Ideal Key Derivation and Encryption in Simulation-Based Security
Identifieur interne : 001B57 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001B56; suivant : 001B58Ideal Key Derivation and Encryption in Simulation-Based Security
Auteurs : Ralf Küsters ; Max TuengerthalSource :
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science [ 0302-9743 ] ; 2011.
Abstract
Abstract: Many real-world protocols, such as SSL/TLS, SSH, IPsec, DNSSEC, IEEE 802.11i, and Kerberos, derive new keys from other keys. To be able to analyze such protocols in a composable way, in this paper we extend an ideal functionality for symmetric and public-key encryption proposed in previous work by a mechanism for key derivation. We also equip this functionality with message authentication codes (MACs), digital signatures, and ideal nonce generation. We show that the resulting ideal functionality can be realized based on standard cryptographic assumptions and constructions, hence, providing a solid foundation for faithful, composable cryptographic analysis of real-world security protocols. Based on this new functionality, we identify sufficient criteria for protocols to provide universally composable key exchange and secure channels. Since these criteria are based on the new ideal functionality, checking the criteria requires merely information-theoretic or even only syntactical arguments, rather than involved reduction arguments. As a case study, we use our method to analyze two central protocols of the IEEE 802.11i standard, namely the 4-Way Handshake Protocol and the CCM Protocol, proving composable security properties. As to the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the first rigorous cryptographic analysis of these protocols.
Url:
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2_12
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To be able to analyze such protocols in a composable way, in this paper we extend an ideal functionality for symmetric and public-key encryption proposed in previous work by a mechanism for key derivation. We also equip this functionality with message authentication codes (MACs), digital signatures, and ideal nonce generation. We show that the resulting ideal functionality can be realized based on standard cryptographic assumptions and constructions, hence, providing a solid foundation for faithful, composable cryptographic analysis of real-world security protocols. Based on this new functionality, we identify sufficient criteria for protocols to provide universally composable key exchange and secure channels. Since these criteria are based on the new ideal functionality, checking the criteria requires merely information-theoretic or even only syntactical arguments, rather than involved reduction arguments. As a case study, we use our method to analyze two central protocols of the IEEE 802.11i standard, namely the 4-Way Handshake Protocol and the CCM Protocol, proving composable security properties. As to the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the first rigorous cryptographic analysis of these protocols.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>springer</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Ralf Küsters</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Trier, Germany</json:string><json:string>E-mail: kuesters@uni-trier.de</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Max Tuengerthal</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Trier, Germany</json:string><json:string>E-mail: tuengerthal@uni-trier.de</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>OriginalPaper</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>Abstract: Many real-world protocols, such as SSL/TLS, SSH, IPsec, DNSSEC, IEEE 802.11i, and Kerberos, derive new keys from other keys. To be able to analyze such protocols in a composable way, in this paper we extend an ideal functionality for symmetric and public-key encryption proposed in previous work by a mechanism for key derivation. We also equip this functionality with message authentication codes (MACs), digital signatures, and ideal nonce generation. We show that the resulting ideal functionality can be realized based on standard cryptographic assumptions and constructions, hence, providing a solid foundation for faithful, composable cryptographic analysis of real-world security protocols. Based on this new functionality, we identify sufficient criteria for protocols to provide universally composable key exchange and secure channels. Since these criteria are based on the new ideal functionality, checking the criteria requires merely information-theoretic or even only syntactical arguments, rather than involved reduction arguments. As a case study, we use our method to analyze two central protocols of the IEEE 802.11i standard, namely the 4-Way Handshake Protocol and the CCM Protocol, proving composable security properties. 