The CL-atse protocol analyser
Identifieur interne :
000389 ( PascalFrancis/Corpus );
précédent :
000388;
suivant :
000390
The CL-atse protocol analyser
Auteurs : Mathieu TuruaniSource :
-
Lecture notes in computer science [ 0302-9743 ] ; 2006.
RBID : Pascal:07-0517960
Descripteurs français
- Pascal (Inist)
- Protocole transmission,
Sécurité,
Cryptographie,
Compilateur,
Analyse atteignabilité,
Authentification,
Unification,
Théorie type,
Typage,
Ingénierie connaissances,
Réécriture,
Intrus,
Secret,
Equité,
Contrainte inégalité,
Satisfaction contrainte,
Modélisation,
Exponentiation.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- Authentication,
Compiler,
Constraint satisfaction,
Cryptography,
Equity,
Exponentiation,
Inequality constraint,
Intruder,
Knowledge engineering,
Modeling,
Reachability analysis,
Rewriting,
Safety,
Secrecy,
Transmission protocol,
Type theory,
Typing,
Unification.
Abstract
This paper presents an overview of the CL-Atse tool, an efficient and versatile automatic analyser for the security of cryptographic protocols. CL-Atse takes as input a protocol specified as a set of rewriting rules (IF format, produced by the AVISPA compiler), and uses rewriting and constraint solving techniques to model all reachable states of the participants and decide if an attack exists w.r.t. the Dolev-Yao intruder. Any state-based security property can be modelled (like secrecy, authentication, fairness, etc...), and the algebraic properties of operators like xor or exponentiation are taken into account with much less limitations than other tools, thanks to a complete modular unification algorithm. Also, useful constraints like typing, inequalities, or shared sets of knowledge (with set operations like removes, negative tests, etc...) can also be analysed.
Notice en format standard (ISO 2709)
Pour connaître la documentation sur le format Inist Standard.
| pA |
| A01 | 01 | 1 | | @0 0302-9743 |
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| A05 | | | | @2 4098 |
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| A08 | 01 | 1 | ENG | @1 The CL-atse protocol analyser |
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| A09 | 01 | 1 | ENG | @1 Term rewriting and applications : 17th international conference, RTA 2006, Seattle, WA, USA, August 12-14, 2006 : proceedings |
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| A11 | 01 | 1 | | @1 TURUANI (Mathieu) |
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| A12 | 01 | 1 | | @1 PFENNING (Frank) @9 ed. |
|---|
| A14 | 01 | | | @1 Loria-INRIA @2 Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy @3 FRA @Z 1 aut. |
|---|
| A20 | | | | @1 277-286 |
|---|
| A21 | | | | @1 2006 |
|---|
| A23 | 01 | | | @0 ENG |
|---|
| A26 | 01 | | | @0 3-540-36834-5 |
|---|
| A43 | 01 | | | @1 INIST @2 16343 @5 354000153621310210 |
|---|
| A44 | | | | @0 0000 @1 © 2007 INIST-CNRS. All rights reserved. |
|---|
| A45 | | | | @0 16 ref. |
|---|
| A47 | 01 | 1 | | @0 07-0517960 |
|---|
| A60 | | | | @1 P @2 C |
|---|
| A61 | | | | @0 A |
|---|
| A64 | 01 | 1 | | @0 Lecture notes in computer science |
|---|
| A66 | 01 | | | @0 DEU |
|---|
| C01 | 01 | | ENG | @0 This paper presents an overview of the CL-Atse tool, an efficient and versatile automatic analyser for the security of cryptographic protocols. CL-Atse takes as input a protocol specified as a set of rewriting rules (IF format, produced by the AVISPA compiler), and uses rewriting and constraint solving techniques to model all reachable states of the participants and decide if an attack exists w.r.t. the Dolev-Yao intruder. Any state-based security property can be modelled (like secrecy, authentication, fairness, etc...), and the algebraic properties of operators like xor or exponentiation are taken into account with much less limitations than other tools, thanks to a complete modular unification algorithm. Also, useful constraints like typing, inequalities, or shared sets of knowledge (with set operations like removes, negative tests, etc...) can also be analysed. |
|---|
| C02 | 01 | X | | @0 001D02B07C |
|---|
| C02 | 02 | X | | @0 001D04A04E |
|---|
| C02 | 03 | X | | @0 001D02B02 |
|---|
| C03 | 01 | X | FRE | @0 Protocole transmission @5 06 |
|---|
| C03 | 01 | X | ENG | @0 Transmission protocol @5 06 |
|---|
| C03 | 01 | X | SPA | @0 Protocolo transmisión @5 06 |
|---|
| C03 | 02 | X | FRE | @0 Sécurité @5 07 |
|---|
| C03 | 02 | X | ENG | @0 Safety @5 07 |
|---|
| C03 | 02 | X | SPA | @0 Seguridad @5 07 |
|---|
| C03 | 03 | X | FRE | @0 Cryptographie @5 08 |
|---|
| C03 | 03 | X | ENG | @0 Cryptography @5 08 |
|---|
| C03 | 03 | X | SPA | @0 Criptografía @5 08 |
|---|
| C03 | 04 | X | FRE | @0 Compilateur @5 09 |
|---|
| C03 | 04 | X | ENG | @0 Compiler @5 09 |
|---|
| C03 | 04 | X | SPA | @0 Compilador @5 09 |
|---|
| C03 | 05 | 3 | FRE | @0 Analyse atteignabilité @5 10 |
|---|
| C03 | 05 | 3 | ENG | @0 Reachability analysis @5 10 |
|---|
| C03 | 06 | X | FRE | @0 Authentification @5 11 |
|---|
