principle of customary international <italic>environmental</italic> law. Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of <italic>general</italic> or <italic>customary international law</italic> appears less than clear. We consider, however, that it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, but abstract, question. We note that the Panel itself did not make any definitive finding with regard to the status of the precautionary principle in international law and that the precautionary principle, at least outside the field of international environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation.<xref rid="fn87" ref-type="fn"><sup>87</sup></xref></p></disp-quote>
It is important to note the Appellate Body’s finding on the relation between Articles 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. The Appellate Body observed that the right of a member to set up its own desired and deigned level of sanitary protection under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement is an independent right, not an exception from a general obligation under Article 3.1.<xref rid="fn88" ref-type="fn"><sup>88</sup></xref> However, the right of a member state to define its appropriate level of protection is not at all an absolute or unqualified right.<xref rid="fn89" ref-type="fn"><sup>89</sup></xref> Thus, under Article 3.3, a state member may exercise its autonomous right to establish higher levels of protection than existing international standards, provided there is sufficient scientific justification to do so.<xref rid="fn90" ref-type="fn"><sup>90</sup></xref> It also emphasised that that Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should be read together.<xref rid="fn91" ref-type="fn"><sup>91</sup></xref></p><p>Of particular relevance to this paper is that, according to Johnson and Hanrahan:
<disp-quote><p>[t]he United States continues to question whether the EU has conducted an adequate risk assessment to support its position, and maintains there is a clear worldwide scientific consensus supporting the safety to consumers of eating hormone-treated meat.<xref rid="fn92" ref-type="fn"><sup>92</sup></xref></p></disp-quote>
These authors indicate that there is a concern among the literature, that ‘dispute settlement panels [may] … be more deferential to national governments when the relevant scientific evidence is not available to make an objective risk assessment’.<xref rid="fn93" ref-type="fn"><sup>93</sup></xref> It follows that there are particular concerns about the level of scientific evidence needed in such disputes.<xref rid="fn94" ref-type="fn"><sup>94</sup></xref> For example, Johnson and Hanrahan show that the EU has relied upon one set of scientific studies, and the US on another set of studies.<xref rid="fn95" ref-type="fn"><sup>95</sup></xref> It is not therefore, surprising that both countries have attempted to highlight flaws in the approach of the other.<xref rid="fn96" ref-type="fn"><sup>96</sup></xref> According to Kerr and Hobbs:
<disp-quote><p>a country could always find a justification for restricting international trade in a product by citing some level of remaining risk or requiring new research. This means that the framers of the SPS [Agreement] must have had an alternative to absolute safety in mind. Otherwise, scientific evidence would not be an operational decision-making criterion.<xref rid="fn97" ref-type="fn"><sup>97</sup></xref></p></disp-quote>
However, as outlined by Neeliah and Goburdhun, the issue for a developing country is that they may have ‘insufficient capacity to risk assessment[s]’.<xref rid="fn98" ref-type="fn"><sup>98</sup></xref> Therefore, the level of scientific evidence necessary under the WTO scheme, particularly under the <italic>SPS Agreement</italic>, continues to cause controversy, as outlined in India’s dairy dispute.<xref rid="fn99" ref-type="fn"><sup>99</sup></xref></p><p>In relation to dairy products, the USITC argues that there is unjustified discrimination between domestic and imported products because the latter are subject to more stringent standards in relation to bacteria and hormones.<xref rid="fn100" ref-type="fn"><sup>100</sup></xref> The details of this allegation were centred on three primary concerns, that:
<list list-type="order"><list-item><label>(1)</label><p>India’s own domestic maximum residue levels for several of those pesticides were higher than the Codex Committee levels they were seeking to impose on imports of milk and milk products;</p></list-item><list-item><label>(2)</label><p>the Indian government is not regularly testing Indian dairy products for these residues but is seeking to impose blanket restrictions on imported products, which the U.S. government notes is a violation of national treatment provisions in the WTO; and</p></list-item><list-item><label>(3)</label><p>milk and milk products that U.S. exporters ship globally meet Indian and Codex Committee residue testing…<xref rid="fn101" ref-type="fn"><sup>101</sup></xref></p></list-item></list>
In response, the Indian government argued that the reasons for the higher standards for imports were part of a general move towards higher standards for all but, the Indian government did not provide a timetable for when these higher standards would be imposed on domestic products.<xref rid="fn102" ref-type="fn"><sup>102</sup></xref> It is worth noting that India has itself opposed and criticised high SPS standards as trade barriers in the past, as a result of its own products being restricted from various markets.<xref rid="fn103" ref-type="fn"><sup>103</sup></xref> India has also argued that its certification regulations on chemical contaminants are in accordance with Codex Committee standards.<xref rid="fn104" ref-type="fn"><sup>104</sup></xref></p><p>In relation to wheat, however, the Indian standards related to contaminants do not comply with the Codex Alimentarius Commission standards. The international standard for ergot contamination in shipments of wheat, barley, and corn is 0.05 per cent, but India’s standard on the other hand was 0.01 per cent prior to January 2008, and the USITC contends that after this time the regulation of US imports became even more stringent, requiring ‘freedom’ from ergot contamination.<xref rid="fn105" ref-type="fn"><sup>105</sup></xref></p><p>Das expresses the following sentiments in relation to SPS restrictions on Indian imports, which are broadly similar to the criticisms raised by the USITC, and noting that seven concerns have been raised against India in the SPS committee meetings between 1995 and 2006, and further questions raised during the Trade Policy Review of India carried out by the WTO in 2007.<xref rid="fn106" ref-type="fn"><sup>106</sup></xref> Key concerns related to questions of whether or not the Indian SPS measures were in line with international standards and whether they were based on recognised scientific principles, and so in accordance with the requirements of the SPS Agreement. India’s response, however, was emphatic that the SPS measures employed in India are based on accepted scientific principles and are in line with international standards, as set by the major recognized bodies that govern such standards:
<disp-quote><p>The import risk analysis is reportedly conducted in consultation with technical experts on the basis of well-recognized scientific principles and with reference to the specific product and the disease situation prevailing in the exporting country vis-a’-vis that prevailing in India. Standards are formulated through technical committees, which have representatives of different stakeholders, such as manufactures, consumers, testing labs, R&D institutions, and so on.<xref rid="fn107" ref-type="fn"><sup>107</sup></xref></p></disp-quote>
