The Anglo-American Special Relationship
Identifieur interne : 002266 ( Istex/Corpus ); précédent : 002265; suivant : 002267The Anglo-American Special Relationship
Auteurs : Geoffrey WarnerSource :
- Diplomatic History [ 0145-2096 ] ; 1989-10.
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-7709.1989.tb00068.x
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<aff id="au1">GEOFFREY WARNER is professor of European Humanities at the Open University, Milton Keynes, England. A graduate of Cambridge University, he did postgraduate work at the University of Paris and has taught in Australia and at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University, as well as in the United Kingdom. Author of Pierre Lava1 and the Eclipse of France (1968), he is currentIy working on a study of the origins and development of the Cold War between 1941 and 1956.</aff>
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<p>On 26 May 1950, Britain's foreign secretary Ernest Bevin told his Cabinet colleagues that the United States increasingly regarded the North Atlantic Treaty as the focus for the further development of the Western world. Britain's future relations with the United States would largely be determined, therefore, by the success of the collaboration between the two countries in the Atlantic alliance. “Since it is the kernel of their policy,” Bevin argued, “it must also be the kernel of ours.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn1">1</xref></p>
<p>Without calling Bevin's sincerity into question, it would be quite wrong to conclude that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has always been at the center of the so-called special relationship between Britain and the United States. Indeed, it could be argued that one of the things that is special about it is the way in which it transcended the obvious focus of common interest in the security of Western Europe. Both countries had worldwide interests and commitments and consciously sought to harmonize them. Any discussion of the special relationship must take its global aspect into account, not least because most of the major rifts in it have occurred outside the NATO area.</p>
<p>As far as Britain was concerned, the need for a special relationship with the United States arose from an awareness of its diminished strength in the postwar world. A report dated 29 June 1945 from the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, the body charged with assessing Britain's postwar security requirements, observed that even a united British Empire would be incapable of securing its interests against the most likely potential aggressor, the Soviet Union, without the support of powerful allies. It was therefore “vital to ensure the full and early support in war of the U.S.A.” A few weeks later, on 14 August, the new Labour Cabinet was warned by economist John Maynard Keynes of the likelihood of a cumulative deficit of $3 million on the country's balance of payments for the period 1946–1949. This could only be offset by American aid. Without it Britain would face the prospect of “a financial Dunkirk” which would entail not only “a sudden and humiliating withdrawal” from its overseas commitments but also “an indefinite postponement” of the government's ambitious reform program.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn2">2</xref></p>
<p>Britain's aim, therefore, was quite simply to harness the much greater military, political, and economic power of the United States in support of its own objectives. Despite the difficulties involved, it was felt that superior British diplomatic skill could bring this about. As an anonymous Foreign Office official patronizingly put it in March 1944: “If we go about our business in the right way we can help to steer this great unwieldy barge, the United States of America, into the right harbour. If we don't, it is likely to continue to wallow in the ocean, an isolated menace to navigation.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn3">3</xref></p>
<p>It has been argued by some scholars that the years 1945–1947 saw something of an uphill struggle by the British government to gain the support of the U.S. government.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn4">4</xref> It should not be forgotten, however, just how much was achieved during this period. Although unpopular in many quarters, the American loan to Britain at the end of 1945 was vital to the latter's economic reconstruction. In June-July 1946 the little known Spaatz-Tedder agreement, under which the RAF agreed to prepare some of its airfields in East Anglia to accommodate American heavy bombers capable of carrying out both conventional and atomic strikes against the Soviet Union, paved the way for the much more highly publicized transfer of B-29s to Britain during the Berlin crisis of 1948. In 1947 the still classified UKUSA agreement on the exchange of intelligence was concluded, which provided for the extension and development into the postwar period of the extremely fruitful pooling of information, particularly signals intelligence, or SIGINT, which had existed during the Second World War. Finally, the “Pentagon talks” on the defense of the Middle East at the end of the same year were regarded by the British as a great success in winning American backing for their position in what they saw as the most crucial overseas area from the point of view of imperial defense.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn5">5</xref></p>
<p>These successes, however, have to be offset by the breakdown of the intimate wartime collaboration between the two countries on the development of nuclear weapons. The McMahon Act of August 1946 greatly restricted the exchange of information on atomic matters between Britain and the United States. The Attlee government promptly resolved to press ahead with the development of Britain's own atomic bomb. “We could not afford to acquiesce in an American monopoly of this new development,” Bevin told the other members of the highly secret Cabinet committee which took this decision in January 1947.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn6">6</xref></p>
<p>Such sentiments showed that while a special relationship with the United States was still desirable, it was important not to allow Britain to become too dependent on it. For the Labour government this was partly a question of ideology. As Bevin put it to the Cabinet's defense committee in March 1946, Britain was “the last bastion of social democracy,” a philosophy which was quite different from both “the red tooth and claw of American capitalism and the Communist dictatorship of Soviet Russia.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn7">7</xref> At the back of the foreign secretary's plan for a “Western Union” in 1948 there undoubtedly lay the long-term objective of a vast Eurafrican bloc, consisting of the Western European countries and their colonial territories and backed by the Commonwealth, which would be able to assume if not a neutral at any rate a genuinely independent position between the Soviet Union and the United States.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn8">8</xref></p>
<p>A number of factors were responsible for the gradual decline of this concept: the continued weakness of the British economy culminating in the devaluation of sterling in September 1949, which bound Britain more closely to the United States; the reluctance of the Commonwealth to pursue a joint policy under British direction; the hijacking of the movement for Western European unity by the federalists, whose ideas were regarded as totally impracticable by Bevin; and opposition from within the Cabinet and civil service to what were seen as his own unrealistic schemes.</p>
<p>Most important from the point of view of this paper, however, was the intensification of the Cold War. The negotiations which led to the North Atlantic Treaty began in March 1948 with Britain playing a leading role. The essential requirement, as Bevin told the Cabinet on 2 November 1948, was an American commitment to respond at once to any Russian attack upon Western Europe. “[Al]though the European powers must necessarily hold the front in case of aggression,” the foreign secretary stated, “it was not possible for Great Britain to repeat the role that she had played in 1914 and 1940. … It was essential that everybody should be brought into the war at the same moment. The security of Western Europe required a regional pact which committed the trans-Atlantic as well as the continental Powers.” The North Atlantic Treaty was of course concluded in April 1949, but it was not until December 1950 that this objective was finally achieved, when the United States agreed to the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower as supreme commander of the alliance's forces and to the placing of the reinforced American contingents in Europe under his command. Bevin, who had only a few months left to live, is reported to have said on this occasion that he had nearly died three times during the previous year but had kept himself alive “because I wanted to see this North Atlantic Alliance properly launched.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn9">9</xref></p>
