HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION
Identifieur interne : 001162 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 001161; suivant : 001163HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION
Auteurs : Laszlo GoerkeSource :
- Bulletin of Economic Research [ 0307-3378 ] ; 2013-01.
English descriptors
- KwdEn :
- H24, H26, I20, human capital, income tax, tax evasion.
Abstract
A strictly risk‐averse individual with an exogenous gross income in period one can acquire human capital in the same period and evade taxes. Period‐two income rises with educational investments in period one and can also be hidden from tax authorities. It is shown that a greater tax deductibility of educational investments and higher individual ability induce a positive correlation between tax evasion and educational investments in period two, whereas the relationship in period one is ambiguous. These theoretical predictions can explain diverse empirical findings on the correlation between education and tax evasion.
Url:
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00436.x
Links to Exploration step
ISTEX:50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546ALe document en format XML
<record><TEI wicri:istexFullTextTei="biblStruct"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title xml:lang="en">HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION</title><author><name sortKey="Goerke, Laszlo" sort="Goerke, Laszlo" uniqKey="Goerke L" first="Laszlo" last="Goerke">Laszlo Goerke</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>IAAEG, Trier, IZA, Bonn, and CESifo, Munich</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></titleStmt><publicationStmt><idno type="wicri:source">ISTEX</idno><idno type="RBID">ISTEX:50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A</idno><date when="2013" year="2013">2013</date><idno type="doi">10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00436.x</idno><idno type="url">https://api.istex.fr/document/50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A/fulltext/pdf</idno><idno type="wicri:Area/Istex/Corpus">001162</idno><idno type="wicri:explorRef" wicri:stream="Istex" wicri:step="Corpus" wicri:corpus="ISTEX">001162</idno></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION</title><author><name sortKey="Goerke, Laszlo" sort="Goerke, Laszlo" uniqKey="Goerke L" first="Laszlo" last="Goerke">Laszlo Goerke</name><affiliation><mods:affiliation>IAAEG, Trier, IZA, Bonn, and CESifo, Munich</mods:affiliation></affiliation></author></analytic><monogr></monogr><series><title level="j">Bulletin of Economic Research</title><idno type="ISSN">0307-3378</idno><idno type="eISSN">1467-8586</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2013-01">2013-01</date><biblScope unit="volume">65</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">1</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="91">91</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="105">105</biblScope></imprint><idno type="ISSN">0307-3378</idno></series><idno type="istex">50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00436.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">BOER436</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc><seriesStmt><idno type="ISSN">0307-3378</idno></seriesStmt></fileDesc><profileDesc><textClass><keywords scheme="KwdEn" xml:lang="en"><term>H24</term><term>H26</term><term>I20</term><term>human capital</term><term>income tax</term><term>tax evasion</term></keywords></textClass><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage></profileDesc></teiHeader><front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">A strictly risk‐averse individual with an exogenous gross income in period one can acquire human capital in the same period and evade taxes. Period‐two income rises with educational investments in period one and can also be hidden from tax authorities. It is shown that a greater tax deductibility of educational investments and higher individual ability induce a positive correlation between tax evasion and educational investments in period two, whereas the relationship in period one is ambiguous. These theoretical predictions can explain diverse empirical findings on the correlation between education and tax evasion.</div></front></TEI><istex><corpusName>wiley</corpusName><author><json:item><name>Laszlo Goerke</name><affiliations><json:string>IAAEG, Trier, IZA, Bonn, and CESifo, Munich</json:string></affiliations></json:item></author><subject><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>human capital</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>income tax</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>tax evasion</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>H24</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>H26</value></json:item><json:item><lang><json:string>eng</json:string></lang><value>I20</value></json:item></subject><articleId><json:string>BOER436</json:string></articleId><language><json:string>eng</json:string></language><originalGenre><json:string>article</json:string></originalGenre><abstract>A strictly risk‐averse individual with an exogenous gross income in period one can acquire human capital in the same period and evade taxes. Period‐two income rises with educational investments in period one and can also be hidden from tax authorities. It is shown that a greater tax deductibility of educational investments and higher individual ability induce a positive correlation between tax evasion and educational investments in period two, whereas the relationship in period one is ambiguous. These theoretical predictions can explain diverse empirical findings on the correlation between education and tax evasion.