Das also notes that developed countries have seen protectionist intent behind Indian regulations and standards in a few instances. For example, the EC has noted that the mandatory certification that India imposes on certain products on the grounds of health, safety, the environment and infrastructure, while based on mandatory uniform standards, is imposed on a list of products that particularly relate, and thus, is discriminatory towards, imported goods.<xref rid="fn108" ref-type="fn"><sup>108</sup></xref></p><p>The connection between the prevalent utilisation of SPS restrictions as thinly veiled protectionist measures in the North cannot be ignored in any discussion of the appropriateness of reducing such NTBs in developing countries such as India. In that regard, Athukorala makes the following comment in relation to export subsidies, which, in our view, is readily transferable to NTBs:
<disp-quote><p>The key impediments to further trade liberalization are undoubtedly rooted in the [Indian] domestic political economy. However, continuing high agricultural protection in developed countries and considerable backpedalling of these countries from their WTO commitments also help undermine protagonists of reforms in India (and other developing countries). Of course, the fact that rich countries subsidize their agricultural exports is not a valid economic argument for India (or any other country) to adopt similar distortionary policies… However, when it comes to policy reform in a highly politically sensitive area such as agriculture, it is unrealistic to expect pure economic logic to prevail over political compulsion.<xref rid="fn109" ref-type="fn"><sup>109</sup></xref></p></disp-quote>
After considering the SPS measures currently employed by India, Das concludes that India has a long way to go, both at the domestic and international fronts, to confront the challenges of SPS regulation effectively.<xref rid="fn110" ref-type="fn"><sup>110</sup></xref> She argues that India needs to take a more proactive approach, based on a comprehensive action plan.<xref rid="fn111" ref-type="fn"><sup>111</sup></xref></p><p>In view of the snail’s pace of the multilateral negotiations, it is unlikely that these trade restrictive measures will be outlawed in the WTO in near future. The Australian exporters would benefit significantly if the proposed FTA could make steadfast progress in these areas. It is yet to be seen whether such measures will be incorporated under an Australia-India FTA, as negotiations are still under way. However, it is probable that FTA negotiations would endeavor to be consistent with WTO Agreements, including the SPS Agreement. Even if bans cannot be removed for non-trade concerns, there might be scope for relaxing the rules for importations from Australia.</p><p>Based on a restrictive reading of GATT Article XXIV, a contention may arise that any such special concession for Australia would be subjected to the MFN obligation. Surely such an apprehension would deter India from making any concession in these areas. However, the validity of such contention is tenuous as the text of Article XXIV authorises derogation from all the provisions of the GATT, and not merely Article 1 of the GATT as it refers to ‘provisions of the Agreement’, not any particular provision.<xref rid="fn112" ref-type="fn"><sup>112</sup></xref> Therefore, Article XXIV allows derogation from all provisions of the Agreement, not just from the MFN obligation in Article I.<xref rid="fn113" ref-type="fn"><sup>113</sup></xref> This is <italic>a fortiori</italic> if we take note of the Appellate Body’s finding in <italic>Turkey- Textiles</italic> that stated ‘Article XXIV may justify a measure which is inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions.’<xref rid="fn114" ref-type="fn"><sup>114</sup></xref> However, it should be noted that in a case involving a customs union (and presumably also an FTA), this flexibility is available only when the party claiming the exception can show that the measure at issue is introduced upon the formation of a customs union or FTA that fully meets the requirements of XXIV (8) (a) and 5(a) of the GATT and also that the formation of that customs union (or FTA) would be prevented if it were not allowed to introduce the measure at issue.<xref rid="fn115" ref-type="fn"><sup>115</sup></xref> Thus, the Appellate Body has implied that a party to a customs union or FTA can only use Article XXIV as a shield for its otherwise non-complying measures when the customs union or FTA in question complies with the internal and external trade liberalisation requirement of Article XXIV. Islam and Alam show that in relation to the decision on Article XXIV(5):
<disp-quote><p>any measures introduced to a PTA after its formation that are inconsistent with the WTO, do not fall within the exception, and members of a PTA can only retreat from the WTO rules if such a retreat is essential to the formation of the PTA.<xref rid="fn116" ref-type="fn"><sup>116</sup></xref></p></disp-quote>
On a more general matter, Hilpold shows that:
<disp-quote><p>We have … seen that the vagueness of these provisions leaves many questions open and to attribute the task to fill these lacunae to a judicial organ means that this organ is bestowed with enormous power. The Panel took a very pragmatic approach.<xref rid="fn117" ref-type="fn"><sup>117</sup></xref></p></disp-quote>
Conversely, Hilpold asserts that ‘[n]onetheless, the Appellate Body took the occasion to warn the panel that it had to require the parties to prove that the conditions required had been fulfilled’.<xref rid="fn118" ref-type="fn"><sup>118</sup></xref> Hilpold goes on to outline that this decision was broad in the sense that Article XXIV is not merely related ‘to the MFN principle’, though it is also restricted by certain ‘boundaries’.<xref rid="fn119" ref-type="fn"><sup>119</sup></xref> According to Fischer, this case does not ‘undermine the supremacy of WTO law over regional arrangements’.<xref rid="fn120" ref-type="fn"><sup>120</sup></xref> However, this is certainly a consideration for Australia and India.</p></sec></sec></sec><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_009" sec-type="head1"><label>4.</label><title>Tackling Anti-dumping</title><p>India is one of the world’s most frequent users of trade remedy measures, particularly anti-dumping. It quite frequently uses anti-dumping investigations against efficient producers who export to its market. A WTO Press release in May 2009 demonstrates that India consistently ranks in the top league of the user of anti-dumping measures.<xref rid="fn121" ref-type="fn"><sup>121</sup></xref> Sections 9A, 9AA, 9B, 9C of India’s <italic>Customs Tariff Act</italic>, 175 and <italic>Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment and Collection of Anti-dumping Duty on Dumped Articles and for Determination of Injury) Rules</italic>, 1995 (the Rules) contain its Anti-dumping laws.<xref rid="fn122" ref-type="fn"><sup>122</sup></xref> Article VI of the GATT requires that to impose any anti-dumping duty, authorities of any importing country must establish that there is a positive dumping margin, that is, the product in question must be sold at a lower price than its normal commercial value, the dumped product must inflict or threaten to inflict a material injury to the domestic industry, and there must be a causal link between the dumping and injury or threat of material injury to the domestic producers. It is the Directorate General of Anti-dumping and Allied Duties in the Ministry of Commerce in India (Directorate) that is entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the anti-dumping investigation.