<p>At the same time Britain itself moved in the direction of a great commitment to the defense of Western Europe. The chiefs of staff, in their global strategy paper of May 1947, had listed the “three pillars” of British security as the defense of the United Kingdom, the control of the essential sea communications, and the holding of the Middle East. By July 1948, under the impact of the Brussels Treaty which linked Britain, France, and the Benelux countries in the Western European Union, the Berlin blockade, and the negotiations for an Atlantic alliance, the chiefs had added the defense of Western Europe as far to the east as possible. At this stage the expectation was still that Britain's own contribution to this defense would be mainly aeronaval, but in March 1950 the Cabinet's defense committee approved the dispatch of two infantry divisions to reinforce the British occupation forces in Germany. Two month later, in another global strategy paper, the chiefs of staff announced what they described as “a most important change” in the relative importance which they attached to Western Europe as opposed to the Middle East. “If we lost the Middle East,” they now argued, “we would still survive: if we lost Western Europe, we might well be defeated.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn10">10</xref></p>
<p>Any suggestion that Western Europe, with or without the support of the Commonwealth, could even in the long term constitute a meaningful “third force” in the world now seemed to have been abandoned. Even with the help of the Commonwealth, Bevin told the Cabinet on 8 May 1950, Western Europe was not strong enough to confront a military threat from the East. Britain and Western Europe must henceforth rely upon “the English-speaking democracies of the Western Hemisphere,” and “the wider concept of the Atlantic community” must begin to be substituted for the earlier concept of Western union. In response to American requests after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the British government put its money where its mouth was by launching a massive rearmament program.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn11">11</xref></p>
<p>In return for their efforts in Europe and elsewhere, the British hoped for and expected a privileged position as the United States's principal ally and partner. To some extent this was conceded, as is shown most convincingly at the working level by the regular but informal consultations between U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson and British Ambassador in Washington Sir Oliver Franks, during which the whole range of international issues was discussed. Nevertheless, there remained disappointment in London that Britain was still insufficiently differentiated from the rest of Western Europe and that, in the words of one Foreign Office official, the Americans “were not prepared to encourage us to think that we could establish, through any special relationship with them, an alibi for our duties in respect of European integration.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn12">12</xref></p>
<p>American pressure for closer integration with Western Europe was a sore point with the British government, not only for the well-known reasons: the Commonwealth, the sterling area, the different political and economic structures of Britain and the Western European countries, and the psychological gulf which separated one of the victorious “Big Three” of the Second World War from those who had been defeated and occupied. There was also a rarely expressed and therefore rarely noticed fear that closer integration with Western Europe would increase Britain's dependence upon the United States. As Bevin remarked on 24 April 1950, if Britain surrendered its sovereignty to a European organization the Americans would be able to influence British policy indirectly by means of the financial pressure they could bring to bear upon the weaker member of the organization in which Britain would always be a minority.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn13">13</xref></p>
<p>There was a major crisis in the special relationship at the end of 1950, but not untypically it arose in Asia rather than Europe. At a press conference on 30 November President Harry S. Truman conveyed the impression not only that he was about to authorize the use of the atomic bomb in Korea, where allied forces were under severe pressure from the Communist Chinese, but also that he would entrust the decision to his “mad satrap” General Douglas MacArthur, the local commander in chief. Since the so-called modus vivendi of January 1948 the British government had lost its right of veto and even of consultation over the use of American nuclear weapons which President Roosevelt had accorded to Prime Minister Winston Churchill in October 1943, and the Foreign Office had already become concerned at the implications this had for the launching of nuclear strikes from the USAF bases in Britain which had grown in number since the first B-29s had crossed the Atlantic during the Berlin crisis of 1948. Truman's press conference had widened the area of concern and caused considerable anxiety among the general public, so that when Attlee flew to Washington on 3 December 1950 for urgent consultations with the president, one of his principal objectives was to secure a general American commitment on prior consultation before any use of the atomic bomb. Truman gave him a verbal assurance, but when the prime minister suggested that he might care to write it down, the president retorted “that if a man's word wasn't any good it wasn't made any better by writing it down.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn14">14</xref></p>
<p>Further efforts were made by the British government during 1951 to secure a specific commitment in respect of atomic bombs launched from bases on British soil. A form of words was eventually agreed between the two sides according to which the use of American air bases in Britain in an emergency was a matter for the joint decision of the British and U.S. governments “in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time.” This agreement was revealed in the House of Commons on 5 December 1951, exactly one year after Attlee's visit to Washington, by the new Conservative prime minister, Winston Churchill, whose party had been returned to power in the general election at the end of October. It had, however, been prepared by the Labour government, an impressive example of the continuity of British foreign policy.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn15">15</xref></p>
<p>Another example of continuity in the NATO context concerned the rearmament of West Germany. It was widely known that the alliance's force goals could not be reached without a German contribution, but in view of the experience of the Second World War, the latter would clearly give rise to severe political problems. In September 1950 the British Cabinet reluctantly agreed to the principle of West German rearmament because the Truman administration had made it clear that full American participation in the defense of Western Europe was conditional upon it. The French, for whom domestic political implications were even more difficult than they were for the British, initially dug in their heels and refused, but subsequently produced a plan for a European army organized along the same supranational lines as the recently proposed Schuman Plan for the integration of Western Europe's coal and steel industries. The British and Americans were horrified by the French plan. Both regarded it as militarily unworkable and as a device to delay German rearmament. In addition, the British had no sympathy with its federalist implications. By mid-1951, however, the Americans had come round to supporting the European Defense Community, as the European army plan was now known, because they felt it was the only way in which German rearmament would ever be achieved.</p>
<p>In these circumstances both the British Labour and Conservative governments were prepared to give the EDC their general blessing, but neither was prepared to join what Churchill once called “a sludgy amalgam.” The question became progressively more acute after 1951 and the Churchill government made great efforts to produce a satisfactory solution to the problem of Britain's relationship to the EDC, but every concession prompted fresh demands from the importunate French, who were terrified that without British help their creation would eventually fall under the domination of the historic German enemy. When the French National Assembly finally voted down the EDC in August 1954, it was the British foreign secretary Anthony Eden who, even if he did not quite dream up the idea in his bath one morning, persuaded the interested parties to accept the alternative solution of an expanded Western European Union combined with a pledge to keep British forces on the Continent so long as its members desired. This was a remarkable diplomatic achievement, especially in view of an almost total and inexplicable paralysis on the part of the United States, and one which undoubtedly merited the tribute subsequently paid by the Belgian foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, to its architect: “In 1954 and 1955 [Eden] saved the Atlantic alliance.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn16">16</xref></p>
<p>Winston Churchill was, of course, the great proponent of the special relationship. If he did not actually coin the expression himself, he certainly gave it the widest publicity in his famous Fulton speech in March 1946. In a meeting shortly before his inauguration in January 1953, President-elect Eisenhower recorded that Churchill had “an almost childlike faith” that the answers to all foreign policy problems were to be found in the Anglo-American partnership. Eisenhower found this notion “completely fatuous” and wistfully expressed the hope that the aged British prime minister would soon hand over the reins of power to someone younger, a sentiment that was shared by many of Churchill's own colleagues.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn17">17</xref></p>
