InforLorV4, PascalFrancis, Corpus, bibRecord, 000276

Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries

Identifieur interne : 000276 ( PascalFrancis/Corpus ); précédent : 000275; suivant : 000277

Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries

Auteurs : Mathieu Baudet ; Véronique Cortier ; Steve Kremer

Source :

Information and computation : (Print) [ 0890-5401 ] ; 2009.

RBID : Pascal:09-0176595

Descripteurs français

Pascal (Inist)
- Implémentation, Théorie équationnelle, Lien, Primitif, Consistance sémantique, Equivalence, Informatique théorique, Protocole sécurité.

English descriptors

KwdEn :
- Computer theory, Equational theory, Equivalence, Implementation, Link, Primitive, Security protocol, Soundness.

Abstract

In this paper we study the link between formal and cryptographic models for security protocols in the presence of passive adversaries. In contrast to other works, we do not consider a fixed set of primitives but aim at results for arbitrary equational theories. We define a framework for comparing a cryptographic implementation and its idealization with respect to various security notions. In particular, we concentrate on the computational soundness of static equivalence, a standard tool in cryptographic pi calculi. We present a soundness criterion, which for many theories is not only sufficient but also necessary. Finally, to illustrate our framework, we establish the soundness of static equivalence for the exclusive OR and a theory of ciphers and lists.

Notice en format standard (ISO 2709)

Pour connaître la documentation sur le format Inist Standard.

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A08	`01`	`1`	`ENG`	`@1 Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries`
A11	`01`	`1`		`@1 BAUDET (Mathieu)`
A11	`02`	`1`		`@1 CORTIER (Véronique)`
A11	`03`	`1`		`@1 KREMER (Steve)`
A14	`01`			`@1 DCSSI @2 Paris @3 FRA @Z 1 aut.`
A14	`02`			`@1 Loria/CNRS &/INRIA Lorraine Projet Cassis @3 FRA @Z 2 aut.`
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A23	`01`			`@0 ENG`
A43	`01`			`@1 INIST @2 8341 @5 354000186726760020`
A44				`@0 0000 @1 © 2009 INIST-CNRS. All rights reserved.`
A45				`@0 40 ref.`
A47	`01`	`1`		`@0 09-0176595`
A60				`@1 P`
A61				`@0 A`
A64	`01`	`1`		`@0 Information and computation : (Print)`
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C01	`01`		`ENG`	@0 In this paper we study the link between formal and cryptographic models for security protocols in the presence of passive adversaries. In contrast to other works, we do not consider a fixed set of primitives but aim at results for arbitrary equational theories. We define a framework for comparing a cryptographic implementation and its idealization with respect to various security notions. In particular, we concentrate on the computational soundness of static equivalence, a standard tool in cryptographic pi calculi. We present a soundness criterion, which for many theories is not only sufficient but also necessary. Finally, to illustrate our framework, we establish the soundness of static equivalence for the exclusive OR and a theory of ciphers and lists.
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C03	`01`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Implementación @5 17`
C03	`02`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Théorie équationnelle @5 18`
C03	`02`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Equational theory @5 18`
C03	`02`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Teoría ecuaciónal @5 18`
C03	`03`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Lien @5 19`
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C03	`04`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Primitif @5 20`
C03	`04`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Primitive @5 20`
C03	`04`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Primitivo @5 20`
C03	`05`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Consistance sémantique @5 21`
C03	`05`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Soundness @5 21`
C03	`05`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Consistencia semantica @5 21`
C03	`06`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Equivalence @5 22`
C03	`06`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Equivalence @5 22`
C03	`06`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Equivalencia @5 22`
C03	`07`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Informatique théorique @5 23`
C03	`07`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Computer theory @5 23`
C03	`07`	`X`	`SPA`	`@0 Informática teórica @5 23`
C03	`08`	`X`	`FRE`	`@0 Protocole sécurité @4 CD @5 96`
C03	`08`	`X`	`ENG`	`@0 Security protocol @4 CD @5 96`
N21				`@1 131`
N44	`01`			`@1 OTO`
N82				`@1 OTO`

Format Inist (serveur)

NO :	PASCAL 09-0176595 INIST
ET :	Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries
AU :	BAUDET (Mathieu); CORTIER (Véronique); KREMER (Steve)
AF :	DCSSI/Paris/France (1 aut.); Loria/CNRS &/INRIA Lorraine Projet Cassis/France (2 aut.); LSV/CNRS & INRIA Saclay Projet SECSI & ENS Cachan/France (3 aut.)
DT :	Publication en série; Niveau analytique
SO :	Information and computation : (Print); ISSN 0890-5401; Coden INFCEC; Etats-Unis; Da. 2009; Vol. 207; No. 4; Pp. 496-520; Bibl. 40 ref.
LA :	Anglais
EA :	In this paper we study the link between formal and cryptographic models for security protocols in the presence of passive adversaries. In contrast to other works, we do not consider a fixed set of primitives but aim at results for arbitrary equational theories. We define a framework for comparing a cryptographic implementation and its idealization with respect to various security notions. In particular, we concentrate on the computational soundness of static equivalence, a standard tool in cryptographic pi calculi. We present a soundness criterion, which for many theories is not only sufficient but also necessary. Finally, to illustrate our framework, we establish the soundness of static equivalence for the exclusive OR and a theory of ciphers and lists.
CC :	001D02A08
FD :	Implémentation; Théorie équationnelle; Lien; Primitif; Consistance sémantique; Equivalence; Informatique théorique; Protocole sécurité
ED :	Implementation; Equational theory; Link; Primitive; Soundness; Equivalence; Computer theory; Security protocol
SD :	Implementación; Teoría ecuaciónal; Vínculo; Primitivo; Consistencia semantica; Equivalencia; Informática teórica
LO :	INIST-8341.354000186726760020
ID :	09-0176595

Links to Exploration step

Pascal:09-0176595

Le document en format XML

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Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries

Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries

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