Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?
Identifieur interne : 000233 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 000232; suivant : 000234Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?
Auteurs : Christina Eckes [Pays-Bas]Source :
- European Law Journal [ 1351-5993 ] ; 2012-03.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Absolute primacy, Action service, Additional condition, Ahmed, Applicable european, Ausbrechender rechtsakt, Autonomous, Binding force, Blackwell, Blackwell publishing, Bosphorus airways, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bverfg, Bverfge decision, Case commune, Case costa, Case internationale handelsgesellschaft, Charter obligations, Common approach, Common market, Constitutional complaint, Constitutional traditions, Core principles, Data retention decision, Democratic republic, Derogation, Direct effect, Domestic measures, Eckes, European community, European convention, European council, European court, European courts, European institutions, European treaties, European union, External dimension, External relations, First instance, First line, First ruling, Foreign affairs, Foreign policy, Forms part, Fundamental rights, Fundamental rights protection, General principles, German court, Grand chamber, High representative, Highest courts, Human rights, Ibid, Independent actor, Individual sanctions, Internal market, International agreements, International community, International fruit company, International obligations, International organisation, International plane, International presence, International relations, International sanctions, International treaties, Jean monnet, Journal volume, Judicial actors, Judicial review, Kadi, Legal order, Legal sphere, Lisbon, Lisbon decision, Lisbon treaty, Lord hope, Maastricht, Maastricht decision, Mangold, Many actors, Member states, Member states rank, Mesquer, Military monopoly, Mojahedin organisation, National courts, National level, National rules, October, Ordinary laws, Organisation, Other hand, Oxford university press, Para, Political actors, Precise impact, Preliminary reference, Primary european, Private individuals, Rights protection, Same time, Schweizer bundesgericht, Security council, Security council resolutions, Special status, Strong statement, Supremacy, Supreme court, Swiss supreme court, Territorial scope, Test case, Tfeu, Unconditional supremacy, Vertical frictions.
Abstract
The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00595.x
Affiliations:
Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)
- to stream Istex, to step Corpus: 001984
- to stream Istex, to step Curation: 001863
- to stream Istex, to step Checkpoint: 000103
- to stream Main, to step Merge: 000233
- to stream Main, to step Curation: 000233
Le document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?</title><author><name sortKey="Eckes, Christina" sort="Eckes, Christina" uniqKey="Eckes C" first="Christina" last="Eckes">Christina Eckes</name></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:F5AF5223A136F473E2D2B5AC82909FAEF293AD04</idno><date when="2012" year="2012">2012</date><idno type="doi">10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00595.x</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/F5AF5223A136F473E2D2B5AC82909FAEF293AD04/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">001984</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">001984</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Curation">001863</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Checkpoint">000103</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Checkpoint">000103</idno><idno type="wicri:doubleKey">1351-5993:2012:Eckes C:protecting:supremacy:from</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Merge">000233</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Curation">000233</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Main/Exploration">000233</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?</title><author><name sortKey="Eckes, Christina" sort="Eckes, Christina" uniqKey="Eckes C" first="Christina" last="Eckes">Christina Eckes</name><affiliation wicri:level="4"><country>Pays-Bas</country><placeName><settlement type="city">Amsterdam</settlement><region>Hollande-Septentrionale</region></placeName><orgName type="university">Université d'Amsterdam</orgName></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">European Law Journal</title><idno type="ISSN">1351-5993</idno><idno type="eISSN">1468-0386</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2012-03">2012-03</date><biblScope unit="volume">18</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="230">230</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="250">250</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">1351-5993</idno></series><idno type="istex">F5AF5223A136F473E2D2B5AC82909FAEF293AD04</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1468-0386.2011.00595.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">EULJ595</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">1351-5993</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="Teeft" xml:lang="en"><term>Absolute primacy</term><term>Action service</term><term>Additional condition</term><term>Ahmed</term><term>Applicable european</term><term>Ausbrechender rechtsakt</term><term>Autonomous</term><term>Binding force</term><term>Blackwell</term><term>Blackwell publishing</term><term>Bosphorus airways</term><term>Bundesverfassungsgericht</term><term>Bverfg</term><term>Bverfge decision</term><term>Case commune</term><term>Case costa</term><term>Case internationale handelsgesellschaft</term><term>Charter obligations</term><term>Common approach</term><term>Common market</term><term>Constitutional complaint</term><term>Constitutional traditions</term><term>Core principles</term><term>Data retention decision</term><term>Democratic republic</term><term>Derogation</term><term>Direct effect</term><term>Domestic measures</term><term>Eckes</term><term>European community</term><term>European convention</term><term>European council</term><term>European court</term><term>European courts</term><term>European institutions</term><term>European treaties</term><term>European union</term><term>External dimension</term><term>External relations</term><term>First instance</term><term>First line</term><term>First ruling</term><term>Foreign affairs</term><term>Foreign policy</term><term>Forms part</term><term>Fundamental rights</term><term>Fundamental rights protection</term><term>General principles</term><term>German court</term><term>Grand chamber</term><term>High representative</term><term>Highest courts</term><term>Human rights</term><term>Ibid</term><term>Independent actor</term><term>Individual sanctions</term><term>Internal market</term><term>International agreements</term><term>International community</term><term>International fruit company</term><term>International obligations</term><term>International organisation</term><term>International plane</term><term>International presence</term><term>International relations</term><term>International sanctions</term><term>International treaties</term><term>Jean monnet</term><term>Journal volume</term><term>Judicial actors</term><term>Judicial review</term><term>Kadi</term><term>Legal order</term><term>Legal sphere</term><term>Lisbon</term><term>Lisbon decision</term><term>Lisbon treaty</term><term>Lord hope</term><term>Maastricht</term><term>Maastricht decision</term><term>Mangold</term><term>Many actors</term><term>Member states</term><term>Member states rank</term><term>Mesquer</term><term>Military monopoly</term><term>Mojahedin organisation</term><term>National courts</term><term>National level</term><term>National rules</term><term>October</term><term>Ordinary laws</term><term>Organisation</term><term>Other hand</term><term>Oxford university press</term><term>Para</term><term>Political actors</term><term>Precise impact</term><term>Preliminary reference</term><term>Primary european</term><term>Private individuals</term><term>Rights protection</term><term>Same time</term><term>Schweizer bundesgericht</term><term>Security council</term><term>Security council resolutions</term><term>Special status</term><term>Strong statement</term><term>Supremacy</term><term>Supreme court</term><term>Swiss supreme court</term><term>Territorial scope</term><term>Test case</term><term>Tfeu</term><term>Unconditional supremacy</term><term>Vertical frictions</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.</div></front></TEI><affiliations><list><country><li>Pays-Bas</li></country><region><li>Hollande-Septentrionale</li></region><settlement><li>Amsterdam</li></settlement><orgName><li>Université d'Amsterdam</li></orgName></list><tree><country name="Pays-Bas"><region name="Hollande-Septentrionale"><name sortKey="Eckes, Christina" sort="Eckes, Christina" uniqKey="Eckes C" first="Christina" last="Eckes">Christina Eckes</name></region></country></tree></affiliations></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Sarre/explor/MusicSarreV3/Data/Main/Exploration
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 000233 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Main/Exploration/biblio.hfd -nk 000233 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Wicri/Sarre
|area= MusicSarreV3
|flux= Main
|étape= Exploration
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:F5AF5223A136F473E2D2B5AC82909FAEF293AD04
|texte= Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.33. |  |