<p>Far from improving during the Churchill government, however, it might seem that the special relationship actually deteriorated. This is certainly the impression one would gain from reading the relevant volume of the memoirs of then Foreign Secretary Sir Anthony Eden, which, as Eden's successor Selwyn Lloyd remarked after reading the first draft, was permeated throughout by “a strong anti-American bias.” But Eden was writing in the aftermath of the Suez crisis, which ended his political career, and historians must be careful not to fall victim to his bitterness. Although there were disagreements between the British and Americans at this time, notably over the Middle East and Indochina, there was considerable cooperation too. Even in the Middle East the two governments were able to join forces in organizing the overthrow of the Mossadegh regime in Iran in 1953, while the U.S. government paid the greatest possible tribute to its British partner in April 1955 when it agreed to announce its willingness to participate in summit talks with the Russians precisely in order to secure the return of the Conservatives in the general election held later that month.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn18">18</xref></p>
<p>The new prime minister was Sir Anthony Eden. If he had “saved the Atlantic alliance” in 1954 and 1955, did he come close to destroying it in 1956? The answer is almost certainly “no,” but the Suez crisis of that year did mark the greatest rift in the special relationship since the end of the Second World War. The Americans were angry that the British had deceived them, that they had distracted the world's attention from the Russian invasion of Hungary, and that they had rendered the newly emerging nations more susceptible to Communist propaganda concerning “Western imperialism.” For their part the British were furious that the Americans, whom they regarded as their most faithful friends and allies, should have stabbed them in the back precisely when they felt most passionately that their vital interests were at stake.</p>
<p>This paper is not the place for a detailed history of the crisis, but it is important to describe the kinds of pressure which the United States applied to Britain, since these illustrate the inherent one-sidedness of the special relationship. First, there was the economic and more especially the financial pressure which was undoubtedly the principal factor in compelling the British to bring their military operation to a halt. “We must stop, we must stop,” Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan told a junior Foreign Office minister shortly before the cease-fire was decided, “or we will have no more dollars left by the end of the week.” This pressure, moreover, continued after the cease-fire in order to compel the British to withdraw their forces from Egypt. It was so ruthless and relentless, in fact, that both Eden and his foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, later agreed that the government should have resigned at the end of November 1956.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn19">19</xref></p>
<p>Second, there was the cutoff in the supply of intelligence information. This was virtually total from 31 October, the day after the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt and Israel, until 6 November, when channels were partially reopened in order to transmit a reassuring American assessment of what, on the face of it, was a Soviet threat to launch a missile attack on Britain and France.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn20">20</xref> This, incidentally, was also the date of the cease-fire in Egypt.</p>
<p>Third, there is some intriguing but incomplete evidence of American connivance in and encouragement of the plans of Harold Macmillan and R. A. Butler, the two most obvious candidates for the succession, to force the resignation of Eden as prime minister.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn21">21</xref> Eden did resign in January 1957 and was duly succeeded by Macmillan.</p>
<p>If Eden's premiership witnessed the nadir of the special relationship, the first phase of Macmillan's almost certainly saw its apogee. Unlike many of his fellow-supporters of the Suez operation—and he was one of its most enthusiastic advocates—the new prime minister saw no point in crying over spilled milk. An internal postmortem on Suez, written in the Cabinet office, concluded among other things that the episode had exposed the limitations of British strength and that Britain “could never again resort to military action outside British territories, without at least American acquiescence.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn22">22</xref> The corollary, therefore, was to reestablish Anglo-American relations on a sound footing, a task which Macmillan set about immediately and with great energy. Fortunately, the Americans were receptive. At the height of the Suez crisis, President Eisenhower had written a friend: “Britain not only has been, but must be, our best friend in the world,” and less than two weeks after Macmillan took over as prime minister, Eisenhower invited him to a meeting in either Washington or Bermuda. Macmillan appreciated what he later called the president's “delicacy” in proposing the latter location. “For us,” he wrote, “Bermuda—British territory—made the whole difference.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn23">23</xref></p>
<p>The meeting took place from 21–24 March 1957 and the prime minister reported to his Cabinet colleagues that he did not see how it could have gone better. On 14 October, Selwyn Lloyd recorded the penitent reflections of John Foster Dulles, the arch-villain of the Suez crisis from the British point of view. He and the president believed, Lloyd cabled, that there should be a reexamination of the whole structure of Western cooperation and that the Anglo-American alliance must be at the core of this process. Dulles believed that there had possibly been “too much 'take it or leave it' and 'we know best' spirit” on the American side, while the president felt he had been “quite wrong” to abolish the combined chiefs of staff organization at the end of the Second World War! Would the prime minister care to come to Washington in order to discuss all of this?<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn24">24</xref></p>
<p>Indeed, he would. Moreover, on 28 October 1957 Macmillan reported triumphantly to the Cabinet that, as a result of his conversations in the U.S. capital (on 23–25 October), the two governments had agreed to concert a common policy in order to counter Soviet encroachment, not only by the military but also by political, economic, and propaganda means; and that the U.S. government had agreed to adopt and apply a policy of pooling resources in respect of the development and production of new weapons, in pursuit of which the president had undertaken to request Congress to amend the McMahon Act. All that Britain had to do in return for what the prime minister described as these “substantial and valuable concessions on the part of the United States government” was not to press for a change in Chinese representation at the United Nations without prior American agreement. No wonder Selwyn Lloyd felt able to conclude that “largely as a result of the personal friendship between the Prime Minister and President Eisenhower, we had now succeeded in regaining the special relationship with the United States which we had formerly enjoyed.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn25">25</xref></p>
<p>Thanks mainly to their shared experiences in the Mediterranean theater during the Second World War, Macmillan and Eisenhower were personal friends, but the roots of the Anglo-American rapprochement after Suez went much deeper than this. They were embedded in the changing military balance between East and West. Both the United States and Britain were now thermonuclear powers, having exploded their first hydrogen devices in October 1952 and May 1957, respectively. Largely on grounds of economy, both had adopted defense policies based upon strategic nuclear deterrence as opposed to more costly conventional forces, the United States with the “new look” in 1953 and Britain with the Sandys white paper in 1957. (In Britain's case it is important to emphasize that this quite consciously involved a reduction in its commitment to NATO. An immediate consequence of the new British defense posture was the withdrawal of some of the forces which the government had promised would remain in Western Europe under the London and Paris agreements of 1954.) The Soviet Union, however, was also a thermonuclear power and it was imperative for the West to maintain its superiority, not least in respect to nuclear weapons delivery systems. The Americans were particularly anxious to deploy the first generation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe, whence they could reach targets inside Russia, and President Eisenhower formally offered them to Macmillan at Bermuda in March 1957. Although the warheads would be under control of the United States, the delivery vehicles would be owned by Britain and operated by British personnel. They thus constituted a valuable contribution to the modernization of Britain's own nuclear deterrent, especially after it developed its own thermonuclear warheads.</p>
