The Role of the Federal Judiciary in Directing Student-Authority Interaction
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Auteurs : Henry S. BangserSource :
- Education and Urban Society [ 0013-1245 ] ; 1976-05.
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DOI: 10.1177/001312457600800302
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URI="journalpublishing.dtd" name="istex:docType"></istex:docType><istex:document><article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="2.3" xml:lang="EN"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="hwp">speus</journal-id><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">EUS</journal-id><journal-title>Education and Urban Society</journal-title><issn pub-type="ppub">0013-1245</issn><publisher><publisher-name>Sage Publications</publisher-name><publisher-loc>Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA</publisher-loc></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.1177/001312457600800302</article-id><article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">10.1177_001312457600800302</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Articles</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>The Role of the Federal Judiciary in Directing Student-Authority Interaction</article-title></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>Bangser</surname><given-names>Henry S.</given-names></name><aff>New Trier East High School</aff></contrib></contrib-group><pub-date pub-type="ppub"><month>05</month><year>1976</year></pub-date><volume>8</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>267</fpage><lpage>306</lpage><custom-meta-wrap><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>sagemeta-type</meta-name><meta-value>Journal Article</meta-value></custom-meta><custom-meta xlink:type="simple"><meta-name>search-text</meta-name><meta-value> THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAR Y 1N DIRECTING STUDENT-A UTHORITY INTERACTION HENRY S. BANGSER New Trier East High School Three times in the past seven years the United States Supreme Court has declared that a student has suffered unfairly through the actions of public elementary or second- ary school officials. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District (1969), Goss v. Lopez (1975), and Wood v. Strickland (1975) serve as notice to educators that constitu- tional law has emerged as one of the most dynamic issues facing schooling in the 1970s. This article will explore the educational and legal questions extending from this recent intervention of the judiciary into the student-disciplinarian relationship. In this regard, the significance of Tinker will be measured through its impact on future courts' conceptions of proper student conduct. Finally, the due process and liability guidelines in Goss and Wood will be considered to establish a more enlightened legal posture for school administrators vis-'a-vis their students. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT OR JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: A LEGAL-PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTION Proponents of an expansion of the constitutional rights of public school students often advocate the doctrine of judicial EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY, Vol. 8 No. 3, May 1976 i 1976 Sage Publications, Inc. [267J [2681 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 activism in educational matters. This results in the increased involvement of the federal judiciary in the day-to-day operations of the public schools. On the other hand, many school leaders who see the federal courts as absentee landlords overseeing their school building might opt for one of two alternatives to their present condition-either a severe relaxation of the existing legal standards for school discipli- narians in dealing with unruly students or the advocacy of judicial restraint by the nation's courts. With the most recent expansion of students' rights in Goss and Wood, the first possibility seems remote. The second requires closer scrutiny. One of the best examples of the restraint-activism argu- ment can be found in the consistent refusal of the Supreme Court to decide on the constitutionality of regulations limiting the hair length of male students. On this issue, the late Justice Hugo Black, sitting as the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, denied a motion by Chesley Karr, a student at Coronado High School in El Paso, Texas to declare the school's rule against hirsute boys unconstitu- tional, saying: The records of the federal courts, including ours, show a heavy burden of litigation in connection with cases of great impor- tance-the kind of litigation our court must be able to handle if they are to perform their responsibility to society. Moreover, our Constitution has sought to distribute the powers of government in this Nation between the United States and the States. Surely, the federal judiciary can perform no greater service to the Nation than to leave the States unhampered in the performance of their purely local affairs. Surely few policies can be thought of that States are more capable of deciding than the length of the hair of schoolboys. [Karr v. Schmidt, 19711 Diametrically opposed to this position of judicial restraint stands Justice William 0. Douglas, who in dissenting to a denial of certiorari in another hair case, argued, "I can conceive of no more compelling reason to exercise our discretionary jurisdiction than a conflict of such magnitude, Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2691 on an issue of importance bearing on First and Ninth Amendment rights" (Freeman v. Flake, 1972). The authority of the federal judiciary to examine the actions of public school officials is clear. Yet common sense argues that the courts' power and legitimacy will depend on the degree to which the citizenry perceives its decisions as acceptable. Should judges become involved in matters of questionable importance, the chances that school districts will adopt measures to conform to the court's mandates are very low indeed. This is the most persuasive argument in favor of judicial restraint in the educational domain. Once the courts do become involved in a students' rights question, the problem of determining the proper legal standard still remains. Before Tinker, when a student claimed that a state authority had misused his granted power, the law initially presumed that the superior did, in fact, employ reasonable means to enforce the regulation involved. There- fore, the burden of proof was placed on the student to show that the rule or its application was unreasonable and that there was no rational basis for its implementation. This standard was used' unless the student could show that the statute or administrative act in question infringed on one of his "fundamental rights" which were explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. Since 1969, the number of freedoms included in this category has increased significantly. Should the court view the student's concern as funda- mental, the school board is required to show that a compelling interest is furthered by the promulgation of the rule. There is theoretically no middle ground between the rational basis test and the compelling state interest test. If the disagreement lies in the application of a fairly commonplace disciplinary device which does not raise a serious constitu- tional claim (e.g., detention after school for littering the halls), the judge will no doubt rule that the educational goal to be achieved by the school in detaining the student (more respect for school property) bore a rational and reasonable [2701 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 relationship to -the rule that was enforced. If, on the other hand, a pupil was told to remain after school on a daily basis because the views he expressed in a United States History class contradicted those of the teacher, the judge would require the school authorities to show that the most basic operations of the school system will be disrupted by the student exercising his freedom of speech, a fundamental right. It is unlikely that many disciplinary regulations will meet this more severe test. In either of these hypothetical cases the school authority, be it school board, superintendent, principal, or teacher may be held accountable in a federal court through the imple- mentation of the once-forgotten Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13, 42 U.S.C. 1983. Better known as "Section 1983," this Act provides that: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. By far the greatest number of students' rights cases since Tinker have been brought under this federal provision. A final consideration in the issue of judicial involvement, then, becomes the proper role of Section 1983 in the schooling process. Weddle (1971) -*suggests that "if damages are to be permitted against school officials, the argument places great responsibilities on the judiciary and on legislators to clearly articulate the guidelines which are to be followed." Therefore, it does not follow that every case of a school authority's abuse of power under the color of a state statute should be adjudicated in a federal court. A determination must be made concerning the appropriateness of the stu- dent's claim. The judicial stance forwarded by the Fifth Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2711 Circuit Court of Appeals is a position which should be adopted in considering 1983 cases. Outlining this approach, Frels (1971) argues that to avoid becoming outside school boards, the federal judiciary "should not hear a case on its merits until there has been a final adjudication at the institutional level." Three Fifth Circuit cases form the crux of this argument for exhaustion of administrative remedies. Stevenson v. Board of Education of Wheeler County (1970) ruled on the complaint of three black male students who were suspended from high school for refusing to shave. The Court held that the case only became ripe for consideration by the federal judiciary after the school board made it clear that the disciplinary action had been considered fully by all school authorities. A similar problem was confronted in Ferguson v. Thomas, (1970). Here, the Court argued that: Federal Court hearings ... should be limited in the first instance to the question of whether or not federal rights have been violated in the procedures followed by the academic agency in processing the plaintiff s grievance. If a procedural deficit appears, the matter should, at that point, be remanded to the institution for its compliance with minimum federal or supple- mentary academically created standards. Stevenson and Ferguson were cited with approval in Lucas v. Chapman (1970) where the Court reinforced the administra- tive exhaustion doctrine noting that "abdication to the courts may be the short way across, but it may be the long way around, as in this case." What remains available to the plaintiff as this position becomes widely accepted reveals an interesting future for 1983 litigation. If the school cures the original deficiency in procedural due process, the student has no right to resubmit a complaint on procedural grounds. This would insure that the majority of cases actually decided by the district courts would be substantive in nature. In other words, the courts [272] EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 will be dealing with questions of fundamental fairness rather than more clear-cut matters of form. There is little doubt that substantive changes in schools are more difficult to make and harder to detect if not nwde than procedural ones.' This problem reinforces the belief that the courts may not be effective change-agents in the educational process. An aware- ness of the possible ineffectiveness of judicial pronounce- ments in reorganizing the schools, an important factor in the doctrine of judicial restraint, formed the foundation of the dissents of Justice Black in Tinker and Justice Powell in Goss and Wood. TINKER AND ITS ANTECEDENTS The story of Mary Beth Tinker, her older brother John, and Christopher Eckhardt has been well-chronicled in legal and educational journals since 1969. A recapitulation reveals that on December 14, 1965 the principals of the Des Moines schools met for the expressed purpose of adopting a policy which prohibited the wearing of political armbands. A few days later, the three students were suspended for displaying black armbands in protest against the Vietnam war. Subse- quently, they filed a complaint under Section 1983 re- questing an injunction to restrain the school officials from enforcing the regulation and the granting of nominal dam- ages. Finding the principals' actions reasonable, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa dismissed the students' complaint. