Precontractual information asymmetry between principal and agent
Identifieur interne : 00EE44 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 00EE43; suivant : 00EE45Precontractual information asymmetry between principal and agent
Auteurs : David Sappington [États-Unis]Source :
- Economics Letters [ 0165-1765 ] ; 1980.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Asymmetry, Bell journal, Discussion paper, Economic research, Efficient contract, Efficient contracts, Harvard institute, Inefficient outcome, Information asymmetry, Informational environment, Major findings, Necessary conditions, Optimal contract, Optimal strategy, Post pareto, Precontractual, Precontractual information asymmetry, Productive technology, Random state, Sappington, Sappington precontractual information asymmetry, Strict inequality, True distribution, Utility function.
Abstract
Abstract: In the presence of precontractual information asymmetry between principal and risk-neutral agent, the optimal strategy for the principal will be to deliberately induce outcomes which are ex post Pareto inefficient, except under rare circumstances.
Url:
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(80)90135-4
Affiliations:
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Le document en format XML
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