<p>The situation became even more pressing in October 1957, when its launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, indicated that the Soviet Union might soon be able to deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting targets in the United States. The British government was well aware that Sputnik was largely responsible for the access of American enthusiasm for the special relationship which was demonstrated at the Washington meeting. One consequence was a proposal, accepted at the meeting of the NATO Council in December 1957, for the deployment of American IRBMs on the territory of other alliance members. The detailed agreement for the stationing of IRBMs in Britain was eventually concluded in February 1958 and provided for a “dual key” mechanism whereby the missiles could not be launched without the approval of both the British and U.S. governments. On 2 July 1958, President Eisenhower signed a revised version of the Atomic Energy Act and the administration followed it up the very next day by signing a new agreement on nuclear collaboration in the field of defense with the British government.</p>
<p>The changing military balance between East and West was paralleled by the first signs of a shift in the balance of power within the Western alliance. In 1950, Britain, although a long way behind the United States, was unquestionably the second most powerful country in the Western world. Its GDP stood at $20.3 billion, compared with France's $8.8 billion, West Germany's $10.6 billion, and Japan's $4.8 billion, while at 689,000, Britain's armed forces were larger than those of any other member of NATO save the United States. By 1957–58, however, the situation had begun to change. West Germany's economic miracle was well under way—its rate of economic growth was almost three times that of Britain during the 1950s—and the first contingents of what would eventually become the largest military force in Western Europe were recruited in 1957. France's economy, too, had been growing much faster than Britain's and its armed forces had overtaken in size those of its cross-channel neighbor in 1958. Admittedly this latter phenomenon was due to the war in Algeria, but it was likely to endure given Britain's decision to abolish conscription, which was announced in the Sandys white paper of 1957. In June 1958, moreover, France acquired a strong man in the shape of General Charles de Gaulle, who was determined to end the chronic political instability that had characterized the Fourth Republic and had been a major contributing factor in the relatively low level of French influence in world affairs. Finally, both France and West Germany were at the core of a new and potentially powerful politico-economic grouping, the European Economic Community (EEC), which had been launched in March 1957.</p>
<p>It is revealing that no serious thought was ever given by the British government to joining the EEC. There was, it is true, considerable concern at the economic divisions it would cause in the Western world, and strenuous though unsuccessful efforts were made to offset these, first by the proposal for a European-wide free trade area, and after this was turned down by the French at the end of 1958, by the formation of the European Free Trade Association which was designed to act as a bridge between the EEC and the rest of Western Europe. The idea that the EEC might develop into a rival focus of power within the Western alliance and the world generally does not seem to have occurred to British policymakers in the late 1950s. Its own resources, plus of course its special relationship with the United States, seemed more than enough to secure Britain's accustomed place in the sun.</p>
<p>By 1960, however, the British government was beginning to have second thoughts. The principal catalyst was undoubtedly the failure of the Paris summit in May, which was a bitter blow to Macmillan, who for more than eighteen months had invested a great deal of time and energy in his more or less self-appointed role as honest broker between East and West. “Shall we,” he wondered in one of his gloomier moods, “be caught between a hostile (or at least less and less friendly) America and a boastful, powerful 'Empire of Charlemagne'—now under French but later bound to come under German control[?] Is this the real reason for 'joining' the Common Market … and for abandoning (a) the Seven [EFTA], (b) British agriculture, (c) the Commonwealth? It's a grim choice.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn26">26</xref></p>
<p>Britain finally took the plunge in July 1961 and applied for full membership in the EEC. Macmillan told Commonwealth leaders in September of the following year that one reason for his government's decision was that he thought it inevitable that, given the realities of power, the United States would attach growing importance to the views of the EEC and that there would also be a developing tendency for the Americans and the EEC to “concert policy on major issues without the same regard for our views and interests such as our present relationship with Washington affords.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn27">27</xref></p>
<p>This belief was undoubtedly encouraged by the policies of the Kennedy administration, which had come to power in the United States in 1961. Despite the close personal friendship which seemed to exist between Macmillan and John F. Kennedy, the whole thrust of the new administration's policy toward Western Europe and NATO was in the direction of deemphasizing the special relationship with Britain in favor of the so-called grand design, which would hopefully appease the growing restlessness of France and West Germany while at the same time maintaining the dominant position of the United States within the alliance.</p>
<p>Nowhere was this clearer than in the field of defense. Macmillan's defense minister from 1959 to 1962, Harold Watkinson, has made no secret of his distaste for the McNamara regime in the Pentagon compared to the more easygoing attitudes of the Eisenhower administration. He wrote that “by 1962 [and the context makes clear that he was thinking of the early part of the year] I became convinced that Britain should seek to strengthen her future defense through her ties with Europe, rather than by seeking to preserve what looked increasingly impossible to achieve, namely a special defense relationship with the United States.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn28">28</xref></p>
<p>What Macmillan described as “McNamara's foolish speech” at Ann Arbor in June 1962, in which the secretary of defense attacked independent nuclear deterrents, only served to make matters worse. The new administration was anxious to reduce what it saw as NATO's excessive dependence upon nuclear weapons in favor of a policy of flexible response. This involved the elimination of the British, and now also the French, independent deterrents and an attempt to allay the European allies' anxieties by selling them American missiles. “In NATO,” Macmillan recorded, “all the allies are angry with the American proposal that we should buy rockets to the tune of umpteen millions of dollars, the warheads to be under American control. This is not a European rocket. It's a racket of the American industry.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn29">29</xref></p>
<p>For Britain, however, the most alarming demonstration of the way in which American thinking was moving came at the end of the year with the Skybolt affair. In order to ensure an independent nuclear delivery system in the missile gap, the British government had been working on an IRBM called Blue Streak. In February 1960 Blue Streak was canceled on grounds of cost and vulnerability. In the spirit of the special relationship the Eisenhower administration had offered to sell Britain an American air-to-ground missile, Skybolt, which would have prolonged the life of the RAFs strategic bomber force. The British also believed that they had secured a gentlemen's agreement whereby, if Skybolt failed to come up to the mark, they would be permitted to buy Polaris, a submarine-launched missile then being developed for the U.S. Navy. In return the British had agreed to provide base facilities for the American Polaris submarines.</p>
<p>By late 1962 the Pentagon had concluded that Skybolt was unlikely to be successful and should be canceled. Moreover, it aired its doubts in public without consulting the British. As if this were not bad enough, the administration initially showed no inclination to honor the alleged gentlemen's agreement entered into by its predecessor regarding Polaris. Such missiles, it insisted, would only be made available in the context of a multilateral, mixed-crewed submarine force under NATO control. On hearing the news, Harold Macmillan is reported to have exclaimed incredulously “You don't expect our chaps to share their grog with the Turks, do you?” But much more was at stake than the Royal Navy's rum ration. The future of Britain's independent nuclear deterrent was in the balance, and so was the special relationship. It took tough negotiations between the two sides at Nassau from 18–21 December 1962 to reach a compromise whereby Britain did receive its own Polaris missiles, but pledged in return to allocate them to NATO “except where … supreme national interests are at stake.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn30">30</xref></p>
<p>Just over three weeks after the Nassau agreement, on 14 January 1963, President de Gaulle vetoed British entry into the EEC. It seems reasonably certain from the evidence that the former did not give rise to the latter. De Gaulle never wanted Britain in the Common Market, partly because he did not relish a possible rival for its leadership, and partly because the rhetoric of the special relationship led him to suspect that Britain would play the part of an American “Trojan horse” in an organization which he firmly believed should develop in increasing independence from the United States. Macmillan was shattered. “All our policies at home and abroad are in ruins,” he lamented in his diary.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn31">31</xref></p>
