Integration of security policy into system modeling
Identifieur interne :
000351 ( PascalFrancis/Corpus );
précédent :
000350;
suivant :
000352
Integration of security policy into system modeling
Auteurs : Nazim Benaïsa ;
Dominique Cansell ;
Dominique MerySource :
-
Lecture notes in computer science [ 0302-9743 ] ; 2006.
RBID : Pascal:08-0029213
Descripteurs français
English descriptors
Abstract
We address the proof-based development of (system) models satisfying a security policy. The security policy is expressed in a model called OrBAC, which allows one to state permissions and prohibitions on actions and activities and belongs to the family of role-based access control formalisms. The main question is to validate the link between the security policy expressed in OrBAC and the resulting system; a first B model is derived from the OrBAC specification of the security policy and then the model is refined to introduce properties that can be expressed in OrBAC. The refinement guarantees that the resulting B (system) model satisfies the security policy. We present a generic development of a system with respect to a security policy and it can be instantiated later for a given security policy.
Notice en format standard (ISO 2709)
Pour connaître la documentation sur le format Inist Standard.
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| A08 | 01 | 1 | ENG | @1 Integration of security policy into system modeling |
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| A11 | 01 | 1 | | @1 BENAÏSA (Nazim) |
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| A11 | 02 | 1 | | @1 CANSELL (Dominique) |
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| A11 | 03 | 1 | | @1 MERY (Dominique) |
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| A12 | 01 | 1 | | @1 JULLIAND (Jacques) @9 ed. |
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| A12 | 02 | 1 | | @1 KOUCHNARENKO (Olga) @9 ed. |
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| A14 | 01 | | | @1 Université Henri Poincaré Nancy @3 FRA @Z 1 aut. @Z 3 aut. |
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| A14 | 03 | | | @1 Université de Metz @3 FRA @Z 2 aut. |
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| A20 | | | | @1 232-247 |
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| A21 | | | | @1 2006 |
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| A23 | 01 | | | @0 ENG |
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| A26 | 01 | | | @0 978-3-540-68760-3 |
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| A43 | 01 | | | @1 INIST @2 16343 @5 354000153639230160 |
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| A44 | | | | @0 0000 @1 © 2008 INIST-CNRS. All rights reserved. |
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| A45 | | | | @0 15 ref. |
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| A47 | 01 | 1 | | @0 08-0029213 |
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| A60 | | | | @1 P @2 C |
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| A66 | 01 | | | @0 DEU |
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| C01 | 01 | | ENG | @0 We address the proof-based development of (system) models satisfying a security policy. The security policy is expressed in a model called OrBAC, which allows one to state permissions and prohibitions on actions and activities and belongs to the family of role-based access control formalisms. The main question is to validate the link between the security policy expressed in OrBAC and the resulting system; a first B model is derived from the OrBAC specification of the security policy and then the model is refined to introduce properties that can be expressed in OrBAC. The refinement guarantees that the resulting B (system) model satisfies the security policy. We present a generic development of a system with respect to a security policy and it can be instantiated later for a given security policy. |
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| C03 | 03 | X | FRE | @0 Sécurité informatique @5 06 |
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| C03 | 06 | X | ENG | @0 Information system @5 09 |
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| C03 | 06 | X | SPA | @0 Sistema información @5 09 |
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| C03 | 07 | 3 | FRE | @0 Contrôle accès @5 18 |
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| C03 | 07 | 3 | ENG | @0 Access control @5 18 |
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| C03 | 10 | X | FRE | @0 Méthode raffinement @5 25 |
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| C03 | 10 | X | ENG | @0 Refinement method @5 25 |
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| C03 | 10 | X | SPA | @0 Método afinamiento @5 25 |
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| N44 | 01 | | | @1 OTO |
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| pR |
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Format Inist (serveur)
| NO : | PASCAL 08-0029213 INIST |
|---|
| ET : | Integration of security policy into system modeling |
|---|
| AU : | BENAÏSA (Nazim); CANSELL (Dominique); MERY (Dominique); JULLIAND (Jacques); KOUCHNARENKO (Olga) |
