Tournament Compensation Systems, Employee Heterogeneity, and Firm Performance
Identifieur interne : 001537 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001536; suivant : 001538Tournament Compensation Systems, Employee Heterogeneity, and Firm Performance
Auteurs : Uschi Backes-Gellner ; Kerstin PullSource :
- Human Resource Management [ 0090-4848 ] ; 2013-05.
English descriptors
Abstract
Tournament compensation systems are widely used in practice and have been extensively analyzed theoretically. However, one major problem has hardly been studied in a company context so far: Although it is theoretically well understood that tournament compensation systems are only effective when employees are homogeneous, it has rarely been analyzed what companies can do when they are confronted with employee heterogeneity. In our article, we derive hypotheses on the performance effects of tournament compensation systems in a context of employee heterogeneity based on tournament and expectancy theory. Using personnel records from incentive travel contests, we are able to show that performance is lower in a situation with employee heterogeneity, but that in heterogeneous tournaments, incentives may still work for a subgroup of employees whom we term the “threshold group.” In addition, we also show how companies manage to design the information disclosure systems necessary to install effective “handicapping” or “league‐building” systems in order to increase the effort‐performance expectancy.
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DOI: 10.1002/hrm.21535
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Using personnel records from incentive travel contests, we are able to show that performance is lower in a situation with employee heterogeneity, but that in heterogeneous tournaments, incentives may still work for a subgroup of employees whom we term the “threshold group.” In addition, we also show how companies manage to design the information disclosure systems necessary to install effective “handicapping” or “league‐building” systems in order to increase the effort‐performance expectancy.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>6.896</score><pdfVersion>1.3</pdfVersion><pdfPageSize>594 x 792 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractCharCount>1105</abstractCharCount><pdfWordCount>10659</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>70866</pdfCharCount><pdfPageCount>24</pdfPageCount><abstractWordCount>158</abstractWordCount></qualityIndicators><title>Tournament Compensation Systems, Employee Heterogeneity, and Firm Performance</title><refBibs><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. E. 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However, one major problem has hardly been studied in a company context so far: Although it is theoretically well understood that tournament compensation systems are only effective when employees are homogeneous, it has rarely been analyzed what companies can do when they are confronted with employee heterogeneity. In our article, we derive hypotheses on the performance effects of tournament compensation systems in a context of employee heterogeneity based on tournament and expectancy theory. Using personnel records from incentive travel contests, we are able to show that performance is lower in a situation with employee heterogeneity, but that in heterogeneous tournaments, incentives may still work for a subgroup of employees whom we term the “threshold group.” In addition, we also show how companies manage to design the information disclosure systems necessary to install effective “handicapping” or “league‐building” systems in order to increase the effort‐performance expectancy.</p></abstract><textClass xml:lang="en"><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>reward systems</term></item><item><term>performance management</term></item><item><term>pay for performance</term></item><item><term>compensation and benefits</term></item></list></keywords></textClass><textClass><keywords scheme="Journal Subject"><list><head>article-category</head><item><term>HR Science Forum</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2013-05">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/8786519E77E85E9F69D3E273C50816C9B7586DB0/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company</publisherName><publisherLoc>Hoboken</publisherLoc></publisherInfo><doi registered="yes">10.1002/(ISSN)1099-050X</doi><issn type="print">0090-4848</issn><issn type="electronic">1099-050X</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="HRM"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" xml:lang="en" sort="HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT">Human Resource Management</title><title type="short">Hum. Resour. Manage.</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="30"><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1002/hrm.v52.3</doi><numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="52">52</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue">3</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2013-05">May/June 2013</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="4" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1002/hrm.21535</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="HRM21535"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="24"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="articleCategory">HR Science Forum</title><title type="tocHeading1">HR Science Forum</title></titleGroup><copyright ownership="publisher">© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.</copyright><eventGroup><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:JWSART34_TO_WML3G version:3.2.2 mode:FullText" date="2013-05-22"></event><event type="firstOnline" date="2013-05-22"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2013-05-22"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-01-27"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.6.4 mode:FullText" date="2015-10-02"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst">375</numbering><numbering type="pageLast">398</numbering></numberingGroup><correspondenceTo>Department of HRM and Organization, School of Business and Economics, University of Tuebingen, Nauklerstr. 47, D‐72074, Tuebingen, Germany, Phone: +49‐7071‐968778, Fax: +49‐7071‐295077.