<p>The Conservative government survived for nearly two more years, although ill-health forced Macmillan himself to resign in October 1963. The thirteen years of Conservative rule were marked, as we have seen, by both the heights and the depths of the special relationship. Even if the latter had again begun to decline after 1961, it was still a reality, as no one who reads Macmillan's account of his frequent and intimate exchanges with President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 could gainsay.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn32">32</xref> Moreover, after de Gaulle's veto of its entry into the EEC, Britain had nowhere else to go. Macmillan's realization of the changing balance of power within the Western alliance had come too late.</p>
<p>At the general election of October 1964 a Labour government under Harold Wilson was narrowly returned to power. Labour had been in opposition for so long that there was some uncertainty as to precisely where it stood in the field of foreign policy. (The Conservative government had warned the United States that if it failed to deliver the goods at Nassau it “might have to deal with a more neutralist and less pro-American Labor government!”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn33">33</xref>) Any anxieties on that score, however, were soon dissipated. Despite his left-wing reputation, Wilson was no neutralist. In any event, his majority in the House of Commons was wafer thin and the pound was under constant pressure. He needed all the help he could get and the most obvious source was the United States. Although the details remain obscure, recent research has shown that in the course of 1964–65 some sort of deal was struck between the British and U.S. governments whereby, in return for American support of sterling, Britain agreed to retain a military presence east of Suez. According to Britain's new secretary of defense, Denis Healey, the Americans took the view that British forces were “much more useful to the alliance outside Europe than in Germany.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn34">34</xref></p>
<p>With its growing involvement in Vietnam, it was not surprising that the United States felt the need for reliable support elsewhere in an increasingly turbulent Third World. It was also the case that the U.S. treasury believed that the pound was the first line of defense for the dollar. The British government, for its part, was happy to oblige. Wilson and the majority of his colleagues did not want a Labour government to be saddled with the opprobrium of a third devaluation (after 1931 and 1949), and even if British troops had not already been engaged in confrontation with Indonesia in defense of Malaysia, a continuing presence east of Suez would have fed the prime minister's delusions of grandeur.</p>
<p>The new government also swiftly abandoned its preelection pledge to phase out Britain's independent nuclear deterrent. The Nassau agreement, which had been the subject of much Labour derision when it was originally concluded, was now eagerly embraced and steps were taken later in the government's life to update the Polaris missiles supplied under its terms. There was still, however, the problem of the proposed NATO multilateral force, which some enthusiasts in the U.S. administration continued to favor. It had hardly any advocates in Britain and when Wilson went to Washington in December 1964 for his first meeting with President Lyndon B. Johnson, he took with him an alternative proposal which, as Denis Healey candidly admitted later, was deliberately “devised … as a means of scuppering the M. L. F.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn35">35</xref> It succeeded too.</p>
<p>After greatly increasing his parliamentary majority in the general election of March 1965, Wilson carried out another reversal in policy. Hitherto a skeptic about if not an opponent of British membership in the EEC, the prime minister now began to mobilize support for a second application to join. His own motives are unclear, although it is likely that he was greatly influenced by the civil service which, after having strongly opposed closer links with Europe in the 1940s and 1950s, had now evidently come to regard them as the answer to the country's problems. One thing is certain: the Cabinet, like the Labour party itself, was bitterly divided. The internal debates which took place in the second half of 1965 and of which we are fortunate in possessing a number of detailed accounts, provide a fascinating insight into the fundamental political assumptions of those involved, and the continuing relevance of the special relationship was never far from the center of preoccupation.</p>
<p>One of the most enthusiastic “Europeans” was George Brown, the right-wing deputy leader of the Labour party and foreign secretary from August 1966. Before taking over his new office Brown had confided to one Cabinet colleague that after the recent American bombing of Hanoi, “the time had come when we had to reassess our entire foreign policy and look again at the close relations with America. As it was, we were getting separated from the United States without really establishing any close relations with Europe.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn36">36</xref> If all the right-wingers had argued like Brown, the divisions within the government might have been less acute. The left-wing minister Barbara Castle told her colleagues in October 1966 that if Britain truly intended to abandon the special relationship and pursue a Gaullist policy of détente with the Soviet Union, she might be interested in an approach to Europe, but since it was her understanding that the main purpose behind the proposed second attempt to join the EEC was “to fight for links with the U.S. and for NATO,” she was not interested.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn37">37</xref></p>
<p>Tony Benn, a future leader of the Labour left whose views were then still evolving, wondered whether the special relationship was not worth a great deal more to Britain than entry into Europe. As the minister responsible for Britain's nuclear program, among other things, Benn was well aware of just how close the special relationship was in the nuclear field. “Not only do we have defence relations [he noted in his diary]—as a result of which all British atomic security is vetted and overseen and double checked and approved by the Americans—but we also owe a tremendous amount to them in the sphere of technology.” Indeed, one of his senior civil servants told him in June 1967 that he did not believe a British approach to Europe would succeed unless the government was prepared to make a nuclear deal with the French, which would involve a break in the special relationship and changing sides in the NATO battle—joining the French against the Americans.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn38">38</xref></p>
<p>This view may have been over melodramatic, but it does seem that the British government did make one important shift in its policy at least partly in order to accommodate the anti-American prejudices of General de Gaulle. According to the then chancellor of the exchequer, James Callaghan, one reason for rejecting a long-term package for the protection of sterling put forward by the United States in February 1967 was because the political conditions attached, which included the familiar demand for a continuing military presence east of Suez, would have complicated efforts to convince the French leader that Britain was sincere in its European vocation.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn39">39</xref></p>
<p>The main reason for the rejection of the package, however, lay in the growing conviction that Britain could simply no longer afford a world role. In July 1967 a defense white paper announced an almost total withdrawal of British forces from east of Suez by 1977. The shock of devaluation, which took place in November 1967, compelled an acceleration of this timetable. In January 1968, Wilson told the House of Commons that the date of withdrawal had been brought forward to 1971 and the defense white paper of February 1968 summed it all up with the words, “Britain's defence effort will in [the] future be concentrated mainly in Europe and the North Atlantic.” The Americans were deeply upset. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk described the British government's decisions to George Brown as “opting out” and “the end of an era.” Six months later Rusk told the National Security Council that the United States and Britain were now “working on fewer real problems” and that “[t]he concept of Atlantic cooperation could replace the special relationship,” while Defense Secretary Clark Clifford explained that “the British do not have the resources, the backup, or the hardware to deal with any big world problem. … They are no longer a powerful ally of ours because they cannot afford the cost of an adequate defense effort.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn40">40</xref></p>