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Kleinberg</name><affiliations><json:string>Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Friedemann Mattern</name><affiliations><json:string>ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>John C. Mitchell</name><affiliations><json:string>Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Moni Naor</name><affiliations><json:string>Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Oscar Nierstrasz</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>C. Pandu Rangan</name><affiliations><json:string>Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Bernhard Steffen</name><affiliations><json:string>University of Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Madhu Sudan</name><affiliations><json:string>Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Demetri Terzopoulos</name><affiliations><json:string>University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Doug Tygar</name><affiliations><json:string>University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Moshe Y. Vardi</name><affiliations><json:string>Rice University, Houston, TX, USA</json:string></affiliations></json:item><json:item><name>Gerhard Weikum</name><affiliations><json:string>Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science, Saarbrücken, Germany</json:string></affiliations></json:item></editor><issn><json:string>0302-9743</json:string></issn><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>1611-3349</json:string></eissn><title>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</title><copyrightDate>2011</copyrightDate></serie><host><editor><json:item><name>Aggelos Kiayias</name><affiliations><json:string>Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, National and Kapodistrian University of Athen, Panepistimiopolis Ilisia, 15784, Athens, Greece</json:string><json:string>E-mail: aggelos@kiayias.com</json:string></affiliations></json:item></editor><subject><json:item><value>Computer Science</value></json:item><json:item><value>Computer Science</value></json:item><json:item><value>Data Encryption</value></json:item><json:item><value>Discrete Mathematics in Computer Science</value></json:item><json:item><value>Systems and Data Security</value></json:item><json:item><value>Computer Communication Networks</value></json:item><json:item><value>Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity</value></json:item></subject><isbn><json:string>978-3-642-19073-5</json:string></isbn><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>1611-3349</json:string></eissn><title>Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2011</title><bookId><json:string>978-3-642-19074-2</json:string></bookId><volume>6558</volume><pages><last>179</last><first>161</first></pages><issn><json:string>0302-9743</json:string></issn><genre><json:string>book-series</json:string></genre><eisbn><json:string>978-3-642-19074-2</json:string></eisbn><copyrightDate>2011</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2</json:string></doi></host><publicationDate>2011</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2011</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2_12</json:string></doi><id>FB032C108B47A12441DBD5E4BCF246ED4B8C8839</id><score>1.16777</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/FB032C108B47A12441DBD5E4BCF246ED4B8C8839/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/FB032C108B47A12441DBD5E4BCF246ED4B8C8839/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/FB032C108B47A12441DBD5E4BCF246ED4B8C8839/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Ideal Key Derivation and Encryption in Simulation-Based Security</title><respStmt><resp>Références bibliographiques récupérées via GROBID</resp><name resp="ISTEX-API">ISTEX-API (INIST-CNRS)</name></respStmt><respStmt><resp>Références bibliographiques récupérées via GROBID</resp><name resp="ISTEX-API">ISTEX-API (INIST-CNRS)</name></respStmt></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><pubPlace>Berlin, Heidelberg</pubPlace><availability><p>Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011</p></availability><date>2011</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">Ideal Key Derivation and Encryption in Simulation-Based Security</title><author xml:id="author-1"><persName><forename type="first">Ralf</forename><surname>Küsters</surname></persName><email>kuesters@uni-trier.de</email><affiliation>University of Trier, Germany</affiliation></author><author xml:id="author-2"><persName><forename type="first">Max</forename><surname>Tuengerthal</surname></persName><email>tuengerthal@uni-trier.de</email><affiliation>University of Trier, Germany</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="m">Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2011</title><title level="m" type="sub">The Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference 2011, San Francisco, CA, USA, February 14-18, 2011. Proceedings</title><idno type="pISBN">978-3-642-19073-5</idno><idno type="eISBN">978-3-642-19074-2</idno><idno type="pISSN">0302-9743</idno><idno type="eISSN">1611-3349</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2</idno><idno type="book-ID">978-3-642-19074-2</idno><idno type="book-title-ID">216708</idno><idno type="book-sequence-number">6558</idno><idno type="book-volume-number">6558</idno><idno type="book-chapter-count">25</idno><editor><persName><forename type="first">Aggelos</forename><surname>Kiayias</surname></persName><email>aggelos@kiayias.com</email><affiliation>Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, National and Kapodistrian University of Athen, Panepistimiopolis Ilisia, 15784, Athens, Greece</affiliation></editor><imprint><publisher>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><pubPlace>Berlin, Heidelberg</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2011"></date><biblScope unit="volume">6558</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="161">161</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="179">179</biblScope></imprint></monogr><series><title level="s">Lecture Notes in Computer Science</title><editor><persName><forename type="first">David</forename><surname>Hutchison</surname></persName><affiliation>Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Takeo</forename><surname>Kanade</surname></persName><affiliation>Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Josef</forename><surname>Kittler</surname></persName><affiliation>University of Surrey, Guildford, UK</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Jon</forename><forename type="first">M.