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed without opinion. On February 24, 1969, the United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision, found that the principals' regulation was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, but expressed no opinion concerning the form of relief which the peti- tioners should have received. The majority opinion, written by Justice Abe Fortas, coupled with a heated dissent by Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2731 Justice Black, provided the academic world with its first serious debate on the issue of the proper place of discipline in students' lives. Fortas' effort to outline the boundaries of the First Amendment in the public schools has received great publicity. However, his educational statements rejecting the antiquated view of the passive student awaiting divine guidance from his teachers are even more significant for this inquiry. To appreciate how great a departure the Tinker portrait was from the established student-authority social relationship, one need only survey the case law and school law writings a few years before the case. Those students who anticipated that judges and educators would be sympathetic to a Beatle-type haircut in the mid-1960s were mistaken. A case in point involved a 17-year-old student at Attleboro (Mass.) High School. On September 1 1, 1964, the principal refused to admit George Leonard, Jr., because the boy had long hair which the administration decided was detrimental to classroom disci- pline. It mattered little that George had been a professional musician since the age of 12, had performed at the Newport Jazz Festival and the New York World's Fair, or that his father had spent a great deal of money to promote George's career, which the boy contended was furthered by his hairstyle. When the school committee upheld the principal's action on September 21, the nation's first appellate hair case, Leonard v. School Committee of Attleboro (1965), had begun. The pre-Tinker, pro-disciplinarian bias was articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in finding against the student, "the domain of family privacy must give way in so far as a regulation reasonably calculated td maintain school discipline may affect it." The court implic- itly held that the parental authority to promote a child's lifestyle beyond the schoolhouse doors must be subordinated to the general conditions established for school attendance once the son or daughter becomes a student. [2741 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 While it may be surprising to recently sensitized educators that this thinking existed only ten years ago, the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was consistent with the legal guidance, outdated as it was, which school administrators were receiving from credible sources. Fox (1961) revealed the lack of development in students' rights litigation from 1900 to 1960. In his article on the rules of pupil conduct, 37% of the cases cited were more than 50 years old, and 48% occurred before 1940. Using these decisions, he offered the conclusion that "evidently super- intendents, principals, and teachers have found ways to handle pupil problems without inciting a great amount of controversy and litigation." It is little wonder that school authorities throughout the 1960s developed a sense of misguided self-righteousness in their dealings with students. While the courts remained unburdened and school adminis- trators continued confident, there is evidence that the citizenry was beginning to recognize viable alternatives to the suffocating paternalism underlying school disciplinary regula- tions. The February 1965 issue of Phi Delta Kappan related a story of Edward Kores, a 15-year-old Connecticut high school student who had been expelled for wearing his hair in a Beatle-cut. The April Phi Delta Kappan reproduced the reader responses. Surprisingly, half of the letters supported the student's position, with the balance equally divided between support for the administration and noncommital stances. Perhaps with the civil rights movement polarizing the political community of the late 1960s, Justice Fortas, in Tinker, was speaking not only for five sympathetic justices, but also for those educational moderates who had moved to the left on social issues during the previous five years. In this respect, the case represents a paradox for school governance. In the constitutional domain, the limited application of the Tinker decision acts as a directive for later student com- plaints; but in the educational domain, the Fortas opinion has opened a pandora's box for subsequent courts to Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2751 confront. Most authors have not sought to distinguish between these two issues. However, the exploration of the impact of the judiciary on a pupil's perception of his rights in the school's social system mandates this approach to Tinker. Constitutionally, Fortas' contention that pupils "do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door" does not mean that Tinker stands as the foundation of all civil liberties for public school students. Tinker did not even define the boundaries of all First Amendment claims: The problem posed by the present case does not relate to regulation of the length of skirts or the type of clothing, to hairstyle, or deportment. It does not concern aggressive, disrup- tive action or even group demonstrations. Our problem involves direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to "pure speech." What the Court did argue was that the constitutionality of a public school First Amendment regulation depended on the history of the formation of that regulation. Further, the legality of any application of the regulation rested on the ability of the school to show that actions contrary to the policy produced serious negative effects for the school's operations. Despite what many educators feared, Tinker did not suddenly make the control of pupil conduct impossible. Rather, Tinker was crucial because in confronting the collision between the exercise of pupils' speech and the whims of a school authority, the majority chose to shift the burden of proof to the authority. In the limited context of political protest, this meant that a denial of expression could not be justified unless it could be shown "that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with school- work and discipline." This forecasting of material disruption was amplifled in the statement that the state "must be able to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." The compelling [276] EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 state interest test had been made applicable to some First Amendment student complaints. In the wake of this recognition, the Court had constructed an entirely new social and educational conception of school children. The image of a self-initiating, opinionated young partner in the learning process had been offered to school leaders by the nation's highest court. Public schooling could only be furthered now if students were allowed to express opinions on issues generated outside the school walls. To offer students anything less would be doing the entire educational system an injustice. If this communication of ideas caused slight inconveniences, either to school author- ities or to other students, these were the prices of democracy. Students were no longer expected to be automatons, blindly accepting the teachings of school people. Significantly, it was the abuse of this doctrine of student participation which Justice Black chose as the basis for his dissent. Black posed two problems to be resolved: "whether students and teachers may use the schools at their whim as a platform for the exercise of free speech-'symbolic' or 'pure,' " and "whether the courts will allocate to themselves the function of deciding how the pupils' school day will be spent." The latter issue, basically one of judicial activism or restraint (to be reargued in both Goss and Wood), has been explored earlier. The former concern, that Tinker "is the beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness in this country fostered by the judiciary," reflects the more tradi- tional attitude towards the student-disciplinarian relation- ship. That "taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their age they need to learn, not teach" unfortunately becomes the foundation of a position that schools should be factories in which patriotism is meshed with young minds to produce quiet, accepting citizens. The Court's majority, as well as the majority of clear-thinking school leaders in the 1970s, reject this distortion of our public schools' curricular goals. Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [277] THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND EDUCATIONAL PROGENY OF TINKER Given the material disruption test in cases of symbolic speech, two basic questions had to be answered by school authorities. First, should students have free expression avenues available to them which extend far beyond political armbands, and, if so, must school leaders operate under the same restrictions when these methods are employed? Second, what kinds of evidence might be produced to support a disciplinarian's claim that significant disruption of the educa- tional process is imminent? Klahn (1 97 1 ) offers insight into the first of these questions. Speaking as a former Des Moines principal in December, 1965, he suggests that in a city where local headlines read YANKS ASSAIL U.S.; FAMILIES ARE STUNNED and HECKLERS FRY HAMBURGER IN FRONT OF PEACE FASTERS, "the assumption that wear- ing the 'token' might lead to disruption was logical under the circumstances of social and economic upheaval. It reflected the cautious adherence to orderly tradition charac- teristic of a well-established society." Once the Supreme Court rejected this thinking, the problem remained that armbands represented only one type of student protest. What if the students had used the school newspaper to publicize their dissatisfaction with administration policies or the teaching ability of the faculty? The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (serving Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) has been the most liberal sectional influence on the extension of First Amendment rights to students. Scoville v. Board of Education of Joliet Township High School District 204, County of Will, State of Illinois (1970) detailed the kinds of criticism which administrators must endure from students who wish to publicize personal feelings about authorities' personalities and actions. The two plaintiff-students were editors of the publication "Grass [278] EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 High," which was written off school premises but sold to students and faculty on school grounds (a total of 60 copies at $.15 each). As a result of this distribution, students Scoville and Breen were suspended for five days, barred from both fall semester examinations and further participation in the school debating team, and expelled from the normal second semester day