Participatory Gains and Policy Effectiveness: The Open Method of Co‐ordination Information Society
Identifieur interne : 000481 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000480; suivant : 000482Participatory Gains and Policy Effectiveness: The Open Method of Co‐ordination Information Society
Auteurs : Alison Harcourt [Royaume-Uni]Source :
- JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies [ 0021-9886 ] ; 2013-07.
Abstract
This article provides empirical findings on the relationship between the open method of co‐ordination and participation (OMC). Empirically, it draws on within‐case analysis to examine how participation, venues and outcomes have varied in different domains of information society policy. This is a challenging case for claims about the participatory effects of the OMC because it is not a policy originally designed to address social policy concerns or unemployment problems. The main conceptual argument is that the OMC is a political opportunity structure that distributes participatory gains. The article examines this opportunity structure by separating out the dimensions of ‘procedure’ and ‘outcomes’ and including ‘transparency’ as a moderating variable. The findings point to participatory effects in all but one case, although not for the same actors and at the same level (European Union or national/sub‐national).
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/jcms.12022
Affiliations:
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<front><div type="abstract">This article provides empirical findings on the relationship between the open method of co‐ordination and participation (OMC). Empirically, it draws on within‐case analysis to examine how participation, venues and outcomes have varied in different domains of information society policy. This is a challenging case for claims about the participatory effects of the OMC because it is not a policy originally designed to address social policy concerns or unemployment problems. The main conceptual argument is that the OMC is a political opportunity structure that distributes participatory gains. The article examines this opportunity structure by separating out the dimensions of ‘procedure’ and ‘outcomes’ and including ‘transparency’ as a moderating variable. The findings point to participatory effects in all but one case, although not for the same actors and at the same level (European Union or national/sub‐national).</div>
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