AustralieFrV1, Main, Exploration, bibRecord, 007043

Maximal Matching for Double Auction

Identifieur interne : 007043 ( Main/Exploration ); précédent : 007042; suivant : 007044

Maximal Matching for Double Auction

Auteurs : Dengji Zhao [Australie, France] ; Dongmo Zhang [Australie] ; Md Khan [Australie] ; Laurent Perrussel [France]

Source :

Lecture Notes in Computer Science [ 0302-9743 ] ; 2011.

RBID : ISTEX:35F48BDB366863B55A7522498C82BC13EEAE0CA2

English descriptors

KwdEn :
- Algorithm, Atching, Auction, Bidding prices, Compatibility, Double auction, Double auction design, Double auction market, Double auction mechanism, Double auction mechanism design, Experimental results, Extra matchable, Extran umberof, High liquidity, Incentive compatibility, Individual rationality, Last matchable, Liquidity, Liquidity maximization, Long term, Market liquidity, Market model, Market share, Matchable, Maximal, Mechanism design, Multiple buyers, Order output, Recursively check, Same number, Sellers, Social welfare, Sort order, Theoretical results, Total amount, Tournament platform, Trader distribution, Trading agent competition market design, Transaction volume, Uniform price, Worst case.
Teeft :
- Algorithm, Atching, Auction, Bidding prices, Compatibility, Double auction, Double auction design, Double auction market, Double auction mechanism, Double auction mechanism design, Experimental results, Extra matchable, Extran umberof, High liquidity, Incentive compatibility, Individual rationality, Last matchable, Liquidity, Liquidity maximization, Long term, Market liquidity, Market model, Market share, Matchable, Maximal, Mechanism design, Multiple buyers, Order output, Recursively check, Same number, Sellers, Social welfare, Sort order, Theoretical results, Total amount, Tournament platform, Trader distribution, Trading agent competition market design, Transaction volume, Uniform price, Worst case.

Abstract

Abstract: We study the problem of mechanism design for a double auction market where multiple buyers and sellers buy and sell a commodity. We design and implement a matching algorithm that maximizes market liquidity, including the number of transactions and buy/sell-volume. We prove that, given the number of matches, the algorithm also maximizes auctioneer’s profit. Based on the CAT Tournament (Trading Agent Competition Market Design) platform, we show with experiments that the new matching method not only increases market liquidity but also significantly improves market share and auctioneer’s profit in the long term, compared with equilibrium matching, the most commonly used matching method.

Url:

https://api.istex.fr/document/35F48BDB366863B55A7522498C82BC13EEAE0CA2/fulltext/pdf

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-17432-2_52

Affiliations:

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Le document en format XML

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Maximal Matching for Double Auction

Maximal Matching for Double Auction

Source :

English descriptors

Abstract

Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)

Le document en format XML

Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)

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