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Assent: Not a Compelling Problem —A Response to J. F. Keenan

Identifieur interne : 000614 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000613; suivant : 000615

Assent: Not a Compelling Problem —A Response to J. F. Keenan

Auteurs : Richard J. Barrett

Source :

Irish Theological Quarterly [ 0021-1400 ] ; 1993-12.

RBID : ISTEX:F0CBB0954E2EB054541B48A4E4D5E91FD859734E

English descriptors

Teeft :
- Acta apostolicae sedis, Active magisterium, Assent, Authoritative teaching, Bishop thomas, Broad band, Canon, Cardinal ratzinger, Catholic church, Catholic universities, Centesimus annus, Christian community, Compelling assent, Concrete determinations, Concrete norms, Contemporary theologians, Cursory glance, Dieu, Dignitatis humanae, Doctrina fidei, Droits, Ecclesial context, Ecclesiastical authority, Ecclesiastical office, Gentium, Higher studies, Incarnate model, Infallible definition, Infallible teaching authority, Iusiurandum fidelitatis, John paul, Keenan, Kiely, Kohlberg, Legitimate pluralism, Liberal individualism, Liberal individualist philosophy, Lumen, Lumen gentium, Magisterial, Magisterium, Many people, Mature person, Modern society, Moral choices, Moral development, Moral discourse, Moral doctrine, Moral domain, Moral reasoning, Moral theology, Notre dame, Oath, Official statements, Parental, Parental model, Pastoral magisterium, Paulist press, Pope john paul, Primary object, Private sphere, Religious assent, Religious submission, Roman pontiff, Second paragraph, Secondary object, Semantic history, Simple structure, Sont ensemble, Specific acts, Studia canonica, Subjective dimension, Subjective dimensions, Teaching authority, Teaching office, Teaching role, Theologian, Thomas aquinas, Vast majority, Vatican.

Url:

https://api.istex.fr/ark:/67375/M70-C44WMQG5-7/fulltext.pdf

DOI: 10.1177/002114009305900402

Links to Exploration step

ISTEX:F0CBB0954E2EB054541B48A4E4D5E91FD859734E

Le document en format XML

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<meta-value>264 Assent: Not a Compelling Problem —A Response to J. F. Keenan SAGE Publications, Inc.1993DOI: 10.1177/002114009305900402 Richard J.Barrett Introduction In a well-documented argument, Fr Keenan ("Compelling Assent: Magisterium, Conscience and Oaths" in ITQ 57/3 (1991) 209-27) turns the tables of the theologian-magisterium relationship and rather than focus on avenues of dissent or assent available to the theologian, he invites us to evaluate avenues of proclamation open to the magisterium. He argues that its primary competence is a contribution to the formation of consciences, ostensibly an activity which has an objective and a subjective dimension, rather than laying down particular judgments about right or wrong to which the faithful are required to assent. He cites the valuable research into moral development of L. Kohlberg to indicate that the alternative approach to magisterium, that of obedience, suggests a parental model which, potentially at least, restricts the believer to an immature stage of moral awareness. Fr Keenan is, however, careful to distance his treatment from the more obvious pitfalls of American liberal philosophy, which, he remarks, tends to depict conscience as an instrument for the defence of the liberty of the individual, a liberty which amounts to a freedom from rather than a freedom for the legitimate claims of conscience. In this he stands apart from such a tradition and identifies himself with a formidable array of critics of the presumption that Americans are specially competent to deal with the complexities surrounding the conscience. Moreover, with laudable and, might I say, uncommon openness, he cites an example of a lack of this sensitivity in the attempted imposition of concrete norms on the faithful following the pastoral The Challenge of Peace. This example, he argues, belies four common assumptions made in theological writing today: (a) only conservatives compel assent and exercise authority excessively; (b) only the Vatican errs on the side of intolerance; (c) Americans are more sensitive to issues of intolerance; (d) only theology professors are objects of the magisterium's intolerance (op. cit., p. 211). In this and many respects Fr Keenan's article represents a step forward in theological discussion; it brings to light official intolerance for ostensibly non-conservative ends, thereby opens up the deeper question of the rightful use of ecclesiastical authority, poses the problem of the different magisterial values which need to be applied to hierarchical statements and provides us with the contemporary lived background concerning the question of assent as related to two recent acts of the magisterium, the profession of faith and oath of loyalty. 265 The following observations are not primarily designed to justify specific acts of the magisterium, like the profession of faith, or to show why the expression compelling assent may be inappropriate to describe their raison d'etre; rather they are essentially directed to contextualising the modern post-conciliar exercise of magisterial authority in the Church and to interpreting them as authoritative attempts to keep alive a tradition in a fragmenting world. Notes on conscience and freedom With Fr Keenan one applauds Alasdair Maclntyre's work After Virtue. It is a sobering portrayal of contemporary moral discourse and as a "state of the nation" analysis offers moral theologians within the Catholic Church much food for thought. There is, however, more than one way of interpreting Maclntyre's work, and more than one way of composing a Catholic response to the situation it describes. One could, moreover, interpret it, particularly as it relates to the function of magisterium in our time, in a rather different way from that of Fr Keenan. MacIntyre does not speak of pluralism, he speaks of fragmentation. Pluralism assumes an under-pinning unity; much in the manner that a multi-cultural approach to education assumes that the component cultures are using the same logical tools; hence the possibility of comparison. MacIntyre's thesis, however, is that such a unity no longer exists in moral discourse: What we possess [...] are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use the key expressions. But we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality.2 2 A cursory glance at the newspapers in the West over the last years would verify that this picture - true of moral philosophy - could also be applied to the disintegration of large geo-political systems in the North of the globe. Political society, and Western systems are by no means completely immune to the malaise, is apparently coming apart at the juridical and moral seams, and much of it has to do with questions of rights, of freedom, of law and of conscience. The new world order hailed only a few years ago as a dividend of the end of the Cold War seems to have brought with it a whole new set of ethical, social and economic challenges which are too various and universal to be met by shifts in political policy. Fr Keenan cites some examples of rights-talk from America; and discusses it in relation to the active magisterium. If one thing emerges from MacIntyre's work, it is that the simple assertion of rights in political and legal discourse can have very different meanings on the lips of 266 different governments, entities, public bodies or individuals.3 The employment of such rhetoric no longer suffices as a common ground for moral discourse. This is MacIntyre's insight: so much so, that he compares the actual condition of society today to a collection of shipwrecked strangers pursuing their own interests under minimal constraints.4 We are strangers to each other and we are speaking different languages. This is occasionally verified in the relationship of theologians to magisterium.5 It is my conviction that underestimating the role of law in determining the mores of many people in and out of the Church has led to a certain embourgeoisement of the Christian notion of conscience and the abandonment of the legislative sphere as an important channel for the evangelization (or authentic liberation) of mankind.6 This forms the remote context for the interplay between magisterium and conscience of the believer today, and first of all we need to recall the place of norms in the Church. We may begin by taking up Fr Keenan's citation of Lawrence Kohlberg's important study on Moral Development.' He suggests that as a result of these findings (75% of people live by rules and regulations [stage 4],' 25% live by ideals [stage 5]9) we - or rather the magisterium - should be gearing people for stage 5 rather than stage 4; i.e. to rely more on freedom than on rules and regulations. As I say, this is laudable at one level and it concurs with the way these findings have been frequently interpreted by the broad band of contemporary moral theologians up to recently. It does assume, however, as does the greater part of Fr Keenan's treatment, that the function of magisterium is essentially geared to the maintenance of those with a very high degree of moral reasoning.'° This seems to miss an essential element of magisterial activity. If I may be permitted to cite another of Fr Keenan's sources: Many adults do, in fact, depend on law, tradition or convention for their moral reasons, because most adults do not get beyond stage 4 of Kohlberg's scale. Tradition, law and convention are things which seem to have undergone a rather abrupt devaluation in the recent past. What would seem to have happened then, for the most part, is a change of content without a change of structure; I mean, the substitution of a new and less conscious adherence to new conventions, replacing an adherence to older conventions, which at least had the advantage of being more easily recognised as conventions or traditions (italics mine, the significance of which will become apparent)." I It seems that Fr Keenan's invitation to jettison a rhetoric of "practical judgments about right or wrong", because, to adopt Kohlberg's terminology, we need to attain stage 5 in our moral development, amounts to climbing to the top of the spiritual castle, forgetting that one arrived 267 there in part due to rule-morality, kicking away the stool and then expecting others to make a qualitative and discontinuous leap up to the same stage; an attitude which, if one may continue the allusion, is strikingly dissonant with stage 5 of moral reasoning. 12 The fact that the vast majority of people have not attained such a high level, however, would invite three observations: (a) this situation may be read positively or negatively; but it is not so inherently; laws and conventions are a necessary phase - but only a phase - on the road to integral living; (b) the vast majority of people depend on them; (c) since the magisterium is a pastoral office, it is called to speak to everybody, not just the 25% (and scripture is full of injunctions to do so). In sum, a pastoral magisterium cannot, in this world, be content with dusting off the 75% of its hearers on the grounds that they represent the moral chaff of society. For this reason the activity of the magisterium of the Catholic Church is peculiarly characterised both by "practical judgments about right and wrong" and inviting people to go beyond them to a life of communion with the Father in Christ and the Spirit. To put it in the decency of a dead language, we would say that it is not so much a question of aut ... aut as of et ... et. A pastoral magisterium cannot afford to be partisan. On a more philosophical note, in common with the Kohlbergian scale and much of projected moral theology of the proportionalist school, Fr Keenan's position seems to be based upon a simple two-term model of moral choices. Would that moral choices were so simple. Instead, as Fr B. Kiely writes: Kohlberg and his colleagues have done much research on moral development and found that the moral reasoning of most adults does not rise beyond a conventional level [...] since the problems posed in his test have a relatively simple structure; limits on reasoning- capacity should be more evident in more complex situations.13 The simple structure which Fr Kiely reports here is a two-term model of relations between persons and a good or right, something common in the very legal systems of a liberal democratic culture which Fr Keenan questions and which Kohlberg's cases come from. 14 This two-term model is, as Fr Kiely suggests, a very simple one; one which does not adequately describe the complex situations in which many moral choices, especially those of Christians in modern technocratic societies, are normally made. 15 Here I wish only to point out that, while Fr Keenan's treatment berates the predominant philosophical trend of the United States for neglecting the authentic claims of the common good on the conscience, this approach does not get to the heart of the problem; invoking the claims of the common good on an unchanged notion of right, in the current climate, is tantamount to starving a cold and feeding a fever; it makes a cure less rather than more probable.16 268 Somewhere between Aquinas and Suarez, jus, which is the Latin ancestor of the modern notion of "right", assumed a subjective meaning, which unhinged it from its interpersonal sense in which it was cast as the actuation of justice in a relationship between persons, or the pursuit of the just thing; therefore, a three-term relation. 