</forename><surname>Kleinberg</surname></persName><affiliation>Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Friedemann</forename><surname>Mattern</surname></persName><affiliation>ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">John</forename><forename type="first">C.</forename><surname>Mitchell</surname></persName><affiliation>Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Moni</forename><surname>Naor</surname></persName><affiliation>Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Oscar</forename><surname>Nierstrasz</surname></persName><affiliation>University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">C.</forename><surname>Pandu Rangan</surname></persName><affiliation>Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Bernhard</forename><surname>Steffen</surname></persName><affiliation>University of Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Madhu</forename><surname>Sudan</surname></persName><affiliation>Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Demetri</forename><surname>Terzopoulos</surname></persName><affiliation>University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Doug</forename><surname>Tygar</surname></persName><affiliation>University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Moshe</forename><forename type="first">Y.</forename><surname>Vardi</surname></persName><affiliation>Rice University, Houston, TX, USA</affiliation></editor><editor><persName><forename type="first">Gerhard</forename><surname>Weikum</surname></persName><affiliation>Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science, Saarbrücken, Germany</affiliation></editor><biblScope><date>2011</date></biblScope><idno type="pISSN">0302-9743</idno><idno type="eISSN">1611-3349</idno><idno type="series-Id">558</idno></series><idno type="istex">FB032C108B47A12441DBD5E4BCF246ED4B8C8839</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2_12</idno><idno type="ChapterID">12</idno><idno type="ChapterID">Chap12</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2011</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>Abstract: Many real-world protocols, such as SSL/TLS, SSH, IPsec, DNSSEC, IEEE 802.11i, and Kerberos, derive new keys from other keys. To be able to analyze such protocols in a composable way, in this paper we extend an ideal functionality for symmetric and public-key encryption proposed in previous work by a mechanism for key derivation. We also equip this functionality with message authentication codes (MACs), digital signatures, and ideal nonce generation. We show that the resulting ideal functionality can be realized based on standard cryptographic assumptions and constructions, hence, providing a solid foundation for faithful, composable cryptographic analysis of real-world security protocols. Based on this new functionality, we identify sufficient criteria for protocols to provide universally composable key exchange and secure channels. Since these criteria are based on the new ideal functionality, checking the criteria requires merely information-theoretic or even only syntactical arguments, rather than involved reduction arguments. As a case study, we use our method to analyze two central protocols of the IEEE 802.11i standard, namely the 4-Way Handshake Protocol and the CCM Protocol, proving composable security properties. As to the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the first rigorous cryptographic analysis of these protocols.</p></abstract><textClass><keywords scheme="Book-Subject-Collection"><list><label>SUCO11645</label><item><term>Computer Science</term></item></list></keywords></textClass><textClass><keywords scheme="Book-Subject-Group"><list><label>I</label><label>I15033</label><label>I17028</label><label>I14050</label><label>I13022</label><label>I16021</label><item><term>Computer Science</term></item><item><term>Data Encryption</term></item><item><term>Discrete Mathematics in Computer Science</term></item><item><term>Systems and Data Security</term></item><item><term>Computer Communication Networks</term></item><item><term>Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2011">Published</change><change xml:id="refBibs-istex" who="#ISTEX-API" when="2016-11-22">References added</change><change xml:id="refBibs-istex" 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Surrey</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Guildford</City><Country>UK</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff4"><OrgName>Cornell University</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Ithaca</City><State>NY</State><Country>USA</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff5"><OrgName>ETH