</p><p>There are several problematic aspects of anti-dumping investigations in India from the point of view of exporters. Article 5.4 of the WTO <italic>Agreement on Anti-Dumping</italic> requires that any petition from domestic producers cannot authorise domestic anti-dumping authorities to initiate an investigation unless the producers account for at least 25 per cent of total domestic production. Rule 5(3) also contains this provision of a minimum threshold of 25 per cent. So, theoretically, to trigger a lawful investigation, it is first necessary to ascertain the actual share of the petitioner in the domestic production. This reduces the prospect of frivolous applications. However, in some cases the Directorate has initiated investigations even though the petitioners have failed to establish properly that they do fulfil this minimum threshold of domestic production. There are cases in which producers have wrongly claimed to be the sole domestic producer, nonetheless the Directorate has initiated investigation.<xref rid="fn123" ref-type="fn"><sup>123</sup></xref> There is even an instance that the Directorate had initiated investigation even though the petitioner’s application was so flawed that it did not even properly make out domestic producers of the like good.<xref rid="fn124" ref-type="fn"><sup>124</sup></xref></p><p>So, there remains a distinct possibility that in some cases, anti-dumping investigations in India have been initiated even though the petitioner does not meet the legal criterion, as it does not sufficiently represent the domestic industry. Australian agricultural export has not yet been subjected to an anti-dumping duty, possibly because of the low volume of agricultural export to India. As the trade volume grows, the chances of anti-dumping action would also be rising. Even when an exporter may successfully defend its case in a frivolous anti-dumping investigation, it would have to bear the financial burden of defending its case.</p><p>Whether FTA partners can impose trade remedy measures against each other’s imports remain an open question in the WTO Jurisprudence.<xref rid="fn125" ref-type="fn"><sup>125</sup></xref> However, Australia has proposed in the WTO negotiations that FTA partners should not be allowed to maintain any trade remedy measures beyond the interim phase, as continuance of trade remedy measures would contradict their commitment of liberalising internal trade.<xref rid="fn126" ref-type="fn"><sup>126</sup></xref> However, this position has not yet received general support of the wider membership of the WTO because of the concerns of many WTO members of losing the weapon of responding to so-called ‘unfair trading practices’. Indeed, except for its comprehensive FTA with New Zealand, none of the other FTAs concluded by Australia has abolished the scope of anti-dumping duties.<xref rid="fn127" ref-type="fn"><sup>127</sup></xref> Nonetheless, the fact remains that an anti-dumping measure is a discriminatory trade practice and generally it is the most efficient exporters who are its target. Ideally, if the proposed FTA could abolish trade remedy measures like anti-dumping altogether in bilateral trade, there could be significant benefit to exporters as in many cases these measures are mere ramifications of protectionism. Even if this grand aim of totally outlawing anti-dumping action in bilateral trade cannot be achieved, if issues identified above can be addressed through the proposed FTA that would be a significant advantage for not just Australian agricultural exporters but also for exporters in other sectors.</p><p>India has offered some concessions in relation to anti-dumping duties to some of its FTA partners. For instance, Article 2.14 <italic>Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of India</italic> (Korea- India FTA) provides that before initiating any anti-dumping investigation against exporters from the other party, a state party is obliged to notify the other party at least ten working days prior to the date on which investigation would commence. Similar provision of advance notification is also provided for in Article 2.7.1 of the <italic>Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of India and the Republic of</italic> Singapore. Advance notification would help the exporters to be better equipped for preparing their case. Article 2.17 of the Korea- India FTA provides that in imposing any anti-dumping duty against exporter of another party, authorities would apply a duty less than the margin of dumping where such lesser duty would be sufficient to wipe out the injury to the domestic industry.</p></sec><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_010" sec-type="head1"><label>5.</label><title>Benefits of Agricultural Trade Liberalisation to the Indian Economy</title><p>Indian farms average less than 1.4 hectares in size and are deprived of usage of modern cultivation technology.<xref rid="fn128" ref-type="fn"><sup>128</sup></xref> The Indian agricultural sector depends on governmental supports in the form of input subsidy and price support for its viability.<xref rid="fn129" ref-type="fn"><sup>129</sup></xref> The Indian Government maintains minimum support prices for some 25 major agricultural commodities and commodities that are subject to this price support system are paddy, <italic>jowar, bajra</italic>, maize, <italic>ragi, arhar</italic>, <italic>moong</italic>, <italic>urad</italic>, cotton, nut, sunflower seed, <italic>soyabeen, sesamum</italic>, nigerseed, wheat, barley, gram, lentil, mustard, safflower, <italic>toria</italic>, copra, de-husked coconut, jute, sugarcane, tobacco.<xref rid="fn130" ref-type="fn"><sup>130</sup></xref> The government decides this price on the basis of the recommendations of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices (CACP), which comprises of <italic>inter alia</italic> representatives of agricultural producers.<xref rid="fn131" ref-type="fn"><sup>131</sup></xref> This puts a burden on the treasury and the resources spent could be better directed to improvement of infrastructure and on research and development.<xref rid="fn132" ref-type="fn"><sup>132</sup></xref> While governmental support for the agricultural sector may be designed to support poor subsistence farmers, in practice by raising prices, they often exacerbate the situation of the landless poor.<xref rid="fn133" ref-type="fn"><sup>133</sup></xref> Moreover, studies have shown that the benefits of governmental subsidies overwhelmingly go to the large firms owned by affluent people rather than subsistence farmers.<xref rid="fn134" ref-type="fn"><sup>134</sup></xref></p><p>Subsidies in agriculture are not only fiscally demanding but also pose a risk for long term sustainable development. Many Indian state governments offer electricity for agricultural production either for free or at very low prices and this subsidised electricity supply encourage cultivation of water-intensive crops and over-exploitation of ground waters which could be environmentally damaging.<xref rid="fn135" ref-type="fn"><sup>135</sup></xref> Subsidised supply of input in the form fertiliser is encouraging over-use and causing soil degradation.<xref rid="fn136" ref-type="fn"><sup>136</sup></xref> Although achieving self-sufficiency in food has remained a national policy goal of successive Indian governments over the last couple of decades, the relatively low productivity of the agricultural sector and concern for the environmental degradation questions the merit of the goal.</p><p>Because of its WTO commitments, India does not provide direct export subsidies that may overtly violate its WTO obligations but it continues to use indirect export subsidies.<xref rid="fn137" ref-type="fn"><sup>137</sup></xref> Export subsidies may assist domestic producers to compete with their foreign counterparts and have political appeal but from the overall economic welfare perspective of the exporting country, it makes little sense. Export subsidies artificially reduce the price of products for the consumers of the importing country. On average, Indian people spend a very high proportion of their household income (almost half of total expenditure) for buying food.