InforLorV4, PascalFrancis, Corpus, bibRecord, 000086

Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy

Identifieur interne : 000086 ( PascalFrancis/Corpus ); précédent : 000085; suivant : 000087

Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy

Auteurs : Véronique Cortier ; Ben Smyth

Source :

Journal of computer security [ 0926-227X ] ; 2013.

RBID : Pascal:13-0145410

Descripteurs français

Pascal (Inist)
- Sécurité informatique, Vote électronique, Logiciel libre, Internet, Administration électronique, Vie privée, Faisabilité, Spécification formelle, Simultanéité informatique, Protocole transmission, Confidentialité, Réseau web, Vulnérabilité, Grossissement, Législation, pi calcul, ..

English descriptors

KwdEn :
- Computer security, Concurrency, Confidentiality, Electronic government, Electronic vote, Feasibility, Formal specification, Internet, Legislation, Magnification, Open source software, Private life, Transmission protocol, Vulnerability, World wide web, pi calculus.

Abstract

Helios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system, suitable for use in low-coercion environments. In this article, we analyse ballot secrecy in Helios and discover a vulnerability which allows an adversary to compromise the privacy of voters. The vulnerability exploits the absence of ballot independence in Helios and works by replaying a voter's ballot or a variant of it, the replayed ballot magnifies the voter's contribution to the election outcome and this magnification can be used to violated privacy. We demonstrate the practicality of the attack by violating a voter's privacy in a mock election using the software implementation of Helios. Moreover, the feasibility of an attack is considered in the context of French legislative elections and, based upon our findings, we believe it constitutes a real threat to ballot secrecy. We present a fix and show that our solution satisfies a formal definition of ballot secrecy using the applied pi calculus. Furthermore, we present similar vulnerabilities in other electronic voting protocols - namely, the schemes by Lee et al., Sako and Kilian and Schoenmakers- which do not assure ballot independence. Finally, we argue that independence and privacy properties are unrelated, and non-malleability is stronger than independence.

Notice en format standard (ISO 2709)

Pour connaître la documentation sur le format Inist Standard.

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C01	`01`		`ENG`	@0 Helios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system, suitable for use in low-coercion environments. In this article, we analyse ballot secrecy in Helios and discover a vulnerability which allows an adversary to compromise the privacy of voters. The vulnerability exploits the absence of ballot independence in Helios and works by replaying a voter's ballot or a variant of it, the replayed ballot magnifies the voter's contribution to the election outcome and this magnification can be used to violated privacy. We demonstrate the practicality of the attack by violating a voter's privacy in a mock election using the software implementation of Helios. Moreover, the feasibility of an attack is considered in the context of French legislative elections and, based upon our findings, we believe it constitutes a real threat to ballot secrecy. We present a fix and show that our solution satisfies a formal definition of ballot secrecy using the applied pi calculus. Furthermore, we present similar vulnerabilities in other electronic voting protocols - namely, the schemes by Lee et al., Sako and Kilian and Schoenmakers- which do not assure ballot independence. Finally, we argue that independence and privacy properties are unrelated, and non-malleability is stronger than independence.
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Format Inist (serveur)

NO :	PASCAL 13-0145410 INIST
ET :	Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy
AU :	CORTIER (Véronique); SMYTH (Ben)
AF :	CNRS, Loria, UMR 7503/Vandœuvre/France (1 aut.); INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt/Paris/France (2 aut.)
DT :	Publication en série; Niveau analytique
SO :	Journal of computer security; ISSN 0926-227X; Pays-Bas; Da. 2013; Vol. 21; No. 1; Pp. 89-148; Bibl. 100 ref.
LA :	Anglais
EA :	Helios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system, suitable for use in low-coercion environments. In this article, we analyse ballot secrecy in Helios and discover a vulnerability which allows an adversary to compromise the privacy of voters. The vulnerability exploits the absence of ballot independence in Helios and works by replaying a voter's ballot or a variant of it, the replayed ballot magnifies the voter's contribution to the election outcome and this magnification can be used to violated privacy. We demonstrate the practicality of the attack by violating a voter's privacy in a mock election using the software implementation of Helios. Moreover, the feasibility of an attack is considered in the context of French legislative elections and, based upon our findings, we believe it constitutes a real threat to ballot secrecy. We present a fix and show that our solution satisfies a formal definition of ballot secrecy using the applied pi calculus. Furthermore, we present similar vulnerabilities in other electronic voting protocols - namely, the schemes by Lee et al., Sako and Kilian and Schoenmakers- which do not assure ballot independence. Finally, we argue that independence and privacy properties are unrelated, and non-malleability is stronger than independence.
CC :	001D02B04; 001D02A05; 001D02B07C
FD :	Sécurité informatique; Vote électronique; Logiciel libre; Internet; Administration électronique; Vie privée; Faisabilité; Spécification formelle; Simultanéité informatique; Protocole transmission; Confidentialité; Réseau web; Vulnérabilité; Grossissement; Législation; pi calcul; .
ED :	Computer security; Electronic vote; Open source software; Internet; Electronic government; Private life; Feasibility; Formal specification; Concurrency; Transmission protocol; Confidentiality; World wide web; Vulnerability; Magnification; Legislation; pi calculus
SD :	Seguridad informatica; Voto electrónico; Software libre; Internet; Administración electrónica; Vida privada; Practicabilidad; Especificación formal; Simultaneidad informatica; Protocolo transmisión; Confidencialidad; Red WWW; Vulnerabilidad; Aumento; Legislación; pi calculo
LO :	INIST-28149.354000173229760030
ID :	13-0145410