<p>By a supreme irony the enforced concentration of Britain's defense effort on Europe coincided with General de Gaulle's second veto of British entry into the EEC. In February 1969 the general seemed to show some sign of relenting when he suggested to the British ambassador in Paris, Christopher Soames, that he was willing to discuss a new and looser form of European association, politically controlled by Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy, which would take the place of both NATO and the EEC. What was essential, however, was that this new association must be truly independent of the United States. However sincere the French president's proposals may have been, the Foreign Office saw them as a cunning trap designed to lure Britain into a position in which it would be discussing the destruction of an organization to which it already belonged (NATO) and another which it professed to wish to join (the EEC). This fact could be disclosed to the other interested parties at any time, thereby causing the greatest possible embarrassment to the British government. The Foreign Office therefore revealed de Gaulle's proposals itself, first to the other EEC governments and the United States, and then to the world at large by means of a deliberate “leak” to the press. De Gaulle was furious and Anglo-French relations sank to new depths of acrimony and suspicion.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn41">41</xref></p>
<p>The inconsistent and unhappy record of the Wilson government as set out in the last few pages must be partially offset by the successes enjoyed in NATO itself by Denis Healey, whose six-year tenure at the British ministry of defense from 1964 to 1970, combined with considerable energy and debating skills, gave him a position of great influence within the alliance. Thus Healey played an important part in the December 1967 decision to adopt the so-called revised strategic concept concerning the proper balance between NATO's conventional and nuclear forces. He had also been instrumental in April 1967 in setting up the nuclear planning group, which discussed the thorny issue of the use and control of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Western Europe. Finally, in 1968, Healey proposed the formation of a separate caucus within NATO which would coordinate the views of the European members of the alliance, an idea which came to fruition in the shape of the “Eurogroup.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn42">42</xref></p>
<p>The Labour government was defeated in the general election of June 1970 and was succeeded by a Conservative administration under Edward Heath. Henry Kissinger, who as President Richard M. Nixon's national security adviser and secretary of state worked with him, subsequently penned the following portrait of Heath:</p>
<disp-quote><p>[O]f all British leaders Heath was probably … the least committed emotionally to the United States. It was not that he was anti-American. Rather, he was immune to the sentimental elements of that attachment forged in two world wars. … [T]he United States was a friendly foreign country, entitled to the consideration that reflected its power and importance, but the special relationship was an obstacle to the British vocation in Europe. Heath was content to enjoy no higher status in Washington than any other European leader. Indeed, he came close to <italic>insisting</italic> on it.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn43">43</xref></p></disp-quote>
<p>The contrast with, say Attlee, who proudly informed his colleagues after his talks in Washington in December 1950 that Britain had been “lifted out of the 'European queue' and treated as the United States's 'principal ally,'” was almost total.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn44">44</xref></p>
<p>With single-minded dedication, Heath mounted the third attempt to take Britain into the EEC and, thanks in large part to the rapport he succeeded in establishing with Georges Pompidou, de Gaulle's successor as president of France, he achieved his objective. His solidarity with his fellow Europeans sometimes embarrassed and annoyed the United States, as for example when he joined France and other European countries in disassociating himself from American policy at the time of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973. Indeed, he was to reveal thirteen years later that he had refused permission for the United States to use bases in Cyprus during the crisis, although he failed to mention one of the consequences: namely, that in retaliation and on only the second known occasion since the conclusion of the UKUSA agreement in 1947, the United States cut off the flow of intelligence to Britain for a week.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn45">45</xref></p>
<p>Nevertheless, it would be quite wrong to assume that the Heath government and British entry into Europe marked the end of Britain's special relationship with the United States. As Kissinger has also recorded, it was not easy to end because it was so informal and intangible in the first place. It is also clear that the old habits of consultation and cooperation persisted at the working level. Kissinger himself cites an excellent example of this when he describes the role of the Foreign Office official, Sir Thomas Brimelow, in the preparation and drafting of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war signed in Washington on 22 June 1973.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn46">46</xref></p>
<p>Moreover, the Heath government was in power for less than four years. The Wilson-Callaghan Labour government of 1974–1979 and the Conservative Thatcher government which has been in power since 1979 pursued a much more traditional policy in which the special relationship looms large. Indeed, as the British prime minister's most recent and best biographer has observed, “The Reagan-Thatcher axis was the most personal alliance in the Western world throughout the 1980s. From Moscow to Pretoria, from Tripoli to Buenos Aires, no theatre of global conflict failed to feel its effects. It eclipsed, where it did not determine, many of the details of Mrs. Thatcher's performance in the diplomatic field.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn47">47</xref></p>
<p>There were differences of course—over Grenada, over SDI, and over the Reykjavik “summit” for example—but these were soon composed and were in any case overshadowed by a broader identity of views. There was certainly no danger of Europe replacing the United States in Margaret Thatcher's affections. “Winning the battle over Britain's contribution to the Community budget,” writes Hugo Young,</p>
<disp-quote><p>did not herald a new era of Euro-minded leadership. The country remained hooked on its special relationship with the United States, and a combative relationship all points east of Dover. In June 1988, President Reagan paid his last visit to Britain, and the occasion was dominated not by the future but by the past, with president and prime minister drenching each other in sentiment about the Second World War. At no point did Britain position itself in concerted fashion to intervene as West Germany continued to grow closer to France. Britain, instead, appeared not to want to lead. With the single European market beckoning in 1992, Britain's role was to spoil the party and set a firm limit to the measures of unification it would tolerate.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn48">48</xref></p></disp-quote>
<p>Paradoxically, the prime minister's attachment to the special relationship has been paralleled by a marked shift away from it in the perceptions of the public at large. There has traditionally been strong support for NATO and the American alliance on the part of British public opinion. However, there has always been an underlying degree of apprehension about alleged American impetuosity in foreign affairs. This feeling has undoubtedly been strengthened by the presidency of Ronald Reagan who, in the words of an American student of British public opinion, was widely regarded in Britain “as a simplistic (though personally amicable) dunce whose poor grasp of the issues could do much damage,” and this has in turn had an important effect upon attitudes toward Britain's relations with the United States. The same author cites Gallup opinion poll data to the effect that whereas only 22 percent of respondents in March 1981 felt that these relations were too close, by March 1984 the proportion had risen to 34 percent, and by April 1986 (the month of the U.S. air strike against Libya from bases in Britain) was 47 percent. Over the same period the proportion which felt that they were not close enough more than halved, from 15 to 7 percent.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn49">49</xref></p>
<p>Depending on one's point of view, the Labour opposition in recent years has either expressed this growing concern or whipped it up. It has been extremely critical of American foreign policy in the Third World, and while its official policy in the last two general elections has been to remain a member of NATO, it has espoused a nonnuclear defense policy, abandoning Britain's independent deterrent and insisting upon the withdrawal of all U.S. nuclear bases. There is also a powerful current of opinion on the Labour left which would like to withdraw from NATO and adopt a neutralist foreign policy. The party has, however, lost three elections in a row and, for reasons which have as much to do with the configuration of British domestic politics as defense and foreign policy, will not find it easy to regain power. Even if it does, it could well modify its views as it has done in the past when moving from opposition into government.</p>