17 For Aquinas the moral law was a means of actuating a virtue (or doing the just thing: Greek, to dikaion); a fundamentally three-term model of the moral relationship.18 Thus laws before the rubicon appear rather like a manual for one's computer - designed to help the user get the maximum out of it; after this point laws resemble rules posted on a prison notice-board - designed to keep bad people from getting too great a taste for freedom.19 The two approaches are fundamentally different, even if they appear to share the same coinage and today appear to indulge in the same language.2° The second, "prison-notice" approach lies at the heart of liberal individualist philosophy and society;21 it is not shared by a Catholic reading of to dikaion as it is summed up in the objective aspect of jus, 22 pursued in the contemporary notion of "fundamental human rights" and applied, in recent papal teaching on development, to the notion of solidarity.23 For the liberal individualist, freedom is the absence of duty, simply and wholly; it is not related to the good but to the will of the individual. Here lies the raison d'être of the later Hobbesian maxim auctoritas non veritas facit legem: laws and rules essentially do little more than keep freedoms from getting out of hand; hence the need to keep them to a minimum. According to this optic, however, self-realisation can only be achieved by maximising my options and minimising the options of others; this vision has its attractions for the free-market side of economic theory (one recalls, for instance, the anti-social maxims of Thatcherism; there is no such thing as society).24 A right, therefore, becomes an inviolable faculty of exercising choices; the larger the range, the greater the freedom. So individuals in order to exercise their rights must minimise the rights of others. And here we begin to touch on the economic violence inherent in systems built upon liberal individualism.25 Law is therefore always seen with the prison optic; it performs no positive role; it merely limits freedoms.26 There are three ways therefore of dealing with the existence of norms in the Christian Church: (a) one contests them along the lines of the prison model above; (b) one tries to observe them with a view to the Pauline principle, for the sake of the weaker brother; or (c) one reinter- prets them as instances of a disposition which is being required rather than a particular form of behaviour; it is the disposition that counts rather than the specific act. If it is true that the minimisation of concrete norms is characteristic of a sort of bourgeois Western ideology which seeks to maximise the individual freedoms of the powerful against the rights of the weak, this need not necessarily be the case within the Christian community. The 269 minimisation of concrete rules and norms is desirable and is often the sign of genuine progress. As Kohlberg demonstrates, it is characteristic of the morally mature person to argue from principle and not from rules. Nevertheless, whatever the ideal was, today it is quickly diverted by the ideology we have outlined and steered down a siding to await eventual extinction. If Alasdair MacIntyre is correct (and every indication suggests that he is) in asserting that we live in a world which has lost the notion of virtue, it may well do to remember that for St Thomas Aquinas the most important virtue was prudence. To put it in the form of a question : is it prudent for the Church to refuse to provide concrete guidelines for the faithful in the midst of contemporary confusion, information manipulation and a choice-orientated notion of right, which together militate against the reception of gospel values? Indeed is it not precisely for this reason that the magisterium is called to exercise an active and concrete function, serving both the gospel and man? For the hypothetical fully mature person the gospel alone with a parenetic magisterial tradition might suffice; but for the weak, the confused, the "ordinary" Christian, gospel values need to be incarnated and expressed in norms.2' The practicality of the approach In the context we have described, it is possible that Fr Keenan's approach may run into its first obstacle: impracticality. When applied to concrete moral dilemmas it certainly offers hope for some; but in the main it tends to assume an inordinately high faculty of moral reasoning in the people entrusted to the care of pastors. Moreover, behind it lies not only the question whether the magisterium ought to teach specific moral norms but whether it is even able to do so. Certainly the Fathers of Vatican II accepted that the Church "cannot always have an answer to every question" but there is a radical difference between the recognition of the need to encourage legitimate pluralism over undefined issues which do not threaten the deposit of faith and the radical claims of, for example, proportionalism, a system which, as B. Kiely remarks. would have a greater claim to practicality if we were able to see the future extensively and in detail; if our spontaneous evaluation of reflexive and other consequences were always appropriate; if our attitudes had no utilitarian and ego-defensive functions threatening the value-expressive function; if (in Lonergan's terms) we were fully converted, free from bias, and quite authentic; and if we were never inhibited by the fear of loss attendant upon doing our duty. These conditions are not fulfilled in reality. Even if they were fulfilled, the first step in the proportionalist approach, the moral neutralisation of the act-as-means, would still be a problem [...] but a problem that, at least, would be less likely to cause practical confusion in the ideally endowed beings which we, unfortunately, are not.28 270 With Fr Keenan, this author too concurs with Klaus Demmer as presented, but I would draw his attention to Fr Demmer's affirmation that Jesus' anti-pharisaical mentality did not per se exclude the possibility and indeed the necessity of a "juridical" function of magisterium.29 Certainly Church law, unlike that of the pharisees, is informed by compassion for the sinner, and even its strictures of the severity of excommunication represent an ultimate attempt, not to exclude sinners from some pale of salvation, but to draw them to final reconciliation. With Fr Demmer, therefore, one notes that Paul, the apostle of freedom, is also the apostle of the obedience of faith, an optic recently adopted by one scripture scholar in a very nuanced treatment of St Paul's teaching and the problems posed by the Old Law.3° The obedience required by the New Law is not one which conditions the acceptance of faith in Christ but flows from it.31 Precisely here then is to be found the inception point of our et ... et, the ideal of tomorrow ... and the present reality of today, the subjective dimension and the objective dimension of the formation of conscience: since the magisterium proclaims Christ's teaching and grace between a first and a second coming, it carries out this function to a world, yes already redeemed, but yet still in need of full redemption, in the gia e non ancora of his kingdom, passing through a city in which the voices of conflicting ideologies and values strain for the attention of the embattled cives. It is interesting that, despite rejecting a parental model of a magisterium-faithful relationship, Fr Keenan cites Klaus Demmer's approach to law, which itself puts the finality of Jesus' coming in terms of participating in a parental relationship with the Father. Surely one should not be entirely inimical to a parental model of magisterium; it would appear to offer a better pedigree than most as one of the preferred leitmotivs of Christian soteriology. Nevertheless, one understands the problem. It is symptomatic of the "critical" ideology (which, however, is selective of its objects and uncritical towards its sources) of an alienated individual-orientated society that in asserting the absolute autonomy of the unattached, it takes a jaundiced view of parent-child analogies with regard to religious authority. When such analogies appear in the Christian community, therefore, it is easy to understand them not as examples of parental love but of paternalism; to regard the language and idiom of "mother" Church not as a guarantee of maternal solicitude but as the inappropriate demands of an obsessive parent; to see in the talya of Matthew 18:4 not so much the child-like trust of the disciple as the childish credulity of the dependent. An ideology which likewise collapses classical virtues into modern hang-ups easily reduces humility to subservience and meekness to spinelessness. It is, however, wisdom (not necessarily synonymous with intelligence) to see the magisterium as teacher as well as prophet, its norms as liberating from the tyranny of subjectivism, its function destined for today as well as tomorrow, its role to inform the 271 consciences of the faithful both in its objective and in its subjective dimensions and its finality to expound the mysteries hidden for all ages. For the one Lord who prophesied Peter's failure is the same who predicted that after it he would strengthen his brothers, and the same who thereafter exhorted him by the sea of Tiberias to look after his sheep. He meant those without a shepherd. He meant that they would, at times, need one. So is the obedience of faith the mere slavish acceptance of a parental model of authority? The parental model, if it is too difficult to accept, may also give way to the challenge-response model of contemporary moral discourse. Professing one's faith (as distinct from compelling assent) may sometimes require concrete manifestations of faith and trust. Speaking not only for the specialist but also for the lay-person, there are matters in this age of increasing specialisation which one may have neither the time nor the resources to approfondire. The believer can be grateful that statements in a positive way are proposed by an active magisterium which help clarify the issues, related to the unity of faith, even if they do not do so related to the legitimate pluralism of theology. While not wishing to emphasise too strongly the principle involved in "pluralism of theology - unity of faith", and certainly not as far as a dialectic, it seems reasonable to expect the voice of faith to speak with a certain unity. While noting too that the semantic history of the term magisterium may not necessarily involve us in a univocal definition of the term, a pastoral chair in the officium praelationis of Thomas' time performed a function of doctrinal vigilance which remained distinct from the cathedra magisterialis.32 This teaching office, one would add, with F. A. Sullivan and H. Kfng, commenting on Didache 15, 1, was in the early Church distinct from the prophetic office, and not altogether without reason.33 One cannot deny the value of the latter. I do not think, however, that one can be collapsed into the other. The teaching office is not just about tomorrow but about today; it is not just about the eschaton; it must also say something about life now; it is not provided just to hint at the celestial but also to clear this terrestrial pane through which it all seems so dim. The Irish readers of this review will be well aware of the story of the foundation of Mount Melleray, in which payment for land was promised tomorrow - tomorrow, something which, by definition, never comes. Fr Keenan's approach to magisterium could leave the faithful clutching at the straws of a hypothetical tomorrow when the farmstead is being sold from under their feet today. Theology or theologies? The invocation of "the theology mandated by Vatican II" to justify Fr Keenan's approach causes one some concern, for I believe that the Coun- cil's mandate was not such as to sanction one theology. In fact, and this 272 seems to be verified by a cursory glance at the Acta Synodalia, the Fathers drew from differing - even conflicting - theologies insights which could be useful to highlight aspects of the truths of faith relevant to our time. The finished products of Vatican II often represent the carefully honed positions of opinio communior rather than definitions of the doctrina credenda. Moreover, Vatican II was a council of predominantly pastoral rather than dogmatic purpose, notwithstanding the constitutions Lumen Gentium and Dei Verbum. This is not to relativise the importance of the dogmatic constitutions but simply to underline that its doctrine did not attain that level of definition which some perhaps would have liked and others of a different point of view today would prefer. Differing theologies (rather than one theology), therefore, vied with one another in the redaction of texts; many of the final drafts of the documents represent a nuanced balancing act between two or more schools of thought. One thinks of the question of potestas sacra, the sacramentality of the diaconate, the question of benefices, the notion of ecclesiastical office, and the doctrine of marriage. Therefore, were we to respond to "the theology mandated by the council" we would have to ask: which theology? The confessionalism of Dignitatis Humanae 14 or the separationism of Dignitatis Humanae I I? The sacerdotalism of Lumen Gentium 10 or the mono-episcopalism of Lumen Gentium 25? The clericalism of the definition of the laity in Lumen Gentium 31 or the laicism of Apostolicam Actuositatem 2? The sedentary model of Lumen Gentium 22 or the itinerant model of Ad Gentes 4? The word-orientated ministry of Presbyterorum Ordinis 4 or the sacrifice- orientated notion of paragraph 2? The optimism of Gaudium et Spes I or the realism of Gaudium et Spes 13?34 Clearly this is a very dialectical way of posing the problem, a dialectic that one would not necessarily subscribe to. It does help to show, however, that Vatican II is the repository not of one theology but of many, and that today many theologies of Church, of ministry and of mission continue to vie with one another regarding its interpretation. Positive and negative exercises of magisterium As a post-conciliar child one would tend in the main to welcome the positive nature of magisterial guidance which has characterised official statements since Vatican II and one would not share Fr Keenan's pessimism as to what this means for the academic agenda of theology. The quotation from the pontificate of Pius XII is quite adroit, but today theologians do have the choice whether to make one or other act of the magisterium a central part of their research. If one must recall the cases of Kfng, Curran and Drewermann, one should also recall that the broad band of theologians do not quite share the same make-or-break positions adopted by these theologians. Often individual theologians who in 273 conscience feel they may no longer share the official position of the Catholic Church are not constrained to retain office with the burden of a