program. They were permitted to attend a day class in physics and the night school at Joliet Central High School on a probationary basis. Neither the place, the manner, nor the time of the distribution precipitated the disciplining of the two students. Rather, it was the content of the publication. The Tinker warning that students "may not be confined to the expres- sion of those sentiments that are officially approved" would seem to have forbidden official actions based on mere disagreement with the students' position. Despite this, the District Court found that while no substantial libel or obscenity case was presented by the school board, distribu- tion of the publication could legitimately be stopped. The basis for this judgment was an editorial which urged "all students in the future to either refuse to accept or destroy upon acceptance all propaganda that Central's administration publishes." Could a reasonable administrator forecast that as a result of this position, read by only 60 students and faculty, material disruption of the educational process would occur? Curiously, the District Court did not even deal with this question. It dismissed the students' complaint without hearing any evidence required to strike a balance of the competing interests as Tinker mandated. A panel of the Seventh Circuit upheld the District Court decision, but upon a rehearing en banc, the Court held for the students on the grounds that the District Court did not require the presenta- tion of evidence to show that the Board was justified in forecasting disruption. Had the editorial done no more than urge nonacceptance of written material, the implications of Scoville would be Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2791 minimal. However, the editorial also accused the senior dean of having a "sick mind" because of his statements on the role of discipline in students' lives. The Tinker description included a system where personal intercommunication involv- ing controversial topics is inevitable and ultimately to be encouraged. Certainly it could be strongly argued that many more students are interested in a student leader's arguments concerning the school administration's role in controlling student conduct than a war thousands of miles away. Might not an educational purpose be served through the airing of views on school disciplinarians' methods? The Scoville court clearly answered in the affirmative. Extend the "sick mind" situation two steps further. Must any teacher be subjected to public exposure of his faults at the whim of dissatisfied students? Does a teacher or administrator have any recourse if a student abuses him or her with profanity? The Scoville court assumed the position that "schools are increasingly accepting student criticism as a worthwhile influence in school administration." The implica- tion here, as well as the expressed statements in Tinker, suggest that student discussion of school personnel must be allowed unless it can be shown that disruptive effects will result. Quite properly, however, any libel or slander laws which would apply to citizens outside the school context should restrain those students eager to comment on their teachers. Once school authorities allow the school newspaper to publish comments or allow a colloquium to be formed on the issue of incompetent teachers, must they then sit back and wait until a breakdown of the teaching function has occurred before limiting these activities? It is possible that those Circuits which are in agreement with the Scoville philosophy might require this high level of proof before sanctioning the prohibition of this type of student expres- sion. The question of profanity and obscenity in the public schools poses a less perplexing problem. With the Supreme [2801 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 Court offering- little real guidance on the question of obscenity, lower courts have used various approaches in deciding the extent of school authorities' power to regulate this kind of student speech. If there is a general standard, it must be that the content of the expression should have some redeeming social value. Put in a school context, the speech or publication must be lacking in educational value to be legitimately proscribed. In a student-teacher confrontation where profanity is used by the pupil, the school would be on solid ground should a suspension be imposed. The discipli- narian could argue that the student had at his disposal a number of alternatives that he could have used to make his point (e.g., softer language or an appeal to a higher authority). Under this argument, the school is really invoking the Tinker ruling that disciplinary procedures will be honored by the judiciary unless they come into conflict with rcognized fundamental rights. Three other specific issues raised by the post-Tinker concern with the proper role of authority involvement in student conduct merit consideration. They include the proliferation of male hair length cases arising in the past six years, the questionable methods used in searching students and their lockers to preserve law and order in the schools, and the use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary tool. No single students' rights issue has received greater attention in the courts or in recent law review articles than the proper regulation of the length of boys' hair. However, with more than 180 reported cases since Leonard in 1965, the composition of grooming codes, consistent with legal guidelines, remains difficult indeed. The reasons for this difficulty are threefold. First, while nine Circuits have rendered some judgment on the issue, they are divided with four favoring the student and five upholding school regula- tions. Thus, while some school authorities may be safe in their jurisdiction should they seek to compel a boy to cut his hair as a prerequisite for admission to a public school, others Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [281] will have similar attempts rejected by the local federal courts. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to grant certiorari in six hair cases during the past eight years. The Court has done this on appeals from Circuits finding for the students and from those upholding school authorities, so that final adjudication on this issue remains very much in doubt. Third, at least four separate constitutional attacks have been employed by the plaintiff-students in seeking invalidation of hair rules. These include a free expression claim under the First Amendment, personal privacy considerations under the Ninth Amendment, equal protection of the laws complaints under the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., if girls can go to school with long hair, why can't boys?), and substantive due process arguments also under the Fourteenth Amendment. With no consistent position offered by the complainants, any attempt to avert future lawsuits through administrative planning is hindered.2 The precepts in Tinker that school officials do not enjoy absolute authority over students whose constitutional rights must be honored should pose procedural problems for disciplinarians under the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment. However, while school authorities must now justify infringement on students' First Amendment freedoms, students will find little sympathy in the courts should they complain that they or their lockers have been searched unreasonably. Administrators have successfully claimed that possession of weapons, drugs, or stolen goods will lead to a school atmosphere where illegal actions are condoned and society's rules are broken at will. They argue that this is a logical extension of the material disruption test Further, the statement in Tinker that a balance must be struck between the school's duty to maintain discipline and the students' free expression rights necessitates a factual, case-by-case determination of the propriety of the author- ities' actions. This standard applies equally well to Fourth Amendment questions, for the U.S. Constitution clearly [282] EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 indicates that only reasonable searches and seizures are valid. While different constitutional tests are used by the federal courts in deciding First Amendment "preferred freedom" cases and Fourth Amendment issues, the best explanation for judges generally finding in favor of students in free expres- sion questions and against them in search and seizure complaints is not found in the legal arena. The clearest answer lies instead in the type of educational concerns that were outlined in Tinker. While Justice Fortas spoke of young citizens eager to learn through involvement in social criticism, most search and seizure cases since Tinker have presented very different factual situations. In re G. (1970-one of a series of search and seizure cases appearing in the California courts from 1969 to 1972) arose when the dean of students and the principal, acting on a tip from the plaintiff's classmate, ordered the plaintiff to empty his pockets. The contents included a canister with amphetamine pills. The police were alerted and juvenile court proceedings against the student ensued. Significantly, the societal interests ("the omnipresent evil of drugs") were judged superior to the students' private educational considerations. Noting that the test of reason- ableness was satisfied by the suspicion that illegal student actions were involved, the fruits of the search became admissible in the juvenile proceedings.3 Fortas saw the issue in Tinker as one of competing interests between students expressing themselves in a positive manner and an administra- tion bent on the suppression of those beliefs. His arguments cannot be logically extended to the student's right to bring into the school illegal or harmful materials. No educational purpose can be served by allowing a young person to store drugs in his locker. For this reason, many administrators have taken care to alert students that their lockers are not private vis-a-vis the school authorities. It is often well publicized that the administration possesses the conmbinations to all school lockers, and that the student cannot assume that a fee paid to Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [283] maintain the locker implies temporary ownership. This kind of prior restraint over the students' privacy rights would never be allowed in First Amendment questions. It seems clear that in search and seizure claims, the student remains the party who must show that the school authorities' actions were unreasonable. The use of corporal punishment in the schools serves as a perfect bridge between the social and educational mandates of Tinker and the strict procedural guidelines of Goss v. Lopez and Wood v. Strickland. If Tinker challenged those who would limit student expression, recent law review and educational articles have similarly questioned the appropri- ateness of intentionally inflicting physical pain on a child who misbehaves in the hope of deterring future misbe- havior.4 In 1972, the National Education Association Board of Directors adopted the recommendation of its Blue Ribbon Panel on Corporal Punishment that physical beatings in public schools should be eliminated by the end of the 1972-1973 school year. In support of its position, the NEA argued that- physical punishment "is an inefficient way to maintain order. . . and usually has to be repeated over and over; may increase disruptive behavior; hinders learning; is often a symptom of frustration rather than a disciplinary procedure; does not develop self-discipline; discourages teachers from seeking more effective means of discipline; and inclines everyone in the school community to regard students as less than human and the school as dehumanizing." While a number of actions in tort have been brought against teachers for assault and battery since the turn of the century, it was not until 1971 that plaintiffs began to question the constitutionality of corporal punishment. The pre-1971 judicial stance argued that the presumption of reasonableness available to disciplinarians existed in corporal punishment cases if the authority acted in good faith. Only a showing of malice on the part of the teacher could expose him to liability. The burden of proof, as in present search and [2841 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 seizure case law and in pre-Tinker First Amendment deci- sions, clearly fell on the student in corporal punishment claims. Judges declared that they would uphold any statute authorizing physical beaing unless the student could show that the regulation or its application bore no reasonable relation to the educational function of the state. In only three years (1971-1974), the courts moved from a solid position upholding the constitutionality of corporal punishment to a more flexible middle-of-the-road approach. In Ware v. Estes (1971), two plaintiffs (one of whom had been knocked unconscious by an assistant principal after making an obscene remark to him) argued that the adminis- tering of corporal punishment in the Dallas Independent School District violated their rights under the Eighth (cruel and unusual punishment) and Fourteenth (due process of law) Amendments. The District Court found that where evidence does not show that a school's corporal punishment policy is arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious, a claim against it does not raise itself to the level of a constitutional question. Therefore the implementation of the regulation cannot violate students' civil rights. Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the immediate result was to sanction corporal punishment, without any reservations, in all those districts awaiting guidance. This unfortunate position was reaffirmed in Sims v. Board of Education (1971), where the court rejected arguments that corporal punishment violated: (a) procedural due process rights of the student because there was no opportu- nity for notice, hearing, or right of representation; (b) substantive due process rights because corporal punishment was unrelated to any educational purpose; (c) the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by the infliction of punishment which invades the right to physical integrity and dignity of the person; and (d) the Eighth Amendment right of a student to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2851 The major shift in corporal punishment claims appeared in Ingraham v. Wright (1974). for the first time, the application of corporal punishment was declared unconstitutional. Signif- icantly, however, the Ingraham court did not invalidate corporal punishment per se as an educational tool. Had the Fifth Circuit decided in this manner, physical punishment would have been declared unconstitutional in all school districts in this six-state jurisdiction. Rather, it held that because of circumstances existing in one school (Drew Junior High School, Dade County, Florida), a system of punishment was developed which violated the constitutional safeguard against cruel and unusual punishment. This "system" in- cluded the frequency of paddlings, the type of misconduct punished, and the extent of resulting injuries. The Court agreed that the methods employed in administering physical punishment must be fundamentally fair. To comport with this requirement, schools must enforce discipline in a manner which is consistent with the due process requirements of notice and hearing: Inquiry should be made to determine whether the student knew or should have known that his conduct violated school rules or policies.... The publishing of written rules of conduct would obviously eliminate many problems which would arise in this area.... If a student claims that he is innocent of the conduct which merits punishment, school officials should make sufficient inquiries to insure that, to the contrary, the student is guilty beyond any reasonable doubt. To aid in the determination of guilt, school authorities were told to provide, in an informal setting, an opportunity for the pupil to respond to his accusers and to provide a reasonable defense. This prepunishment inquiry raises the problem of the decreased effectiveness of corporal punishment because of delay. The overriding concern, however, must be that arbitrary and unreasoned physical action is prevented when- [2861 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 ever possible. It is clear that the Ingraham court contended that abuses of corporal punishment regulations are better controlled by the procedural guidelines provided in the Fourteenth Amendment than the more indefinite limitations of the Eighth Amendment. Finally, the Court held that in cases of systematic and severe abuse of corporal punishment regulations, both school administrators (those closest to the abuse itself) and indi- vidual school board members may be held liable for damages. Disciplinarians may be liable if they knew or should have known of the concentrated scheme of abuse. Ingraham indicated that liability may arise from a situation where the punishment was clearly excessive given the extent of the misdeed. This argument, coupled with the procedural man- dates for a hearing, labels Ingraham as a critical case on two fronts. First, it stands as a more rational statement on corporal punishment; and second, it serves as a constitutional transition between the final ripples of Tinker and the due process and liability holdings in Goss and Wood. GOSS AND WOOD: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL GOVERNANCE With the courts allowing school authorities substantial latitude before 1960, the most autocratic kinds of adminis- trative inquests were accepted as preexclusion school hear- ings. It remained unclear exactly what the judiciary perceived as the necessary ingredients of due process of law in contested suspension and expulsion actions. However, in nonschool contexts, the Supreme Court had stressed the need for at least minimal due process standards: No better instrument has been devised for arriving at the truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him an opportunity to meet it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the feelings, so important to a popular Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [287] govemment, that justice has been done. [Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 19511 Procedural fairness is never more important than in the anxious times when students must confront a school discipli- narian who is armed with accusations and evidence obtained from a third party. Goss v. Lopez was the first case in which the Supreme Court recognized that the basic notions of due process should apply to public elementary and secondary schools. However, informed educators should have reacted to Goss as no more than the natural extension of the widening scope of judicial intervention in juvenile and educational matters in the 1 960s and early 1 970s. This activism was rooted in four critical cases upon which the Goss doctrine rests. In reversing the judgment of an Alabama District Court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Dixon v. Alabama Board of Education (1961 ) that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected students in public univer- sities from being expelled without notice of the charges and an impartial hearing. While the elements of the hearing were tied to the circumstances of the particular case, Dixon applied much of the earlier Supreme Court due process philosophy to the public school environment. Six years after Dixon, the Supreme Court outlined the procedural due process rights of juveniles in In re Gault (1967). Here the Court held that prior to the "sentencing" of a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School, the 1 5-year-old boy was entitled to many of the basic elements of due process which would normally be available to an adult whose criminal guilt or innocence was in question. These included notice of the charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, privilege against self- incrimination, right to a transcript of the proceedings, and the right to appellate review. [ 288] EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 Advocates of- the constitutional rights of public elementary and secondary school students must surely have seen the possible repercussions of these two decisions. If exclusion from a university is to be protected against arbitrary state action on the grounds that "the right to remain at the college ... is an interest of extremely great value" (Dixon), then the removal of a high school education must be even more damaging to the future of the students involved. Further, with the Supreme Court granting juveniles the right to procedural due process in situations where a severe punishment is meted out, the removal of education must fall somewhere within the Gault span of protection. Even if public school authorities were persuaded to grant procedural due process in expulsion or long suspension cases, the fact remained that most state statutes (e.g., the Ohio school code provision challenged in Goss) provided that a student could be suspended for up to ten days without a prior hearing. Only after the student had been judged guilty by an administrator would the school board determine whether or not the suspension was justified. Should the board members find the discipline unreasonable, notation of the suspension would be expunged from the student's record and all missed assignments could be made up without penalty. Still unsatisfied by this procedure, however, was the charge that the suspended student's reputation was damaged among his peers and faculty even if acquitted in a later hearing. Prior to Goss, why should a public school student have expected that he or she would be accorded due process before any removal of his or her right to an education? Ironically, - the Supreme Court answered this question through the complaints of two nontenured college professors who were denied a hearing prior to their dismissal. In The Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972) and Perry v. Sindermann (1972), Justice Stewart (the author of both opinions) argued that when a citizen has a legitimate claim to Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2891 a liberty or property interest, it cannot be withdrawn without due process of law. Crucial for the Goss doctrine was Stewart's rejection of the District Court's use of the weighing process (governmental versus individual interests) in deter- mining whether any hearing was required prior to suspension of a governmental right. He urged that "to determine whether due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to the nature of the interest at stake." If it could be established that a student had either a property or a liberty interest in continuing his schooling he must be granted due process of law prior to any removal of that interest, even if the interruption were only for a short period of time. According to Stewart, the weight of the individual's interest would deternine the extent of the hearing to be provided, not whether there must be a hearing at all. So even if before Roth and Sindermann it seemed that expulsions demanded a prior hearing while a one-day suspension clearly did not, that distinction effectively dis- appeared after these opinions. These new guidelines were followed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio which held in favor of the plaintiff-students on September 12, 1973 in the case of Lopez v. Williams (1 973): It [the right to an education] either is or is not a liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. The difference between expulsion and suspension becomes important only when the Court con- fronts the question of what process is due to protect the Fourteenth Amendment liberty. Evidence was presented before a three-judge panel concerning the suspensions of eight students in the Columbus, Ohio public school