| C03 | 06 | X | ENG | @0 Authentication @5 11 |
|---|
| C03 | 06 | X | SPA | @0 Autenticación @5 11 |
|---|
| C03 | 07 | X | FRE | @0 Unification @5 12 |
|---|
| C03 | 07 | X | ENG | @0 Unification @5 12 |
|---|
| C03 | 07 | X | SPA | @0 Unificación @5 12 |
|---|
| C03 | 08 | 3 | FRE | @0 Théorie type @5 13 |
|---|
| C03 | 08 | 3 | ENG | @0 Type theory @5 13 |
|---|
| C03 | 09 | X | FRE | @0 Typage @5 14 |
|---|
| C03 | 09 | X | ENG | @0 Typing @5 14 |
|---|
| C03 | 09 | X | SPA | @0 Tipificación @5 14 |
|---|
| C03 | 10 | 3 | FRE | @0 Ingénierie connaissances @5 15 |
|---|
| C03 | 10 | 3 | ENG | @0 Knowledge engineering @5 15 |
|---|
| C03 | 11 | X | FRE | @0 Réécriture @5 18 |
|---|
| C03 | 11 | X | ENG | @0 Rewriting @5 18 |
|---|
| C03 | 11 | X | SPA | @0 Reescritura @5 18 |
|---|
| C03 | 12 | X | FRE | @0 Intrus @5 19 |
|---|
| C03 | 12 | X | ENG | @0 Intruder @5 19 |
|---|
| C03 | 12 | X | SPA | @0 Intruso @5 19 |
|---|
| C03 | 13 | X | FRE | @0 Secret @5 20 |
|---|
| C03 | 13 | X | ENG | @0 Secrecy @5 20 |
|---|
| C03 | 13 | X | SPA | @0 Secreto @5 20 |
|---|
| C03 | 14 | X | FRE | @0 Equité @5 21 |
|---|
| C03 | 14 | X | ENG | @0 Equity @5 21 |
|---|
| C03 | 14 | X | SPA | @0 Equidad @5 21 |
|---|
| C03 | 15 | X | FRE | @0 Contrainte inégalité @5 22 |
|---|
| C03 | 15 | X | ENG | @0 Inequality constraint @5 22 |
|---|
| C03 | 15 | X | SPA | @0 Constreñimiento desigualdad @5 22 |
|---|
| C03 | 16 | X | FRE | @0 Satisfaction contrainte @5 23 |
|---|
| C03 | 16 | X | ENG | @0 Constraint satisfaction @5 23 |
|---|
| C03 | 16 | X | SPA | @0 Satisfaccion restricción @5 23 |
|---|
| C03 | 17 | X | FRE | @0 Modélisation @5 24 |
|---|
| C03 | 17 | X | ENG | @0 Modeling @5 24 |
|---|
| C03 | 17 | X | SPA | @0 Modelización @5 24 |
|---|
| C03 | 18 | X | FRE | @0 Exponentiation @4 CD @5 96 |
|---|
| C03 | 18 | X | ENG | @0 Exponentiation @4 CD @5 96 |
|---|
| C03 | 18 | X | SPA | @0 Expositoración @4 CD @5 96 |
|---|
| N21 | | | | @1 337 |
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| N44 | 01 | | | @1 OTO |
|---|
| N82 | | | | @1 OTO |
|---|
|
|---|
| pR |
| A30 | 01 | 1 | ENG | @1 International Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications @2 17 @3 Seattle WA USA @4 2006 |
|---|
|
|---|
Format Inist (serveur)
| NO : | PASCAL 07-0517960 INIST |
|---|
| ET : | The CL-atse protocol analyser |
|---|
| AU : | TURUANI (Mathieu); PFENNING (Frank) |
|---|
| AF : | Loria-INRIA/Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy/France (1 aut.) |
|---|
| DT : | Publication en série; Congrès; Niveau analytique |
|---|
| SO : | Lecture notes in computer science; ISSN 0302-9743; Allemagne; Da. 2006; Vol. 4098; Pp. 277-286; Bibl. 16 ref. |
|---|
| LA : | Anglais |
|---|
| EA : | This paper presents an overview of the CL-Atse tool, an efficient and versatile automatic analyser for the security of cryptographic protocols. CL-Atse takes as input a protocol specified as a set of rewriting rules (IF format, produced by the AVISPA compiler), and uses rewriting and constraint solving techniques to model all reachable states of the participants and decide if an attack exists w.r.t. the Dolev-Yao intruder. Any state-based security property can be modelled (like secrecy, authentication, fairness, etc...), and the algebraic properties of operators like xor or exponentiation are taken into account with much less limitations than other tools, thanks to a complete modular unification algorithm. Also, useful constraints like typing, inequalities, or shared sets of knowledge (with set operations like removes, negative tests, etc...) can also be analysed. |
|---|
| CC : | 001D02B07C; 001D04A04E; 001D02B02 |
|---|
| FD : | Protocole transmission; Sécurité; Cryptographie; Compilateur; Analyse atteignabilité; Authentification; Unification; Théorie type; Typage; Ingénierie connaissances; Réécriture; Intrus; Secret; Equité; Contrainte inégalité; Satisfaction contrainte; Modélisation; Exponentiation |
|---|
| ED : | Transmission protocol; Safety; Cryptography; Compiler; Reachability analysis; Authentication; Unification; Type theory; Typing; Knowledge engineering; Rewriting; Intruder; Secrecy; Equity; Inequality constraint; Constraint satisfaction; Modeling; Exponentiation |
|---|
| SD : | Protocolo transmisión; Seguridad; Criptografía; Compilador; Autenticación; Unificación; Tipificación; Reescritura; Intruso; Secreto; Equidad; Constreñimiento desigualdad; Satisfaccion restricción; Modelización; Expositoración |
|---|
| LO : | INIST-16343.354000153621310210 |
|---|
| ID : | 07-0517960 |
|---|
Links to Exploration step
Pascal:07-0517960
Le document en format XML