conscience in conflict. For this reason, unlike Fr Keenan, I do not think that the requirements of Canon 833, n. 7, amount to compelling assent; one prefers to see them as professions of the unity of faith upon which legitimate theological pluralism can flourish. As for theologians spending an inordinate amount of energy on the discussion of specific magisterial statements, I think one should recall that the theologian is not constrained to write or publish on them; this is a matter of choice. In any case, if theology is to be described as fides quaerens intellectum then it would appear to be reasonable that the vox fidei totius communitatis should have a significant contribution to make to the theological project. In this scenario theology is neither reduced to playing handmaid to the magisterium nor does it become unhinged from the community of faith that it is designed to serve. Both magisterium and theologian are subject to the Word of God, and both vocations are realised within the context of the call to preach the gospel, expound the mysteries of faith and deepen one's understanding of the Word. One may perhaps also apply this to the raison d'etre of the profession of faith. While some canonists and theologians object to additions of a certain magisterial value to what is ostensibly a profession of faith, one could suggest that a less rigid approach is called for. It seems reasonable to expect that the vast body of official statements which do not touch upon matters of faith directly but which are important for the Church's self-understanding in our time should require some commitment from those wishing to assume responsible office in the Church. It is important not to underemphasise the freedom and personal responsibility which this means. Vatican II itself is no exception to this rule; surely we would advise a commitment to the teachings of the dogmatic constitution Lumen Gentium or that document which arguably represents the most important development in the history of dogma in our time, Dignitatis Humanae? What of the pastoral constitution Gaudium et Spes or the ecumenical document Redintegratio Unitatis? Given the unwillingness of followers of Mgr Lefebvre to accept these documents, it seems both prudent and proportionately justified to exact a commitment to teachings of the ordinary and extraordinary magisterium in our time from those who will be educators, teachers and pastors. From the point of view of the faithful this much we have a right to. Such an expectation does not amount to compelling assent, as such, but since the granting and acceptance of ecclesiastical office is a matter of freedom on the part of both parties, such a condition imposed by the legislator simply represents an assurance that precisely the agenda of Vatican II, which J. F. Keenan cites, will continue to be applied in all areas of Church life. If a profession of faith is to be educed for our time we should expect it to articulate the more positive approach to the formulation of 274 authoritative teaching which was signalled by Vatican II. The teachings of Vatican II, it appears to this author, require from us a response more positive than is perhaps implied in the negative formulae of Trent and Vatican I. While some theologians may be happier with the negative style of magisterium exercised once upon a time, I would tend to concur with Paul VI that it is not enough to say what one must not believe; it is everything to outline what one should believe. This is not the parental model of the pre-pluralist era; this is keeping alive the tradition in an age of fragmentation. It is not enough simply to outlaw aspects of the unacceptable face of unredeemed humanity; it is an important function of magisterium today to point to Christ and to outline, positively, what it can mean to be fully human, fully alive. The profession of faith Members of the Christian faithful who teach a theological discipline in any faculty (quibuslibet institutis) of higher studies are required by canon 812 to have a mandate (read "canonical mission") from the competent ecclesiastical authority, usually the diocesan bishop, and, according to the general law of canon 833, 7, and the particular law regarding Catholic universities and institutes, Sapientia Christiana 27, §1, to have made a profession of faith.35 The new profession of faith requires not just the minimal assent of faith, but, by adding three new paragraphs related to different exercises of the Church's teaching authority, seems to require a commitment which has as its object other products of official teaching. Yet surely a profession of faith should restrict itself to matters of faith? Here begins the theological conundrum. Since in canon 833, n. 7, and SC 27, §1, no mention is made of an oath of fidelity (iusiurandum fidelitatis), this poses a canonical conundrum. Objections As many different objections appeared against the profession and oath, it seems appropriate to outline them generically under some broad headings: Theological: A number of English-speaking scholars felt that the mixing of two objects, articles of faith and of common doctrine, in a profession of faith was problematic.36 Others argued that the requirement of an oath as such seemed to contradict the teaching of the gospel, in which Jesus states that anything more than "yes" or "no" comes from the devil, and that oaths have not always been well seen by the Fathers of the Church.3' Promulgation: The Profession and Oath appeared first in the 25 February 1989 edition of L'Osser -vatore Romano. This did not fulfil the legal requirements for promulgation. It appeared some weeks later in an 275 edition of the Acta Apostolicae Sedis dated 5 January 1989. In both the Osservatore and the Acta it was described as an "Act" of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Canonists asked what constitutes an "act" of a Congregation? Is it a "law", an "instruction", a "decree"? What also hampered its reception was the fact that it appeared without a signature, therefore constituting a "nameless document".38 Competence: The profession of faith appears to have constituted an executive decree, and as such the CDF enjoys competence to issue it (cann. 31 and 32), the oath of fidelity seems to have constituted a new obligation and therefore a general decree coming under the terms of canon 30 and not canon 32. But, according to Pastor Bonus 18, as from I March 1989, Roman dicasteries had no competence to issue new laws unless signed by the Roman Pontiff. No such approval appeared in the case above, though in a rescript dated 19 September 1989 Cardinal Ratz- inger explained that papal approval in forma specifica was given through a Rescriptum ex Audientia SS.mi on I July 1989 and the rescript was thereafter to be transmitted (ad foras datur) or published, which occurred in the 7 October 1989 issue of Acta Apostolicae Sedis.39 Up to this announcement the oath seems to have had no force. Presentation: Furthermore the "Nota di presentazione" that appeared in L'Osservatore Romano and thereafter in Acta Apostolicae Sedis to introduce the profession and oath states that the oath of fidelity is to be sworn by all who take office. This observation, however, is difficult to reconcile with the strict terms of the categories of persons identified in canon 833, which refers to the Profession of Faith. From a legal point of view the "Nota di presentazione" has no juridic force; while attached to the professio, it bears no signature which would identify its author, and therefore its juridic value as a public document is seriously compromised. Compelling assent or avoiding dissent? It would seem entirely appropriate that Christians profess their faith; this is done regularly, at specific moments in the liturgical year and every time they are gathered into church to celebrate the- Sunday Eucharist. In this connection therefore the profession of faith comes as no surprise. Since theologians receive their vocation as theologians within an ecclesial context it would seem fair that they express their faith one with the Church they serve.4° The ecclesial context of this vocation naturally brings with it a certain accountability to the voice of the community of faith in tradition, as represented by the magisterium, a principle which forms the central preoccupation of the CDF's Instruction on the Ecclesial Vocation of the Theologian (1990).41 The new profession indicates grades of response required of candidates by the Church authorities for different types of doctrinal formulae. Beginning in the second paragraph with' a response characterised by 276 "firm faith" (firma fide), thereafter to one of "embracing and holding" (teneor) and finally to an attitude of religious assent (obsequium), the profession envisages different objects for each response. The first paragraph is not new; it simply repeats the credal formula of the 1967 profession. The second paragraph is new. It touches upon the primary object of infallible teaching authority in the Church, that is to say, doctrines educed from the Word of God which concern divinely revealed truth. I also believe with firm faith all those things which are contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down, and as they are proposed by the Church, whether by a solemn judgement or by its ordinary and universal magisterium, as divinely revealed and to be believed as such.42 The formula firma fide refers to the assent of faith required toward "doctrines that have been revealed by God, and thus are part of the deposit of faith entrusted to the Church".43 Not all such doctrines may be found explicitly in the Bible, but "they must be such as the Church has come to recognise through her growth in understanding the sacred deposit committed to her".44 The object of this act of faith presents itself in two ways: firstly, in reference either to a matter of faith or to a matter of mores - i.e., the deposit of faith may include not only matters of faith but also matters of morality;45 secondly, under two juridical forms, either as a "solemn definition"46 or as doctrine taught by the "ordinary and universal magisterium". We know from canon 749, §3, that solemn definitions of an infallible kind may not be presumed to be such unless manifestly so defined (Infallibiliter definita nulla intelligitur doctrina nisi id manifesto constiterit). 47 This would seem to rule out the possibility, for example, that the document Humanae Vitae amounted to an infallible definition, whatever one concludes regarding the substance of the teaching contained therein, since nowhere in the text itself is it manifestly stated to be an infallible definition. The third paragraph of the Profession states: I also firmly accept and hold all those things concerning doctrine about faith or morals which are definitively proposed by the same Church.48 This grade of response does not refer to the assent of faith, because it does not touch upon the primary object of the Church's teaching authority (things divinely revealed) but upon its secondary object, i.e. those doctrines regarding faith or morals which are not in themselves revealed but are required for the safeguarding or exposition of what is contained in the deposit of faith.49 The relationship of these doctrines to revealed truth must be such that the Church will need to speak about the 277 matter in order to defend or explain the primary object of supreme teaching authority.5° The terms "accept and hold" differ from the expression in the previous paragraph firma fide, because a pronouncement upon some matter which may not be in itself revealed by God is not proposed for belief by an act of divine faith, either at the level of the truth of the proposition itself or the authority of the Church proposing it.51 The fourth paragraph runs as follows: Furthermore, I adhere with religious submission of will and intellect to the doctrines which either the Roman Pontiff or the College of Bishops propose, when they exercise their authoritative teaching office, even though they do not intend to proclaim those doctrines by a definitive act.52 As regards the object, this refers to those doctrines of faith and morals which are taught by Pope or College exercising their authoritative teaching office. Regarding the response of the faithful, we should note that that term obsequium crops up again in the phrase intellectus et volun- tatis obsequium religiosum. It comes from Lumen Gentium 25, for which reason Fr Sullivan evidently prefers the same translation as that of the CLSB&I from the Code of Canon Law, i.e. "religious submission of mind and will", which resonates well with translations of the conciliar document. In the same article, however, he translates Lumen Gentium's phrase religioso animi obsequio as "religious assent of soul", of which the formula above is apparently an explanation. So are we to conclude that assent is synonymous with submission? Fr Sullivan clarifies that for the sake of argument he is accepting the Abbott and Flannery translations of the term in the documents of Vatican II, and the CLSB&I's translation of the same from the Code of Canon Law, i.e. as religious submission. Fr Orsy instead prefers to distinguish the subjective and objective poles of what is fundamentally an attitude. In the first, emphasis is on a disposition of loyalty or respect, in the second, on a response to certain acts of the magisterium.53 Fr Ombres prefers the term religious allegiance, 54 while Bishop Thomas distinguishes between the response due to the authority proposing the statement and the veracity of the statement itself; the first always required respect, the second is a matter of further theological reflections. 