<p>There are many on the left who, feeding upon the comments of members of the U.S. administration to the effect that Labour's defense policy is incompatible with NATO security and the revelations of Peter Wright concerning alleged CIA-MI5 “dirty tricks” to “destabilize” the Wilson government in the 1970s, are convinced that no American administration would tolerate a government in Britain which genuinely sought to break its defense links with the United States and NATO. A recent and highly successful fictionalized version of the likely consequences of the election of a neutralist Labour government has the American president telling his advisers, “We lost China in 1949 and got by. We lost Vietnam in 1973 and got by. But if we lose Britain, we're done for.”<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn50">50</xref></p>
<p>It is certainly true that although Britain has become a much less powerful ally for the United States since its armed forces and military commitments were drastically reduced in the 1960s and since other allies such as West Germany, France, and Japan overtook it in economic terms in the same period, it still performs an important if not vital function in terms of American security. In the mid-1980s there were over 130 U.S. bases and military facilities of various kinds on British soil. The most obvious of these are the air bases—approximately one fifth of USAF personnel stationed abroad is in Britain—and the nuclear submarine bases, but probably the most important are the electronic intelligence installations such as Menwith Hill in Yorkshire and Chicksands in Bedfordshire.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn51">51</xref> It remains a matter for speculation as to what the United States would do if the existence or operation of any of these was threatened by the actions of the host government.</p>
<p>Ultimately, however, Britain's special relationship with the United States and its membership in NATO have always depended upon successive governments' perception of the threat from the Soviet Union. There have been earlier hopes of East-West détente, notably after Stalin's death in 1953 and again in the 1970s, but the advent of Gorbachev and <italic>perestroika</italic> are in a class by themselves. While professing admiration and sympathy for Gorbachev's policies, the Thatcher government is proceeding extremely cautiously insofar as the consequences for the Western alliance are concerned, as can be seen in its strong support for the modernization of NATO's theater nuclear weapons. Even if the Soviet Union is no longer a threat, the argument runs, it still has the capability to become one again.</p>
<p>As in its attitude toward the United States, the government's perception of the Soviet Union seems to be lagging behind that of public opinion. In March 1981, 70 percent of respondents to a MORI poll stated that they thought the Soviet Union wished to extend its power over other countries, while only 31 percent said the same about the United States. Eight years later the two superpowers are running about neck and neck in the expansion stakes, with only 35 percent now believing that the Soviet Union wanted to extend its power compared with 33 percent thinking it of the United States.<xref ref-type="fn" rid="fn52">52</xref> Mrs. Thatcher may not be, to use one of her own expressions, “for turning” as a result of such sentiments on the part of the electorate. But if détente between the two superpowers continues, she could well find that, to use another of her favorite phrases, “there is no alternative.”</p>
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<title>Footnotes</title>
<fn id="fn1"><label>1</label><p>C.P. (50) 118, 28 May 1950, <italic>Documents on British Policy Overseas</italic>, 2d ser. (Lmdon, 1984-), 2, no. 113 (hereafter <italic>DBPO</italic>, 2d ser., with volume and document numbers).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn2"><label>2</label><p>P.H.P. (45) 29 (O) Final, 29 June 1945, CAB 81/46, Public Record Office, Kew. England; C.P. (45) 112, 14 August 1945, <italic>Documents on British Policy Overseas</italic>, 1st ser. (London, 1984), 3. no. 6 (hereafter <italic>DBPO</italic>, la ser., with volume and document numbers).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn3"><label>3</label><p>Unsigned memorandum, 21 March 1944, Record Class FO 371/38523/AN1538, PRO.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn4"><label>4</label><p>See. for example, Terry H. Anderson, <italic>The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1943–1947</italic> (Columbia, MO, 1981); and Robert M. Hathaway, <italic>Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947</italic> (New York, 1981).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn5"><label>5</label><p>Documents on the American loan are printed in <italic>DBPO</italic>, 1st ser., 3; and in U.S. Department of State, <italic>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945</italic> (Washington, 1969), 6:l–204 (hereafter <italic>FRUS</italic> with year and volume number), For the Spaatz-Tedder agreement see Simon Duke, <italic>US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom: A Matter for Joint Decision?</italic> (London, 1987), 20–25. 195–98. For the UKUSA agreement see James Bamford, <italic>The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Mast Secret Agency</italic>, rev. ed. (New York, 1983), chap. 8. For the “Pentagon talks” see William Roger Louis, <italic>The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United Slates, and Postwar Imperialism</italic> (Oxford, 1984), 109–11.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn6"><label>6</label><p>GEN.163/1st Meeting, 8 January 1947, CAB 130/18, PRO. See also Margaret Gowing, <italic>Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, 2</italic> vols. (London, 1974), 1:92–111.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn7"><label>7</label><p>D.O. (46) 40, 13 March 1946, CAB 131/2, PRO.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn8"><label>8</label><p>For a fuller development of this thesis see Geoffrey Warner, “The Labour Government and the Unity of Western Europe,” in <italic>The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments,1945–1951</italic>, ed. Ritchie Ovendale (Leicester, 1984), 61–82; and idem, “Britain and Europe in 1948: The View from the Cabinet,” in <italic>Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy, end Germany in a Postwar World, 1945–1950</italic>, ed. Josef Becker and Franz Knipping (New York, 1986), 27–46.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn9"><label>9</label><p>C.P. (48) 249, 2 November 1948, Record Class CAB 129/30, PRO. For Britain's role in the formation of NATO see Nicholas Henderson, <italic>The Birth of NATO</italic> (London 1982). which is in fact a classified contemporary account. Bevin's alleged remark in December 1950 is cited in Geoffrey Warner, “The British Labour Government and the Atlantic Alliance, 1949–1951,” in <italic>Western Security: The Formative Years: European and Atlantic Defence, 1947–1953</italic>, ed. Olav Riste (Oslo, 1985), 263.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn10"><label>10</label><p>D.O. (47) 44, 22 May 1947, printed in Julian Lewis, <italic>Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Postwar Strategic Defence, 1942–1947</italic> (London, 1988), appendix 7. The original is still classified. See also D.O. (50) 5th Meeting, 23 March 1950, CAB 131/8; and D.O. (50) 34, May 1950, cited in <italic>DBPO</italic>, 26 ser. 2, no. 43, fn. 2 (the document is still classified).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn11"><label>11</label><p>C.M. (50) 29, 8 May 1950, <italic>DBPO</italic>, 2d ser. 2, no. 74; Warner, “The British Labour Government and the Atlantic Alliance,” 256–62.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn12"><label>12</label><p>Evelyn Schuckburgh letter, 21 June 1950, <italic>DBPO</italic>, 2d ser. 2, no. 117. See also Dean Acheson, <italic>Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department</italic> (New York, 1969), 323–24.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn13"><label>13</label><p>Kinns minute, 24 April 1950, Ernest Davies MSS (in private possession). Mr. Davies was a parliamentary undersecretary of state for foreign affairs at the time. I am most grateful to him for showing me this document, which has not been published and which I have been unable to locate in the Public Record Office.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn14"><label>14</label><p>Jessup memorandum, 7 December 1950, <italic>FRUS, 1950</italic> (Washington, 1978), 5:1452. See also Gowing, <italic>Independence and Deterrence</italic> 1:308–13.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn15"><label>15</label><p><italic>FRUS, 1951</italic> (Washington, 1979), 1:880–94, 900. See also Gowing, <italic>Independence and Deterrence</italic> 1:315–18.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn16"><label>16</label><p>Paul-Henri Spaak, <italic>Combats Inachevés</italic> [Unfinished struggles] (Paris, 1969), 1:315. For the Labour government's policy toward EDC see Geoffrey Warner, “The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe,” 74–79; for that of the Conservative government see John Young, “German Rearmament and the European Defence Community,” in <italic>The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, 1951–19455</italic>, ed. John Young (Leicester, 1988), 81–107.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn17"><label>17</label><p>Robert H. Ferrell, ed., <italic>The Eisenhower Diaries</italic> (New Yok, 1981), 222–24.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn18"><label>18</label><p>Lloyd letter, 8 August 1959, Record Class FO 800/728, PRO. See also Anthony Eden, <italic>Full Circle</italic> (Landon, 1980), passim; Brian Lapping, <italic>End of Empire</italic> (London, 1985), chap. 4; and C. D. Jackson log, 11 July 1955, <italic>FRUS, 1955–1957</italic> (Washington, 1989), 5:304.