Intuition in the context of implicit memory
Identifieur interne : 001781 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001780; suivant : 001782Intuition in the context of implicit memory
Auteurs : Werner WippichSource :
- Psychological Research [ 0340-0727 ] ; 1994-02-01.
Abstract
Summary: Most recent work concerned with intuition has demonstrated that people can respond discriminatively to coherence that they cannot identify. Specifically, in a gestalt-closure task subjects were shown slides of paired drawings. One of the drawings represented a fragmented picture of a common object, whereas the other was constructed by rotation of the elements of the coherent gestalt. When the subjects were unable to name the object, they were urged to make a forced-choice decision regarding which of the two drawings represented a real object. The results showed that the proportion of pictures not correctly identified, that were nevertheless correctly selected as coherent, was significantly higher than chance. The current experiment replicated these findings. In addition, it was shown that a study phase with either coherent or incoherent picture primes can bias intuitive judgments in the test phase in accordance with a processing view. Incoherent-picture primes reduced the forced-choice decisions to a level of chance. Moreover, priming was found to be dependent on the similarity between the study and the test stimuli. We argue that a more fluent reprocessing of coherent, or primed, stimuli may be a basis for intuitive judgments. Intuition may go wrong when priming has favored an incoherent solution.
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00419717
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ISTEX:D27379BD583A0B50ED80BBC6F00B2AF1F590445ELe document en format XML
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Res</title><idno type="ISSN">0340-0727</idno><idno type="eISSN">1430-2772</idno><imprint><publisher>Springer-Verlag</publisher><pubPlace>Berlin/Heidelberg</pubPlace><date type="published" when="1994-02-01">1994-02-01</date><biblScope unit="volume">56</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">2</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="104">104</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="109">109</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0340-0727</idno></series><idno type="istex">D27379BD583A0B50ED80BBC6F00B2AF1F590445E</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1007/BF00419717</idno><idno type="ArticleID">BF00419717</idno><idno type="ArticleID">Art6</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0340-0727</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">Summary: Most recent work concerned with intuition has demonstrated that people can respond discriminatively to coherence that they cannot identify. Specifically, in a gestalt-closure task subjects were shown slides of paired drawings. One of the drawings represented a fragmented picture of a common object, whereas the other was constructed by rotation of the elements of the coherent gestalt. When the subjects were unable to name the object, they were urged to make a forced-choice decision regarding which of the two drawings represented a real object. The results showed that the proportion of pictures not correctly identified, that were nevertheless correctly selected as coherent, was significantly higher than chance. The current experiment replicated these findings. In addition, it was shown that a study phase with either coherent or incoherent picture primes can bias intuitive judgments in the test phase in accordance with a processing view. Incoherent-picture primes reduced the forced-choice decisions to a level of chance. Moreover, priming was found to be dependent on the similarity between the study and the test stimuli. We argue that a more fluent reprocessing of coherent, or primed, stimuli may be a basis for intuitive judgments. Intuition may go wrong when priming has favored an incoherent solution.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>springer</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Werner Wippich</name><affiliations><json:string>Fachbereich I - Psychologie, Postfach 3825, D-54286, Trier, Germany</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><articleId><json:string>BF00419717</json:string><json:string>Art6</json:string></articleId><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>OriginalPaper</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>Summary: Most recent work concerned with intuition has demonstrated that people can respond discriminatively to coherence that they cannot identify. Specifically, in a gestalt-closure task subjects were shown slides of paired drawings. One of the drawings represented a fragmented picture of a common object, whereas the other was constructed by rotation of the elements of the coherent gestalt. When the subjects were unable to name the object, they were urged to make a forced-choice decision regarding which of the two drawings represented a real object. The results showed that the proportion of pictures not correctly identified, that were nevertheless correctly selected as coherent, was significantly higher than chance. The current experiment replicated these findings. In addition, it was shown that a study phase with either coherent or incoherent picture primes can bias intuitive judgments in the test phase in accordance with a processing view. Incoherent-picture primes reduced the forced-choice decisions to a level of chance. Moreover, priming was found to be dependent on the similarity between the study and the test stimuli. We argue that a more fluent reprocessing of coherent, or primed, stimuli may be a basis for intuitive judgments. Intuition may go wrong when priming has favored an incoherent solution.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>7.398</score><pdfVersion>1.3</pdfVersion><pdfPageSize>598 x 785 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>false</refBibsNative><keywordCount>0</keywordCount><abstractCharCount>1328</abstractCharCount><pdfWordCount>4974</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>29499</pdfCharCount><pdfPageCount>6</pdfPageCount><abstractWordCount>202</abstractWordCount></qualityIndicators><title>Intuition in the context of implicit memory</title><refBibs><json:item><author><json:item><name>K,S Bowers</name></json:item><json:item><name>G Regehr</name></json:item><json:item><name>C Balthazard</name></json:item><json:item><name>K Parker</name></json:item></author><host><volume>22</volume><pages><last>110</last><first>72</first></pages><author></author><title>Cognitive Psychology</title><publicationDate>1990</publicationDate></host><title>Intuition in the context of discovery</title><publicationDate>1990</publicationDate></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>P Graf</name></json:item><json:item><name>G Mandler</name></json:item></author><host><volume>23</volume><pages><last>568</last><first>553</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior</title><publicationDate>1984</publicationDate></host><title>Activation makes words more accessible , but not necessarily more retrievable</title><publicationDate>1984</publicationDate></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>L,L Jacoby</name></json:item><json:item><name>L,G Allan</name></json:item><json:item><name>J,C