The frequency of wars
Identifieur interne : 001577 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001576; suivant : 001578The frequency of wars
Auteurs : Mark Harrison ; Nikolaus WolfSource :
- The Economic History Review [ 0013-0117 ] ; 2012-08.
Abstract
Wars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870. The main tradition of western political and philosophical thought suggests that extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period should have reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This view is clearly incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity to wage war. Most fundamentally, the growing number of sovereign states has been closely associated with the spread of democracy and increasing commercial openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts. Trade and democracy are traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves, and because they reduce the willingness to go to war, given the national capacity to do so, but the same factors may also have been increasing the capacity for war, and thus its frequency.
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0289.2011.00615.x
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The main tradition of western political and philosophical thought suggests that extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period should have reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This view is clearly incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity to wage war. Most fundamentally, the growing number of sovereign states has been closely associated with the spread of democracy and increasing commercial openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts. Trade and democracy are traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves, and because they reduce the willingness to go to war, given the national capacity to do so, but the same factors may also have been increasing the capacity for war, and thus its frequency.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>wiley</corpusName><author><json:item><name>MARK HARRISON</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Warwick, University of Birmingham, and Stanford University;</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>NIKOLAUS WOLF</name><affiliations><json:string>Humboldt‐Universität and Centre for Economic Policy Research.</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><articleId><json:string>EHR615</json:string></articleId><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>Wars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870. The main tradition of western political and philosophical thought suggests that extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period should have reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This view is clearly incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity to wage war. Most fundamentally, the growing number of sovereign states has been closely associated with the spread of democracy and increasing commercial openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts. 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(17 Nov. 2008), the University of Birmingham Centre for Russian and East European Studies current affairs seminar (25 February 2009), and the German Historical Institute conference on War in Transnational and Long Run Perspective, Moscow (2 July 2010). We thank Alex Apostolides, Stephen Broadberry, Nick Crafts, Jari Eloranta, Bishnupriya Gupta, James Harrison, Les Hannah, Alex Klein, Bas van Leeuwen, Anandi Mani, Philippe Martin, Sharun Mukand, Dennis Novy, Eugenio Proto, Jeremy P. 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Revised version submitted 10 February 2011; Accepted 24 February 2011</unparsedEditorialHistory><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="6"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="3"></count><count type="formulaTotal" number="0"></count><count type="referenceTotal" number="69"></count><count type="wordTotal" number="11678"></count><count type="linksPubMed" number="0"></count><count type="linksCrossRef" number="0"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">The frequency of wars<link href="#fn1"><sup>1</sup></link></title><title type="tocForm">The frequency of wars</title><title type="shortAuthors">MARK HARRISON AND NIKOLAUS WOLF</title><title type="short">FREQUENCY OF WARS</title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" affiliationRef="#a1"><personName><givenNames>MARK</givenNames><familyName>HARRISON</familyName></personName></creator><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr2" affiliationRef="#a2"><personName><givenNames>NIKOLAUS</givenNames><familyName>WOLF</familyName></personName></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="a1"><unparsedAffiliation>University of Warwick, University of Birmingham, and Stanford University;</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation><affiliation xml:id="a2"><unparsedAffiliation>Humboldt‐Universität and Centre for Economic Policy Research.</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><supportingInformation><p>Table S1. <i>Time series data, 1870?2001</i></p><p>Table S2. <i>Unit root tests on FW(the frequency of pairwise conflicts)</i></p><p>Table S3. <i>The trend in FW(pairwise conflict frequency), 1871?2001</i></p><p>Table S4. <i>The trend in FW no US (pairwise conflict frequency, excluding those involving the US), 1871?2001</i></p><p>Table S5. <i>The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP</i></p><p>Table S6. <i>The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP per capita</i></p><supportingInfoItem><mediaResource alt="supporting info item" href="urn-x:wiley:00130117:media:ehr615:EHR_615_sm_TableS1-S6"></mediaResource><caption>Supporting info item</caption></supportingInfoItem></supportingInformation><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><p>Wars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870. The main tradition of western political and philosophical thought suggests that extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period should have reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This view is clearly incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity to wage war. Most fundamentally, the growing number of sovereign states has been closely associated with the spread of democracy and increasing commercial openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts. Trade and democracy are traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves, and because they reduce the willingness to go to war, given the national capacity to do so, but the same factors may also have been increasing the capacity for war, and thus its frequency.