<xref rid="fn138" ref-type="fn"><sup>138</sup></xref> If trade policies are more liberalised, it is possible that consumers will benefit from increased competition, which lower prices, and inevitably in a liberalised environment, consumers will have a bigger variety of products to choose from. In relation to possible niche agricultural products that could be addressed by an FTA between Australia and India (to the benefit of Australian producers) may be goat and sheep meat, as the USITC report notes, ‘[g]oat and sheep meat are actually preferred by Indians to buffalo meat and poultry, but consumption is low because low production levels keep their prices relatively high’.<xref rid="fn139" ref-type="fn"><sup>139</sup></xref></p><p>India has a thriving food processing industry,<xref rid="fn140" ref-type="fn"><sup>140</sup></xref> and removing barriers to market access for raw materials essential to the industry would actually be economically beneficial for India even from a crude mercantilist point of view. For products which are processed in India as an input for further processing and re-exporting, if barriers to imports from Australia are lowered, it may consequently benefit India’s food processing industry. The reason is that reliable and cheaper inputs would decrease the industry’s cost of production of processed stuff and therefore, should enhance its export performance. This would be a better way to promote export than providing welfare reducing input subsidies. This would also help to create new jobs and would be likely to draw more foreign direct investment, the positive effect of which may spill over to the other sectors of the economy.<xref rid="fn141" ref-type="fn"><sup>141</sup></xref> As a developing country, import tariffs are an important source of revenue. However, lowering tariff barriers may not necessarily lower revenue income as increased volume of imports may make up for the lost revenue from lowered tariff. The Indian Government has recognised the potential value of imports in the Preamble to India’s Foreign Trade Policy which acknowledges that ‘[w]hile increase in exports is of vital importance, we have also to facilitate those imports which are required to stimulate our economy’.<xref rid="fn142" ref-type="fn"><sup>142</sup></xref></p><p>India has implemented a National Agricultural Policy since mid-2000.<xref rid="fn143" ref-type="fn"><sup>143</sup></xref> The core objectives of the agricultural policy are to adequately award local farmers with a substantial price, but also to maintain stable prices for the consumers and the long-standing, strategic goal of self-sufficiency.<xref rid="fn144" ref-type="fn"><sup>144</sup></xref> One of the key long-term aims of the Policy is to increase annual domestic growth in agriculture over the next two decades to over 4%.<xref rid="fn145" ref-type="fn"><sup>145</sup></xref> It follows that any proposal aimed at liberalizing the importation of agricultural products from Australia must be shown not to conflict with (and preferably enhance) this overarching policy goal. However, this agricultural policy should not be viewed in isolation and should be assessed in the context of its wider economic policy. It is also important to note that an FTA is based on reciprocity and hence, whatever market access India may offer the Australian agricultural sector would likely to be reciprocated by Australia in non-agricultural sectors. In particular, any market access for labour intensive manufactured goods, such as textiles, clothing, and footwear, in which India may have comparative advantage, is likely to benefit its economy substantially. This may pave the way for efficient re-allocation of resources.</p></sec><sec id="B10.1163_22119000_01401006_011" sec-type="head1"><label>6.</label><title>Conclusion</title><p>Generally, the existing market access barriers in the agricultural sector of the developed economies receive most of the attention in the literature on protectionism in agricultural trade. This is because of the high volume of market distorting subsides prevalent in many OECD countries. However, that should not detract attention away from the protectionism in major developing countries like India. Because of the substantial number of people employed in agriculture and the strategic quest for national self-sufficiency in agriculture; agricultural trade liberalisation remains a difficult task for Indian policy makers. The target of achieving self-sufficiency in agriculture may have popular political appeal, but its economic wisdom is dubious. As the Indian economy continues to prosper, it should allow liberalisation in agriculture. It may be difficult to implement this in the short term, but would be likely to enhance economic welfare in the long term. An FTA with Australia could provide a spur to such liberalisation and assist with the agricultural producers of Australia to enhance their exports to India. The positive impact of liberalisation in agriculture will not necessarily be limited to this sector, but would also be likely to spill over to other sectors of the Indian economy. Any efficient re-allocation of resources that are used to provide parasitic support to the agricultural sector can be better spent for development of infrastructure and in sectors, which are more efficient.</p><p>While a successful conclusion of the Doha Round would be a better avenue to reduce agricultural protectionism globally; in view of the impasse surrounding the Doha Round, Australia with an efficient agricultural industry cannot sit idly. Australian trade negotiators have to be vigilant to secure whatever market access they can for the nation’s agricultural industry through the conclusion of FTAs. Furthermore, it is to be emphasised that the main focus of the Doha Round negotiations is on market access, domestic support, and export subsidies.<xref rid="fn146" ref-type="fn"><sup>146</sup></xref> Hence, with a successful conclusion of the Doha Round, the benefits are larger in terms of market volume because of the sheer number of countries involved. However, by effectively tackling the issue of non-tariff barriers and anti-dumping, a bilateral FTA could also contribute to welfare enhancing trade liberalisation for both parties.</p></sec></body><back><fn-group><fn id="fn1"><p><sup>1)</sup> Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, <italic>Producer and Consumer Support Estimates database</italic>, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3746,en_2649_37401_39551355_1_1_1_37401,00.html">http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3746,en_2649_37401_39551355_1_1_1_37401,00.html</ext-link>> [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn2"><p><sup>2)</sup> WTO, World Tariff Profiles 2011, 12 [World Tariff Profiles 2011].</p></fn><fn id="fn3"><p><sup>3)</sup> Ivan Roberts, Chloe Haseltine and Apsara Maliyasena, <italic>Factors Affecting Australian Agricultural Exports</italic>, (2009), Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics Insight Series, 3 <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://agsurf.abareconomics.com/publications_html/ins/insights_09/a5.pdf">http://agsurf.abareconomics.com/publications_html/ins/insights_09/a5.pdf</ext-link>>. [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn4"><p><sup>4)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn5"><p><sup>5)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn6"><p><sup>6)</sup> Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), <italic>Australia-India FTA Feasibility Study</italic> (30 November 2009) DFAT <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/fta-study/index.html">http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/fta-study/index.html</ext-link>>.