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn19"><label>19</label><p>Douglas Dodds-Parker, <italic>Political Eunuch</italic> (Ascot, 1986), 111–12. See also Lloyd memorandum, 30 May 1958, FO 800/728.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn20"><label>20</label><p>Chester Cooper, <italic>The Lion's Last Roar: Suez, 1956</italic> (New York, 1978), 173, 197–200. Cooper was the CIA'S liaison officer with the British.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn21"><label>21</label><p>This question was first explored in David Carlton, <italic>Anthony Eden, A Biography</italic> (London, 1985), 456–65. A fuller account may now be found in W. Scott Lucas, “Suez, the Americans, and the Overthrow of Anthony Eden,”<italic>L.S.E. Quarterly</italic> 1 (September 1987): 227–54.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn22"><label>22</label><p>Millard memorandum, August 1957, Fo 800/728.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn23"><label>23</label><p>Eisenhower letter, 2 November 1956. in <italic>Ike's Letters to a Friend, 1941–1958</italic>, ed. Robert Griffith (Lawrence, 1984), 175; Harold Macmillan, <italic>Riding the Storm, 1958–1959</italic> (London, 1971), 240–41.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn24"><label>24</label><p>Lloyd telegram, 16 October 1957, PREM ll/246, PRO. See also Macmillan telegram, 25 March 1957, FO 371/129330/Zp28.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn25"><label>25</label><p>C.C 78 (57), 28 October 1957, CAB 128/31 (2).</p></fn>
<fn id="fn26"><label>26</label><p>Harold Macmillan, <italic>Pointing the Way, 1959–1961</italic> (London, 1972), 316.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn27"><label>27</label><p>Harold Macmillan, <italic>At the End of the Day, 1961–1963</italic> (London, 1973), 531.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn28"><label>28</label><p>Harold Watkinson, <italic>Turning Point: A Record of Our Times</italic> (Salisbury, 1986), 144-52.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn29"><label>29</label><p>Macmillan, <italic>At the End of the Day</italic>, 335.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn30"><label>30</label><p>Ibid., 555; George Ball, <italic>The Post Has Another Pattern, Memoirs</italic> (New York, 1982). 262–68. See also Macmillan, <italic>At the End of the Day</italic>, 341–44, 355–62, 553–55.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn31"><label>31</label><p>Macmillan, <italic>At the End of the Day</italic>, 367.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn32"><label>32</label><p>Ibid., chap. 7.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn33"><label>33</label><p>Ball, <italic>Post Has Another Pattern</italic>, 266.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn34"><label>34</label><p>Richard Crossman, <italic>The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister</italic>, 3 vols. (London, 1976), 1:95. See also Clive Ponting, <italic>Breach of Promise: Lobour in Power, 1964–1970</italic> (London, 1989), chap. 3.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn35"><label>35</label><p>Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, <italic>Denis Healey and the Politics of Power</italic> (London, 1971), 172–73.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn36"><label>36</label><p>Tony Benn, <italic>Out of the Wilderness: Diaries, 1963–1967</italic> (London, 1988), 449.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn37"><label>37</label><p>Barbars Castle, <italic>The Castle Diaries, 1964–1970</italic> (London, 1984), 178.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn38"><label>38</label><p>Benn, <italic>Out of the Wilderness</italic>, 480–81, 503. See also Crossman, <italic>Diaries of a Cabinet Minister</italic> 2:84.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn39"><label>39</label><p>James Callaghan, <italic>The and Change</italic> (London, 1987), 211–12.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn40"><label>40</label><p>Reed and Williams, <italic>Healey</italic>, 229; Castle, <italic>Castle Diaries</italic>, 354; Ponting, <italic>Breach of Promise</italic>, 59.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn41"><label>41</label><p>Michael Stewart, <italic>Life and Lobour: An Autobiography</italic> (London, 1980), 224–26. See also Joe Haines, <italic>The Politics of Power</italic> (London, 1977), 74–81.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn42"><label>42</label><p>Reed and Williams, <italic>Healey</italic>, 254–58.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn43"><label>43</label><p>Henry Kissinger, <italic>White House Years</italic> (Boston, 1979), 933.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn44"><label>44</label><p>Attlee telegram, 10 December 1950, FO 800/817.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn45"><label>45</label><p>Henry Kissinger, <italic>Years of Upheaval</italic> (Boston, 1982), 709–17; Heath, speech to the House of Commons, 16 April 1986, Parliamentary Debates (House), 6th ser., vol. 95, col. 891; Duncan Campbell, <italic>The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain</italic>, rev. ed. (London. 1986), 345.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn46"><label>46</label><p>Kissinger, <italic>White House Years</italic>, 90: idem, <italic>Years of Upheaval</italic>, 278–85.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn47"><label>47</label><p>Hugo Young, <italic>One of Us</italic> (London, 1985), 249.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn48"><label>48</label><p>Ibid., 541–42.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn49"><label>49</label><p>Dean Gordon, “British Altitudes towards the United States,” in <italic>British Security Policy and the Atlantic Alliance: Prospects for the 1990s</italic>, ed. Martin Holmes et al. (Washington, 1987), 101, 113.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn50"><label>50</label><p>Chris Mullin, <italic>A Very British Coup</italic> (London, 1988), 161.The author is a Labour M.P.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn51"><label>51</label><p>Campbell, <italic>Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier</italic>, 286–96; Duke, <italic>US Defence Bases</italic>, appendix 3.</p></fn>
<fn id="fn52"><label>52</label><p><italic>The Times</italic>, 5 April 1989.</p></fn>
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</article></istex:document></istex:metadataXml><mods version="3.6"><titleInfo><title>The Anglo-American Special Relationship</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="alternative" contentType="CDATA"><title>The Anglo-American Special Relationship</title></titleInfo><name type="personal"><namePart type="given">Geoffrey</namePart><namePart type="family">Warner</namePart><affiliation>GEOFFREY WARNER is professor of European Humanities at the Open University, Milton Keynes, England. A graduate of Cambridge University, he did postgraduate work at the University of Paris and has taught in Australia and at the Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University, as well as in the United Kingdom. Author of Pierre Lava1 and the Eclipse of France (1968), he is currentIy working on a study of the origins and development of the Cold War between 1941 and 1956.</affiliation></name><typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource><genre type="research-article" displayLabel="research-article" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://content-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XTP-1JC4F85T-7">research-article</genre><originInfo><publisher>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><place><placeTerm type="text">Oxford, UK</placeTerm></place><dateIssued encoding="w3cdtf">1989-10</dateIssued><dateCreated encoding="w3cdtf">2007-06-01</dateCreated><copyrightDate encoding="w3cdtf">1989</copyrightDate></originInfo><relatedItem type="host"><titleInfo><title>Diplomatic History</title></titleInfo><titleInfo type="abbreviated"><title>Diplomatic History</title></titleInfo><genre type="journal" authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://publication-type.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/JMC-0GLKJH51-B">journal</genre><identifier type="ISSN">0145-2096</identifier><identifier type="eISSN">1467-7709</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID">dh</identifier><identifier type="PublisherID-hwp">dh</identifier><part><date>1989</date><detail type="volume"><caption>vol.</caption><number>13</number></detail><detail type="issue"><caption>no.</caption><number>4</number></detail><extent unit="pages"><start>479</start><end>499</end></extent></part></relatedItem><identifier type="istex">B90D935AD7BB1F71AAECA2E130E3AA0D84E97657</identifier><identifier type="DOI">10.1111/j.1467-7709.1989.tb00068.x</identifier><accessCondition type="use and reproduction" contentType="copyright">© The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)</accessCondition><recordInfo><recordContentSource authority="ISTEX" authorityURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr" valueURI="https://loaded-corpus.data.istex.fr/ark:/67375/XBH-GTWS0RDP-M">oup</recordContentSource><recordOrigin>© The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)</recordOrigin></recordInfo></mods><json:item><extension>json</extension><original>false</original><mimetype>application/json</mimetype><uri>https://api.istex.fr/document/B90D935AD7BB1F71AAECA2E130E3AA0D84E97657/metadata/json</uri></json:item></metadata><serie></serie></istex></record>Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)
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