Links to Exploration step

Pascal:13-0145410

Le document en format XML

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<fC03 i1="13" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Vulnerability</s0>
<s5>20</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="13" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Vulnerabilidad</s0>
<s5>20</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="14" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Grossissement</s0>
<s5>21</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="14" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Magnification</s0>
<s5>21</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="14" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Aumento</s0>
<s5>21</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="15" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>Législation</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="15" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>Legislation</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="15" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>Legislación</s0>
<s5>22</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="16" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>pi calcul</s0>
<s5>23</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="16" i2="X" l="ENG"><s0>pi calculus</s0>
<s5>23</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="16" i2="X" l="SPA"><s0>pi calculo</s0>
<s5>23</s5>
</fC03>
<fC03 i1="17" i2="X" l="FRE"><s0>.</s0>
<s4>INC</s4>
<s5>82</s5>
</fC03>
<fN21><s1>119</s1>
</fN21>
<fN44 i1="01"><s1>OTO</s1>
</fN44>
<fN82><s1>OTO</s1>
</fN82>
</pA>
</standard>
<server><NO>PASCAL 13-0145410 INIST</NO>
<ET>Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy</ET>
<AU>CORTIER (Véronique); SMYTH (Ben)</AU>
<AF>CNRS, Loria, UMR 7503/Vandœuvre/France (1 aut.); INRIA Paris-Rocquencourt/Paris/France (2 aut.)</AF>
<DT>Publication en série; Niveau analytique</DT>
<SO>Journal of computer security; ISSN 0926-227X; Pays-Bas; Da. 2013; Vol. 21; No. 1; Pp. 89-148; Bibl. 100 ref.</SO>
<LA>Anglais</LA>
<EA>Helios 2.0 is an open-source web-based end-to-end verifiable electronic voting system, suitable for use in low-coercion environments. In this article, we analyse ballot secrecy in Helios and discover a vulnerability which allows an adversary to compromise the privacy of voters. The vulnerability exploits the absence of ballot independence in Helios and works by replaying a voter's ballot or a variant of it, the replayed ballot magnifies the voter's contribution to the election outcome and this magnification can be used to violated privacy. We demonstrate the practicality of the attack by violating a voter's privacy in a mock election using the software implementation of Helios. Moreover, the feasibility of an attack is considered in the context of French legislative elections and, based upon our findings, we believe it constitutes a real threat to ballot secrecy. We present a fix and show that our solution satisfies a formal definition of ballot secrecy using the applied pi calculus. Furthermore, we present similar vulnerabilities in other electronic voting protocols - namely, the schemes by Lee et al., Sako and Kilian and Schoenmakers- which do not assure ballot independence. Finally, we argue that independence and privacy properties are unrelated, and non-malleability is stronger than independence.</EA>
<CC>001D02B04; 001D02A05; 001D02B07C</CC>
<FD>Sécurité informatique; Vote électronique; Logiciel libre; Internet; Administration électronique; Vie privée; Faisabilité; Spécification formelle; Simultanéité informatique; Protocole transmission; Confidentialité; Réseau web; Vulnérabilité; Grossissement; Législation; pi calcul; .</FD>
<ED>Computer security; Electronic vote; Open source software; Internet; Electronic government; Private life; Feasibility; Formal specification; Concurrency; Transmission protocol; Confidentiality; World wide web; Vulnerability; Magnification; Legislation; pi calculus</ED>
<SD>Seguridad informatica; Voto electrónico; Software libre; Internet; Administración electrónica; Vida privada; Practicabilidad; Especificación formal; Simultaneidad informatica; Protocolo transmisión; Confidencialidad; Red WWW; Vulnerabilidad; Aumento; Legislación; pi calculo</SD>
<LO>INIST-28149.354000173229760030</LO>
<ID>13-0145410</ID>
</server>
</inist>
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Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy

Attacking and fixing Helios: An analysis of ballot secrecy

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