</p></fn><fn id="fn7"><p><sup>7)</sup> Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), <italic>Australia-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Negotiations</italic>, DFAT <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aifta/index.html">http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aifta/index.html</ext-link>>. [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn8"><p><sup>8)</sup> World Trade Organization, <italic>Welcome to the Regional Trade Agreements Information System (RTA-IS)</italic>, <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicShowMemberRTAIDCard.aspx?enc=p+SHsWlLnAcvlvAR037oHlzz8vdgxcDOBxpA/viOnZY">http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicShowMemberRTAIDCard.aspx?enc=p+SHsWlLnAcvlvAR037oHlzz8vdgxcDOBxpA/viOnZY</ext-link>=> [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn9"><p><sup>9)</sup> See e.g., News Worms, ‘EU-India FTA to Adversely Impact Agriculture, Livelihoods, Health: FAFTA’, <italic>Bilaterals.org</italic> (online), 3 May 2010 <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article17263">http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?article17263</ext-link>>; David Cronin, ‘Indian Farmers Won’t Say Cheese’, IPS News (online), 3 May 2010 <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51292">http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51292</ext-link>>; Roopam Singh and Ranja Sengupta, ‘The EU India FTA in Agriculture and Likely Impact on Indian Women’ (Centad and Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2009) [Roopam and Sengupta].</p></fn><fn id="fn10"><p><sup>10)</sup> Ibid, Roopam and Sengupta, 19, citing Sharma Shefali (2009) ‘The EU-India FTA, Critical Considerations in a Time of Crisis’, CENTAD Working Paper No. 11; Sophie Powell, (2008) ‘The EU-India FTA: Initial Observations from a Development Perspective’, <italic>Traidcraft</italic>, September 2008; Christa Wichterich, ‘Economic Growth Without Social Justice, EU-India trade Negotiations and Their Implications for Social Development and Gender Justice’, Women in Development Europe (WIDE), (Brussels, 2007).</p></fn><fn id="fn11"><p><sup>11)</sup> See V.S. Sheshadri, ‘Evolution in India’s Regional Trading Arrangements’ (2009) 43 <italic>Journal of World Trade</italic> 903, 914 implying that it may not be a co-incidence that the advanced economies with whom India was negotiating FTAs were not significant exporter of agricultural products.</p></fn><fn id="fn12"><p><sup>12)</sup> Australian Bureau of Statistics, <italic>Australia’s Bilateral Relationships</italic>, (24 May 2012) <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1301.0~2012~Main%20Features~Australia's%20bilateral%20relationships~210">http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Lookup/by%20Subject/1301.0~2012~Main%20Features~Australia’s%20bilateral%20relationships~210</ext-link>>.</p></fn><fn id="fn13"><p><sup>13)</sup> Stephen Smith, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘The new Australian Government: Trade Policies and Priorities’ (Speech delivered at the Griffith Asia Institute in the Gallery of Modern Art, Brisbane, 14 August 2009) <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2009/090814_gai.html">http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2009/090814_gai.html</ext-link>>.</p></fn><fn id="fn14"><p><sup>14)</sup> Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, <italic>Australia’s Export Fact Sheet</italic>, Department of Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.innovation.gov.au/Section/AboutDIISR/FactSheets/Pages/Australia'sExportsFactSheet.aspx">http://www.innovation.gov.au/Section/AboutDIISR/FactSheets/Pages/Australia’sExportsFactSheet.aspx</ext-link>> 23 September 2010.</p></fn><fn id="fn15"><p><sup>15)</sup> Australian Government Austrade, <italic>India Profile</italic> (2009), Australian Government Austrade <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.austrade.gov.au/India-profile/default.aspx">http://www.austrade.gov.au/India-profile/default.aspx</ext-link>> 26 February 2011; Consulate General of India, Sydney, <italic>India Australia Trade Brief</italic> (2009) Consulate General of India, Sydney <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.indianconsulatesydney.org/australian_trade_brief.htm">http://www.indianconsulatesydney.org/australian_trade_brief.htm</ext-link>> 9 October 2011 [Trade Brief].</p></fn><fn id="fn16"><p><sup>16)</sup> DFAT, <italic>Agriculture and the WTO</italic> (2010) DFAT <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/trade_in_agriculture.html">http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/trade_in_agriculture.html</ext-link>> [Agriculture and the WTO] [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn17"><p><sup>17)</sup> Trade Brief, above n 15.</p></fn><fn id="fn18"><p><sup>18)</sup> Prema-Chandra Athukorala, ‘Agricultural Trade Policy Reforms in India’ (2005) 6 <italic>South Asia Economic Journal</italic> 23, 26 [Athukorala].</p></fn><fn id="fn19"><p><sup>19)</sup> European Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, <italic>Agricultural Commodity Markets Outlook 2009-2018</italic> (A comparative analysis of projections published1 by Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Food and Agriculture Organisation, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute, US Department for Agriculture, July 2009) European Commission Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, 69 <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/tradepol/worldmarkets/outlook/2009_2018_en.pdf">http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/tradepol/worldmarkets/outlook/2009_2018_en.pdf</ext-link>> [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn20"><p><sup>20)</sup> Garry Pursell, Ashok Gulati, and Kanupriya Gupta, ‘India’ in Kym Anderson and Will Martin (eds), <italic>Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Asia</italic> (World Bank, 2009) 339, 343 [Pursell, Gulati and Gupta].</p></fn><fn id="fn21"><p><sup>21)</sup> World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review Body, <italic>Trade Policy Review of India: Report by the</italic> Secretariat, WTO Doc, WT/TPR/S/182 (18 April 2007), 99 [Trade Policy Review]; ‘Agribusiness in India: Green Shoots:’ <italic>The Economist</italic> 394 (8673), 13 March 2010, 65-66 [Green Shoots]; Marina Kim and Jammie Penm, ‘India’s Economic Prospects and Implications for Australia’s Export Commodity Market’ (2007) 14 <italic>Australian Commodity</italic> 677, 685 [Kim and Penm].</p></fn><fn id="fn22"><p><sup>22)</sup> Ibid, Kim and Penm.</p></fn><fn id="fn23"><p><sup>23)</sup> Jyoti Thottam and Elliot Hannon, <italic>Tapping into India’s Growing Alcohol Market</italic>, Time (online) 23 December 2009, <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1949796,00.html">http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1949796,00.html</ext-link>> [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn24"><p><sup>24)</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Government of Australian and Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industry of the Government of India, ‘Australia-India Joint Free Trade Agreement Feasibility Study’ (Report, 2010) 36.</p></fn><fn id="fn25"><p><sup>25)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn26"><p><sup>26)</sup> Ibid 37.</p></fn><fn id="fn27"><p><sup>27)</sup> Ibid 37.</p></fn><fn id="fn28"><p><sup>28)</sup> Ibid 39.</p></fn><fn id="fn29"><p><sup>29)</sup> World Tariff Profiles 2011, above n 2, 49, 60.</p></fn><fn id="fn30"><p><sup>30)</sup> World Tariff Profiles 2011, above n 2, 93; DFAT, <italic>Australia-India FTA Feasibility Study - Industry Consultations Background Paper</italic> (2008) DFAT <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/fta-study/background_study.html">http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/india/fta-study/background_study.html</ext-link>>. [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn31"><p><sup>31)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn32"><p><sup>32)</sup> Pursell, Gulati, and Gupta, above n 20, 8.