55 Bishop Thomas has, perhaps in a much more polarised fashion, highlighted the objective-subjective dimension of the response due to non-definitive but authoritative exercises of the magisterium. Fr Keenan is correct to observe the lack of agreement on the precise degree of assent designated by the term obsequium. From "respect" to "allegiance" to "submission" to "assent", the term conveys a wide range of possibilities. What is common in these various attributions among authors, however, is that the response of the Christian faithful is directed 278 (a) towards the authority and (b) towards the teaching proposed. The first accounts for the subjective tone of such designates as "allegiance" and "respect"; the second for the more objective tone of such designates as "assent" and "adherence". In one a disposition, in the other a specific act of intellect and will. I am not convinced, therefore, that a lack of agreement among scholars concerning the precise figure with which to identify the meaning of obsequium means we are justified in suspending our reponse to specific acts of the magisterium like the profession and oath.56 Nor am I convinced that emphasis on the subjective dimensions of obsequium's range of meanings absolves us from coming to terms with its more objective dimension. A disposition of respect or loyalty must be concretised in specific acts of assent and adherence lest the response of the Christian faithful to the authoritative but not definitive acts of the magisterium be reduced to a very fluid solution of attitudes that never quite manage to converge and crystallise into specific responses. Summing up, therefore, one with F. A. Sullivan, we should recall that the response to non-definitive acts of authoritative teaching is certainly to be distinguished from the kinds of response featured in the previous two paragraphs of the professio fidei. The assent of faith directed to definitively revealed truth and the firm acceptance or embrace of what has been taught in a definitive way differ from the response required for non-definitive exercises of the Church's teaching authority.57 A distinction, even one described as fundamental, however, does not mean a division. The responses are deliberately set within the broadened parameters of a faith which has committed itself to listen to the pastors of Jesus Christ. The third grade of response, furthermore, should not be rendered so fluid that the Christian faithful are permitted to adopt a spectrum of responses which can range from religious assent, on the one hand, to "faithful dissent", on the other. I would suggest that this latter euphemism is only possible in a Church that divorces the ordinary from the extraordinary teaching activity of the magisterium and elevates the latter so far beyond its roots in the former, that, in the sensitised climate of modern liberal democracies, requiring assent to authoritative but non-definitive teachings seems tantamount to expecting the faithful to swear allegiance to a golden calf. Why the new terms of the profession of faith? The following reflections are not designed to be official rationes legum as it were for the profession of faith's new terms but they are simply offered as one possible explanation for the extended parameters of the formula. 279 An incarnate model of magisterium Looking at the matter theologically, we should not find the new obligations of the profession entirely surprising. Both from the point of view of the complexity of official statements and the very different responses required for them, it would seem appropriate to devise a more nuanced act of commitment to teachings of one kind or another. There is also the matter of the specific circumstances of the epoch in which we live. In a dis-incarnate model of magisterium the object of its activity may be cast as either a yesterday or a tomorrow, but never a today-reality. In an incarnate model, the exercise of the magisterium is for today; it is necessary precisely because today we live in a pluralist or, with Maclntyre, increasingly fragmented society; its object - to witness to a tradition. Thus, among the many voices which clamour for the attention of the Christian conscience, that of faith must be heard to speak with a certain clarity - even simplicity - acting, if I may allude to T. S. Eliot's Four Quartets, as a "still point in a turning universe". Dialectics in the post-conciliar context I have not mentioned theologies which do not appear, at least not explicitly as theologies, in the documents of Vatican II - the theological insights which emerged sometime after the Council and which became the subject of magisterial pronouncements. There were some very necessary theologies (a theology of the spirit, which made room for the visible and invisible aspects of the Church in a unified organic theory, and a theology of law) which did not achieve full or adequate treatment in the council documents. Must we assume that the worthy efforts of Paul VI in this respect are to be jettisoned? What about the vertical and horizontal aspects of the anthropologies worked out by Paul VI and John Paul II; are these too to be jettisoned? De facto these constituted efforts to provide an integrated vision of man and his relationship with God in the face of the strongly dialectical approach which gripped theology after the council. I would suggest that the prevalence of dialectical theologies in the post-conciliar period, in which gospel was opposed to law, charism to institution, mercy to justice, love to fear and Church to Christ, neither required nor advised doctrinal definitions as their corrective, but rather the ordinary exercises of the teaching office of the magisterium. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to exact a commitment to embrace the content of such teaching from those assuming responsible offices in the Church. Otherwise, without such an assurance the Christian community could become the subject of competing theologies, not only at a purely academic level, but since theology and praxis are so closely woven together, also at a pastoral level. In the vacuum left by the absence of an agreed adherence to the ordinary magisterium, bishop, presbyters and 280 deacons could find it increasingly difficult to administer the particular Church and present to the people of God a coherent statement of the teachings of the Church. Ecclesial office: a responsibility for others Occasionally the teaching of theology which comes into conflict with official authority is cast as a question of a "right to think" threatened by an oppressive authority. 58 The simple introduction of terms and models of debate from a civil forum into the delicate relationship between theologian and magisterium rarely helps in an objective inquiry into the respective responsibilities of theologians and pastors. This relationship is today, at least in official documents, cast in terms of responsibility. Academic freedom in the Church therefore is not a freedom from the claims of the fundamental rights of the faithful but a freedom for an integral presentation of faith.59 One should, furthermore, note that the provision of an ecclesiastical office or indeed a post which carries with it some standing as a "Catholic theologian" is a matter of discretion. The person accepting an office (i.e. professor of theology in an official institute) under the condition of making a profession of faith does so freely. I do not think it is straining the canonical situation to say that the Church does not compel assent, as Fr Keenan suggests; should the candidate feel that the terms of the profession or oath impose burdens which are unacceptable, then in conscience he probably should not accept the responsibilities implied in the post or office to be assumed. This position is by no means unreasonable; it preserves the integrity of the theologian and the pastoral security of the people of God.6° From a canonical point of view, given the presumption of law in favour of internal conformity of will to external solemnity, the consent of the candidate will be assumed to coincide with the external taking of the profession. Theologians who seek the added distinction of being "Catholic", therefore, willingly take on the responsibilities implied in an office that confers a concern for the pastoral good of the Christian faithful in full communion with the Catholic Church.61 General conclusion Fr Keenan's article has done us a service by opening up for frank discussion what is potentially a very delicate matter in the life of the Church. While one could provide different criteria for the evaluation of exercises of episcopal authority and a different approach to the question of the response due to certain types of magisterial statement, one must applaud the openness and delicacy with which a theologian - particularly one from a society that emphasises personal freedom - has treated the issue of conscience in its rapport with ecclesiastical authority. As a 281 response to the work of a noted theologian, one hopes that this set of comments has not misinterpreted Fr Keenan's work nor over-simplified his argument; it is offered as a contribution to a discussion, which, within the parameters of the required response of the faithful to the magisterium, remains an open one. 1. Cf. J. F. Keenan, op. cit., p. 209. 2. Cf. A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: U.N.D. Press, 1981) 232f. 3. R. A. McCormick, "The Search for Truth in the Catholic Context", America 155 (1986) 276-82; K. Rahner, "Orthodoxy and Freedom in Theology", Co 1971, n. 7, 90-105; id., "Theology and the Church's Teaching Authority after the Council", Authority (ed. F. J. Adelman, Chestnut Hill, 1974) 866-104; A. Russell, "Theology in Context and 'The Right to Think' in Three Contemporary Theologians: Gutiérrez, Dussel and Boff", Pacifica 2 (1989) 282-322. 4. MacIntyre states: "It is, from both standpoints [that of Nozick and Rawls], as though we had been shipwrecked on an uninhabited island with a group of other individuals, each of whom is a stranger to us and to all the others [...]. This individualistic view [...] contains within itself a certain note of realism about modern society; modern society is indeed often, at least in surface appearance, nothing but a collection of strangers, each pursuing his or her own interests under minimal constraints" (id., op. cit., p. 233). 5. Thus one way of teasing out the problem is to establish a hierarchy or economy of rights (cf. J. Cardinal Ratzinger, The Church, Ecumenism and Politics (Slough: St Paul's Publications, 1988), 202). 6. "Sachent donc ceux qui l'ignorent [i.e. les lois], sachent les enemies de Dieu et du genre humain, quelque nom qu'ils prennent, qu'entre le fort et le faible, entre le riche et le pauvre, entre le maitre et le serviteur, c'est la liberté qui opprime et la loi qui affranchit" (P. Lacordaire, Sermon a Notre Dame de Paris 1848; Ratzinger urges a co-ordinated response regarding Christian efforts to affect the legislature (cf. J. Cardinal Ratzinger, Threats to Life (London: CTS, 1991) 5f). 7. Cf. L. Kohlberg, Assessing Moral Stages: a manual (Harvard: Centre for Moral Development and Education, 1978-79). 8. The A4 stage, for example, "treats the good of the social system in a relatively concrete and letter-of-the-law manner" (cf. B. Kiely, Psychology and Moral Theology (Roma: P.U.G., 1987) 56). 9. Kiely states: "Moral reasoning at stage 5 [...] is distinguished by a method for ranking values and for criticising inappropriate rankings of values. It is in this sense that it is called 'principled'" (id., Psychology and Moral Theology, p. 60). Less than 3% reach stage 6 of moral reasoning. 10. Fr Keenan is by no means the first to have suggested that post-Vatican II Catholics ought to advance to stage 5 moral reasoning (cf. R. Duska and M. Whelan, Moral Development: a guide to Piaget and Kohlberg (New York: Paramus/Toronto: Paulist, 1975) 87-91). However, B. Kiely observes that advancing to stage 5 "is in itself a difficult task for the great majority, and the challenge [...] in a period of unusually rapid change accompanied by a widespread uncertainty about traditional values may have been too severe [...] for many people, resulting in a degree of disorientation" (id., Psychology and Moral Theology, p. 71). 11. Ibid., p. 71. 12. One refers here not, of course, to those present human beings who do rely on rule-morality, but rather to those who, in Fr Keenan's desired future, would not be able to have recourse to it. 13. Cf. B. Kiely, "The Impracticality of Proportionalism", Gregorianum 66 (1985) 679. 14. Note that in Kohlberg's own thought satisfactory solutions even to problems of justice are found only at stage 6, which does not seem to occur naturally except in very rare cases such as Kant and Kohlberg himself (cf. B. Kiely, Psychology and Moral Theology, p. 62). Stage 5 emphasises rights rather than duties and may lead to conclusions which do not serve a coherent notion of justice ... (id., ibid., p. 60). 