Zurich</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Zurich</City><Country>Switzerland</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff6"><OrgName>Stanford University</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Stanford</City><State>CA</State><Country>USA</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff7"><OrgName>Weizmann Institute of Science</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Rehovot</City><Country>Israel</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff8"><OrgName>University of Bern</OrgName><OrgAddress><City>Bern</City><Country>Switzerland</Country></OrgAddress></Affiliation><Affiliation ID="Aff9"><OrgName>Indian Institute of 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To be able to analyze such protocols in a composable way, in this paper we extend an ideal functionality for symmetric and public-key encryption proposed in previous work by a mechanism for key derivation. We also equip this functionality with message authentication codes (MACs), digital signatures, and ideal nonce generation. We show that the resulting ideal functionality can be realized based on standard cryptographic assumptions and constructions, hence, providing a solid foundation for faithful, composable cryptographic analysis of real-world security protocols.</Para><Para>Based on this new functionality, we identify sufficient criteria for protocols to provide universally composable key exchange and secure channels. Since these criteria are based on the new ideal functionality, checking the criteria requires merely information-theoretic or even only syntactical arguments, rather than involved reduction arguments.</Para><Para>As a case study, we use our method to analyze two central protocols of the IEEE 802.11i standard, namely the 4-Way Handshake Protocol and the CCM Protocol, proving composable security properties. As to the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the first rigorous cryptographic analysis of these protocols.</Para></Abstract><KeywordGroup Language="En"><Heading>Keywords</Heading><Keyword>security protocols</Keyword><Keyword>compositional analysis</Keyword><Keyword>simulation-based security</Keyword></KeywordGroup><ArticleNote Type="Misc"><SimplePara>This work was partially supported by the DFG under Grant KU 1434/5-1 and KU 1434/6-1.</SimplePara></ArticleNote></ChapterHeader><NoBody></NoBody></Chapter></Part></Book></Series></Publisher></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Ideal Key Derivation and Encryption in Simulation-Based Security</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Ideal Key Derivation and Encryption in Simulation-Based Security</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Ralf</namePart><namePart type="family">Küsters</namePart><affiliation>University of Trier, Germany</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: kuesters@uni-trier.de</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Max</namePart><namePart type="family">Tuengerthal</namePart><affiliation>University of Trier, Germany</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: tuengerthal@uni-trier.de</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="conference" displayLabel="OriginalPaper"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Springer Berlin Heidelberg</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Berlin, Heidelberg</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2011</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2011</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">Abstract: Many real-world protocols, such as SSL/TLS, SSH, IPsec, DNSSEC, IEEE 802.11i, and Kerberos, derive new keys from other keys. To be able to analyze such protocols in a composable way, in this paper we extend an ideal functionality for symmetric and public-key encryption proposed in previous work by a mechanism for key derivation. We also equip this functionality with message authentication codes (MACs), digital signatures, and ideal nonce generation. We show that the resulting ideal functionality can be realized based on standard cryptographic assumptions and constructions, hence, providing a solid foundation for faithful, composable cryptographic analysis of real-world security protocols. Based on this new functionality, we identify sufficient criteria for protocols to provide universally composable key exchange and secure channels. Since these criteria are based on the new ideal functionality, checking the criteria requires merely information-theoretic or even only syntactical arguments, rather than involved reduction arguments. As a case study, we use our method to analyze two central protocols of the IEEE 802.11i standard, namely the 4-Way Handshake Protocol and the CCM Protocol, proving composable security properties. As to the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the first rigorous cryptographic analysis of these protocols.