</p></fn><fn id="fn33"><p><sup>33)</sup> Przemyslaw Kowalski and Nora Dihel, ‘India’s Trade Integration, Realising the Potential’ (OECD Trade Policy Working Papers, No. 88, May 2009) 8.</p></fn><fn id="fn34"><p><sup>34)</sup> Trade Policy Review, above n 21, 32.</p></fn><fn id="fn35"><p><sup>35)</sup> <italic>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations</italic>, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 187 (entered into force 1 January 1995) Annex 1A, art XXIV (‘<italic>GATT</italic>’).</p></fn><fn id="fn36"><p><sup>36)</sup> Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, <italic>Negotiations under Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994</italic>, Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Department of Commerce, <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://commerce.nic.in/wtomar2k2.htm">http://commerce.nic.in/wtomar2k2.htm</ext-link>> [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn37"><p><sup>37)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn38"><p><sup>38)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn39"><p><sup>39)</sup> Pursell, Gulati, and Gupta, above n 20, 348.</p></fn><fn id="fn40"><p><sup>40)</sup> World Tariff Profiles 2011, above n 2, 14.</p></fn><fn id="fn41"><p><sup>41)</sup> For example of its closest neighbours, with the exception of Bangladesh (whose least-developed nation status limits comparison) India’s rate is the highest, out-rating Pakistan’s 95.6%, and significantly exceeding the rates of Sri Lanka (50%) and Nepal (41.5%); see ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn42"><p><sup>42)</sup> Agriculture and the WTO, above n 16.</p></fn><fn id="fn43"><p><sup>43)</sup> <italic>Agreement on Agriculture</italic> in World Trade Organization, <italic>The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations</italic> (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 33, art 4.2 (‘<italic>Agreement on Agriculture</italic>’).</p></fn><fn id="fn44"><p><sup>44)</sup> Trade Policy Review, above n 21, 43.</p></fn><fn id="fn45"><p><sup>45)</sup> David Hallam et al., <italic>The Market for Non-Traditional Agricultural Exports</italic> (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2004) xv, 27, 28, 31, 33, 41.</p></fn><fn id="fn46"><p><sup>46)</sup> Pursell, Gulati and Gupta above n 20, 346.</p></fn><fn id="fn47"><p><sup>47)</sup> Panel Report, <italic>India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products</italic>, WTO Doc WT/DS90/R (6 April 1999 adopted as modified by Appellate Body Report 22 September 1999), Appellate Body Report, <italic>India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and Industrial Products</italic>, WTO Doc AB-1999-3, WT/DS90/AB/R (23 August 1999 adopted 22 September 1999).</p></fn><fn id="fn48"><p><sup>48)</sup> Athukorala, above n 18, 31.</p></fn><fn id="fn49"><p><sup>49)</sup> Ibid 32.</p></fn><fn id="fn50"><p><sup>50)</sup> Ibid 32.</p></fn><fn id="fn51"><p><sup>51)</sup> WTO Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, <italic>Updating Notifications Pursuant to Article XVII:4(a) of the GATT 1994 and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII</italic>: <italic>India</italic>, WTO Doc G/STR/N/8/IND G/STR/N/9/IND G/STR/N/10/IND G/STR/N/11/IND (6 May 2010) 3.</p></fn><fn id="fn52"><p><sup>52)</sup> For an overview of state trading entities distort market, see generally Steve McCorriston and Donald MacLaren, ‘The Trade Distorting Effect of state Trading Enterprises in Importing Countries’ (2005) 49 <italic>European Economic Review</italic> 1693.</p></fn><fn id="fn53"><p><sup>53)</sup> The WTO requires notification in a 3 year cycle, see WTO, <italic>State Trading Enterprises: Regulation</italic> (2012), WTO <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/statra_e/notifstatr.htm">http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/statra_e/notifstatr.htm</ext-link>>, but India’s pervious notification was in 2001.</p></fn><fn id="fn54"><p><sup>54)</sup> United States International Trade Commission, <italic>India: Effects of Tariffs and Non-Tariff Measures on U.S Agricultural Exports</italic> (2009) United States International Trade Commission, 6-13 <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4107.pdf">http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4107.pdf</ext-link>> [USITC].</p></fn><fn id="fn55"><p><sup>55)</sup> Trade Policy Review, above n 21, 54.</p></fn><fn id="fn56"><p><sup>56)</sup> Eximkey, <italic>General Notes Regarding Import Policy</italic>, Eximkey <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.eximkey.com/contents/showpage1.asp?pageid=14050">http://www.eximkey.com/contents/showpage1.asp?pageid=14050</ext-link>> [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn57"><p><sup>57)</sup> Trade Policy Review, above n 21, 46; USITC, above n 54, 6-11.</p></fn><fn id="fn58"><p><sup>58)</sup> Trade Policy Review, above n 21, 106.</p></fn><fn id="fn59"><p><sup>59)</sup> Appellate Body Report, <italic>United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline</italic>, WTO Doc WT/DS2/ab/R, AB-1996-1 (29 April 1996, adopted 20 May 1996) 16-17.</p></fn><fn id="fn60"><p><sup>60)</sup> Steve Charnovitz, ‘Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX’ (1991) 25 <italic>Journal of World Trade</italic> 37, 44-5.</p></fn><fn id="fn61"><p><sup>61)</sup> Ibid 45.</p></fn><fn id="fn62"><p><sup>62)</sup> Appellate Body Report, <italic>United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products</italic>, WTO Doc WT/DS58/AB/R (12 October 1998) [128]-[132].</p></fn><fn id="fn63"><p><sup>63)</sup> Panel Report, <italic>United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna</italic> (“Tuna/Dolphin II), WTO Doc WT/DS29/R (16 June, 1994, (unadopted)).</p></fn><fn id="fn64"><p><sup>64)</sup> Appellate Body Report, <italic>Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef</italic>, WTO Doc AB-2000-8, WT/DS161/AB/R (11 December 2000, adopted 10 January 2001) [164].</p></fn><fn id="fn65"><p><sup>65)</sup> Nele Matz-Lück and Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Article XX lit. g GATT’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Anja Seibert-Fohr (eds), <italic>WTO – Technical Barriers and SPS Measures</italic> (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 141, 145-7, 151-2; Nele Matz-Lück and Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Article XX lit. g GATT’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum, Peter-Tobias Stoll and Holger P Hesetermeyer (eds), <italic>WTO – Trade in Goods</italic> (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 544, 549-551, 554; GATT Panel Report, <italic>United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada</italic>, GATT Doc L/5198 – 29S/91 (22 December 1981, adopted 22 February 1982) [3.8], [3.13], [4.7] [4.15]; GATT Panel Report, <italic>Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon</italic>, GATT Doc L/6268 – 35S/98 (20 November 1987, adopted 22 March 1988) [3.1], [3.3], [3.27], [3.29], [4.4], [4.6]-[4.7]; GATT Panel Report, <italic>United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna</italic>, GATT Doc DS21/R – 39S/1555 (3 September 1991, unadopted) [3.40], [3.43], [5.30]-[5.34]; Shawkat Alam, <italic>Sustainable Development and Free Trade: Institutional Approaches</italic> (Routledge, 2008) 72 [Alam].</p></fn><fn id="fn66"><p><sup>66)</sup> See, e.g., Ibid, Alam, 68.</p></fn><fn id="fn67"><p><sup>67)</sup> Ibid 70.</p></fn><fn id="fn68"><p><sup>68)</sup> Panel Report, <italic>Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres</italic>, WTO Doc WT/DS332/R (12 June 2007, adopted as modified by the Appellate Body Report 17 December 2007) [7.17].