AustralieFrV1, Istex, Checkpoint, bibRecord, 000523

Some Empirical Evidence on Offender Time Discount Rates

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Some Empirical Evidence on Offender Time Discount Rates

Auteurs : Andrew Torre ; Darren Wraith [France]

Source :

Economic Papers: A journal of applied economics and policy [ 0812-0439 ] ; 2012-06.

RBID : ISTEX:A7C1A94CCCA8CF0E342F8293F1488AAA018F9CED

Descripteurs français

Wicri :
- topic : Taux d'escompte, Escompte, Infraction.

English descriptors

Abstract

The conventional wisdom is that offenders have very high discount rates not only with respect to income and fines but also with respect to time incarcerated. These rates are difficult to measure objectively and the usual approach is to ask subjects hypothetical questions and infer time preference from their answers. In this article, we propose estimating rates at which offenders discount time incarcerated by specifying their equilibrium plea, defined as the discount rate, which equates the time and expected time spent in jail following a guilty plea and a trial. Offenders are assumed to exhibit positive time preference and discount time spent in jail at a constant rate. Our choice of sample is interesting because the offenders are not on bail, punishment is not delayed and the offences are planned therefore conforming to Becker’s model of the decision to commit a crime. Contrary to the discussion in the literature, we do not find evidence of consistently high time discount rates, and therefore cannot unequivocally infer that the prison experience always results in low levels of specific deterrence.

Url:

https://api.istex.fr/document/A7C1A94CCCA8CF0E342F8293F1488AAA018F9CED/fulltext/pdf

DOI: 10.1111/j.1759-3441.2011.00152.x

Affiliations:

France

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Le document en format XML

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<term>Prison sentences</term>
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<term>Sentence length</term>
<term>Sentence lengths</term>
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<front><div type="abstract" xml:lang="en">The conventional wisdom is that offenders have very high discount rates not only with respect to income and fines but also with respect to time incarcerated. These rates are difficult to measure objectively and the usual approach is to ask subjects hypothetical questions and infer time preference from their answers. In this article, we propose estimating rates at which offenders discount time incarcerated by specifying their equilibrium plea, defined as the discount rate, which equates the time and expected time spent in jail following a guilty plea and a trial. Offenders are assumed to exhibit positive time preference and discount time spent in jail at a constant rate. Our choice of sample is interesting because the offenders are not on bail, punishment is not delayed and the offences are planned therefore conforming to Becker’s model of the decision to commit a crime. Contrary to the discussion in the literature, we do not find evidence of consistently high time discount rates, and therefore cannot unequivocally infer that the prison experience always results in low levels of specific deterrence.</div>
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Some Empirical Evidence on Offender Time Discount Rates

Some Empirical Evidence on Offender Time Discount Rates

Source :

Descripteurs français

English descriptors

Abstract

Links toward previous steps (curation, corpus...)

Links to Exploration step

Le document en format XML

Pour manipuler ce document sous Unix (Dilib)

Pour mettre un lien sur cette page dans le réseau Wicri