Collins</name></json:item><json:item><name>L,K Larwill</name></json:item></author><host><volume>14</volume><pages><last>247</last><first>240</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition</title><publicationDate>1988</publicationDate></host><title>Memory influences subjective experience: Noise judgments</title><publicationDate>1988</publicationDate></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>L,L Jacoby</name></json:item><json:item><name>C,M Kelley</name></json:item></author><host><volume>13</volume><pages><last>336</last><first>314</first></pages><author></author><title>Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin</title><publicationDate>1987</publicationDate></host><title>Unconscious influences of memory for a prior event</title><publicationDate>1987</publicationDate></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>W,A Johnston</name></json:item><json:item><name>K,J Hawley</name></json:item><json:item><name>J,M Elliott</name></json:item></author><host><volume>17</volume><pages><last>223</last><first>210</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition</title><publicationDate>1991</publicationDate></host><title>Contribution of perceptual fluency to recognition judgments</title><publicationDate>1991</publicationDate></json:item><json:item><host><author><json:item><name>D,S Kahneman</name></json:item><json:item><name>P Slovic</name></json:item><json:item><name>A Tversky</name></json:item></author><title>Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases</title><publicationDate>1982</publicationDate></host></json:item><json:item><host><author><json:item><name>H Reichenbach</name></json:item></author><title>Experience and prediction</title><publicationDate>1938</publicationDate></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>H,L Roediger</name></json:item><json:item><name>M,S Weldon</name></json:item><json:item><name>B,H Challis</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>14</last><first>3</first></pages><author></author><title>Varieties of memory and consciousness</title><publicationDate>1989</publicationDate></host><title>Explaining dissociations between implicit and explicit measures of retention: A processing account</title><publicationDate>1989</publicationDate></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D,L Schacter</name></json:item><json:item><name>S,M Delaney</name></json:item><json:item><name>E,P Merikle</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>123</last><first>83</first></pages><author></author><title>The Psychology of Learning and Motivation</title><publicationDate>1990</publicationDate></host><title>Priming of nonverbal information and the nature of implicit memory</title><publicationDate>1990</publicationDate></json:item><json:item><host><author><json:item><name>D Witherspoon</name></json:item><json:item><name>L,G Allan</name></json:item></author><title>The effect of a prior presentation on temporal judgments in a perceptual identification 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Specifically, in a gestalt-closure task subjects were shown slides of paired drawings. One of the drawings represented a fragmented picture of a common object, whereas the other was constructed by rotation of the elements of the coherent gestalt. When the subjects were unable to name the object, they were urged to make a forced-choice decision regarding which of the two drawings represented a real object. The results showed that the proportion of pictures not correctly identified, that were nevertheless correctly selected as coherent, was significantly higher than chance. The current experiment replicated these findings. In addition, it was shown that a study phase with either coherent or incoherent picture primes can bias intuitive judgments in the test phase in accordance with a processing view. Incoherent-picture primes reduced the forced-choice decisions to a level of chance. Moreover, priming was found to be dependent on the similarity between the study and the test stimuli. 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Specifically, in a gestalt-closure task subjects were shown slides of paired drawings. One of the drawings represented a fragmented picture of a common object, whereas the other was constructed by rotation of the elements of the coherent gestalt. When the subjects were unable to name the object, they were urged to make a forced-choice decision regarding which of the two drawings represented a real object. The results showed that the proportion of pictures not correctly identified, that were nevertheless correctly selected as coherent, was significantly higher than chance. The current experiment replicated these findings. In addition, it was shown that a study phase with either coherent or incoherent picture primes can bias intuitive judgments in the test phase in accordance with a processing view. Incoherent-picture primes reduced the forced-choice decisions to a level of chance. Moreover, priming was found to be dependent on the similarity between the study and the test stimuli. We argue that a more fluent reprocessing of coherent, or primed, stimuli may be a basis for intuitive judgments. Intuition may go wrong when priming has favored an incoherent solution.</Para></Abstract></ArticleHeader><NoBody></NoBody></Article></Issue></Volume></Journal></Publisher></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Intuition in the context of implicit memory</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Intuition in the context of implicit memory</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Werner</namePart><namePart type="family">Wippich</namePart><affiliation>Fachbereich I - Psychologie, Postfach 3825, D-54286, Trier, Germany</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="OriginalPaper"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Springer-Verlag</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Berlin/Heidelberg</placeTerm></place><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">1993-02-23</dateCreated><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1994-02-01</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1994</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">Summary: Most recent work concerned with intuition has demonstrated that people can respond discriminatively to coherence that they cannot identify. Specifically, in a gestalt-closure task subjects were shown slides of paired drawings. One of the drawings represented a fragmented picture of a common object, whereas the other was constructed by rotation of the elements of the coherent gestalt. When the subjects were unable to name the object, they were urged to make a forced-choice decision regarding which of the two drawings represented a real object. The results showed that the proportion of pictures not correctly identified, that were nevertheless correctly selected as coherent, was significantly higher than chance. The current experiment replicated these findings. In addition, it was shown that a study phase with either coherent or incoherent picture primes can bias intuitive judgments in the test phase in accordance with a processing view. Incoherent-picture primes reduced the forced-choice decisions to a level of chance. Moreover, priming was found to be dependent on the similarity between the study and the test stimuli. 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