|---|
| AF : | Université Henri Poincaré Nancy/France (1 aut., 3 aut.); LORIA BP 239/54506 Vandoevre-lès-Nancy/France (1 aut., 2 aut., 3 aut.); Université de Metz/France (2 aut.) |
|---|
| DT : | Publication en série; Congrès; Niveau analytique |
|---|
| SO : | Lecture notes in computer science; ISSN 0302-9743; Allemagne; Da. 2006; Vol. 4355; Pp. 232-247; Bibl. 15 ref. |
|---|
| LA : | Anglais |
|---|
| EA : | We address the proof-based development of (system) models satisfying a security policy. The security policy is expressed in a model called OrBAC, which allows one to state permissions and prohibitions on actions and activities and belongs to the family of role-based access control formalisms. The main question is to validate the link between the security policy expressed in OrBAC and the resulting system; a first B model is derived from the OrBAC specification of the security policy and then the model is refined to introduce properties that can be expressed in OrBAC. The refinement guarantees that the resulting B (system) model satisfies the security policy. We present a generic development of a system with respect to a security policy and it can be instantiated later for a given security policy. |
|---|
| CC : | 001D02B07C; 001D02B04; 001D02B09 |
|---|
| FD : | Développement logiciel; Spécification formelle; Sécurité informatique; Théorie preuve; Vérification programme; Système information; Contrôle accès; Modélisation; Architecture basée modèle; Méthode raffinement |
|---|
| ED : | Software development; Formal specification; Computer security; Proof theory; Program verification; Information system; Access control; Modeling; Model driven architecture; Refinement method |
|---|
| SD : | Desarrollo logicial; Especificación formal; Seguridad informatica; Teoría demonstración; Verificación programa; Sistema información; Modelización; Arquitectura basada modelo; Método afinamiento |
|---|
| LO : | INIST-16343.354000153639230160 |
|---|
| ID : | 08-0029213 |
|---|
Links to Exploration step
Pascal:08-0029213
Le document en format XML
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</keywords><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">We address the proof-based development of (system) models satisfying a security policy. The security policy is expressed in a model called OrBAC, which allows one to state permissions and prohibitions on actions and activities and belongs to the family of role-based access control formalisms. The main question is to validate the link between the security policy expressed in OrBAC and the resulting system; a first B model is derived from the OrBAC specification of the security policy and then the model is refined to introduce properties that can be expressed in OrBAC. The refinement guarantees that the resulting B (system) model satisfies the security policy. We present a generic development of a system with respect to a security policy and it can be instantiated later for a given security policy.</div>
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<ET>Integration of security policy into system modeling</ET>
<AU>BENAÏSA (Nazim); CANSELL (Dominique); MERY (Dominique); JULLIAND (Jacques); KOUCHNARENKO (Olga)</AU>
<AF>Université Henri Poincaré Nancy/France (1 aut., 3 aut.); LORIA BP 239/54506 Vandoevre-lès-Nancy/France (1 aut., 2 aut., 3 aut.); Université de Metz/France (2 aut.)</AF>
<DT>Publication en série; Congrès; Niveau analytique</DT>
<SO>Lecture notes in computer science; ISSN 0302-9743; Allemagne; Da. 2006; Vol. 4355; Pp. 232-247; Bibl. 15 ref.</SO>
<LA>Anglais</LA>
<EA>We address the proof-based development of (system) models satisfying a security policy. The security policy is expressed in a model called OrBAC, which allows one to state permissions and prohibitions on actions and activities and belongs to the family of role-based access control formalisms. The main question is to validate the link between the security policy expressed in OrBAC and the resulting system; a first B model is derived from the OrBAC specification of the security policy and then the model is refined to introduce properties that can be expressed in OrBAC. The refinement guarantees that the resulting B (system) model satisfies the security policy. We present a generic development of a system with respect to a security policy and it can be instantiated later for a given security policy.</EA>
<CC>001D02B07C; 001D02B04; 001D02B09</CC>
<FD>Développement logiciel; Spécification formelle; Sécurité informatique; Théorie preuve; Vérification programme; Système information; Contrôle accès; Modélisation; Architecture basée modèle; Méthode raffinement</FD>
<ED>Software development; Formal specification; Computer security; Proof theory; Program verification; Information system; Access control; Modeling; Model driven architecture; Refinement method</ED>
<SD>Desarrollo logicial; Especificación formal; Seguridad informatica; Teoría demonstración; Verificación programa; Sistema información; Modelización; Arquitectura basada modelo; Método afinamiento</SD>
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