</p></fn><fn id="fn69"><p><sup>69)</sup> <italic>Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures</italic>, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A-4 (15 December 1993) in World Trade Organization, <italic>The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations</italic> (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 59, preamble (‘<italic>SPS Agreement</italic>’); <italic>Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade</italic>, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A-6 (15 December 1993) in World Trade Organization, <italic>The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations</italic> (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 121, preamble (‘<italic>TBT Agreement</italic>’).</p></fn><fn id="fn70"><p><sup>70)</sup> By for example, encouraging adoption of international standards.</p></fn><fn id="fn71"><p><sup>71)</sup> Trade Policy Review, above n 21, 52.</p></fn><fn id="fn72"><p><sup>72)</sup> USITC, above n 54, 6-10.</p></fn><fn id="fn73"><p><sup>73)</sup> Ibid 54.</p></fn><fn id="fn74"><p><sup>74)</sup> Trade Policy Review, above n 21, 53.</p></fn><fn id="fn75"><p><sup>75)</sup> Other reasons include balance of payment issues or potential market surplus.</p></fn><fn id="fn76"><p><sup>76)</sup> USITC, above n 54, 6-11.</p></fn><fn id="fn77"><p><sup>77)</sup> Ibid 6-2, original footnotes omitted.</p></fn><fn id="fn78"><p><sup>78)</sup> Kasturi Das, ‘Coping with SPS Challenges in India: WTO and Beyond’ (2008) 11(4) <italic>Journal of International Economic Law</italic> 971, 997 [Das].</p></fn><fn id="fn79"><p><sup>79)</sup> Ibid, referring to WTO, Trade Policy Review Body, <italic>Trade Policy Review of India, Minutes of Meeting 23 and 25 May 2007: Addendum</italic>, WTO DOC WT/TPR/M/182/Add.1 of (20 July 2007).</p></fn><fn id="fn80"><p><sup>80)</sup> <italic>WTO Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures - Specific Trade Concerns - Note by the Secretariat – Revision</italic>, WTO Docs G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.2 to Rev.6 (15 February 2002- 19 May 2006).</p></fn><fn id="fn81"><p><sup>81)</sup> USTIC, above n 54, 6-2.</p></fn><fn id="fn82"><p><sup>82)</sup> Trade Policy Review of India, above n 21, 54.</p></fn><fn id="fn83"><p><sup>83)</sup> USITC, above n 54, 6-3.</p></fn><fn id="fn84"><p><sup>84)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn85"><p><sup>85)</sup> Panel Report, <italic>European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)</italic> WT Doc WT/DS26/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (18 August 1997 adopted as modified by Appellate Body Report 13 February 1998); Appellate Body Report, <italic>European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones)</italic>, WTO Doc AB-1997-4 WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (16 January 1998 adopted 13 February 1998).</p></fn><fn id="fn86"><p><sup>86)</sup> Ibid, Appellate Body Report, [124]-[125].</p></fn><fn id="fn87"><p><sup>87)</sup> Ibid [123].</p></fn><fn id="fn88"><p><sup>88)</sup> Ibid [172].</p></fn><fn id="fn89"><p><sup>89)</sup> Ibid [173].</p></fn><fn id="fn90"><p><sup>90)</sup> Ibid [171]-[173].</p></fn><fn id="fn91"><p><sup>91)</sup> Ibid [180].</p></fn><fn id="fn92"><p><sup>92)</sup> Renée Johnson and Charles E Hanrahan, ‘The U.S.-EU Beef Hormone Dispute’ (CRS Repot for Congress, Congressional Research Serbice, 7-5700, 6 December 2010) 4.</p></fn><fn id="fn93"><p><sup>93)</sup> Ibid 7.</p></fn><fn id="fn94"><p><sup>94)</sup> Ibid 7-11.</p></fn><fn id="fn95"><p><sup>95)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn96"><p><sup>96)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn97"><p><sup>97)</sup> William A Kerr and Jill E Hobbs, ‘The North American-European Union Dispute Over Beef Produced Using Growth Hormones: A Major Test for the New International Trade Regime’ (2002) 25 <italic>The World Economy</italic> 283, 285.</p></fn><fn id="fn98"><p><sup>98)</sup> S A Neeliah and D Goburdhun, ‘Complying with the Clauses of the SPS Agreement: Case of a Developing Country’ (2010) 21 <italic>Food Control</italic> 902, 902, 909-10.</p></fn><fn id="fn99"><p><sup>99)</sup> Ibid; USITC, above n 54, 6-4.</p></fn><fn id="fn100"><p><sup>100)</sup> USITC, above n 54, 6-4.</p></fn><fn id="fn101"><p><sup>101)</sup> Ibid 6-4–6-5.</p></fn><fn id="fn102"><p><sup>102)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn103"><p><sup>103)</sup> Kajli Bakhshi, <italic>SPS Agreement under the WTO: The Indian Experience</italic> <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.idfresearch.org/pdf/SPS-Agreement.pdf">http://www.idfresearch.org/pdf/SPS-Agreement.pdf</ext-link>>; See also Evdokia Moïsé ‘Food safety: protection or protectionism?’, <italic>OECD Observer</italic> (online), 1999 <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php?aid=3">http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php?aid=3</ext-link>> [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn104"><p><sup>104)</sup> USITC, above n 54, 6-5.</p></fn><fn id="fn105"><p><sup>105)</sup> USITC, above n 54, 6-6 -6-7.</p></fn><fn id="fn106"><p><sup>106)</sup> Das, above n 78.</p></fn><fn id="fn107"><p><sup>107)</sup> Das, above n 78, 1000.</p></fn><fn id="fn108"><p><sup>108)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn109"><p><sup>109)</sup> Prema-Chandra Athukorala, ‘Agricultural Trade Policy Reforms in India’ (2005), 6, <italic>South Asia Economic Journal</italic> 23, 34.</p></fn><fn id="fn110"><p><sup>110)</sup> Das, above n 78, 1001.</p></fn><fn id="fn111"><p><sup>111)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn112"><p><sup>112)</sup> WTO <italic>Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Synopsis of “Systemic” Issues related to Regional Trade Agreements: Note by the Secretariat</italic>, WTO Doc WT/REG/W/37 (2 March 2000) [27(b)].</p></fn><fn id="fn113"><p><sup>113)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn114"><p><sup>114)</sup> Appellate Body Report, <italic>Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products</italic>, WTO Doc WT/DS34/AB/R, AB-1999-5 (1999) [58] [AB Report in Turkey-Textiles].</p></fn><fn id="fn115"><p><sup>115)</sup> Ibid, AB Report in Turkey-Textiles.</p></fn><fn id="fn116"><p><sup>116)</sup> Md Rizwanul Islam and Shawkat Alam, ‘Preferential Trade Agreements and the Scope of GATT Article XXIV, GATS Article V and the Enabling Clause: An Appraisal of GATT/WTO Jurisprudence’ (2009) 56 <italic>Netherlands International Law Review</italic> 1, 9 [Islam and Alam].</p></fn><fn id="fn117"><p><sup>117)</sup> Peter Hilpold, ‘Regional Integration According to Article XXIV GATT – Between Law and Politics’ (2003) 7 <italic>Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law</italic> 219, 248.</p></fn><fn id="fn118"><p><sup>118)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn119"><p><sup>119)</sup> Ibid 249.</p></fn><fn id="fn120"><p><sup>120)</sup> Matthew E Fischer, ‘Is the WTO Appellate Body a “Constitutional Court”? The Interaction of the WTO Dispute Settlement System with Regional and National Actors’ (2008-2009) 40 <italic>Georgetown Journal of International Law</italic> 291, 304-5.</p></fn><fn id="fn121"><p><sup>121)</sup> WTO, ‘Anti-Dumping: WTO Secretariat Reports Increase in New Anti-Dumping Investigations’ (Press Release, PRESS/556, 7 May 2009).</p></fn><fn id="fn122"><p><sup>122)</sup> <italic>The</italic> Act is available online <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://exim.indiamart.com/act-regulations/customs-tariff-act-1975.html">http://exim.indiamart.com/act-regulations/customs-tariff-act-1975.html</ext-link>> and the regulation is available online <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/compendium/comp2.pdf">http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/compendium/comp2.pdf</ext-link>> [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn123"><p><sup>123)</sup> <italic>Tetrafluoroethane or R 134a of all types originating in or exported from China PR and Japan</italic>. All pieces of information on these individual investigations conducted by the Indian authorities in this footnote as well as in subsequent footnotes are collated from the Department of Commerce of Indian Ministry of Commerce & Industry’s website unless indicated otherwise <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/ad_casesinindia.asp?id=2"><italic>http://commerce.nic.in/traderemedies/ad_casesinindia.asp?id=2</italic></ext-link>> [last accessed on 1 November 2012].