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</keywords><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">This paper presents an overview of the CL-Atse tool, an efficient and versatile automatic analyser for the security of cryptographic protocols. CL-Atse takes as input a protocol specified as a set of rewriting rules (IF format, produced by the AVISPA compiler), and uses rewriting and constraint solving techniques to model all reachable states of the participants and decide if an attack exists w.r.t. the Dolev-Yao intruder. Any state-based security property can be modelled (like secrecy, authentication, fairness, etc...), and the algebraic properties of operators like xor or exponentiation are taken into account with much less limitations than other tools, thanks to a complete modular unification algorithm. Also, useful constraints like typing, inequalities, or shared sets of knowledge (with set operations like removes, negative tests, etc...) can also be analysed.</div>
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</fC01><fC02 i1="01" i2="X"><s0>001D02B07C</s0>
</fC02><fC02 i1="02" i2="X"><s0>001D04A04E</s0>
</fC02><fC02 i1="03" i2="X"><s0>001D02B02</s0>
</fC02><fC03 i1="01" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Protocole transmission</s0>
<s5>06</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="01" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Transmission protocol</s0>
<s5>06</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="01" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Protocolo transmisión</s0>
<s5>06</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="02" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Sécurité</s0>
<s5>07</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="02" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Safety</s0>
<s5>07</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="02" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Seguridad</s0>
<s5>07</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="03" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Cryptographie</s0>
<s5>08</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="03" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Cryptography</s0>
<s5>08</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="03" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Criptografía</s0>
<s5>08</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="04" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Compilateur</s0>
<s5>09</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="04" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Compiler</s0>
<s5>09</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="04" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Compilador</s0>
<s5>09</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="05" i2="3" l="FRE"><s0>Analyse atteignabilité</s0>
<s5>10</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="05" i2="3" l="ENG"><s0>Reachability analysis</s0>
<s5>10</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="06" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Authentification</s0>
<s5>11</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="06" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Authentication</s0>
<s5>11</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="06" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Autenticación</s0>
<s5>11</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="07" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Unification</s0>
<s5>12</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="07" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Unification</s0>
<s5>12</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="07" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Unificación</s0>
<s5>12</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="08" i2="3" l="FRE"><s0>Théorie type</s0>
<s5>13</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="08" i2="3" l="ENG"><s0>Type theory</s0>
<s5>13</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="09" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Typage</s0>
<s5>14</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="09" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Typing</s0>
<s5>14</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="09" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Tipificación</s0>
<s5>14</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="10" i2="3" l="FRE"><s0>Ingénierie connaissances</s0>
<s5>15</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="10" i2="3" l="ENG"><s0>Knowledge engineering</s0>
<s5>15</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="11" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Réécriture</s0>
<s5>18</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="11" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Rewriting</s0>
<s5>18</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="11" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Reescritura</s0>
<s5>18</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="12" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Intrus</s0>
<s5>19</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="12" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Intruder</s0>