15. On top of the complexity of many such decisions we should not underestimate the pressure to conform which afflicts moral choices in a society that does not share Christian 282values. It is much stronger, particularly for those operating at stage 4 of Kohlberg's scale, than we commonly realise. It is therefore a question of recognising a privileged tradition among the many which seek to impose themselves (cf B. Kiely, Psychology and Moral Theology, pp. 267-8). 16. D. Hollenbach shows that the magisterium has constantly insisted that society must develop in accordance with the norm of the dignity of the human person (id., Claims in conflict. Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition (New York: Ramsey/Toronto: Paulist, 1979) passim). 17. Cf. J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Justice (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988)5 206-9. 18. Kohlberg's work stands squarely in the tradition of liberal individualism, and he uses a very limited definition of the moral domain (B. Kiely, Psychology and Moral Theology, p. 64f.). His model of the moral domain is two people in conflict over some transferable good (possessions or positions of privilege). This is very limited as a treatment of friendship. The treatment of ethics by Aristotle and Aquinas began from friendship: what kind of virtues and actions are required or excluded by friendship? Obviously there are actions incompatible with friendship. The name one gives to a category of such actions is likely to sound unwelcome (rule, norm ...) but the reality is important and undeniable. 19. It may be that the rubicon lies sometime around a debate held between William of Ockham and John XXII (a canonist and devotee of Aquinas), from the years 1323 to c. 1332 (cf. M. Villey, Seize essais de philosophie du droit (Paris, 1969) 149-69; id., "Si la théorie générale du droit, pour Saint Thomas, est une théorie de la loi", Arch. Phil. Dr. 17 (1972) 427-31). In this debate Ockham proffers a theory of jus which comes close to the subject of this discussion: "jus utendi est potestas licita utendi re extrinseca, quia quis sine culpa sua et absque causa rationabili privari non debet invitus, et si privatus fuerit, privantem poterit in judicio convenire" (cf. M. Villey, Seize essais ..., p. 166). Finnis suggests comparisons with modern "choice" theories of rights and Hart's theory of right as a "small-scale sovereignty" (cf. J. Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 228). 20. The Catholic Church's teaching on rights, however, is based upon an integral notion of the good of the person, repeatedly found in recent expressions of the magisterium: cf. Gaudium et Spes n. 61; Humanae Vitae n. 7; Populorum Progressio n. 23; Octogesima Adveniens n. 40; Familiaris Consortio n. 32; Donum Vitae Introduction, nn. 1, 2, 3, II, 7; Sollicitudo Rei Socialis nn. 1, 9, 10, 29-33, 38. This is obviously a much more complex question than the one dealt with by Kohlberg. 21. By liberal individualist philosophy we mean that which presently inspires the Western consumerist mentality. Liberalism was certainly admirable in its beginnings as it coincided with the development of the understanding of the demands of human dignity and the fundamental equality of all men and women, for it helped liberate man from the oppressive domination of monarchical absolutism and mercantile feudalism. 22. The objective complement to subjective claim-rights has been the subject of magisterial reflection recently. In this connection, Pope John Paul II stated: "On entend beaucoup parler aujourd'hui des droits de l'homme. Dans de très nombreux pays, ils sont violés. Mais on ne parle pas des droits de Dieu. Et pourtant, droits de l'homme et droits de Dieu sont étroitements liés. Là où Dieu et sa loi ne sont pas respectés, l'homme non plus ne peut faire prévaloir ses droits [...]. Adjourd'hui encore vaut ce principe: les droits de Dieu et les droits de l'homme sont respectés ensemble ou ils sont violés ensemble. Notre vie ne sera en bon ordre que si nos rapports avec Dieu sont en bon ordre [...]. Aujourd'hui encore, cette maxime de votre bienheureux n'a rien perdu de sa vérité. Aujourd'hui encore, il s'agit de donner à Dieu ce qui appartient à Dieu. Ce n'est qu'alors que sera aussi donné à l'homme ce qui appartient à l'homme" (in Droits de Dieu et droits le l'homme, Actes du IX e Colloque national des Juristes catholiques, Paris des 11-12 novembre 1989 (Paris: Tequi, 1989) 5. 23. Cf. John Paul II, Centesimus Annus n. 36. 24. And this because goods, as the basis of rights, for the proponent of Western liberal individualism are predominantly those concerned with economic prosperity, and those rights perceived to be more important are defined in relation to the economic reality (this is what makes Thatcherism simply "blue Marxism"), here interpreted as the right to economic freedom of initiative, etc. so that freedom is defined in relation to the material objects to be chosen, accumulated and/or consumed, rather than to the goods spiritual which are summed up in the development of the whole human person. This philosophy is not a product of consumerism, it produces a society in which having is more important than being (cf. John Paul II, Centesimus Annus n. 49). 283 25. Within this ideology everything and everyone becomes subservient to one's interests. The self alone, ultimately, is the subject of inalienable rights, and everything else is defined in relation to its inalienable moral faculty to choose without constraint, or to the powerful (the socially advantaged, whites, males etc.). This is why simply grafting the idea of the common good onto an unchanged fundamentally liberal individualist notion of right does not solve the problem; it merely postpones the day of reckoning and perpetuates real inequalities. 26. Limitation of laws serves to promote the maximisation of the freedom of the powerful, especially by reducing morality to the private sphere (by a tendency to avoid legislation which does not reflect the opinion of the majority, i.e. the moral claims which threaten the status quo are relegated to the private sphere, while the public sphere is not bereft of values, it is simply handed over to the dogmas of liberal individualism). 27. It is not without reason that the Church's disciplinary laws are not referred to as nomoi but as kanones, i.e. they emerge from the values incarnated in the life of the apostolic community (cf. S. Kuttner, "Reflections on Gospel and Law in the History of the Church", Studies in the History of Medieval Canon Law (Northampton: Variorum, 1990) 199-209). 28. Cf B. Kiely, "The Impracticality of Proportionalism", Gregorianum 66 (1985) 682-3. 29. Cf. K. Demmer, Christi vestigia sequentes (Romae: P.U.G., 1991) (Ad uso degli studenti) 44. 30. Don B. Garlington suggests that the teaching contained in the convenient phrase obedience of faith is the distinguishing characteristic of Paul's position taken against Judaism on one hand and Jewish Christianity on the other (id., The Obedience of Faith. A Pauline Phrase in Context (Tübingen, JCB Mohr, 1991) 254-68). 31. For two studies of the biblical aspect of the question: cf. P. Marino, Saint Paul and the Law: Toward a Doctrine of Church Law (Rome, P.U.G., 1988), 167-275; T. J. Deidun, "Love and Law in New Testament Morality", New Covenant Morality in Paul (Analecta Biblica 89) (Rome: P.I.B., 1981) 150-226. 32. Cf. St Thomas Aquinas, Contra impugnantes, c. 2; Quodlib. III, q. 4, a. 1 [9]; In IV Sent. 19, 2, 2, q. 3, sol. 2 as 4. 33. F. A. Sullivan, Magisterium (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1983) 4f.; H. Küng, The Church (London: Search Press, 1978) 345f. 34. The Fathers, during the fourth session, criticised a proposed draft of the constitution on the grounds that it bore signs of an "over-optimistic" view of man. As a result of those criticisms the final text today includes a paragraph (no. 13) on sin (De peccato) (cf. P. Delahaye, "La dignità della persona umana", La chiese nel mondo di oggi (Firenze: Vallecchi editore, 1966, 2nd ed. 1967) 264-86. 35. This is also the interpretation of F. A. Sullivan, "Some Observations on the New Formula for the Profession of Faith", Gregorianum 70, 8 (1989) 549-58. L. Örsy, however, interprets the phrase quibuslibet institutis to refer only to Catholic universities and faculties since the canon appears under that rubric in the Code. J. Manzanares argues that the term missio canonica in SC 27, §1, should be changed to mandate (id., "Las universidades y facultades eclesiásticas", Seminarium 23 (1983) 588). For a clarification of the precise terms of the oath, the context of canon 812, and a critique of both Manzanares and Örsy's readings see F. J. Urrutia, "Iusiurandum fidelitatis", PRC 80 (1991) 571f.; R. J. Barrett, "The Bishop as Ordinary Teacher of the Faith: Notes on the Drewermann Affair", ME 117 (1992) 231-51. 36. Cf. Q. Quade, "University Perspective on the 'Oath of Fidelity"', America vol. 160, no. 14 (15 April 1989) 348-9; L. Örsy, "Profession of Faith and 'Oath of Fidelity"', America vol. 160, n. 14 (15 April 1989) 345-7. 37. Cf. L. Örsy, The Profession of Faith and Oath of Fidelity (Dublin: Dominican, 1991), 45, note 25, in which he reports the mixed reception of oaths among the Fathers. 38. The expression of Fr Örsy, The Profession of Faith, p. 60. 39. Fr Orsy correctly points out that according to the norms for promulgation, and accepting the date of the promulgation of the Rescript as the day of the effective promulgation of the new law, it entered into force on 7 January 1990 (id., The Profession of Faith, p. 63, note 31). 40. J. Galot, "La profession de foi et le serment de fidelité", Espirit et Vie 5 (1989) 694-8.  41. Cf. Congregatio de Doctrina Fidei, Instructio de ecclesiali theologi vocatione in AAS 82 (1991) II, n° 6, p. 1552. 42. For the sake of argument, I have adopted Fr F. A. Sullivan's translations of the three new paragraphs (cf. id., "Observations", op. cit., 549, 551 and 555 concurrently). 284 43. Ibid. 44. The difficulty with such a rigid condition is that apart from appearing to be much more restrictive than the terms of DV 10, F. A. Sullivan has to go to some lengths to include dogmas like the Assumption of the Virgin Mary in his schema. 45. It would appear that Fr Sullivan has amended the position first put forward in Magisterium (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1983) 150, in which he stated: "The concrete determinations of the natural law with regard to the complex problems facing people today are neither formally nor virtually revealed." In an article in 1989, however, he states: "I admit that this could be taken to mean that no concrete determinations or specific norms of the natural law can be found in revelation. I would hesitate to make so absolute a statement" (id., "Observations", Gregorianum 1989, p. 550). 46. Concerning an act of supreme power, this may happen in four ways: (1) proposed by the pope; (2) proposed by the college at an ecumenical council (solemni modo, can. 337, §1); (3) proposed by the college of bishops dispersed throughout the world (Episcoporum in mundo dispersorum 337, §2) in two ways: (a) at their initiative and received by the pope; or (b) through the initiative and reception of the pope (indicta aut libere recepta §2). 47. Fr Sullivan comments: "While it is not manifestly the case that any such revealed moral doctrine has been solemnly defined, there are no doubt some moral truths which are confirmed by divine revelation and have been taught as essential to Christian life" ("Observations", op. cit., p. 550). While not discounting the possibility of a definition of specific moral norms in this later work, Fr Sullivan states that it is manifestly not the case that moral doctrine has been defined. In chapter 6 of his book Magisterium, Fr Sullivan very helpfully reminds us that mores refers not simply to morals in the strict sense of the term but also to "practices" (p. 128). 48. F. A. Sullivan, "Observations", op. cit., loc. cit. 49. This clause is important for the discussion of the inclusion of moral norms in the secondary object of infallible teaching authority. Fr Betti's Nota di presentazione, for instance, suggests that everything that pertains to the natural law may fall within the parameters of irreformable definitions: "Può rientrare nell'oggetto di definizioni irreformabili, anche se non di fede, tutto ciò che si riferisce alla legge naturale, essa pura espressione della voluntà di Dio" (L'Osservatore Romano, 25 Feb. 1989, p. 6). Fr Sullivan suggests, however, that such a statement may need a qualification; one would have to add "and is required for the safeguarding and exposition of revealed truth" (id., "Observations", op. cit., p. 550). 50. Cf. Commissio Theologica, Acta Synodalia Concilii Vaticani Secundi III/1, p. 251; Congregatio Pro Doctrina Fidei, Mysterium Ecclesiae cap. 3, in AAS 65 (1973) 401. 51. +Francis Thomas, "The Bishop in His Teaching Role", op. cit., loc. cit. 52. F. A. Sullivan, "Observations", op. cit., loc. cit. 53. Cf. L. Örsy, The Profession of Faith, p. 66f. Fr Örsy recommends the semantic history of the term provided by F. A. Sullivan ("The Response Due to the Non-Definitive Exercise of Magisterium", Studia canonica 23 (1989) 267-83. 