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>The frequency of wars</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>FREQUENCY OF WARS</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>The frequency of wars1</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">MARK</namePart><namePart type="family">HARRISON</namePart><affiliation>University of Warwick, University of Birmingham, and Stanford University;</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">NIKOLAUS</namePart><namePart type="family">WOLF</namePart><affiliation>Humboldt‐Universität and Centre for Economic Policy Research.</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2012-08</dateIssued><edition>Date submitted 14 December 2009; Revised version submitted 10 February 2011; Accepted 24 February 2011</edition><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2012</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType><extent unit="figures">6</extent><extent unit="tables">3</extent><extent unit="references">69</extent><extent unit="words">11678</extent></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">Wars are increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upward since 1870. The main tradition of western political and philosophical thought suggests that extensive economic globalization and democratization over this period should have reduced appetites for war far below their current level. This view is clearly incomplete: at best, confounding factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity to wage war. Most fundamentally, the growing number of sovereign states has been closely associated with the spread of democracy and increasing commercial openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts. Trade and democracy are traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves, and because they reduce the willingness to go to war, given the national capacity to do so, but the same factors may also have been increasing the capacity for war, and thus its frequency.</abstract><note type="content">*Earlier versions of this article were presented at the annual Defense Economics conference held at the Institute for Defense Analyses of the US Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. (17 Nov. 2008), the University of Birmingham Centre for Russian and East European Studies current affairs seminar (25 February 2009), and the German Historical Institute conference on War in Transnational and Long Run Perspective, Moscow (2 July 2010). We thank Alex Apostolides, Stephen Broadberry, Nick Crafts, Jari Eloranta, Bishnupriya Gupta, James Harrison, Les Hannah, Alex Klein, Bas van Leeuwen, Anandi Mani, Philippe Martin, Sharun Mukand, Dennis Novy, Eugenio Proto, Jeremy P. Smith, and the editor and referees, for advice and comments.</note><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>The Economic History Review</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><note type="content"> Table S1. Time series data, 1870?2001 Table S2. Unit root tests on FW(the frequency of pairwise conflicts) Table S3. The trend in FW(pairwise conflict frequency), 1871?2001 Table S4. The trend in FW no US (pairwise conflict frequency, excluding those involving the US), 1871?2001 Table S5. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP Table S6. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP per capita Table S1. Time series data, 1870?2001 Table S2. Unit root tests on FW(the frequency of pairwise conflicts) Table S3. The trend in FW(pairwise conflict frequency), 1871?2001 Table S4. The trend in FW no US (pairwise conflict frequency, excluding those involving the US), 1871?2001 Table S5. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP Table S6. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP per capita Table S1. Time series data, 1870?2001 Table S2. Unit root tests on FW(the frequency of pairwise conflicts) Table S3. The trend in FW(pairwise conflict frequency), 1871?2001 Table S4. The trend in FW no US (pairwise conflict frequency, excluding those involving the US), 1871?2001 Table S5. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP Table S6. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP per capita Table S1. Time series data, 1870?2001 Table S2. Unit root tests on FW(the frequency of pairwise conflicts) Table S3. The trend in FW(pairwise conflict frequency), 1871?2001 Table S4. The trend in FW no US (pairwise conflict frequency, excluding those involving the US), 1871?2001 Table S5. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP Table S6. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP per capita Table S1. Time series data, 1870?2001 Table S2. Unit root tests on FW(the frequency of pairwise conflicts) Table S3. The trend in FW(pairwise conflict frequency), 1871?2001 Table S4. The trend in FW no US (pairwise conflict frequency, excluding those involving the US), 1871?2001 Table S5. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP Table S6. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP per capita Table S1. Time series data, 1870?2001 Table S2. Unit root tests on FW(the frequency of pairwise conflicts) Table S3. The trend in FW(pairwise conflict frequency), 1871?2001 Table S4. The trend in FW no US (pairwise conflict frequency, excluding those involving the US), 1871?2001 Table S5. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP Table S6. The trend in average percentile rank of countries originating conflicts, 1871?2001, by GDP per capitaSupporting Info Item: Supporting info item - </note><identifier type="ISSN">0013-0117</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1468-0289</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0289</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">EHR</identifier><part><date>2012</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>65</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>1055</start><end>1076</end><total>22</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">A19CC24371CB4D7954075DCF443789586B10DF38</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1468-0289.2011.00615.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">EHR615</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© Economic History Society 2011</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>WILEY</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods></metadata><enrichments><json:item><type>multicat</type><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/A19CC24371CB4D7954075DCF443789586B10DF38/enrichments/multicat</uri></json:item></enrichments><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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