</abstract><qualityIndicators><score>6.104</score><pdfVersion>1.3</pdfVersion><pdfPageSize>484.673 x 697.323 pts</pdfPageSize><refBibsNative>true</refBibsNative><abstractCharCount>623</abstractCharCount><pdfWordCount>8646</pdfWordCount><pdfCharCount>44695</pdfCharCount><pdfPageCount>15</pdfPageCount><abstractWordCount>92</abstractWordCount></qualityIndicators><title>HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION</title><refBibs><json:item><author><json:item><name>K. J. Beron</name></json:item><json:item><name>H. V. Tauchen</name></json:item><json:item><name>A. Dryden Witte</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>89</last><first>67</first></pages><author></author><title>Why People Pay Taxes – Tax Compliance and Enforcement</title></host><title>The effects of audits and socioeconomic variables on compliance</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>M. J. Boskin</name></json:item></author><host><author></author><title>NBER Working Paper No. 116.</title></host><title>Notes on the tax treatment of human capital</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>C. W. Chan</name></json:item><json:item><name>C. S. Troutman</name></json:item><json:item><name>D. O’Bryan</name></json:item></author><host><volume>9</volume><pages><last>103</last><first>83</first></pages><issue>2</issue><author></author><title>Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation</title></host><title>An expanded model of taxpayer compliance. Empirical evidence from the United States and Hong Kong</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B.‐L. Chen</name></json:item></author><host><volume>6</volume><pages><last>403</last><first>381</first></pages><author></author><title>Review of Economic Dynamics</title></host><title>Tax evasion in a model of endogenous growth</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>V. Christiansen</name></json:item></author><host><volume>13</volume><pages><last>93</last><first>389</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Public Economics</title></host><title>Two comments on tax evasion</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Dalamagas</name></json:item></author><host><volume>39</volume><pages><last>26</last><first>309</first></pages><author></author><title>Public Finance Review</title></host><title>A dynamic approach to tax evasion</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. A. Dubin</name></json:item><json:item><name>L. L. Wilde</name></json:item></author><host><volume>41</volume><pages><last>74</last><first>61</first></pages><issue>1</issue><author></author><title>National Tax Journal</title></host><title>An empirical analysis of federal income tax auditing and compliance</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. A. Dubin</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. L. Graetz</name></json:item><json:item><name>L. L. Wilde</name></json:item></author><host><volume>77</volume><pages><last>5</last><first>240</first></pages><author></author><title>American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings</title></host><title>Are we a nation of tax cheaters? New econometric evidence on tax compliance</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. A. Dubin</name></json:item><json:item><name>M. L. Graetz</name></json:item><json:item><name>L. L. Wilde</name></json:item></author><host><volume>43</volume><pages><last>409</last><first>395</first></pages><author></author><title>National Tax Journal</title></host><title>The effect of audit rates on the federal individual income tax, 1977–1986</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. Eaton</name></json:item><json:item><name>H. S. Rosen</name></json:item></author><host><volume>70</volume><pages><last>15</last><first>705</first></pages><author></author><title>American Economic Review</title></host><title>Taxation, human capital, and uncertainty</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Frey</name></json:item><json:item><name>B. Torgler</name></json:item></author><host><volume>35</volume><pages><last>59</last><first>136</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Comparative Economics</title></host><title>Tax morale and conditional cooperation</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>K. Gërxhani</name></json:item></author><host><volume>13</volume><pages><last>55</last><first>119</first></pages><author></author><title>Feminist Economics</title></host><title>Explaining gender differences in tax evasion: the case of Tirana, Albania</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>W. Groot</name></json:item><json:item><name>H. M. van den Brink</name></json:item></author><host><volume>42</volume><pages><last>89</last><first>279</first></pages><author></author><title>Applied Economics</title></host><title>The effects of education on crime</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Jacobs</name></json:item></author><host><pages><last>32</last><first>212</first></pages><author></author><title>Human Capital – Advances in Theory and Evidence</title></host><title>Optimal tax and education policies and investments in human capital</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A.