54. Cf. R. Ombres, "The New Profession of Faith and Oath", Priests and People, vol. 3, no. 9 (October 1989) 339-43. 55. According to this perspective, it is possible that a theologian may retain this submission of intellect and will towards the proposing authority without at the same time feeling able to assent to the truth of what is being said by the same authority (cf. F. Thomas, "The Bishop in His Teaching Role and Those Who Assist Him", Studia canonica 21 (1987) 229-38). 56. F. J. Urrutia sums up the different reactions to the oath of fidelity and shows that while problems do exist regarding its mode of promulgation and application, nevertheless it seems to apply to those teaching theological disciplines in ecclesially-recognised faculties of higher studies ("Iusiurandum fidelitatis", PRC 80 (1991) 577-8). On the precise range of canon 812, see the work of R. Deeley, The Mandate for Those who Teach Theology in Institutes of Higher Studies: An Interpretation of the Meaning of Canon 812 of the Code of Canon Law (Romae: P.U.G., 1986). For the sense of the terms mandatelcanonical mission see Sh. E. Euart, "Implications of Canon 812 for Federal Constitutionality of Government Funded Aid to Catholic Colleges and Universities", The Jurist 50 (1990) 167-97. 57. F. A. Sullivan interjects the term fundamentally here, which seems to me to exaggerate the distinction, albeit an important one. Grades of assent are envisaged by the three formulae adopted in the profession of faith; and the latter part of that equation, assent, needs to be kept in mind. 285 58. Cf. A. Russell, "Theology in Context and 'The Right to Think' in Three Contemporary Theologians: Gutiérrez, Dussel and Boff", Pacifica 2 [1989] 282-322. 59. Thus one of the principal difficulties with the practical application of an otherwise useful concept of the seamless garment approach to ethics (in which, for example, the social and economic teaching of the Church is just as significant as the right to life) is that it neglects to underline that some rights (i.e. to a just wage) are based upon others (the right to live). While constitutions help secular society to devise a "doctrinal" charter in which such an economy or hierarchy of rights is established as self-evident, the Church has not chosen to do so, at least not so explicitly, though canons 204-223 could be regarded as such (cf. J. I. Arrieta, "I diritti dei soggetti nell'ordinamento canonico", Persona y Derecho 1 (1991) 43-4). 60. "The theologian has to be very sure that the freedom he is claiming is legitimately grounded, and then determine how he is going to act publicly and privately in the light of that ... If someone has an appointment which qualifies him in some way to be regarded officially as a Catholic theologian [i.e. canonical mission], as one whose theological positions may be confidently taken up as legitimate for Catholics, such a person bears a great deal of responsibility that at times will require restraint. If he finds himself in a position of dissenting from the magisterium ... the situation may be tolerable all round, if he moves out of a post that is officially Catholic ..." (cf. +F. Thomas, "The Bishop in His Teaching Role and Those Who Assist Him", Studia canonica 21 (1987) 238). 61. Cf. Pope John Paul II, "Allocutio Vasintoniae", AAS 71 (1979) I, 1263-4.</meta-value>
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<back><notes> 
         <p>1. Cf. J. F. Keenan, op. cit., p. 209.</p> 
         <p>2. Cf. A. MacIntyre, <italic> After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory</italic>
 (Notre Dame: U.N.D. Press, 1981) 232f.</p> 
         <p>3. R. A. McCormick, "The Search for Truth in the Catholic Context", <italic>America</italic>
 155 (1986) 276-82; K. Rahner, "Orthodoxy and Freedom in Theology", Co 1971, n. 7, 90-105; id., "Theology and the Church's Teaching Authority after the Council", <italic>Authority</italic>
 (ed. F. J. Adelman, Chestnut Hill, 1974) 866-104; A. Russell, "Theology in Context and 'The Right to Think' in Three Contemporary Theologians: Gutiérrez, Dussel and Boff", <italic>Pacifica</italic>
 2 (1989) 282-322.</p> 
         <p>4. MacIntyre states: "It is, from both standpoints [that of Nozick and Rawls], as though we had been shipwrecked on an uninhabited island with a group of other individuals, each of whom is a stranger to us and to all the others [...]. This individualistic view [...] contains within itself a certain note of realism about modern society; modern society is indeed often, at least in surface appearance, nothing but a collection of strangers, each pursuing his or her own interests under minimal constraints" (id., op. cit., p. 233).</p> 
         <p>5. Thus one way of teasing out the problem is to establish a hierarchy or economy of rights (cf. J. Cardinal Ratzinger, <italic>The Church, Ecumenism and Politics</italic>
 (Slough: St Paul's Publications, 1988), 202).</p> 
         <p>6. "Sachent donc ceux qui l'ignorent [i.e. les lois], sachent les enemies de Dieu et du genre humain, quelque nom qu'ils prennent, qu'entre le fort et le faible, entre le riche et le pauvre, entre le maitre et le serviteur, c'est la liberté qui opprime et la loi qui affranchit" (P. Lacordaire, <italic>Sermon a Notre Dame de Paris</italic>
 1848; Ratzinger urges a co-ordinated response regarding Christian efforts to affect the legislature (cf. J. Cardinal Ratzinger, <italic>Threats to Life</italic>
 (London: CTS, 1991) 5f).</p> 
         <p>7. Cf. L. Kohlberg, <italic> Assessing Moral Stages: a manual</italic>
 (Harvard: Centre for Moral Development and Education, 1978-79).</p> 
         <p>8. The A4 stage, for example, "treats the good of the social system in a relatively concrete and letter-of-the-law manner" (cf. B. Kiely, <italic>Psychology and Moral Theology</italic>
 (Roma: P.U.G., 1987) 56).</p> 
         <p>9. Kiely states: "Moral reasoning at stage 5 [...] is distinguished by a method for ranking values and for criticising inappropriate rankings of values. It is in this sense that it is called 'principled'" (id., <italic>Psychology and Moral Theology,</italic>
 p. 60). Less than 3% reach stage 6 of moral reasoning.</p> 
         <p>10. Fr Keenan is by no means the first to have suggested that post-Vatican II Catholics ought to advance to stage 5 moral reasoning (cf. R. Duska and M. Whelan, <italic>Moral Development: a guide to Piaget and Kohlberg</italic>
 (New York: Paramus/Toronto: Paulist, 1975) 87-91). However, B. Kiely observes that advancing to stage 5 "is in itself a difficult task for the great majority, and the challenge [...] in a period of unusually rapid change accompanied by a widespread uncertainty about traditional values may have been too severe [...] for many people, resulting in a degree of disorientation" (id., <italic>Psychology and Moral Theology,</italic>
 p. 71).</p> 
         <p>11. Ibid., p. 71.</p> 
         <p>12. One refers here not, of course, to those present human beings who do rely on rule-morality, but rather to those who, in Fr Keenan's desired future, would not be able to have recourse to it.</p> 
         <p>13. Cf. B. Kiely, "The Impracticality of Proportionalism", <italic>Gregorianum</italic>
 66 (1985) 679.</p> 
         <p>14. Note that in Kohlberg's own thought satisfactory solutions even to problems of justice are found only at stage 6, which does not seem to occur naturally except in very rare cases such as Kant and Kohlberg himself (cf. B. Kiely, <italic>Psychology and Moral Theology,</italic>
 p. 62). Stage 5 emphasises rights rather than duties and may lead to conclusions which do not serve a coherent notion of justice ... (id., ibid., p. 60).</p> 
         <p>15. On top of the complexity of many such decisions we should not underestimate the pressure to conform which afflicts moral choices in a society that does not share Christian values. It is much stronger, particularly for those operating at stage 4 of Kohlberg's scale, than we commonly realise. It is therefore a question of recognising a privileged tradition among the many which seek to impose themselves (cf B. Kiely, <italic>Psychology and Moral Theology,</italic>
 pp. 267-8).</p> 
         <p>16. D. Hollenbach shows that the magisterium has constantly insisted that society must develop in accordance with the norm of the dignity of the human person (id., <italic>Claims in conflict. Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition</italic>
 (New York: Ramsey/Toronto: Paulist, 1979) passim).</p> 
         <p>17. Cf. J. Finnis, <italic>Natural Law and Natural Justice</italic>
 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988)5 206-9.</p> 
         <p>18. Kohlberg's work stands squarely in the tradition of liberal individualism, and he uses a very limited definition of the moral domain (B. Kiely, <italic>Psychology and Moral Theology,</italic>
 p. 64f.). His model of the moral domain is two people in conflict over some transferable good (possessions or positions of privilege). This is very limited as a treatment of friendship. The treatment of ethics by Aristotle and Aquinas began from friendship: what kind of virtues and actions are required or excluded by friendship? Obviously there are actions incompatible with friendship. The name one gives to a category of such actions is likely to sound unwelcome (rule, norm ...) but the reality is important and undeniable.</p> 
         <p>19. It may be that the rubicon lies sometime around a debate held between William of Ockham and John XXII (a canonist and devotee of Aquinas), from the years 1323 to c. 1332 (cf. M. Villey, <italic>Seize essais de philosophie du droit</italic>
 (Paris, 1969) 149-69; id., "Si la théorie générale du droit, pour Saint Thomas, est une théorie de la loi", <italic>Arch. Phil. Dr.</italic>
 17 (1972) 427-31). In this debate Ockham proffers a theory of <italic>jus</italic>
 which comes close to the subject of this discussion: "jus utendi est potestas licita utendi re extrinseca, quia quis sine culpa sua et absque causa rationabili privari non debet invitus, et si privatus fuerit, privantem poterit in judicio convenire" (cf. M. Villey, Seize <italic>essais</italic>
 ..., p. 166). Finnis suggests comparisons with modern "choice" theories of rights and Hart's theory of right as a "small-scale sovereignty" (cf. J. Finnis, <italic>Natural</italic>
 Law <italic>and Natural</italic>
 Rights, p. 228).</p> 
         <p>20. The Catholic Church's teaching on rights, however, is based upon an <italic>integral</italic>
 notion of the good of the person, repeatedly found in recent expressions of the magisterium: cf. <italic>Gaudium et Spes</italic>
 n. 61; <italic>Humanae Vitae</italic>
 n. 7; <italic>Populorum Progressio</italic>
 n. 23; <italic>Octogesima Adveniens</italic>
 n. 40; <italic>Familiaris Consortio</italic>
 n. 32; <italic>Donum Vitae Introduction,</italic>
 nn. 1, 2, 3, II, 7; <italic>Sollicitudo Rei Socialis</italic>
 nn. 1, 9, 10, 29-33, 38. This is obviously a much more complex question than the one dealt with by Kohlberg.</p> 
         <p>21. By liberal individualist philosophy we mean that which presently inspires the Western consumerist mentality. Liberalism was certainly admirable in its beginnings as it coincided with the development of the understanding of the demands of human dignity and the fundamental equality of all men and women, for it helped liberate man from the oppressive domination of monarchical absolutism and mercantile feudalism.</p> 
         <p>22. The objective complement to subjective claim-rights has been the subject of magisterial reflection recently. In this connection, Pope John Paul II stated: "On entend beaucoup parler aujourd'hui des droits de l'homme. Dans de très nombreux pays, ils sont violés. Mais on ne parle pas des droits de Dieu. Et pourtant, droits de l'homme et droits de Dieu sont étroitements liés. Là où Dieu et sa loi ne sont pas respectés, l'homme non plus ne peut faire prévaloir ses droits [...]. Adjourd'hui encore vaut ce principe: les droits de Dieu et les droits de l'homme sont respectés ensemble ou ils sont violés ensemble. Notre vie ne sera en bon ordre que si nos rapports avec Dieu sont en bon ordre [...]. Aujourd'hui encore, cette maxime de votre bienheureux n'a rien perdu de sa vérité. Aujourd'hui encore, il s'agit de donner à Dieu ce qui appartient à Dieu. Ce n'est qu'alors que sera aussi donné à l'homme ce qui appartient à l'homme" (in <italic>Droits de Dieu et droits le l'homme,</italic>
 Actes du IXe Colloque national des Juristes catholiques, Paris des 11-12 novembre 1989 (Paris: Tequi, 1989) 5.</p> 
         <p>23. Cf. John Paul II, <italic>Centesimus Annus</italic>
 n. 36.</p> 
         <p>24. And this because goods, as the basis of rights, for the proponent of Western liberal individualism are predominantly those concerned with economic prosperity, and those rights perceived to be more important are defined in relation to the economic reality (this is what makes Thatcherism simply "blue Marxism"), here interpreted as the right to economic freedom of initiative, etc. so that freedom is defined in relation to the material objects to be chosen, accumulated and/or consumed, rather than to the goods spiritual which are summed up in the development of the whole human person. This philosophy is not a <italic>product</italic>
