Intellectual property and optimal copyright protection
Identifieur interne : 001065 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 001064; suivant : 001066Intellectual property and optimal copyright protection
Auteurs : Christian Koboldt [Allemagne]Source :
- Journal of Cultural Economics [ 0885-2545 ] ; 1995-06-01.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Academic works, Additional work, Appropriate scope, Basic problem, Best solution, Best strategy, Christian koboldt, Christiankoboldt, Complete absence, Computer programs, Computer software, Consumer surplus, Copier, Copying, Copying costs, Copying technology, Copyright, Copyright holder, Copyright protection, Copyright solution, Copyright system, Cultural economics, Dissemination, Economic analysis, Economic rationale, Efficient allocation, Externality, First order condition, First term, Free market entry, Further literature, Gross profit, Gross profits, Historische studien, Imperfect substitutes, Individual valuation, Individual valuations, Individual willingness, Inequality, Infinite number, Information carrier, Information carriers, Information goods, Information production, Intellectual goods, Intellectual property, Intellectual property rights, Intellectualpropertyand optimalcopyrightprotection, Koboldt, Large number, Legal monopoly, Limit price, Long time, Lower cost, Marginal consumer, Marginal copy, Marginal cost, Marginal costs, Marginal profit, Marginal work, Market entry, Market mechanism, Market price, Maximisation problem, Maximising, Maximising welfare, Maximum number, Maximum welfare, Maximum willingness, Monopolistic competition, Monopoly price, Monopoly prices, Monopoly profits, Necessary condition, Opposite case, Optimal copyright protection, Optimal intensity, Optimal level, Optimal price, Optimality condition, Optimum copyright protection, Optimum product diversity, Original copies, Original producer, Original producers, Other hand, Other words, Partial derivatives, Price discrimination, Private copying, Producer surplus, Production cost, Profit maximising creators, Property right, Property rights, Public externalities, Public goods, Same time, Second term, Side payments, Social welfare, Social welfare loss, Square brackets, Terms yields, Work decreases, Works decreases, Works increases.
Abstract
Abstract: Copyright protection, or more generally, intellectual property rights, can be regarded as a means for the stimulation of production of information goods. This paper analyses the basic problem of production and dissemination of information and the role of copyright protection as an incentive for the producers of creative works. Using a simple model, it is shown that not only a cause for limiting the extent of copyright protection does exist, but that also an argument for a minimum level of protection can be found. Even optimal copyright protection, given the restriction that production and dissemination of information goods has to be co-ordinated by a market mechanism, however, does not lead to a first-best (allocatively efficient) solution. Hence, the judgment that copyright protection is the best solution to the basic problem can be grounded only on a comparative institutional approach.
Url:
DOI: 10.1007/BF01074202
Affiliations:
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Le document en format XML
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ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Abstract: Copyright protection, or more generally, intellectual property rights, can be regarded as a means for the stimulation of production of information goods. This paper analyses the basic problem of production and dissemination of information and the role of copyright protection as an incentive for the producers of creative works. Using a simple model, it is shown that not only a cause for limiting the extent of copyright protection does exist, but that also an argument for a minimum level of protection can be found. Even optimal copyright protection, given the restriction that production and dissemination of information goods has to be co-ordinated by a market mechanism, however, does not lead to a first-best (allocatively efficient) solution. Hence, the judgment that copyright protection is the best solution to the basic problem can be grounded only on a comparative institutional approach.</div></front></TEI><affiliations><list><country><li>Allemagne</li></country></list><tree><country name="Allemagne"><noRegion><name sortKey="Koboldt, Christian" sort="Koboldt, Christian" uniqKey="Koboldt C" first="Christian" last="Koboldt">Christian Koboldt</name></noRegion></country></tree></affiliations></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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