‐S. Kolm</name></json:item><json:item><name>B. Larsen</name></json:item></author><host><author></author><title>Working Paper 2010:3</title></host><title>The black economy and education</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>D. Levhari</name></json:item><json:item><name>Y. Weiss</name></json:item></author><host><volume>64</volume><pages><last>63</last><first>950</first></pages><author></author><title>American Economic Review</title></host><title>The effect of risk on the investment of human capital</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>W.‐Z. Lin</name></json:item><json:item><name>C. C. Yang</name></json:item></author><host><volume>25</volume><pages><last>40</last><first>1827</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control</title></host><title>A dynamic portfolio choice model of tax evasion: comparative statics of tax rates and its implications for economic growth</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>OECD (2009). Tax Administration in OECD and Selected Non‐OECD Countries: Comparative Information Series (2008) , Paris : OECD, pp. 136–146.</title></host></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>OECD (2011). Taxing Wages 2009–2010 , Paris : OECD.</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. H. Pencavel</name></json:item></author><host><volume>12</volume><pages><last>24</last><first>115</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Public Economics</title></host><title>A note on income tax evasion, labor supply, and nonlinear tax schedules</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>G. Richardson</name></json:item></author><host><volume>15</volume><pages><last>69</last><first>150</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation</title></host><title>Determinants of tax evasion, a cross‐country investigation</title></json:item><json:item><host><author></author><title>Economic and behavioral determinants of tax compliance: evidence from the 1997 Arkansas Tax Penalty Amnesty Program</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Torgler</name></json:item></author><host><volume>21</volume><pages><last>31</last><first>525</first></pages><author></author><title>European Journal of Political Economy</title></host><title>Tax morale and direct democracy</title></json:item><json:item><host><pages><last>35</last><first>31</first></pages><author></author><title>Torgler, B. (2007). Tax Compliance and Tax Morale , Cheltenham ( UK ), and Northampton , MA : Edward Elgar, pp. 31–35.</title></host></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>B. Torgler</name></json:item><json:item><name>N. T. Valev</name></json:item></author><host><volume>28</volume><pages><last>68</last><first>554</first></pages><author></author><title>Contemporary Public Policy</title></host><title>Gender and public attitudes toward corruption and tax evasion</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>J. L. F. Wilson</name></json:item><json:item><name>S. Sheffrin</name></json:item></author><host><volume>61</volume><pages><last>74</last><first>256</first></pages><author></author><title>Finanzarchiv</title></host><title>Understanding surveys of taxpayer honesty</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>A. D. Witte</name></json:item><json:item><name>D. F. Woodbury</name></json:item></author><host><volume>38</volume><pages><last>13</last><first>1</first></pages><author></author><title>National Tax Journal</title></host><title>The effect of tax laws and tax administration on tax compliance: the case of the U.S: individual income tax</title></json:item><json:item><author><json:item><name>S. Yitzhaki</name></json:item></author><host><volume>3</volume><pages><last>2</last><first>201</first></pages><author></author><title>Journal of Public Economics</title></host><title>A note on income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis</title></json:item></refBibs><genre><json:string>article</json:string></genre><host><volume>65</volume><publisherId><json:string>BOER</json:string></publisherId><pages><total>15</total><last>105</last><first>91</first></pages><issn><json:string>0307-3378</json:string></issn><issue>1</issue><genre><json:string>journal</json:string></genre><language><json:string>unknown</json:string></language><eissn><json:string>1467-8586</json:string></eissn><title>Bulletin of Economic Research</title><doi><json:string>10.1111/(ISSN)1467-8586</json:string></doi></host><categories><wos><json:string>social science</json:string><json:string>economics</json:string></wos><scienceMetrix><json:string>economic & social sciences</json:string><json:string>economics & business </json:string><json:string>economics</json:string></scienceMetrix></categories><publicationDate>2013</publicationDate><copyrightDate>2013</copyrightDate><doi><json:string>10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00436.x</json:string></doi><id>50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A</id><score>0.7513656</score><fulltext><json:item><extension>pdf</extension><original>true</original><mimetype>application/pdf</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A/fulltext/pdf</uri></json:item><json:item><extension>zip</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/zip</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A/fulltext/zip</uri></json:item><istex:fulltextTEI uri="https://api.istex.fr/document/50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A/fulltext/tei"><teiHeader><fileDesc><titleStmt><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION</title></titleStmt><publicationStmt><authority>ISTEX</authority><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><availability><p>© 2012 The Author. Bulletin of Economic Research © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research.