 of consumerism, it <italic>produces</italic>
 a society in which <italic>having</italic>
 is more important than <italic>being</italic>
 (cf. John Paul II, <italic>Centesimus Annus</italic>
 n. 49).</p> 
         <p>25. Within this ideology everything and everyone becomes subservient to one's interests. The self alone, ultimately, is the subject of inalienable rights, and everything else is defined in relation to its inalienable moral faculty to choose without constraint, or to the powerful (the socially advantaged, whites, males etc.). This is why simply grafting the idea of the common good onto an unchanged fundamentally liberal individualist notion of right does not solve the problem; it merely postpones the day of reckoning and perpetuates real inequalities.</p> 
         <p>26. Limitation of laws serves to promote the maximisation of the freedom of the powerful, especially by reducing morality to the private sphere (by a tendency to avoid legislation which does not reflect the opinion of the majority, i.e. the moral claims which threaten the <italic>status quo</italic>
 are relegated to the private sphere, while the public sphere is not bereft of values, it is simply handed over to the dogmas of liberal individualism).</p> 
         <p>27. It is not without reason that the Church's disciplinary laws are not referred to as <italic>nomoi</italic>
 but as <italic>kanones,</italic>
 i.e. they emerge from the values incarnated in the life of the apostolic community (cf. S. Kuttner, "Reflections on Gospel and Law in the History of the Church", <italic>Studies in the History of Medieval Canon Law</italic>
 (Northampton: Variorum, 1990) 199-209).</p> 
         <p>28. Cf B. Kiely, "The Impracticality of Proportionalism", <italic>Gregorianum</italic>
 66 (1985) 682-3.</p> 
         <p>29. Cf. K. Demmer, <italic>Christi vestigia sequentes</italic>
 (Romae: P.U.G., 1991) (Ad uso degli studenti) 44.</p> 
         <p>30. Don B. Garlington suggests that the teaching contained in the convenient phrase <italic>obedience of faith</italic>
 is the distinguishing characteristic of Paul's position taken against Judaism on one hand and Jewish Christianity on the other (id., <italic>The Obedience of Faith. A Pauline Phrase in Context</italic>
 (Tübingen, JCB Mohr, 1991) 254-68).</p> 
         <p>31. For two studies of the biblical aspect of the question: cf. P. Marino, <italic>Saint Paul and the Law: Toward a Doctrine of Church Law</italic>
 (Rome, P.U.G., 1988), 167-275; T. J. Deidun, "Love and Law in New Testament Morality", <italic>New Covenant Morality in Paul</italic>
 (Analecta Biblica 89) (Rome: P.I.B., 1981) 150-226.</p> 
         <p>32. Cf. St Thomas Aquinas, <italic> Contra impugnantes,</italic>
 c. 2; <italic>Quodlib.</italic>
 III, q. 4, a. 1 [9]; <italic>In IV Sent.</italic>
 19, 2, 2, q. 3, sol. 2 as 4.</p> 
         <p>33. F. A. Sullivan, <italic> Magisterium</italic>
 (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1983) 4f.; H. Küng, <italic>The Church</italic>
 (London: Search Press, 1978) 345f.</p> 
         <p>34. The Fathers, during the fourth session, criticised a proposed draft of the constitution on the grounds that it bore signs of an "over-optimistic" view of man. As a result of those criticisms the final text today includes a paragraph (no. 13) on sin <italic>(De peccato)</italic>
 (cf. P. Delahaye, "La dignità della persona umana", <italic> La chiese nel mondo di oggi</italic>
 (Firenze: Vallecchi editore, 1966, 2nd ed. 1967) 264-86.</p> 
         <p>35. This is also the interpretation of F. A. Sullivan, "Some Observations on the New Formula for the Profession of Faith", <italic>Gregorianum</italic>
 70, 8 (1989) 549-58. L. Örsy, however, interprets the phrase <italic>quibuslibet institutis</italic>
 to refer only to Catholic universities and faculties since the canon appears under that rubric in the Code. J. Manzanares argues that the term <italic>missio canonica</italic>
 in SC 27, §1, should be changed to <italic>mandate</italic>
 (id., "Las universidades y facultades eclesiásticas", <italic> Seminarium</italic>
 23 (1983) 588). For a clarification of the precise terms of the oath, the context of canon 812, and a critique of both Manzanares and Örsy's readings see F. J. Urrutia, "Iusiurandum fidelitatis", <italic>PRC</italic>
 80 (1991) 571f.; R. J. Barrett, "The Bishop as Ordinary Teacher of the Faith: Notes on the Drewermann Affair", <italic>ME</italic>
 117 (1992) 231-51.</p> 
         <p>36. Cf. Q. Quade, "University Perspective on the 'Oath of Fidelity"', <italic>America</italic>
 vol. 160, no. 14 (15 April 1989) 348-9; L. Örsy, "Profession of Faith and 'Oath of Fidelity"', <italic> America</italic>
 vol. 160, n. 14 (15 April 1989) 345-7.</p> 
         <p>37. Cf. L. Örsy, <italic>The Profession of Faith and Oath of Fidelity</italic>
 (Dublin: Dominican, 1991), 45, note 25, in which he reports the mixed reception of oaths among the Fathers.</p> 
         <p>38. The expression of Fr Örsy, <italic>The Profession of Faith,</italic>
 p. 60.</p> 
         <p>39. Fr Orsy correctly points out that according to the norms for promulgation, and accepting the date of the promulgation of the Rescript as the day of the effective promulgation of the new law, it entered into force on 7 January 1990 (id., <italic>The Profession of Faith,</italic>
 p. 63, note 31).</p> 
         <p>40. J. Galot, "La profession de foi et le serment de fidelité", <italic>Espirit et Vie</italic>
 5 (1989) 694-8.</p> 
         <p>41. Cf. Congregatio de Doctrina Fidei, <italic>Instructio de ecclesiali theologi vocatione</italic>
 in AAS 82 (1991) II, n° 6, p. 1552.</p> 
         <p>42. For the sake of argument, I have adopted Fr F. A. Sullivan's translations of the three new paragraphs (cf. id., "Observations", op. cit., 549, 551 and 555 concurrently).</p> 
         <p>43. Ibid.</p> 
         <p>44. The difficulty with such a rigid condition is that apart from appearing to be much more restrictive than the terms of DV 10, F. A. Sullivan has to go to some lengths to include dogmas like the Assumption of the Virgin Mary in his schema.</p> 
         <p>45. It would appear that Fr Sullivan has amended the position first put forward in <italic>Magisterium</italic>
 (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1983) 150, in which he stated: "The concrete determinations of the natural law with regard to the complex problems facing people today are neither formally nor virtually revealed." In an article in 1989, however, he states: "I admit that this could be taken to mean that no concrete determinations or specific norms of the natural law can be found in revelation. I would hesitate to make so absolute a statement" (id., "Observations", <italic> Gregorianum</italic>
 1989, p. 550).</p> 
         <p>46. Concerning an act of supreme power, this may happen in four ways: (1) proposed by the pope; (2) proposed by the college at an ecumenical council <italic>(solemni modo,</italic>
 can. 337, §1); (3) proposed by the college of bishops dispersed throughout the world <italic>(Episcoporum in mundo dispersorum</italic>
 337, §2) in two ways: (a) at their initiative and received by the pope; or (b) through the initiative and reception of the pope <italic>(indicta aut libere recepta</italic>
 §2).</p> 
         <p>47. Fr Sullivan comments: "While it is not manifestly the case that any such revealed moral doctrine has been solemnly defined, there are no doubt some moral truths which are confirmed by divine revelation and have been taught as essential to Christian life" ("Observations", op. cit., p. 550). While not discounting the possibility of a definition of specific moral norms in this later work, Fr Sullivan states that it is manifestly not the case that moral doctrine has been defined. In chapter 6 of his book <italic>Magisterium,</italic>
 Fr Sullivan very helpfully reminds us that <italic>mores</italic>
 refers not simply to morals in the strict sense of the term but also to "practices" (p. 128).</p> 
         <p>48. F. A. Sullivan, "Observations", op. cit., loc. cit.</p> 
         <p>49. This clause is important for the discussion of the inclusion of moral norms in the secondary object of infallible teaching authority. Fr Betti's <italic>Nota di presentazione,</italic>
 for instance, suggests that <italic>everything</italic>
 that pertains to the natural law may fall within the parameters of irreformable definitions: "Può rientrare nell'oggetto di definizioni irreformabili, anche se non di fede, tutto ciò che si riferisce alla legge naturale, essa pura espressione della voluntà di Dio" <italic>(L'Osservatore Romano,</italic>
 25 Feb. 1989, p. 6). Fr Sullivan suggests, however, that such a statement may need a qualification; one would have to add "and is required for the safeguarding and exposition of revealed truth" (id., "Observations", op. cit., p. 550).</p> 
         <p>50. Cf. Commissio Theologica, <italic> Acta Synodalia Concilii Vaticani Secundi</italic>
 III/1, p. 251; Congregatio Pro Doctrina Fidei, <italic>Mysterium Ecclesiae</italic>
 cap. 3, in <italic>AAS</italic>
 65 (1973) 401.</p> 
         <p>51. +Francis Thomas, "The Bishop in His Teaching Role", op. cit., loc. cit.</p> 
         <p>52. F. A. Sullivan, "Observations", op. cit., loc. cit.</p> 
         <p>53. Cf. L. Örsy, <italic>The Profession of Faith,</italic>
 p. 66f. Fr Örsy recommends the semantic history of the term provided by F. A. Sullivan ("The Response Due to the Non-Definitive Exercise of Magisterium", <italic>Studia canonica</italic>
 23 (1989) 267-83.</p> 
         <p>54. Cf. R. Ombres, "The New Profession of Faith and Oath", <italic>Priests and People,</italic>
 vol. 3, no. 9 (October 1989) 339-43.</p> 
         <p>55. According to this perspective, it is possible that a theologian may retain this <italic>submission of intellect and will</italic>
 towards the proposing authority without at the same time feeling able to assent to the truth of what is being said by the same authority (cf. F. Thomas, "The Bishop in His Teaching Role and Those Who Assist Him", <italic> Studia canonica</italic>
 21 (1987) 229-38).</p> 
         <p>56. F. J. Urrutia sums up the different reactions to the oath of fidelity and shows that while problems do exist regarding its mode of promulgation and application, nevertheless it seems to apply to those teaching theological disciplines in ecclesially-recognised faculties of higher studies ("Iusiurandum fidelitatis", <italic>PRC</italic>
 80 (1991) 577-8). On the precise range of canon 812, see the work of R. Deeley, <italic> The Mandate for Those who Teach Theology in Institutes of Higher Studies: An Interpretation of the Meaning of Canon 812 of the Code of Canon Law</italic>
 (Romae: P.U.G., 1986). For the sense of the terms <italic>mandatelcanonical mission</italic>
 see Sh. E. Euart, "Implications of Canon 812 for Federal Constitutionality of Government Funded Aid to Catholic Colleges and Universities", <italic>The Jurist</italic>
 50 (1990) 167-97.</p> 
         <p>57. F. A. Sullivan interjects the term <italic>fundamentally</italic>
 here, which seems to me to exaggerate the distinction, albeit an important one. Grades of assent are envisaged by the three formulae adopted in the profession of faith; and the latter part of that equation, assent, needs to be kept in mind.</p> 
         <p>58. Cf. A. Russell, "Theology in Context and 'The Right to Think' in Three Contemporary Theologians: Gutiérrez, Dussel and Boff", <italic>Pacifica</italic>
 2 [1989] 282-322.</p> 
         <p>59. Thus one of the principal difficulties with the practical application of an otherwise useful concept of the <italic>seamless garment</italic>
 approach to ethics (in which, for example, the social and economic teaching of the Church is just as significant as the right to life) is that it neglects to underline that some rights (i.e. to a just wage) are based upon others (the right to live). While constitutions help secular society to devise a "doctrinal" charter in which such an economy or hierarchy of rights is established as self-evident, the Church has not chosen to do so, at least not so explicitly, though canons 204-223 could be regarded as such (cf. J. I. Arrieta, "I diritti dei soggetti nell'ordinamento canonico", <italic>Persona y Derecho</italic>
 1 (1991) 43-4).</p> 
         <p>60. "The theologian has to be very sure that the freedom he is claiming is legitimately grounded, and then determine how he is going to act publicly and privately in the light of that ... If someone has an appointment which qualifies him in some way to be regarded officially as a Catholic theologian [i.e. canonical mission], as one whose theological positions may be confidently taken up as legitimate for Catholics, such a person bears a great deal of responsibility that at times will require restraint. If he finds himself in a position of dissenting from the magisterium ... the situation may be tolerable all round, if he moves out of a post that is officially Catholic ..." (cf. +F. Thomas, "The Bishop in His Teaching Role and Those Who Assist Him", <italic>Studia canonica</italic>
 21 (1987) 238).</p> 
         <p>61. Cf. Pope John Paul II, "Allocutio Vasintoniae", AAS 71 (1979) I, 1263-4.</p> 
      </notes>
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