Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence
Identifieur interne : 000864 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 000863; suivant : 000865Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence
Auteurs : Jan Potters ; Randolph SloofSource :
- European Journal of Political Economy [ 0176-2680 ] ; 1996.
English descriptors
- Teeft :
- Abrams, Agricultural economics, Agricultural research, American journal, Becker, Beghin, Bender, Broader perspective, Bronars, Campaign contributions, Campaign expenditures, Campaign funds, Capita income, Chappell, Collective action, Committee voting, Congressional elections, Congressional voting, Constituency, Constituency preferences, Constituent interest, Contribution strategy, Corporate pacs, Crain, Demand considerations, Determinant, Easier time, Economic inquiry, Economic interest groups, Economic science association, Economic theory, Electoral support, Empirical analysis, Empirical evidence, Empirical inquiry, Empirical literature, Empirical models, Empirical results, Empirical studies, Endogenous, Esty, European journal, Exchange model, Favorable policy, First group, Government amsterdam, Graddy, Grenzke, Grier, Guttman, Ideological groups, Individual legislators, Interest group, Interest group characteristics, Interest group influence, Interest group politics, Interest group ratings, Interest groups, Joint meeting, Labor groups, Labor pacs, Labor research, Langbein, Last term, Latter result, Legislative outcomes, Legislative voting, Legislator, Likely winners, Lobbyist, Lott, Majority party, Market structure, Munger, Negative effect, Negative impact, Other hand, Pac, Palda, Party affiliation, Party funds, Peltzman, Personal goals, Policy decisions, Policy outcomes, Policy position, Policy process, Policy variables, Political action, Political action committees, Political actions, Political activities, Political activity, Political arena, Political economy, Political expenditures, Political influence, Political market, Political power, Political process, Political science, Political strength, Political success, Political support, Political system, Polity, Poole, Positive effect, Positive impact, Positive relationship, Potential participants, Potter, Pressure groups, Previous section, Public choice, Public choice society, Public economics, Public policy, Public policy variables, Reelection, Relative influence, Romer, Rubin, Science review, Significant effect, Significant impact, Significant influence, Silberman, Sloof, Sloof european journal, Snyder, Social science, Special interest groups, Stratmann, Structural characteristics, Structural relationships, Supply considerations, Support model, Supreme court, Theilmann, Theoretical models, Tollison, Vote issue, Voting behavior, Wilhite, Winden, Zardkoohi, Zupan.
Abstract
Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. The origin of this power is not quite clear, though, and the mechanisms by which influence is effectuated are not yet fully understood. The last two decades have yielded a vast number of studies which use empirical models to assess the importance of interest groups for the formation of public policy. Each of these studies yields insights on particular, confined aspects of interest group politics. To get a more complete picture of the results, however, a broad survey of the literature seems useful. It is the purpose of this paper to provide such a survey.
Url:
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00008-0
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:51FAFA3CD2965B03F55822DF563AA2A9A51D11CBLe document en format XML
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The origin of this power is not quite clear, though, and the mechanisms by which influence is effectuated are not yet fully understood. The last two decades have yielded a vast number of studies which use empirical models to assess the importance of interest groups for the formation of public policy. Each of these studies yields insights on particular, confined aspects of interest group politics. To get a more complete picture of the results, however, a broad survey of the literature seems useful. 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Netherlands</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><subject><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>D72</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>D78</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>Interest groups</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>Empirical models</value></json:item></subject><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>Full-length article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. The origin of this power is not quite clear, though, and the mechanisms by which influence is effectuated are not yet fully understood. The last two decades have yielded a vast number of studies which use empirical models to assess the importance of interest groups for the formation of public policy. Each of these studies yields insights on particular, confined aspects of interest group politics. To get a more complete picture of the results, however, a broad survey of the literature seems useful. It is the purpose of this paper to provide such a survey.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>6.248</score><pdfVersion>1.2</pdfVersion><pdfPageSize>468 x 684 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><keywordCount>4</keywordCount><abstractCharCount>628</abstractCharCount><pdfWordCount>18721</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>113732</pdfCharCount><pdfPageCount>40</pdfPageCount><abstractWordCount>104</abstractWordCount></qualityIndicators><title>Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence</title><pii><json:string>S0176-2680(96)00008-0</json:string></pii><genre><json:string>research-article</json:string></genre><serie><title>Reprinted in</title><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><volume>76</volume><pages><first>347</first><last>359</last></pages></serie><host><title>European Journal of Political Economy</title><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><publicationDate>1996</publicationDate><issn><json:string>0176-2680</json:string></issn><pii><json:string>S0176-2680(00)X0007-9</json:string></pii><volume>12</volume><issue>3</issue><pages><first>403</first><last>442</last></pages><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre></host><categories><wos><json:string>social science</json:string><json:string>political science</json:string><json:string>economics</json:string></wos><scienceMetrix><json:string>economic & social sciences</json:string><json:string>economics & business </json:string><json:string>economics</json:string></scienceMetrix><inist><json:string>sciences humaines et sociales</json:string></inist></categories><publicationDate>1996</publicationDate><copyrightDate>1996</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00008-0</json:string></doi><id>51FAFA3CD2965B03F55822DF563AA2A9A51D11CB</id><score>1</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/51FAFA3CD2965B03F55822DF563AA2A9A51D11CB/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/51FAFA3CD2965B03F55822DF563AA2A9A51D11CB/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/51FAFA3CD2965B03F55822DF563AA2A9A51D11CB/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a">Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><availability><p>ELSEVIER</p></availability><date>1996</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a">Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence</title><author xml:id="author-0000"><persName><forename type="first">Jan</forename><surname>Potters</surname></persName><note