</p></availability><date>2013</date></publicationStmt><sourceDesc><biblStruct type="inbook"><analytic><title level="a" type="main" xml:lang="en">HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION</title><author xml:id="author-1"><persName><forename type="first">Laszlo</forename><surname>Goerke</surname></persName><affiliation>IAAEG, Trier, IZA, Bonn, and CESifo, Munich</affiliation></author></analytic><monogr><title level="j">Bulletin of Economic Research</title><idno type="pISSN">0307-3378</idno><idno type="eISSN">1467-8586</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-8586</idno><imprint><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><pubPlace>Oxford, UK</pubPlace><date type="published" when="2013-01"></date><biblScope unit="volume">65</biblScope><biblScope unit="issue">1</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" from="91">91</biblScope><biblScope unit="page" to="105">105</biblScope></imprint></monogr><idno type="istex">50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A</idno><idno type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00436.x</idno><idno type="ArticleID">BOER436</idno></biblStruct></sourceDesc></fileDesc><profileDesc><creation><date>2013</date></creation><langUsage><language ident="en">en</language></langUsage><abstract xml:lang="en"><p>A strictly risk‐averse individual with an exogenous gross income in period one can acquire human capital in the same period and evade taxes. Period‐two income rises with educational investments in period one and can also be hidden from tax authorities. It is shown that a greater tax deductibility of educational investments and higher individual ability induce a positive correlation between tax evasion and educational investments in period two, whereas the relationship in period one is ambiguous. These theoretical predictions can explain diverse empirical findings on the correlation between education and tax evasion.</p></abstract><textClass xml:lang="en"><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>human capital</term></item><item><term>income tax</term></item><item><term>tax evasion</term></item></list></keywords></textClass><textClass xml:lang="en"><keywords scheme="keyword"><list><head>keywords</head><item><term>H24</term></item><item><term>H26</term></item><item><term>I20</term></item></list></keywords></textClass></profileDesc><revisionDesc><change when="2013-01">Published</change></revisionDesc></teiHeader></istex:fulltextTEI><json:item><extension>txt</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>text/plain</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A/fulltext/txt</uri></json:item></fulltext><metadata><istex:metadataXml wicri:clean="Wiley, elements deleted: body"><istex:xmlDeclaration>version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"</istex:xmlDeclaration><istex:document><component version="2.0" type="serialArticle" xml:lang="en"><header><publicationMeta level="product"><publisherInfo><publisherName>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisherName><publisherLoc>Oxford, UK</publisherLoc></publisherInfo><doi origin="wiley" registered="yes">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-8586</doi><issn type="print">0307-3378</issn><issn type="electronic">1467-8586</issn><idGroup><id type="product" value="BOER"></id><id type="publisherDivision" value="ST"></id></idGroup><titleGroup><title type="main" sort="BULLETIN ECONOMIC RESEARCH">Bulletin of Economic Research</title></titleGroup></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="part" position="01101"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/boer.2013.65.issue-1</doi><numberingGroup><numbering type="journalVolume" number="65">65</numbering><numbering type="journalIssue" number="1">1</numbering></numberingGroup><coverDate startDate="2013-01">January 2013</coverDate></publicationMeta><publicationMeta level="unit" type="article" position="6" status="forIssue"><doi origin="wiley">10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00436.x</doi><idGroup><id type="unit" value="BOER436"></id></idGroup><countGroup><count type="pageTotal" number="15"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="tocHeading1">ARTICLES</title></titleGroup><copyright>© 2012 The Author. Bulletin of Economic Research © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research.</copyright><eventGroup><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:BPG_TO_WML3G version:3.1.9 mode:FullText" date="2012-12-10"></event><event type="publishedOnlineEarlyUnpaginated" date="2012-04-02"></event><event type="firstOnline" date="2012-04-02"></event><event type="publishedOnlineFinalForm" date="2012-12-10"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WILEY_ML3G_TO_WILEY_ML3GV2 version:3.8.8" date="2014-01-08"></event><event type="xmlConverted" agent="Converter:WML3G_To_WML3G version:4.6.4 mode:FullText" date="2015-10-02"></event></eventGroup><numberingGroup><numbering type="pageFirst" number="91">91</numbering><numbering type="pageLast" number="105">105</numbering></numberingGroup><correspondenceTo>Laszlo Goerke, IAAEG, Institut für Arbeitsrecht und Arbeitsbeziehungen in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (IAAEG), Universität Trier, D‐54286 Trier, Germany. Tel: ++49 (0) 651 201 4740; Fax: ++49 (0) 651 201 4742; Email: <email>Goerke@iaaeg.de</email>. The author is grateful to participants of the CESifo area conference on Public Sector Economics in Munich and a seminar in Tübingen, an anonymous referee, Florian Baumann, Laurence Jacquet and especially Dirk Schindler for helpful suggestions and advice. Obviously, any inadequacies are his own responsibility.