system. Since each pupil was suspended under the authority of an Ohio statute and Columbus school regulations, the constitutionality of those provisions was challenged. The eight plaintiffs alleged that suspension without notice and prior hearing violated the Due Process [2901 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They also argued that the "statute and regulations are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because they provide no ascertainable standard for acceptable conduct." Dwight Lopez, Betty Jane Crome, Susan Cooper, and Deborah Fox, the four junior and senior high school students whose stories are related in the District Court's "findings of fact," were each suspended for acts allegedly committed during racial disturbances in late February and early March, 1971. According to his testimony, Dwight Lopez was just sitting in the lunchroom of Central High School during a free study period when a group of black students came in and overturned some tables. On the morning of February 26, 1971, school was suspended at Central, and when Dwight returned home he received a phone call from the principal notifying him that he had been suspended without stating any specific reasons. Dwight never did return to Central High, in part because he was unable to attend the next Board of Education meeting. Instead, he was transferred, against his will, to the Adult Day School. He refused to attend, although he finally enrolled in the Columbus Adult Night School and he received his diploma on June 10, 1972. Betty Jane Crome testified that on March 3, 197 1, students were breaking light bulbs and throwing glasses in the McGuffey Junior High School cafeteria. The principal sent a group of students, including Miss Crome, home after these disturbances. While it was Miss Crome's intention to return home, she stopped with some of her friends at another junior high school on the way, where she was arrested by police officers. While no charges were brought by the police, Betty was suspended from school on March 3, again without any statement of reasons. There was no way she could tell if her dismissal was initiated by her noninvolvement in the bottle- throwing incident, or her passive and harmless loitering after school. Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2911 Deborah Fox was told by an assistant principal at Marion-Franklin Senior High School that she was required to go to his office. Upon arrival, she was suspended for ten days without being granted an opportunity to present her side of the story, though she testified that she violated no school rules. The District Court record reveals that the principal and assistant principal accused her of being disrespectful and suggested that she had a peer group position which labeled her as a militant. These two reasons for dismissal resulted in the following notation on Miss Fox's cumulative record: "3-15-71 Suspended for student disruption." Susan Cooper, also a student at Marion-Franklin Senior High School, wanted to leave school on March 15 because of racial tension. She attempted to obtain an excuse from the administrative bureaucracy, stating that her mother wanted her home if the tension continued. The assistant principal denied her request, telling her she had to go to class. When she refused, she was suspended. Susan returned to school with her mother, but the assistant principal was unavailable for a conference. At no time was Susan's story given any attention by the school authorities. Four classmates of Susan's were also included among the plaintiffs, although the principal was the only person to offer testimony in their cases. The District Court concluded that the plaintiffs were denied due process of law because "they were suspended without a hearing prior to suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter." However, the Court was not very instructive in outlining acceptable administrative guidelines in suspen- sion cases. Rather, the judges related the mandates of other courts that had confronted the same problem and then suggested that: School administrators are free to adopt regulations providing for fair suspension procedures which are consonant with the educa- tional goals of their schools and reflective of the characteristics of [2921 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 their school and locality. There is no way to insure fairness in the suspension process. The choice of the best procedure for a particular school system should be left to the school officials charged with the administration of that school system. The United States Supreme Court was not so generous in providing avenues for school administrators' noncompliance. Justice White, writing for the five-man majority (including Justices Brennan, Marshall, Douglas, and Stewart), reviewed the statements of four of the plaintiffs and presented what any reasonable school authority must recognize to be the proper position in this case. In affirming the District Court finding of unconstitutionality, White applied the due process standards proposed by Justice Stewart in Roth and Sinder- mann. Recognizing both a property interest (the State of Ohio chose to extend the right to an education to the appellees' class generally) and a liberty interest (the suspen- sions, if sustained, could damage the students' reputation as well as future educational and employment chances), Justice White ruled that the notice and prior hearing requirements did apply to the suspension of a student's schooling. With this general constitutional dimension clarified, the problem of measuring the educational impact became as critical as it was six years earlier in Tinker. In Goss, the educational question concerned the degree of administrative headache which school authorities must endure prior to the suspension of a student. Unlike the armband wearers in Tinker, there is generally no contention that students who merit suspension have added anything to the stated function of the school. Rather, these boys or girls are in a clearly defensive position and can expect no more than a fair chance to state their side of the story. The school authorities, by Justice White's own admission, are not required to show why the suspension was necessary in order to have their actions upheld. In fact, White admits that "suspension is considered not only to be a necessary tool to maintain order but a valuable educational device." The educational significance of Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2931 Goss lies in the further extension of the doctrine outlined in Tinker which views the disciplinarian as human and therefore subject to discretionary errors. His judgment cannot and should not stand as an unchallenged statement of truth. White argues in Goss that: Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, fre- quently act on the report and advice of others; and the controlling facts and the nature of the conduct under challenge are often disputed. The risk of error is not at all trivial, and it should be guarded against if that may be done without prohibitive cost or interference with the educational process. To insure the minimization of error and the maximization of fairness, White requires that "in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less . . . the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him, and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." With the exception of the student who threatens the safety of his peers or the educational process, the hearing should precede any exclusion. Recognizing the flexibility inherent in the concept of due process, White distinguishes the relaxed standards preceding a short suspension from the more rigorous and formalized Dixon requirements preceding expul- sions. While the right to counsel, confrontation, cross-exami- nation, and calling of witnesses are not required in Goss, these procedures were left open to the discretion of the disciplinarian in more difficult cases. The skeptic might argue at this juncture- that a simple pretest, posttest set of scenarios would reveal the impotence of the Goss decision: Scenario #1 (Pre-Goss): Disciplinarian: "Young man, I have heard from one of my sources that you were smoking marijuana on school grounds." Student: "But..." [294] EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 Disciplinarian: -"No buts, young man; you are suspended for 10 days. Your parents will be hearing from us soon." Scenario #2 (Post-Goss): Disciplinarian: "Young man, I have heard from one of my sources that you were smoking marijuana on school grounds. What is your answer to this charge?" Student: "Sir, I absolutely deny that I have ever smoked marijuana on school grounds." Disciplinarian: "I do not accept your denial, young man; you are suspended for 10 days. Your parents will be hearing from us soon." Surely, the Supreme Court would not be so foolish as to provide so obvious an escape route for unwilling adminis- trators. Surely, Justice Powell, echoing Justice Black in Tinker, would not have contended that Goss "unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the quality of education" had he not seen greater repercussions than those outlined in the two scenarios. In the second of the great debates on students' rights, Powell chastises White for not only improperly inserting the judiciary into educational decisions, but also for failing to recognize the real benefits which children derive from learning the value of discipline. In his zeal, however, Powell misleads those school authorities who have not stopped to consider the narrowness of the Goss due process guidelines. He claims that the majority has failed to distinguish between the notice and prior hearing requirements for a short suspension and those obligations which the administrators must fulfill before excluding a student from extracurricular activities, denying promotion to the next class, assigning a pupil to a vocational rather than a college preparatory track, or imposing a failing grade. In other words, one of Powell's major disputes with the Court's holding lies in its vagueness. He is correct; but the most significant result of this ambiguity is not addressed by Powell. Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [295] White's guidelines entitle the student to an explanation of the evidence which the authorities have gathered when he or she denies the charges. Two questions arise under these conditions: "what procedures must the authorities employ to satisfy the explanation of evidence requirement?", and "what may happen to the authorities if they try to fulfill their due process responsibilities, but in fact, fall short upon later scrutiny?" The first question cannot be answered intelli- gently until future cases define more clearly the nature of the evidentiary burden on the disciplinarian. One can only speculate that to protect himself, the disciplinarian should require direct evidence from the teacher or other school official to corroborate an oral or written account of the student's alleged misconduct. But protect himself against what? The answer lies in the Supreme Court's holding in Wood v. Strickland. In this case it was determined that school board members may be held liable for damages should a federal court find that they acted in such a way as to deprive a student of his constitutional rights under Section 1983. It would perhaps be slightly misleading to label the White-Powell discussion in Wood as the third of the great Supreme Court debates on students' rights. For rather than clarifying any one particular constitutional question involving the student-disciplinarian relationship, Wood defines the conditions under which students' rights cases may be successfully argued using Section 1983. The plaintiffs in this case, Peggy Strickland and Virginia Crain, were sophomores in good standing at Mena (Ark.) High School on and prior to February 18, 1972. On that date, the two girls were suspended for ten days by the principal, and later that night they were expelled by