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Coordination and Control in Corporate Networks: United States and Germany in Comparison, 1896–1938

Identifieur interne : 001A98 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001A97; suivant : 001A99

Coordination and Control in Corporate Networks: United States and Germany in Comparison, 1896–1938

Auteurs : Paul Windolf

Source :

RBID : ISTEX:D86B78DA336245F227A2644DFF852713C6E4B1F7

Abstract

In the late 19th century, a relatively dense network was created among the large public corporations. This corporate network is examined here for the period between 1896 and 1938 in Germany and the United States. Corporate networks served several purposes: they developed into a medium of self-control in managerially run companies; they became an instrument of bank control in capital-intensive companies; furthermore, they were institutions to regulate competition in the age of mass production. In Germany, the density and centralization of the corporate network increased parallel to the growing degree of cartelization within the economy (cooperative capitalism). In the United States, the density of the network decreased in relation to the extent that antitrust laws were enforced (competitive capitalism).

Url:
DOI: 10.1093/esr/jcn059

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ISTEX:D86B78DA336245F227A2644DFF852713C6E4B1F7

Le document en format XML

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