type="correspondence"><p>Corresponding author</p></note><affiliation>Tilburg University, Department of Economics, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-0001"><persName><forename type="first">Randolph</forename><surname>Sloof</surname></persName><affiliation>Tinbergen Institute and Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands</affiliation></author><idno type="istex">51FAFA3CD2965B03F55822DF563AA2A9A51D11CB</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00008-0</idno><idno type="PII">S0176-2680(96)00008-0</idno></analytic><monogr><title level="j">European Journal of Political Economy</title><title level="j" type="abbrev">POLECO</title><idno type="pISSN">0176-2680</idno><idno type="PII">S0176-2680(00)X0007-9</idno><imprint><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><date type="published" when="1996"></date><biblScope unit="volume">12</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">3</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="403">403</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="442">442</biblScope></imprint></monogr></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>1996</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. The origin of this power is not quite clear, though, and the mechanisms by which influence is effectuated are not yet fully understood. The last two decades have yielded a vast number of studies which use empirical models to assess the importance of interest groups for the formation of public policy. Each of these studies yields insights on particular, confined aspects of interest group politics. To get a more complete picture of the results, however, a broad survey of the literature seems useful. It is the purpose of this paper to provide such a survey.</p></abstract><textClass><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>JEL classification</head><item><term>D72</term></item><item><term>D78</term></item></list></keywords></textClass><textClass><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>Keywords</head><item><term>Interest groups</term></item><item><term>Empirical models</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="1996">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/51FAFA3CD2965B03F55822DF563AA2A9A51D11CB/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Elsevier, elements deleted: tail"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:docType PUBLIC="-//ES//DTD journal article DTD version 4.5.2//EN//XML" URI="art452.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><converted-article version="4.5.2" docsubtype="fla"><item-info><jid>POLECO</jid><aid>96000080</aid><ce:pii>S0176-2680(96)00008-0</ce:pii><ce:doi>10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00008-0</ce:doi><ce:copyright type="unknown" year="1996"></ce:copyright></item-info><head><ce:title>Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence</ce:title><ce:author-group><ce:author><ce:given-name>Jan</ce:given-name><ce:surname>Potters</ce:surname><ce:cross-ref refid="COR1"><ce:sup>∗</ce:sup></ce:cross-ref><ce:cross-ref refid="AFF1"><ce:sup>a</ce:sup></ce:cross-ref></ce:author><ce:author><ce:given-name>Randolph</ce:given-name><ce:surname>Sloof</ce:surname><ce:cross-ref refid="AFF2"><ce:sup>b</ce:sup></ce:cross-ref></ce:author><ce:affiliation id="AFF1"><ce:label>a</ce:label><ce:textfn>Tilburg University, Department of Economics, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands</ce:textfn></ce:affiliation><ce:affiliation id="AFF2"><ce:label>b</ce:label><ce:textfn>Tinbergen Institute and Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands</ce:textfn></ce:affiliation><ce:correspondence id="COR1"><ce:label>∗</ce:label><ce:text>Corresponding author</ce:text></ce:correspondence></ce:author-group><ce:date-accepted day="1" month="6" year="1995"></ce:date-accepted><ce:abstract><ce:section-title>Abstract</ce:section-title><ce:abstract-sec><ce:simple-para>Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. The origin of this power is not quite clear, though, and the mechanisms by which influence is effectuated are not yet fully understood. The last two decades have yielded a vast number of studies which use empirical models to assess the importance of interest groups for the formation of public policy. Each of these studies yields insights on particular, confined aspects of interest group politics. To get a more complete picture of the results, however, a broad survey of the literature seems useful. It is the purpose of this paper to provide such a survey.</ce:simple-para></ce:abstract-sec></ce:abstract><ce:keywords class="jel"><ce:section-title>JEL classification</ce:section-title><ce:keyword><ce:text>D72</ce:text></ce:keyword><ce:keyword><ce:text>D78</ce:text></ce:keyword></ce:keywords><ce:keywords><ce:section-title>Keywords</ce:section-title><ce:keyword><ce:text>Interest groups</ce:text></ce:keyword><ce:keyword><ce:text>Empirical models</ce:text></ce:keyword></ce:keywords></head></converted-article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Jan</namePart><namePart type="family">Potters</namePart><affiliation>Tilburg University, Department of Economics, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands</affiliation><description>Corresponding author</description><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Randolph</namePart><namePart type="family">Sloof</namePart><affiliation>Tinbergen Institute and Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="Full-length article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>ELSEVIER</publisher><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1996</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1996</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">Substantial political power is often attributed to interest groups. The origin of this power is not quite clear, though, and the mechanisms by which influence is effectuated are not yet fully understood. The last two decades have yielded a vast number of studies which use empirical models to assess the importance of interest groups for the formation of public policy. Each of these studies yields insights on particular, confined aspects of interest group politics. To get a more complete picture of the results, however, a broad survey of the literature seems useful. It is the purpose of this paper to provide such a survey.</abstract><subject><genre>JEL classification</genre><topic>D72</topic><topic>D78</topic></subject><subject><genre>Keywords</genre><topic>Interest groups</topic><topic>Empirical models</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>European Journal of Political Economy</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>POLECO</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><originInfo><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">199611</dateIssued></originInfo><identifier type="ISSN">0176-2680</identifier><identifier type="PII">S0176-2680(00)X0007-9</identifier><part><date>199611</date><detail type="volume"><number>12</number><caption>vol.</caption></detail><detail type="issue"><number>3</number><caption>no.</caption></detail><extent unit="issue pages"><start>377</start><end>564</end></extent><extent unit="pages"><start>403</start><end>442</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">51FAFA3CD2965B03F55822DF563AA2A9A51D11CB</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1016/S0176-2680(96)00008-0</identifier><identifier type="PII">S0176-2680(96)00008-0</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource>ELSEVIER</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods></metadata></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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