The effects of incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry: A survey
Identifieur interne : 00C013 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 00C012; suivant : 00C014The effects of incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry: A survey
Auteurs : Donald J. Kridel [États-Unis] ; David E. M. Sappington [États-Unis] ; Dennis L. Weisman [États-Unis]Source :
- Journal of Regulatory Economics [ 0922-680X ] ; 1996-05-01.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Access line, Access rates, Alternative forms, Authors report, British telecom, Christensen, Competition effect pitfall, Competitive intensity, Competitive pressures, Cost reduction, David sappington, December, Demonstration effects, Dennis weisman, Dennisweisman, Deployment, Deregulation, Digital investment, Federal communications commission, Federal level, Fiber deployment, Full pricing flexibility, Future research, Galal, Greenstein, Hybrid plans, Incentive, Incentive regulation, Incentive regulation plan, Incentive regulation plans, Incentiveregulationin, Incentiveregulationin telecommunications, Infrastructure, Infrastructure investment, Ingo vogelsang, Interlata, Intralata, Intralata toll, Intralata toll prices, Intralata toll services, Intrastate, Isdn, Kaestner, Lecs, Local exchange carriers, Lower prices, Market share, Mathios, Mayo, Mcmaster, Network modernization, Nynex, Other hand, Other words, Pitfall, Price caps, Price regulation, Pricing flexibility, Private business sector, Productivity gains, Productivity growth, Rand journal, Regulation, Regulator, Regulatory, Regulatory reform, Regulatory regime, Regulatory regimes, Research associates, Sappington, Schmalensee, Selectivity bias, September, Service prices, Service quality, Service rates, Spiller, State level, Tardiff, Telecommunication, Telecommunications industry, Telecommunications infrastructure, Telecommunications services, Telephone penetration, Time period, Time periods, Toll prices, Total input, Traditional regulation, Vickers, Weisman, Yardstick competition, Ying, Zarkadas, Zona.
Abstract
Abstract: We review recent empirical studies of the performance of incentive regulation in the telecommunications industry. These studies provide evidence that productivity, infrastructure investment, profit levels, telephone penetration, and new service offerings have increased under incentive regulation. Service rates have generally remained stable or decreased slightly, and service quality does not appear to have been affected adversely. There is no evidence that incentive regulation has led to streamlined regulatory proceedings. Strong evidence that incentive regulation has reduced the costs of providing telephone service has not yet materialized.
Url:
DOI: 10.1007/BF00133477
Affiliations:
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These studies provide evidence that productivity, infrastructure investment, profit levels, telephone penetration, and new service offerings have increased under incentive regulation. Service rates have generally remained stable or decreased slightly, and service quality does not appear to have been affected adversely. There is no evidence that incentive regulation has led to streamlined regulatory proceedings. Strong evidence that incentive regulation has reduced the costs of providing telephone service has not yet materialized.</div></front></TEI><affiliations><list><country><li>États-Unis</li></country><region><li>Floride</li><li>Kansas</li></region></list><tree><country name="États-Unis"><noRegion><name sortKey="Kridel, Donald J" sort="Kridel, Donald J" uniqKey="Kridel D" first="Donald J." last="Kridel">Donald J. Kridel</name></noRegion><name sortKey="Sappington, David E M" sort="Sappington, David E M" uniqKey="Sappington D" first="David E. M." last="Sappington">David E. M. Sappington</name><name sortKey="Weisman, Dennis L" sort="Weisman, Dennis L" uniqKey="Weisman D" first="Dennis L." last="Weisman">Dennis L. Weisman</name></country></tree></affiliations></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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