</p></fn><fn id="fn124"><p><sup>124)</sup> <italic>Butter Oil from New Zealand</italic>.</p></fn><fn id="fn125"><p><sup>125)</sup> Islam and Alam, above n 116, 14-18.</p></fn><fn id="fn126"><p><sup>126)</sup> <italic>Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Communication from Australia</italic>, WTO Doc WT/REG/W/18 (17 November 1997) 3-4.</p></fn><fn id="fn127"><p><sup>127)</sup> Australian Government Productivity Commission, <italic>Australia’s Anti-dumping and Countervailing System</italic>, (Report No. 48, Canberra, 18 December 2009) 9.</p></fn><fn id="fn128"><p><sup>128)</sup> Paul Blustein, <italic>Misadventures of The Most Favored Nations: Clashing Egos, Inflated Ambitions and the Great Shambles of the World Trade System</italic> (Public Affairs, 2009) 143 [Blustein].</p></fn><fn id="fn129"><p><sup>129)</sup> Ibid 99; ‘Food and Trade: The New Corn Laws’ <italic>The Economist</italic> 404(8802), 15 September 2012, 13, 14.</p></fn><fn id="fn130"><p><sup>130)</sup> Directorate of Economics and Statistics, <italic>Minimum Support Services</italic> (2010) <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/msp/MSP_4th-Sep-English.pdf">http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/msp/MSP_4th-Sep-English.pdf</ext-link>> at 26 July 2010.</p></fn><fn id="fn131"><p><sup>131)</sup> Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices, <italic>Organisation</italic> <<ext-link ext-link-type="url" xlink:href="http://dacnet.nic.in/cacp/">http://dacnet.nic.in/cacp/</ext-link>> at 26 July 2010.</p></fn><fn id="fn132"><p><sup>132)</sup> Ibid 102.</p></fn><fn id="fn133"><p><sup>133)</sup> Amartya Sen, <italic>Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity</italic> (Picador, 2005) 215; Blustein, above n 128, 189.</p></fn><fn id="fn134"><p><sup>134)</sup> Ibid Sen; Blustein.</p></fn><fn id="fn135"><p><sup>135)</sup> World Bank, ‘<italic>Agriculture for Development: World Development Report 2008</italic>’ (Report, World Bank, 2007) 33, 116.</p></fn><fn id="fn136"><p><sup>136)</sup> Kim and Penm, above n 21, 686-687.</p></fn><fn id="fn137"><p><sup>137)</sup> Athukorala, above n 18, 33.</p></fn><fn id="fn138"><p><sup>138)</sup> Pursell, Gulati and Gupta, above n 20.</p></fn><fn id="fn139"><p><sup>139)</sup> USITC, above n 54, F-13, (original footnote omitted).</p></fn><fn id="fn140"><p><sup>140)</sup> <italic>Green shoots</italic>, above n 21.</p></fn><fn id="fn141"><p><sup>141)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn142"><p><sup>142)</sup> Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, <italic>Foreign Trade Policy</italic> – <italic>1st September 2004 – 31st March 2009</italic> (2006) Preamble – Context, 7.</p></fn><fn id="fn143"><p><sup>143)</sup> Trade Policy Review, above n 21, 103.</p></fn><fn id="fn144"><p><sup>144)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn145"><p><sup>145)</sup> Ibid.</p></fn><fn id="fn146"><p><sup>146)</sup> M. Rafiqul Islam and Md. Rizwanul Islam, ‘The Global Food Crisis and Lacklustre Agricultural Trade Liberalisation: Demystifying their Nexus Underpinning Reform’ (2009) 10(5) <italic>Journal of World Investment & Trade</italic>, 679, 696.</p></fn></fn-group></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges</title></titleInfo><name type="personal" displayLabel="corresp"><namePart type="given">Shawkat</namePart><namePart type="family">Alam</namePart><affiliation>LLB (Hons) (Rajshahi), LLM (Dhaka), PhD (Macquarie); Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Centre for International and Environmental Law, Macquarie University Sydney, Australia, Email: shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: shawkat.alam@mq.edu.au</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Pundarik</namePart><namePart type="family">Mukhopadhya</namePart><affiliation>BEc (Hons) India, MEc India, PhD, NSW; Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia, Email: pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: pundarik.mukhopadhaya@mq.edu.au</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Md. Rizwanul</namePart><namePart type="family">Islam</namePart><affiliation>LLB (Hons) (Dhaka), LLM (National University of Singapore), PhD (Macquarie) Assistant Professor, School of Law, BRAC University, Bangladesh, Email: rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: rizwanuli@alumni.nus.edu.sg</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Martinus Nijhoff Publishers</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Leiden</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2013</dateIssued><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">2013</dateCreated><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2013</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract>In 2007, Australia and India began a joint feasibility study to assess the prospect of an Australia-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Agriculture will be a crucial negotiation point in any such FTA. Agriculture is a key sector of the Australian economy, and an important and lucrative export, with more than half of the sector’s output exported. The scope of increased domestic demand in agriculture is limited for a significant segment of the sector. Therefore, sustained growth of the industry requires new export markets to be opened. This paper will analyse the prospects of boosting agricultural exports from Australia via the proposed FTA. This paper will assess the tariff and non-tariff barriers in agriculture in India and critically assess how an FTA could reduce these barriers. The benefits of increased liberalisation of agricultural trade in India will also be discussed to demonstrate the mutually beneficial opportunities that reduced trade barriers could provide.</abstract><subject><genre>keywords</genre><topic>India</topic><topic>Australia</topic><topic>free trade agreements</topic><topic>WTO</topic><topic>trade in agriculture</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>The Journal of World Investment & Trade</title><subTitle>Law, Economics, Politics</subTitle></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>JWIT</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">1660-7112</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">2211-9000</identifier><part><date>2013</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>14</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>1</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>167</start><end>197</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1163/22119000-01401006</identifier><identifier type="href">22119000_014_01_S06_text.pdf</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© 2013 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>BRILL Journals</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods></metadata><annexes><json:item><extension>jpeg</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>image/jpeg</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB/annexes/jpeg</uri></json:item></annexes><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Agronomie/explor/SisAgriV1/Data/Istex/Corpus
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 000706 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Istex/Corpus/biblio.hfd -nk 000706 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Wicri/Agronomie
|area= SisAgriV1
|flux= Istex
|étape= Corpus
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:C9FE16376E2A78F7E7F1B60333272E3FB02ABCAB
|texte= The Australia India Proposed Free Trade Agreement and Trade in Agriculture: Opportunities and Challenges
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.28. |  |