</correspondenceTo><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:HRM.HRM21535.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="3"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="10"></count><count type="referenceTotal" number="29"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" xml:lang="en">Tournament Compensation Systems, Employee Heterogeneity, and Firm Performance</title><title type="short" xml:lang="en">Tournament Compensation Systems</title></titleGroup><creators><creator xml:id="au1" creatorRole="author" affiliationRef="#af1"><personName><givenNames>Uschi</givenNames><familyName>Backes‐Gellner</familyName></personName></creator><creator xml:id="au2" creatorRole="author" affiliationRef="#af2" corresponding="yes"><personName><givenNames>Kerstin</givenNames><familyName>Pull</familyName></personName><contactDetails><email normalForm="kerstin.pull@uni-tuebingen.de">kerstin.pull@uni‐tuebingen.de</email></contactDetails></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="af1" countryCode="CH" type="organization"><unparsedAffiliation>University of Zurich</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation><affiliation xml:id="af2" countryCode="DE" type="organization"><unparsedAffiliation>University of Tuebingen</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><keywordGroup xml:lang="en" type="author"><keyword xml:id="kwd1">reward systems</keyword><keyword xml:id="kwd2">performance management</keyword><keyword xml:id="kwd3">pay for performance</keyword><keyword xml:id="kwd4">compensation and benefits</keyword></keywordGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><title type="main">Abstract</title><p>Tournament compensation systems are widely used in practice and have been extensively analyzed theoretically. However, one major problem has hardly been studied in a company context so far: Although it is theoretically well understood that tournament compensation systems are only effective when employees are homogeneous, it has rarely been analyzed what companies can do when they are confronted with employee heterogeneity. In our article, we derive hypotheses on the performance effects of tournament compensation systems in a context of employee heterogeneity based on tournament and expectancy theory. Using personnel records from incentive travel contests, we are able to show that performance is lower in a situation with employee heterogeneity, but that in heterogeneous tournaments, incentives may still work for a subgroup of employees whom we term the “threshold group.” In addition, we also show how companies manage to design the information disclosure systems necessary to install effective “handicapping” or “league‐building” systems in order to increase the effort‐performance expectancy.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>Tournament Compensation Systems, Employee Heterogeneity, and Firm Performance</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated" lang="en"><title>Tournament Compensation Systems</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>Tournament Compensation Systems, Employee Heterogeneity, and Firm Performance</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Uschi</namePart><namePart type="family">Backes‐Gellner</namePart><affiliation>University of Zurich</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Kerstin</namePart><namePart type="family">Pull</namePart><affiliation>University of Tuebingen</affiliation><affiliation>Department of HRM and Organization, School of Business and Economics, University of Tuebingen, Nauklerstr. 47, D‐72074, Tuebingen, Germany, Phone: +49‐7071‐968778, Fax: +49‐7071‐295077.</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Hoboken</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2013-05</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2013</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType><extent unit="figures">3</extent><extent unit="tables">10</extent><extent unit="references">29</extent></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">Tournament compensation systems are widely used in practice and have been extensively analyzed theoretically. However, one major problem has hardly been studied in a company context so far: Although it is theoretically well understood that tournament compensation systems are only effective when employees are homogeneous, it has rarely been analyzed what companies can do when they are confronted with employee heterogeneity. In our article, we derive hypotheses on the performance effects of tournament compensation systems in a context of employee heterogeneity based on tournament and expectancy theory. Using personnel records from incentive travel contests, we are able to show that performance is lower in a situation with employee heterogeneity, but that in heterogeneous tournaments, incentives may still work for a subgroup of employees whom we term the “threshold group.” In addition, we also show how companies manage to design the information disclosure systems necessary to install effective “handicapping” or “league‐building” systems in order to increase the effort‐performance expectancy.</abstract><subject lang="en"><genre>keywords</genre><topic>reward systems</topic><topic>performance management</topic><topic>pay for performance</topic><topic>compensation and benefits</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Human Resource Management</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>Hum. Resour. Manage.</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><subject><genre>article-category</genre><topic>HR Science Forum</topic></subject><identifier type="ISSN">0090-4848</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1099-050X</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1002/(ISSN)1099-050X</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">HRM</identifier><part><date>2013</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>52</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>375</start><end>398</end><total>24</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">8786519E77E85E9F69D3E273C50816C9B7586DB0</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1002/hrm.21535</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">HRM21535</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>WILEY</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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