</abstract><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2011</title><subTitle>The Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference 2011, San Francisco, CA, USA, February 14-18, 2011. Proceedings</subTitle></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Aggelos</namePart><namePart type="family">Kiayias</namePart><affiliation>Department of Informatics and Telecommunications, National and Kapodistrian University of Athen, Panepistimiopolis Ilisia, 15784, Athens, Greece</affiliation><affiliation>E-mail: aggelos@kiayias.com</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><genre type="book-series" displayLabel="Proceedings"></genre><originInfo><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2011</copyrightDate><issuance>monographic</issuance></originInfo><subject><genre>Book-Subject-Collection</genre><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="SUCO11645">Computer Science</topic></subject><subject><genre>Book-Subject-Group</genre><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I">Computer Science</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I15033">Data Encryption</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I17028">Discrete Mathematics in Computer Science</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I14050">Systems and Data Security</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I13022">Computer Communication Networks</topic><topic authority="SpringerSubjectCodes" authorityURI="I16021">Algorithm Analysis and Problem Complexity</topic></subject><identifier type="DOI">10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2</identifier><identifier type="ISBN">978-3-642-19073-5</identifier><identifier type="eISBN">978-3-642-19074-2</identifier><identifier type="ISSN">0302-9743</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1611-3349</identifier><identifier type="BookTitleID">216708</identifier><identifier type="BookID">978-3-642-19074-2</identifier><identifier type="BookChapterCount">25</identifier><identifier type="BookVolumeNumber">6558</identifier><identifier type="BookSequenceNumber">6558</identifier><identifier type="PartChapterCount">4</identifier><part><date>2011</date><detail type="part"><title>Proofs of Security</title></detail><detail type="volume"><number>6558</number><caption>vol.</caption></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>161</start><end>179</end></extent></part><recordInfo><recordOrigin>Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011</recordOrigin></recordInfo></relatedItem><relatedItem type="series"><titleInfo><title>Lecture Notes in Computer Science</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">David</namePart><namePart type="family">Hutchison</namePart><affiliation>Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Takeo</namePart><namePart type="family">Kanade</namePart><affiliation>Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Josef</namePart><namePart type="family">Kittler</namePart><affiliation>University of Surrey, Guildford, UK</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Jon</namePart><namePart type="given">M.</namePart><namePart type="family">Kleinberg</namePart><affiliation>Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Friedemann</namePart><namePart type="family">Mattern</namePart><affiliation>ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">John</namePart><namePart type="given">C.</namePart><namePart type="family">Mitchell</namePart><affiliation>Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Moni</namePart><namePart type="family">Naor</namePart><affiliation>Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Oscar</namePart><namePart type="family">Nierstrasz</namePart><affiliation>University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">C.</namePart><namePart type="family">Pandu Rangan</namePart><affiliation>Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Bernhard</namePart><namePart type="family">Steffen</namePart><affiliation>University of Dortmund, Dortmund, Germany</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Madhu</namePart><namePart type="family">Sudan</namePart><affiliation>Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Demetri</namePart><namePart type="family">Terzopoulos</namePart><affiliation>University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Doug</namePart><namePart type="family">Tygar</namePart><affiliation>University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Moshe</namePart><namePart type="given">Y.</namePart><namePart type="family">Vardi</namePart><affiliation>Rice University, Houston, TX, USA</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Gerhard</namePart><namePart type="family">Weikum</namePart><affiliation>Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science, Saarbrücken, Germany</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">editor</roleTerm></role></name><originInfo><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2011</copyrightDate><issuance>serial</issuance></originInfo><identifier type="ISSN">0302-9743</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1611-3349</identifier><identifier type="SeriesID">558</identifier><recordInfo><recordOrigin>Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011</recordOrigin></recordInfo></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">FB032C108B47A12441DBD5E4BCF246ED4B8C8839</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2_12</identifier><identifier type="ChapterID">12</identifier><identifier type="ChapterID">Chap12</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>SPRINGER</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2011</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods></metadata></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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