the Mena School Board. The principal had informed the girls that the Board would meet that night and that they could tell their parents, but neither the girls nor their parents attended the meeting. This flagrant abuse of the girls' right to fair (2961 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 notice and a hearing are critical when the ramifications of Wood become clear to school administrators. Many times in Supreme Court history, a seemingly harmless incident has precipitated historic decisions. Cer- tainly, the actions of the two girls in Wood v. Strickland must rank with the most insignificant. Their penalties arose when they admitted to the principal and the Board that they had added two twelve-ounce bottles of "Right Time," a flavored malt liquor beverage, to one and one-half gallons of punch at a school function. This action violated a written school regulation which prohibited the use of intoxicating beverages at a school sponsored activity. After the initial Board decision to expel the two students, the plaintiffs' parents requested that a special meeting of the Board be called. The Board satisfied this request on March 2, but only after pressure from plaintiffs' counsel. At that meeting the plaintiffs sincerely regretted their childish prank, and asked that the severe punishment be revoked. The Board upheld its former decision, and the girls were told to register in a correspondence course in English from the University of Arkansas which would enable them to graduate with their class two years later. The amended Complaint of the Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants (the superintendent, the principal, and the mem- bers of the School Board) had stigmatized the girls through the humiliation and embarrassment of the excessive punish- ment. Damages were sought from the defendants individually and the school district. The students' attomeys claimed that the administration had acted with malice "and with such wanton disregard of the rights of these plaintiffs as to subject themselves personally and individually." The case was tried before a jury which was unable to reach a verdict. When a mistrial was declared, the defendants moved for a directed verdict. District Court Judge Paul X. Williams, Jr., granted the defendants' motion and denied the students' motion for a new trial. Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2971 In the Court's instructions to the jury, malicious intent was clearly the standard used to determine the liability of the defendants. Good faith decisions of the Board were declared to be well within the boundaries of acceptable state action. The defendants should not be held liable if the jury found that the Board honestly made wrong decisions; "the intelli- gence and quality of judgment of each of the defendants is not in issue in these cases." Given this broad spectrum of acceptable administrative error, it is not surprising that the Arkansas District Court found that the enforcement of the regulation, which was applied equally to all pupils, was constitutionally sound. The appropriateness of any expulsion in light of students' actions should be debatable. However, given the standard of malice used by the District Court in Wood, the nature of the debate became one-sided indeed. On August 29, 1973, a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals nearly turned Wood into a jurisprudential mockery. This Court held that the students were denied due process of law because the Board had failed to prove that "Right Time" was actually an intoxicant. In arguing this position, the Eighth Circuit saw Wood as a case involving substantive due process. No insight was offered into the problem of whether or not the March 2 meeting cured the obvious procedural defects (e.g., no notice or formal hearing) inherent in the February 18 meeting, though the Court did recognize the possibility. Once it was determined that the students had suffered from the lack of constitutional safeguards, the Court was compelled to define its position on school board and administrator liability. Since the principal and superintendent had no vote in the expulsion proceedings and neither actually recommended that action, the Circuit Court held that the District Court's directed verdict in their favor was appropriate under Section 1983. Significantly, the individual Board members were not accorded the same benefits. It was decided that the District Court's instructions that the plaintiffs must show malice was erroneous. Rather, the Eighth Circuit argued that: [2981 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 No such specific intent need be proved to recover damages. It need only be established that the defendants did not, in the light of all the circumstances, act in good faith. The test is an objective, rather than a subjective, one. The appellants must accordingly be given a new trial on the issue of damages with respect to the defendant School Board members. The Eighth Circuit's opinion left two major issues to be resolved by the Supreme Court. First, if the students were denied constitutional rights, what specific due process guar- antee applied? Second, what was the proper extent of protection from lawsuits for damages which governmental officials should enjoy when performing those duties required by law? The former problem was dismissed rather easily. Writing for the majority, Justice White strongly disapproved of the Circuit Court's rejection of the school administration's determination that "Right Time" was an intoxicant. He made it clear that Section 1983 was not designed to "relitigate in a federal court evidentiary questions arising in school discipli- nary proceedings." The students' complaint had alleged procedural due process infractions. While the District Court did not discuss the issue, the Circuit Court did imply that the March 2 meeting may have cured the original procedural deficiencies. However, when the Court of Appeals chose the substantive route, the procedural question was left unan- swered. Therefore, White vacated the Eighth Circuit's judg- ment and ordered the Court to consider the procedural issues. The second question involving the liability of school board members for misguided discretionary acts forms the heart of the Wood doctrine. Justice White uses three Supreme Court cases to guide his opinion. Tenney v. Brandhove (1951) held that Section 1983 was not intended to eliminate traditional Congressional immunity from civil liability for actions taken within the sphere of legislative action. Pierson v. Ray (1967) ruled on the liability of lower court judges when a decision rendered against an individual was later reversed. It was Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [2991 decided that judges, acting in their capacity, like the Congressmen acting in their prescribed roles, were entitled to the absolute immunity conferred by common law principles. In conclusion, Chief Justice Warren differentiated between the immunity available to a municipal police justice and to the police officers whose arrests of several clergymen initially brought the case to court: The common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity, and the officers in this case do not claim that they are entitled to one. Their claim is rather that they should not be liable if they acted in good faith and with probable cause in making an arrest under a statute that they believed to be valid. In other words, while the majority of the Court was willing to extend immunity to a judge, even when he is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, that same privilege is not available to minor executive officers. In comparison, in a true executive immunity case; Scheuer, Administratrix v. Rhodes, Governor of Ohio (1974), the Court held that "qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based" (emphasis added). Under this doctrine, a governor who faces conflicting demands from multiple constituencies should be entitled to greater latitude in decision-making and hence a broader protection of immunity should his decision lead to a deprivation of constitutional rights than the local police officer. Scheuer at least implies that an executive official who acts in good faith and reasonably in light of the prevailing conditions should be entitled to immunity. But how do these prevailing conditions in Scheuer (the case involving the shootings at Kent State) translate into an educational [300] EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 context? Simple logic would argue that the social conditions in a given school must be offset against a given act of student misconduct to determine the level of pupils' legal rights which school officials must honor. Justice Powell's dissent in Wood contends that the school officials who expelled the teenagers are held to more severe standards than the Governor of a state who sent national guardsmen against college students. Whether or not this higher degree of responsibility is actually imposed by Justice White, his opinion does include a major inconsistency. He specifically refers to the functions of school board members as tantamount to "legislators and adjudicators in the school disciplinary process." He also draws an analogy between school officials confronted with student behavior causing or threatening disruption and the executive officer faced with instances of civil disorder. He does not explain, however, why board members' immunity is determined by the standard applicable to executive, rather than legislative or judicial, functions. Regardless of his reason for extending qualified, instead of absolute, immunity to school board members, the warnings for school administrators are clear;, "in the specific context of school discipline ... a school board member is not immune from liability for damages under 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the consti- tutional fights of the student affected or if he took the action with malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitu- tional rights or other injury to the student." In Goss, any fair-minded administrator would have self-imposed the pro- cedural rules outlined by the Supreme Court. Similarly, in Wood, the Court is only requiring that school board members act in accordance with the clearly established legal rights of their pupils. The good faith defense against liability for money damages, suggested by the Eighth Circuit, has simply been defined more clearly. Now, for a board member to Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [3011 argue his position successfully, he must show that he has been educated in the basic tenets of constitutional law as it pertains to the public schools. Ignorance of the law is no longer a valid excuse for unconstitutional actions. In light of the clear evolution in the student-authority relationship since Leonard, the guidelines presented in Wood appear totally justified. Rather than viewing Wood as an unfair intrusion into the decision-making process, educators should recognize that the Court has opened a third line of communication with students. In Tinker, administrators were told that pupils' opinions on controversial social issues merited attention. The educational process would be better served by the inclusion of these diverse views. In Goss it was determined that the quasi-adversary relationship which exists between students and the school disciplinarian would be improved if the children were allowed to communicate their position on "what really happened." Finally, in Wood, the Court's suggestions, while more indirect than in the early two decisions, also propose that openness and conference may enhance public education. Without a concerted effort to include pupils in the process that establishes disciplinary guidelines, school boards must continue to wonder exactly how much those kids really do know about their constitu- tional rights. If Tinker, Goss, and Wood teach us anything, it is that the enlightened control of student behavior, from the construction