<s5>19</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="12" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Intruso</s0>
<s5>19</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="13" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Secret</s0>
<s5>20</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="13" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Secrecy</s0>
<s5>20</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="13" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Secreto</s0>
<s5>20</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="14" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Equité</s0>
<s5>21</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="14" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Equity</s0>
<s5>21</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="14" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Equidad</s0>
<s5>21</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="15" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Contrainte inégalité</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="15" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Inequality constraint</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="15" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Constreñimiento desigualdad</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="16" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Satisfaction contrainte</s0>
<s5>23</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="16" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Constraint satisfaction</s0>
<s5>23</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="16" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Satisfaccion restricción</s0>
<s5>23</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="17" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Modélisation</s0>
<s5>24</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="17" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Modeling</s0>
<s5>24</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="17" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Modelización</s0>
<s5>24</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="18" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Exponentiation</s0>
<s4>CD</s4>
<s5>96</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="18" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Exponentiation</s0>
<s4>CD</s4>
<s5>96</s5>
</fC03><fC03 i1="18" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Expositoración</s0>
<s4>CD</s4>
<s5>96</s5>
</fC03><fN21><s1>337</s1>
</fN21><fN44 i1="01"><s1>OTO</s1>
</fN44><fN82><s1>OTO</s1>
</fN82><pR><fA30 i1="01" i2="1" l="ENG"><s1>International Conference on Rewriting Techniques and Applications</s1>
<s2>17</s2>
<s3>Seattle WA USA</s3>
<s4>2006</s4>
</fA30><server><NO>PASCAL 07-0517960 INIST</NO>
<ET>The CL-atse protocol analyser</ET>
<AU>TURUANI (Mathieu); PFENNING (Frank)</AU>
<AF>Loria-INRIA/Vandoeuvre-lès-Nancy/France (1 aut.)</AF>
<DT>Publication en série; Congrès; Niveau analytique</DT>
<SO>Lecture notes in computer science; ISSN 0302-9743; Allemagne; Da. 2006; Vol. 4098; Pp. 277-286; Bibl. 16 ref.</SO>
<LA>Anglais</LA>
<EA>This paper presents an overview of the CL-Atse tool, an efficient and versatile automatic analyser for the security of cryptographic protocols. CL-Atse takes as input a protocol specified as a set of rewriting rules (IF format, produced by the AVISPA compiler), and uses rewriting and constraint solving techniques to model all reachable states of the participants and decide if an attack exists w.r.t. the Dolev-Yao intruder. Any state-based security property can be modelled (like secrecy, authentication, fairness, etc...), and the algebraic properties of operators like xor or exponentiation are taken into account with much less limitations than other tools, thanks to a complete modular unification algorithm. Also, useful constraints like typing, inequalities, or shared sets of knowledge (with set operations like removes, negative tests, etc...) can also be analysed.</EA>
<CC>001D02B07C; 001D04A04E; 001D02B02</CC>
<FD>Protocole transmission; Sécurité; Cryptographie; Compilateur; Analyse atteignabilité; Authentification; Unification; Théorie type; Typage; Ingénierie connaissances; Réécriture; Intrus; Secret; Equité; Contrainte inégalité; Satisfaction contrainte; Modélisation; Exponentiation</FD>
<ED>Transmission protocol; Safety; Cryptography; Compiler; Reachability analysis; Authentication; Unification; Type theory; Typing; Knowledge engineering; Rewriting; Intruder; Secrecy; Equity; Inequality constraint; Constraint satisfaction; Modeling; Exponentiation</ED>
<SD>Protocolo transmisión; Seguridad; Criptografía; Compilador; Autenticación; Unificación; Tipificación; Reescritura; Intruso; Secreto; Equidad; Constreñimiento desigualdad; Satisfaccion restricción; Modelización; Expositoración</SD>
<LO>INIST-16343.354000153621310210</LO>
<ID>07-0517960</ID>
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