</correspondenceTo><objectNameGroup><objectName elementName="appendix">Appendix</objectName></objectNameGroup><linkGroup><link type="toTypesetVersion" href="file:BOER.BOER436.pdf"></link></linkGroup></publicationMeta><contentMeta><countGroup><count type="figureTotal" number="0"></count><count type="tableTotal" number="0"></count><count type="formulaTotal" number="36"></count><count type="referenceTotal" number="28"></count><count type="linksCrossRef" number="106"></count></countGroup><titleGroup><title type="main">HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION</title></titleGroup><creators><creator creatorRole="author" xml:id="cr1" affiliationRef="#a1"><personName><givenNames>Laszlo</givenNames><familyName>Goerke</familyName></personName></creator></creators><affiliationGroup><affiliation xml:id="a1"><unparsedAffiliation>IAAEG, Trier, IZA, Bonn, and CESifo, Munich</unparsedAffiliation></affiliation></affiliationGroup><keywordGroup xml:lang="en"><keyword xml:id="k1">human capital</keyword><keyword xml:id="k2">income tax</keyword><keyword xml:id="k3">tax evasion</keyword></keywordGroup><keywordGroup xml:lang="en"><keyword xml:id="k4">H24</keyword><keyword xml:id="k5">H26</keyword><keyword xml:id="k6">I20</keyword></keywordGroup><abstractGroup><abstract type="main" xml:lang="en"><title type="main">ABSTRACT</title><p>A strictly risk‐averse individual with an exogenous gross income in period one can acquire human capital in the same period and evade taxes. Period‐two income rises with educational investments in period one and can also be hidden from tax authorities. It is shown that a greater tax deductibility of educational investments and higher individual ability induce a positive correlation between tax evasion and educational investments in period two, whereas the relationship in period one is ambiguous. These theoretical predictions can explain diverse empirical findings on the correlation between education and tax evasion.</p></abstract></abstractGroup></contentMeta></header></component></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA" lang="en"><title>HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Laszlo</namePart><namePart type="family">Goerke</namePart><affiliation>IAAEG, Trier, IZA, Bonn, and CESifo, Munich</affiliation><role><roleTerm type="text">author</roleTerm></role></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="article" displayLabel="article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">2013-01</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">2013</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType><extent unit="formulas">36</extent><extent unit="references">28</extent></physicalDescription><abstract lang="en">A strictly risk‐averse individual with an exogenous gross income in period one can acquire human capital in the same period and evade taxes. Period‐two income rises with educational investments in period one and can also be hidden from tax authorities. It is shown that a greater tax deductibility of educational investments and higher individual ability induce a positive correlation between tax evasion and educational investments in period two, whereas the relationship in period one is ambiguous. These theoretical predictions can explain diverse empirical findings on the correlation between education and tax evasion.</abstract><subject lang="en"><genre>keywords</genre><topic>human capital</topic><topic>income tax</topic><topic>tax evasion</topic></subject><subject lang="en"><genre>keywords</genre><topic>H24</topic><topic>H26</topic><topic>I20</topic></subject><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Bulletin of Economic Research</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0307-3378</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1467-8586</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/(ISSN)1467-8586</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">BOER</identifier><part><date>2013</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>65</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>1</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>91</start><end>105</end><total>15</total></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-8586.2012.00436.x</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">BOER436</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© 2012 The Author. Bulletin of Economic Research © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research.</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource>WILEY</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
EXPLOR_STEP=$WICRI_ROOT/Wicri/Rhénanie/explor/UnivTrevesV1/Data/Istex/Corpus
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_STEP/biblio.hfd -nk 001162 | SxmlIndent | more
Ou
HfdSelect -h $EXPLOR_AREA/Data/Istex/Corpus/biblio.hfd -nk 001162 | SxmlIndent | more
Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri
{{Explor lien
|wiki= Wicri/Rhénanie
|area= UnivTrevesV1
|flux= Istex
|étape= Corpus
|type= RBID
|clé= ISTEX:50FAC004114D5F611A350A2BF2FB81352D57546A
|texte= HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION AND TAX EVASION
}}
| This area was generated with Dilib version V0.6.31. |  |