of school regulations to their implementation, cannot be conducted in a vacuum. Reasonableness remains the key legal component of any authority action taken against a student. It is unreasonable at least, and probably pure nonsense, to assume that today's student will accept unfair and capricious decisions simply because "the principal said so." Farseeing administrators recognized this condition long before Goss, Wood, and perhaps Tinker were ever decided. For these men and women, the Supreme Court did nothing [3021 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 but reinforce the sympathetic course they had previously pursued in the area of students' rights. For other school people who shudder at any mention of judicial activism, the federal courts have undoubtedly erected major obstacles through the new requirements. Most importantly, however, the majority of school board members and administrators who fall somewhere between these two extremes should not overreact or be alarmed. To deal in a constitutional manner with their students, these school authorities are not required to predict the decisions of judges hearing future student complaints. Rather, they must operate in a manner consistent with the applicable legal guidelines at the time of the confrontation with the student. No doubt, hundreds of these educators will be consulting lawyers and attending seminars in the months ahead to obtain the information which is necessary to satisfy this requirement. Since Goss, many state educational agencies have issued clear procedures which make compliance with this decision fairly simple. The adoption of operations consistent with Wood are not as easily developed; but Justice Powell's concerns to the contrary notwith- standing, it should be argued that erroneous administrative judgments made with a complete understanding of the prevailing case law very likely will not result in money damages for the plaintiff-student. NOTES 1. No systematic effort has been made to develop the study of organizational response to judicial decisions. Kirp and Yudof (1974) argue that "many of the studies sacrifice rigor for anecdotes, and nearly all pertain exclusively to the Supreme Court, completely omitting state and lower federal courts." From 1969-1974, 26 dissertations were produced under the general heading of students' rights. The early efforts (1969-1971) basically rehashed the decisions handed down in the field but never considered their repercussions. A second phase (1972-1973) outlined acceptable students' rights codes which administrators Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [303] could adopt if they wanted to avoid litigation. Finally, in 1974, the studies began to show that one reason for noncompliance was the ignorance of the administrators about the nature of constitutional rights. 2. The First Circuit position on free expression claims is most useful: "we recognize that there may be an element of expression and speech involved in one's choice of hair length and style, if only the expression of disdain for conventionality. However, we reject the notion that plaintiff's hair length is of a sufficiently communicative character to warrant the full protection of the First Amendment" (Richards v. Thurston, 1970). Ninth Amendment claims utilize Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). Here, Justice Douglas created a legal penumbra (a zone of privacy) from peripheral rights implied in the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg described the expanded boundaries of the Ninth Amendment in questions of fundamental rights. Equal protection arguments have gained greater acceptance since Crews v. Cloncs (1970). Health and safety objectives were declared to be the only justification for hair length regulations in this case. The strongest student claims have been made under liberty interests protected by substantive due process guarantees. In this instance, the reasonableness of the hair regulation is determined by weighing the evidence offered by school authorities claiming negative educational effects against the pupil's right to individuality. 3. State, rather than federal, cases predominate in student claims under the Fourth Amendment. One key issue concerns the state disciplinary role of the school administrator. In re Donaldson (1969) argued that Fourth Amendment constraints did not apply to school searches because the disciplinarian was a private citizen, not a public official. Most courts, however, have rejected this position and have assumed that the administrator is somewhat confined by the Constitution. Once this is accepted, the motivation for his search becomes critical. If the intent is purely to preserve a positive educational atmosphere of the school, his latitude is enormous. If, however, he is acting as a quasi-police officer, courts have often found that a higher standard of "probable cause" is required. Compare Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University (1968) with Piazzola v. Watkins (.1970). 4. The in loco parentis doctrine, which was the heart of early school board legal arguments on the whole range of student constitutional complaints, has been called into question in corporal punishment cases. If the teacher or administrator is truly serving in the place of the parent during school hours, must not the request of the parent to withhold corporal punishment be honored? The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania answered yes in Glaser v. Marietta (1972). Compare Glaser with Baker v. Owen (1975), which was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court without comment or dissent on October 20, 1975 (44 LW 3235). The District Court in Baker rejected the suggestion that the right of a parent to discipline a child is fundamental, and therefore the state must show a compelling interest to use corporal punishment over parental objection. This Court held that the state can justify physical beating by showing that the punishment furthers a legitimate state goal. However, the District Court did require that four elements of minimal due process must be available to students [3041 EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 who are corporally punished. First, the use of this punishment, not in each individual case but in principle, must be approved by the school principal; second, except for clearly anti-social acts, corporal punishment should not be used unless the student was informed beforehand that the specific misbehavior would result in physical punishment and corporal punishment should never be used as a flrst line of punishment; third, the teacher or principal must punish corporally in the presence of a second school official who is present to hear a spontaneous complaint if the student believes that the application was unreasonable; fourth, the child's parent, upon request, must be given a written explanation of the reasons for the punishment and the name of the second official who was present. CASES BAKER v. OWEN (1975) 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.N.D.C.). THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF STATE COLLEGES v. ROTH (1972) 408 U.S. 564. CREWS v. CLONCS (1970) 432 F. 2d 1259 (7th Cir.). DIXON v. ALABAMA BOARD OF EDUCATION (1961) 394 F. 2d 150. In re DONALDSON (1969) 75 Cal. Rptr. 220. FERGUSON v. THOMAS (1970) 430 F. 2d 852, 858 (5th Cir.). FREEMAN v. FLAKE (1972) 405 U.S. 1032. In re G. (1970) 90 Cal. Rptr. 361. In re GAULT (1967) 387 U.S. 1. GLASER v. MARIETTA (1972) 351 F. Supp. 555. GOSS v. LOPEZ (1975) 419 U.S. 565. GRISWOLD v. CONNECTICUT (1965) 381 U.S. 479. INGRAHAM v. WRIGHT (1974) 498 F. 2d 248, rehearsing en banc granted 504 F. 2d 1379 (5th Cir.). JOINT ANTI-FASCIST REFUGEE COMMITTEE v. McGRATH (1951) 341 U.S. 123, 171-2. KARR v. SCHMIDT (1971) 401 U.S. 1201, 1203. LEONARD v. SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF ATTLEBORO (1965) 212 N.E. 2d 468. LOPEZ v. WILLIAMS (1973) 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1300. LUCAS v. CHAPMAN (1970) 430 F. 2d 945 (5th Cir.). MOORE v. STUDENT AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF TROY STATE UNIVER- SITY (1968) 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala.). PERRY v. SINDERMANN (1972) 408 U.S. 593. PIAZZOLA v. WATKINS (1970) 316 F. Supp. 624 (M.D. Ala.). PIERSON v. RAY (1967) 386 U.S. 547. RICHARDS v. THURSTON (1970) 424 F. 2d 1281, 1283. SCHEUER, ADMINISTRATRIX v. RHODES, GOVERNOR OF OHIO (1974) 416 U.S. 232. Bangser / ROLE OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY [305] SCOVILLE v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF JOLIET TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 204, COUNTY OF WILL, STATE OF ILLINOIS (1970) 425 F. 2d 10. SIMS v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1971) 329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M.). STEVENSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WHEELER COUNTY (1970) 426 F. 2d 1154 (5th Cir.). TENNEY v. BRANDHOVE (1951) 341 U.S. 367. TINKER v. DES MOINES INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT (1969) 393 U.S. 503. WARE v. ESTES (1971) 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex.) aff'd per curiam, 458 F. 2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972). WOOD v. STRICKLAND (1975) 420 U.S. 308. REFERENCES BROWN, J. M. (1972) "Hair, the Constitution and the public schools." J. of Law and Education 1 (July): 371-382. BUSS, W. G. (1974) "The Fourth Amendment and searches of students in public schools." Iowa Law Rev. 59 (April): 739-792. FLYGARE, T. J. (1974) "Short-term student suspensions and the requirements of due process." J. of Law and Education 3 (October): 529-555. FOX, J. (1961) "The power of the principal to establish rules and regulations on pupil conduct," in R. C. Seitz (ed.) Law and the School Principal. Legal Problems of Education Series. Cincinnati, Ohio: W. H. Anderson. FRELS, K. (1971) "Exhaustion of the educational institution's remedies- teachers, students and the federal courts." NOLPE School Law J. (Spring): 3-19. HAZARD, W. R. (1971) Education and the Law. New York: Free Press. HENSLEY, P. W. (1975) "Schools and school districts-corporal punishment.. Texas Law Rev. 53 (January): 395405. KIRP, D. L. and M. G. YUDOF (1974) Educational Policy and The Law. Berkeley: McCutchan. KLAHN, R. P. (1971) "The Tinker case: a principal's view two years later." NASSP Bulletin (February): 69-7 3. LADD, E. T. (1973) ''Assessing the reasonableness of school disciplinary actions: haircut cases illuminate the problem." Buffalo Law Rev. 22 (Winter)C 545-573. LaMORTE, M. W., H. W. GENTRY, and D. P. YOUNG (1971) Students' Legal Rights and Responsibilities. Cincinnati, Ohio: W. H. Anderson. O'TOOLE, G. A., Jr. (1972) "Summary suspension of students pending a disciplinary hearing: how much process is due?" J. of Law and Education 1 (July): 383-410. REUTTER, E. E. (1975) The Courts and Student Conduct. Topeka, Ks.: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education. [ 306 ] EDUCATION AND URBAN SOCIETY / MAY 1976 SCRIVEN, D. C. (1973) "A dilemma in public high schools: school board authority v. the constitutional rights of students to wear long hair." Louisiana Law Rev. 33 (Summer): 697-707. TRAGER, R. (1972) "The legal status of underground newspapers in public secondary schools." Kansas Law Rev. 20 (Winter): 239-251. WEDDELL, R. J. (1971) "Damages under 1983: the school context." Indiana Law J. 46 (Summer): 5 21-5 37. </meta-value></custom-meta></custom-meta-wrap></article-meta></front><back><notes><p><list list-type="order"><list-item><p>1. No systematic effort has been made to develop the study of organizational response to judicial decisions. Kirp and Yudof (1974) argue that "many of the studies sacrifice rigor for anecdotes, and nearly all pertain exclusively to the Supreme Court, completely omitting state and lower federal courts." From 1969-1974, 26 dissertations were produced under the general heading of students' rights. The early efforts (1969-1971) basically rehashed the decisions handed down in the <bold>field</bold> but never considered their repercussions. A second phase (1972-1973) outlined acceptable students' rights codes which administrators could adopt if they wanted to avoid litigation. Finally, in 1974, the studies began to show that one reason for noncompliance was the ignorance of the administrators about the nature of constitutional rights.</p></list-item><list-item><p>2. The First Circuit position on free expression claims is most useful: "we recognize that there may be an element of expression and speech involved in one's choice of hair length and style, if only the expression of disdain for conventionality. However, we reject the notion that plaintiff's hair length is of a sufficiently communicative character to warrant the full protection of the First Amendment" (Richards v. Thurston, 1970). Ninth Amendment claims utilize Griswold v. Connecticut (1965). Here, Justice Douglas created a legal penumbra (a zone of privacy) from peripheral rights implied in the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. In a concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg described the expanded boundaries of the Ninth Amendment in questions of fundamental rights. Equal protection arguments have gained greater acceptance since Crews v. Cloncs (1970). Health and safety objectives were declared to be the only justification for hair length regulations in this case. The strongest student claims have been made under liberty interests protected by substantive due process guarantees. In this instance, the reasonableness of the hair regulation is determined by weighing the evidence offered by school authorities claiming negative educational effects against the pupil's right to individuality.</p></list-item><list-item><p>3. State, rather than federal, cases predominate in student claims under the Fourth Amendment. One key issue concerns the state disciplinary role of the school administrator. In re Donaldson (1969) argued that Fourth Amendment constraints did not apply to school searches because the disciplinarian was a private citizen, not a public official. Most courts, however, have rejected this position and have assumed that the administrator is somewhat confined by the Constitution. Once this is accepted, the motivation for his search becomes critical. If the intent is purely to preserve a positive educational atmosphere of the school, his latitude is enormous. If, however, he is acting as a quasi-police officer, courts have often found that a higher standard of "probable cause" is required. Compare Moore v. Student Affairs Committee of Troy State University (1968) with Piazzola v. Watkins (.1970).</p></list-item><list-item><p>4. The <italic>in loco parentis</italic> doctrine, which was the heart of early school board legal arguments on the whole range of student constitutional complaints, has been called into question in corporal punishment cases. If the teacher or administrator is truly serving in the place of the parent during school hours, must not the request of the parent to withhold corporal punishment be honored? The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania answered yes in Glaser v. Marietta (1972). Compare Glaser with Baker v. Owen (1975), which was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court without comment or dissent on October 20, 1975 (44 LW 3235). The District Court in Baker rejected the suggestion that the right of a parent to discipline a child is fundamental, and therefore the state must show a compelling interest to use corporal punishment over parental objection. This Court held that the state can justify physical beating by showing that the punishment furthers a legitimate state goal. However, the District Court did require that four elements of minimal due process must be available to students who are corporally punished. First, the use of this punishment, not in each individual case but in principle, must be approved by the school principal; second, except for clearly anti-social acts, corporal punishment should not be used unless the student was informed beforehand that the specific misbehavior would result in physical punishment and corporal punishment should never be used as a first line of punishment; third, the teacher or principal must punish corporally in the presence of a second school official who is present to hear a spontaneous complaint if the student believes that the application was unreasonable; fourth, the child's parent, upon request, must be given a written explanation of the reasons for the punishment and the name of the second official who was present.</p></list-item></list></p></notes><ref-list><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>BROWN, J. M.</surname></name> (<year>1972</year>) <article-title>"Hair, the Constitution and the public schools."</article-title><source>J. of Law and Education</source><volume>1</volume> (<issue>July</issue>): <fpage>371</fpage>-<lpage>382</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>BUSS, W. G.</surname></name> (<year>1974</year>) <article-title>"The Fourth Amendment and searches of students in public schools."</article-title><source>Iowa Law Rev.</source><volume>59</volume> (<issue>April</issue>): <fpage>739</fpage>-<lpage>792</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>FLYGARE, T. J.</surname></name> (<year>1974</year>) <article-title>"Short-term student suspensions and the requirements of due process."</article-title><source>J. of Law and Education</source><volume>3</volume> (<issue>October</issue>): <fpage>529</fpage>-<lpage>555</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>FOX, J.</surname></name> (<year>1961</year>) <article-title>"The power of the principal to establish rules and regulations on pupil conduct,"</article-title> in <name name-style="western"><surname>R. C. Seitz</surname></name> (ed.) <source>Law and the School Principal. Legal Problems of Education Series</source>. <publisher-loc>Cincinnati, Ohio</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>W. H. Anderson</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>FRELS, K.</surname></name> (<year>1971</year>) <article-title>"Exhaustion of the educational institution's remedies teachers, students and the federal courts."</article-title><source>NOLPE School Law J.</source> (<issue>Spring</issue>): <fpage>3</fpage>-<lpage>19</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>HAZARD, W. R.</surname></name> (<year>1971</year>) <source>Education and the Law</source>. <publisher-loc>New York</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>Free Press</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>HENSLEY, P. W.</surname></name> (<year>1975</year>) <article-title>"Schools and school districts-corporal punishment..</article-title><source>Texas Law Rev.</source><volume>53</volume> (<issue>January</issue>): <fpage>395</fpage>-<lpage>405</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>KIRP, D. L.</surname></name> and <name name-style="western"><surname>M. G. YUDOF</surname></name> (<year>1974</year>) <source>Educational Policy and The Law</source>. <publisher-loc>Berkeley</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>McCutchan</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>KLAHN, R. P.</surname></name> (<year>1971</year>) <article-title>"The Tinker case: a principal's view two years later."</article-title><source>NASSP Bulletin</source> (<issue>February</issue>): <fpage>69</fpage>-<lpage>73</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>LADD, E. T.</surname></name> (<year>1973</year>) <article-title>"Assessing the reasonableness of school disciplinary actions: haircut cases illuminate the problem."</article-title><source>Buffalo Law Rev.</source><volume>22</volume> (<issue>Winter</issue>): <fpage>545</fpage>-<lpage>573</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>LaMORTE, M. W.</surname></name> , <name name-style="western"><surname>H. W. GENTRY</surname></name>, and <name name-style="western"><surname>D. P. YOUNG</surname></name> (<year>1971</year>) <source>Students' Legal Rights and Responsibilities</source>. <publisher-loc>Cincinnati, Ohio</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>W. H. Anderson</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>O'TOOLE, G. A., Jr.</surname></name> (<year>1972</year>) <article-title>"Summary suspension of students pending a disciplinary hearing: how much process is due?"</article-title><source>J. of Law and Education</source><volume>1</volume> (<issue>July</issue>): <fpage>383</fpage>-<lpage>410</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="book" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>REUTTER, E. E.</surname></name> (<year>1975</year>) <source>The Courts and Student Conduct</source>. <publisher-loc>Topeka, Ks.</publisher-loc>: <publisher-name>National Organization on Legal Problems of Education</publisher-name>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>SCRIVEN, D. C.</surname></name> (<year>1973</year>) <article-title>"A dilemma in public high schools: school board authority v. the constitutional rights of students to wear long hair."</article-title><source>Louisiana Law Rev.</source><volume>33</volume> (<issue>Summer</issue>): <fpage>697</fpage>-<lpage>707</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>TRAGER, R.</surname></name> (<year>1972</year>) <article-title>"The legal status of underground newspapers in public secondary schools."</article-title><source>Kansas Law Rev.</source><volume>20</volume> (<issue>Winter</issue>): <fpage>239</fpage>-<lpage>251</lpage>.</citation></ref><ref><citation citation-type="journal" xlink:type="simple"><name name-style="western"><surname>WEDDELL, R. J.</surname></name> (<year>1971</year>) <article-title>"Damages under §1983: the school context."</article-title><source>Indiana Law J.</source><volume>46</volume> (<issue>Summer</issue>): <fpage>521</fpage>-<lpage>537</lpage>.</citation></ref></ref-list></back></article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo lang="en"><title>The Role of the Federal Judiciary in Directing Student-Authority Interaction</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" lang="en" contentType="CDATA"><title>The Role of the Federal Judiciary in Directing Student-Authority Interaction</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Henry S.</namePart><namePart type="family">Bangser</namePart><affiliation>New Trier East High School</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article"></genre><originInfo><publisher>Sage Publications</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Sage CA: Thousand Oaks, CA</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1976-05</dateIssued><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1976</copyrightDate></originInfo><language><languageTerm type="code" authority="iso639-2b">eng</languageTerm><languageTerm type="code" authority="rfc3066">en</languageTerm></language><physicalDescription><internetMediaType>text/html</internetMediaType></physicalDescription><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Education and Urban Society</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0013-1245</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1552-3535</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">EUS</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID-hwp">speus</identifier><part><date>1976</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>8</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>3</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>267</start><end>306</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">5F009C80D038CA0EB94A220C78813F5484D693CD</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1177/001312457600800302</identifier><identifier type="ArticleID">10.1177_001312457600800302</identifier><recordInfo><recordContentSource>SAGE</recordContentSource></recordInfo></mods></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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